Cuba's struggle against Spain with the causes of American intervention and a full account of the Spanish-American war : including final peace negotiations

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^7 3^

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Cuba's Struggle
Against Spain

WITH THE

Causes for American Interyention and a Full Account

of the Spanish-American War, including

Final Peace Negotiations

By FITZHUGH LEE,
Maj. Gen. U. S. V. ; late Consul General to Cuba, and

JOSEPH WHEELER, Maj. Gen. U. S. V.

With a Story ot Santiago

By governor THEODORE ROOSEVELT, of New York,
LATE Colonel of the Rough Riders

A Description of the Destruction of the ''Maine,'

By commander RICHARD WAINWRIGHT, U. S. N.,
Executive Officer of the '' Maine" and Commander of the " Gloucester"

/ /335C

NLW YORK

THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL PRESS

1639

^

Copyrighted, 1899,

BY

THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL PRESS.
4^11 rights reserved.

» «

« « « t • «
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•. ;>?•'

ILLUSTRATIONS.

' PAGE.

General Fitzhugh Lee, 15

MoRRo Castle, 25

Havana Harbor, 26

Queen Regent Christina and her son, King Alfonso XIII, . . .35

American Consulate, Havana, 36

The Prado — Principal Street in Havana, 45

The Church where Columbus was Buried, 46

Shooting Captured Insurgents, 55

The Famous Filibuster " Dauntless," 56

Prison of Evangelina Cisneros, 65

Entrance to Harbor of Havana — Punta Park, 66

A Bullfight, 75

A Cockfight, . . 76

Governor-General's House, Havana, 85

Maximo Gomez — General-in-Chief of the Cuban Army of Lib-
eration, 86

General Valo. Weyler, 95

Major-General Joseph Wheeler, 96

Governor-General's Palace, Havana, 105

Havana Market, 106

Cuban Forces Sustaining an Attack, 115

Church Converted into Spanish Hospital, 116

On the Trocha, 125

Building a Trocha, 126

4

ILLUSTRATIONS.

PAGE

The United States Battleship " Maine," i35

Captain C. D. Sigsbee, 136

Insurgent Hospital I45

Spanish Hospital 146

Insurgents in Cave Region in Caiguanabo County, . . . .155
Paying the Penalty of Rebellion against Spanish Misrule, . . 156

Colonel Joaquin Ruiz (in Fireman's Uniform), 165

Committee Appointed to Investigate the Ruiz Murder, . . . 166

Cuban Scene, i75

A Spanish Victim Rescued too Late, 176

Cuban Insurgents Fighting the Spaniards in the Open, . . . 185

Spanish Guerrillas, 186

The Marine Guards of the " Maine " at Drill, 195

Revolver Practice on the " Maine," 196

Group Photographed after Breakfast of Officers of the " Maine,"

AT Havana Yacht Club, January 30, 1898, 205

The Crew of the " Maine," Most of whom were Lost, .... 206

Cuban Wounded en route to the Hospital, 215

De«smays, the Cuban Balaklava, 216

" Maine " Coal Passers, whose Quarters were Blown Up, . . . 225

Single-stick Exercise on the " Maine," 226

Admiral Dewey, 243

Battle of Manila, 244

After the Action , 261

BiRDSEYE View of Manila and Environs, 262

Captain-General Blanco, 279

Closing in on Havana, 280

Admiral Sampson, 297

The Spanish Fleet, 298

Capt. " Bob " Evans, 315

View of Morro Castle, Santiago de Cuba, as Seen on Entering the

Harbor, 3j5

On the Firing Line, 333

Captain Chadwick, ^^^

Santiago Refugees at El Caney, 051

ILLUSTRATIONS. 5

PAGE.

Where the Troops Landed, 352

Maceo, 369

Spanish Column at Parade Rest, 370

An Insurgent Camp, 387

A Favorite Havana Cafe, 388

A Group of Red Cross Sisters, 405

A Spanish Officer, 406

A Scene in Eastern Cuba, 423

Los Fosos, 424

Map of the Port of Guantanamo on the South Coast of Cuba, . . 441

Spanish Fort and Signal Tower, 442

Company of Spanish Soldiers Firing, 459

View of Santiago de Cuba from the Harbor, 460

Secretary of the Navy Long, 477

A Part of the Red Cross Corps, 478

A Typical Cuban Camp, 495

A Soldier Funeral, 496

The Pier at Baquiri, 513

Mortar Batteries for Harbor Defense, 514

A Havana Vegetable Seller, 531

Transporting Sugar Cane, 532

Major-General N. B. Miles, 549

Prepared to Ram the Enemy, 567

Citizens of Jaruco Presenting a Memorial for the Victims of the

' Maine," . 568

Secretary Alger, 585

Convoy Crossing Hilly Country — Cuba, 603

Little Convalescents in Hospital, 604

Lieutenant-Commander Richard Wainwright, 621

Destruction of the Battleship " Maine," 622

Colonel Theodore Roosevelt, 639

Wreck of the Battleship " Maine," Havana Harbor, .... 640

Handling the Disappearing Guns, 657

In the Trenches Before Santiago Just Before Surrender, . , . 658

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER I.

DISCOVERY AND SETTLEMENT.

PAGE

Columbus in America — The Most Beautiful Land Ever Seen — A Dream
of the Land of Gold — Character of the Natives — Seeking the Great
Kahn — Tobacco — Colonizing the Island — Founding Havana —
Naming the Island — Slavery and Slaughter — Las Casas and His
Work — Negro Slavery Introduced — Final Extermination of the
Natives i?

CHAPTER 11.

THE CUBA OF TO-DAY.

Size, Shape and Situation of the Island — Its Rivers and Harbors — Vege-
tation and Climate — Agricultural Products — Mineral Resources —
Something about the People — The Negro Population — Religion and
Education — The Spanish Government a Military Despotism — Re-
volting Tyranny 67

CHAPTER III.

CUBA, I492-180O.

The " Queen of the Antilles " — Velasquez Explores the Island — De-
generacy of the Whites — Incursions of Privateers — Havana Captured
by the English — The Golden Age of Cuba 94

CHAPTER IV.

CUBA, 1 800-1 868.

Cuba's Loyalty to Spanish Throne — A Liberal Constitution Granted in
1812 — Ferdinand VII Destroys Cuban Hopes — Constitution of 1836
— Cuban Deputies in the Spanish Cortes — Captain-General Tacon's
High-Handed Despotism — Treatment of Negro Slaves — Administra-
tion of General Valdez — Filibustering Expedition cf General Lopez, 107

8 CONTENTS.

CHAPTER V.

THE TEN years' WAR. p^^^^

Commencement of the Revolution of 1868 — Inhumanity of Captain-Gen-
eral Valmaseda — The " Virginius " Affair — Treaty of Zanjon — The
"Little War " — Financial Depression of 1889-1892 — Reform Bill of
1894 ^ ^ ^

CHAPTER VI.

THE REBELLION OF 1895.

Manuel Garcia — Cuban Autonomists on Side of Spain — Antonio and
Jose Maceo — Landing of Gomez and Marti — Death of Marti —
Gomez Invades Puerto Principe — Marquis of Santa Lucia Elected
President — Recall of Campos — Arrival of General Weyler — An
End of Civilized Warfare — Reform Decrees — Extreme Cruelty of
General Weyler — Marshal Blanco Succeeds Weyler — Colonel Ruiz
Shot as a Spy — The "Maine" Arrives at Havana — The Explosion, 122

CHAPTER VII.

RELATIONS OF CUBA AND THE UNITED STATES IN THE PAST.

Cuba the " Guardian of the Gates of the American Mediterranean " — Ef-
forts of American Administrations to Preserve Neutrality — Seizure
of the Black Warrior — The " Ostend Manifesto" — President Bu-
chanan's Message — Ofificial Correspondence on " Virginius " Affair
— President Cleveland's Messages — American Charity Relieves Suf-
fering — President McKinley's Message 139

CHAPTER VIII.

JANUARY I TO MAY I, 1898.

Anti-American Feeling in Havana — Congress Appropriates $50,000,000 for
National Defense — American Fleet at Key West — Official Report
of Court of Inquiry Concerning the "Maine" Disaster — Relieving
the " Reconcentrados " — President's Message of April 11, 1898 —
Why America Should Intervene to Stop the War — General Lee
Leaves Havana — Congress Directs the President to Intervene — Span-
ish Minister at Washington Receives His Passports — Fleet Blockades
Havana — Call for 125,000 Volunteers — European and South Ameri-
can Powers Declare Neutrality — Organization of the Army 189

CONTENTS. 9

CHAPTER IX.

THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY.

PAGE

Dewey at Manila — Official Reports of Battle of Manila Bay — Spanish
Reports — Admiral Cervera Sails from Cape Verde — Sampson At-
tacks S.an Juan in Porto Rico — Cutting Cables — Cervera Reaches
Santiago — Hobson :Rnd the '' Merrimac " — Landing of Invading
Force — Destruction of Cervera's Fleet — Bombardment of Santiago
— Spanish Ships in Manzanillo Flarbor Destroyed — Official Reports —
A Spanish Account of the Battle of Santiago — Sortie of the Fleet —
Causes of the Spanish Loss — A German View of the Situation 236

CHAPTER X.

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.

The Embarkation — Official Correspondence — Plans of General Miles — •
Las Guasimas — Officers who Participated in the Battle — Forces En-
gaged — El Caney — San Juan — Officers of the Cavalry Division
Killed and Wounded in the Battle of San Juan — List of Officers
Taking Part in the Battle of Santiago de Cuba, July i, 2 and 3, 1898 —
Name of Regimental Commanders and Roster of Regiments and
Other Organizations Composing Fifth Army Corps in Battle of
Santiago de Cuba — Officers Distinguished in the Santiago Campaign, 338

CHAPTER XL

PORTO RICO CAMPAIGN.

General Miles Embarks — Landing of Troops at Arroyo — March towards
Cayey — General Schwan's Movements — Attack on Spanish Position
at Asomanti — Suspension of Hostilities — Description of Porto
Rico 556

CHAPTER XII.

THE CAMP AT MONTAUK POINT.

Conception of the Plan of the Camp — Sailing of the Transports — Donors

of Supplies — General Wheeler's Report 564

CHAPTER XIII.

THE TREATY OF PEACE.

The French Minister Presents a Letter from the Spanish Government —
Reply of the Secretary of State — The Protocol — The Commissioners
Arrange for the Evacuation of Cuba and Porto Rico — The Peace
Commissioners — Meeting in Paris — The Treaty 583

lO CONTENTS.

CHAPTER XIV.

CUBA AS IT IS TO-DAY.

PAGE.

Its Extent — Fertility — Its Harbors and Water Courses — Its Mineral
Wealth — Its Flora — The Black Cubans — Importance of its Sugar
and Tobacco Products 608

CHAPTER XV.

THE DESTRUCTION OF THE MAINE.

Arrival in Havana — The Officers — Official Visits — The Explosion —
Rescue of Survivors — Description of the Wreck — Diving Opera-
tions — The Decision of the Court of Inquiry 623

CHAPTER XVI.

THE FIFTH CORPS AT SANTIAGO.

Unpreparedness of the Army — The Responsibility — The Hurried De-
parture from Tampa — Overcrowded Transports — Poor Food —
Landing at Daiquiri — Advance on Las Guasimas — El Caney — San
y Juan 636

john d. long,

secretary.

Navy Department,

Washington.

The American sailor is worthy of the name. He has maintained
the higli prestige of the men who, during the Revolution and the War
of i8i2 and the Civil war, won for the American navy historic renown.
He is intelligent, patriotic, and animated by the spirit of the RepubHc.
It is the universal testimony of naval officers that there were never
better crews. The Navy is proud of the American seaman and marine.
Nothing could be finer than the tribute with which Captain Evans
closes his report of the part taken by the navy in the naval battle off
Santiago :

'' I cannot express my admiration for my magnificent crew. So
long as the enemy showed its flag, they fought like American seamen;
but when the flag came down they were as gentle and tender as
American women."

Secretary of Navy.

War Department,

Washington.

The American Soldier needs no tribute from me. Nothing that
I might say would add to the glory of his name. The campaign of
Santiago adds a new and illustrious page to the history of his match-
less valor and indomitable spirit, for that was achieved by irresistible
courage.

In spite of hardships never before experienced by our army,^ and
notvvithstanding that the American forces were confronted by an
enemy of great courage and of greater numbers, intrenched in a posi-
tion that seemed madness to assault, the American army — the
American soldier — by individual bravery won a victory equal to any
in the history of battles.

Manilla and Porto Rico would have witnessed like deeds of daring
had opportunities been given.

The American soldier is a patriot — and in the broadest sense —
a man.

Secretary of War,

MAJOR-GENERAL FITZHUGH LEE.

CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.

By FiTZHUGH Lee, Major-General, U. S. V.

CHAPTER L

DISCOVERY AND SETTLEMENT.

Columbus in Cuba— The Most Beautiful Land Ever Seen— A Dream of the
Land of Gold— Character of the Natives— Seeking the Great Kahn—
Tobacco — A Heathen's Exhortation — Colonizing the Island — Founding
Havana — Naming the Island — Slavery and Slaughter — Las Casas and His
Work — Negro Slavery Introduced — Final Extermination of the Natives,

It has been well said that Spain has been ruined by her colonies.
Up to the reign of Charles V. the Spanish were distinguished for
energy and audacity. The confines of the sea, and the great chain of
the Pyrenees, which had given it strength and individuality before the
struggle with the Moors, could confine no longer Spanish ambition.
Spain started out, therefore, to plant her banners, upon which was
inscribed the fierce motto " Conquer or die! " upon new worlds; and,
had she governed wisely and well the territories annexed to the home
government by her seamen and soldiers, she would to-day have been
in the front line of the great Powers of the globe. Consultation, or
compromise with, or affection for her new subjects never had place in
a colonial policy which resembled the Bourbon Government's, that
Gladstone characterized as "' The negation of God erected into a
system." Had the Spanish pioneers who first seized and occupied the
many countries which originally they took possession of organized a
progressive, humane, and enlightened government, allowing the
natives to regulate their own domestic affairs, so that her colonial
possessions would have occupied in reference to the home govern-
ment a position similar to the American States to their central gov-
ernment, or had they been given a liberal and enlightened form of
government, — such as we find possessed by the colonies of the first-
class Powers, — what a magnificent position Spain would have occu-
pied in the history of the world, and what a splendid record the Spanish
people would have made for themselves! They have done jtist the

17

l8 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.

reverse. Spain has always considered that she owned the countries of
which her sailors and soldiers had taken possession, just as if they were
purchased estates, and that it was her duty to get as much as possible
out of them with as little return. Very soon she began to depend
upon the metals, mines, and resources of her allied possessions, rather
than the development of her own resources at home, and to-day her
statesmen, as a result of such policy, are witnessing the golden stream
of her colonial gleanings running dry, but ready to burst forth again
to cheer the hearts of a foreign people and fill the coffers of new
governments.

The people wiio have for so long contributed to the profits of
Spain have at last resented the loss of economic strength and
have *insisted upon using their revenues for their own advan-
tage. The inhabitants, whether direct or colonial descendants of the
Spanish or Indians, negroes, Creoles, or half-castes, have always been
regarded not only as inferiors, but with a certain degree of hate, which
has alienated them from Spain, until they are ready in every case to
take, if necessary, a complete revenge and be driven to fight for inde-
pendence or a change of Flag, that they might have some voice in
shaping their own destinies, and be permitted to organize a govern-
ment which would be under no obligation to pay a tribute to the
purse of Spain, and whose people could hold profitable appointments
in their midst, and not have all offices filled by appointments from
the Madrid Government.

So far as the United States is concerned, it can be safely asserted
that had Spain given a just, legal, peaceful, and humane government
to her colonies lying near the borders of the American Republic, so as
to insure the lives and property of American citizens who had found
homes in her rich possessions, and which would have preserved unin-
terruptedly life, liberty, and property, and proper exchange of com-
mercial relations, there would have been no desire on her part to see
the Spanish flag replaced either by the independent flag of Cuba or
the '' Star-Spangled Banner," but, on the contrary, she w^ould have
continued her policy of assisting Spain, if necessary, to resist any
attempt upon the part of other Powers to seize and hold her colonial
territory.

The continent of which Spain of the fifteenth century was capable
of grasping is dissolving because Spain of the nineteenth century is
incapable of retaining it, and we can almost see the spirit of Columbus
and hear the clanking of his handcuffs in the forefront of the most

DISCOVERY AND SETTLEMENT. I9

dramatic picture in all history. The flag which has floated unchal-
lenged over thousands of square miles for three centuries, before the
print of the white man's foot was ever placed upon them, and com-
pared to which the British Empire of to-day, and the Roman Empire
at the height of its glory, was far inferior, is about to be lowered before
the march of modern civilization.

The colonization of the North American continent and its re-
sults, contrasted with the colonization of new lands by Spanish ex-
plorers, is a most striking and impressive lesson. In one case, though
wars took place between the early North American settlers and the
Indians found in possession of the lands, it must be remembered that
the latter were the aggressors and that every effort was made by the
forefathers of the people of the United States to preserve peace, to be
friends with the natives, and, if possible, avoid armed conflicts. Had
these early Spanish settlers pursued the same tactics, at this hour
Spain would have probably been abreast with that great Republic in all
that constitutes the glory of a nation, and been living in peace and
amity with her own colonies and with the United States. No colonial
revolutions would have marked her triumphal progress, no smoking
villages and bloody paths would have been a part of her record, and
no blush would have crimsoned the face of her National Glory.

Christopher Columbus as a discoverer was a great success. He
gave more than any man who ever lived to a country of which he
was not a native. The world is familiar with his history and his
voyages. In his diary, under date of October 28, 1492, he wrote,
*' This is the most beautiful land ever beheld by human eyes." On
that day he had discovered the island of Cuba. It is true that sixteen
days before he had landed upon another and smaller island, and had
been sailing for a number of days among a group of such islands, ad-
miring their semi-tropical luxuriousness and their strange new beauty.
*' I know not," he said, "where first to go! Never could my eyes
weary of gazing upon the beautiful verdure. The song of the birds
is so sweet that one might desire never to go hence. There are trees
of a thousand species, each having its particular fruit, and all of exqui-
site flavor." But Columbus was not looking for islands; he was in
quest of the Asiatic continent, the fabled Cipango, the East Indian
land of gold where Kublai Khan ruled, and of which Marco Polo had
written. After leaving the lesser islands he thought the goal of his
ambition had been reached, when he came to a place surpassing all
others in beauty, and apparently a continent in size. The natives

20 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.

told him it was rich in gold and sparkling with gems, and when he
saw its blue mountains, green plains, and the beautiful tropical sky,
he was convinced the object of his voyage had been accomplished. It
was then an earthly paradise; to-day, after more than four hundred
vears, cruelty, oppression, bloodshed, famine, and war are encamped
throughout " this most beautiful land."

Cuba is the largest and the westernmost of the four islands known
ds the '' Great Antilles," which differ from most other tropical lands
in possessing unique features so as to belong to a class to themselves,
and is due to certain peculiarities of configuration and soil formations
possessing unusual productiveness.

Columbus first landed at the north coast, at or near what is now
known as Nuevitas del Principe in the province of Del Principe. This
town of seven thousand people is the seaport now of Puerto Principe,
the largest inland city in Cuba, with which it is connected by a rail-
road forty-five miles long, and with other Cuban ports by steamship
lines. Its splendid harbor, nearly circular and the second in size in
Cuba, must have presented a most inviting appearance to Columbus
on that October day 406 years ago. He became more and more en-
chanted with the charming outlook, and with the people, who seemed
to be gentle, hospitable, and intelligent, and who, being interested in
him, gave him information and aid.

Among other things he noticed that the natives had a habit of roll-
ing up the leaves of a certain plant, setting fire to them, and inhaling
the smoke. The natives called it tobacco. Several of his men tried
it, found it grateful, and adopted the practice; and in this way, it is said,
the smoking of tobacco was first made known to the civilized world.

Columbus still thought he had found a continent, and on his second
voyage reached what is now called Cape Maisi, the most eastern ex-
tremity of the island. He then sailed along the southern coast for
some distance, in consequence of the natives telling him that a land
of gold lay further on — they probably meant South America. On
this voyage he found the island of Jamaica. If he had sailed west
along the Cuban southern coast three or four days longer he w^ould
have reached the western end of the island, and then have learned that
he had not discovered a continent, but an island. This great dis-
coverer made a third and last visit to Cuba at the end of May, 1503,
but he never knew the real nature of the land he had found, and
always supposed it to be the mainland of a continent.

The first attempt at colonization in Cuba was made by his son

DISCOVERY AND SETTLEMENT. 21

Diego, in 151 1. He sent an expedition there of 300 men, led by
Diego Velasquez, who had been with his father on his second voyage.
A landing was made, and a town was commenced at Baracoa, and
two or three years later Trinidad and Santiago de Cuba were founded.
Batabano, as it is called, now directly opposite Havana on the south-
ern coast, was next settled, and called San Cristobal de la Hal^ana.

In 1 5 19 the name of the settlement was transferred to the loca-
tion now known as Havana, which was then founded and afterward
became the capital of the island, the original name being Puerto de
Cabaiias. At Batabano Cortez prepared his expedition for the con-
quest of Mexico, sailing for that place in February, 15 19. After-
ward those who remained at Batabano removed to Cabanas, giving
it the name of Havana. Upon their arrival they celebrated a Mass
under a great ceiba tree, the site of which is tO' this day marked with
a large stone column and a small temple at the east side of the Plaza de
Armas. The island was first called Juana, in honor of Prince Juan,
the son of F'erdinand and Isabella. After the death of Ferdinand it
was renamed Fernandino, and later called Santiago after the patron
saint of Spain; later still it was called Ave Maria, in honor of the Holy
Virgin. The natives had, however, from time immemorial called it
Cuba, and Cuba it remains to this day.

Valesquez began the settlement of the island in characteristic
fashion. Instead of m.aking friends of the natives he treated them as
enemies marked for destruction. Those who gave themselves up as
his slaves he spared from death, and used them as beasts of burden;
all those who resisted he massacred, frequently with tortures.

Hatuey, who had been a celebrated chief in San Domingo, but fled
from that island to escape the Spanish, organized an army, and for a
time led his men against his enemies, even at fearful odds. After-
ward he was captured, doomed to be burned at the stake, and bravely
met his fate. Before the fire was kindled he was approached by a
priest, who began to exhort him to believe in Christ in order that his
soul might be taken to heaven. Hatuey interrupted him with the
inquiry, '' Where do the souls of the Spanish go? " The priest replied,
*' To heaven." " Then," said Hatuey, '' I prefer to go to hell."

Bartholomew Las Casas, the famous apostle of the Indies, accom-
panied Velasquez. He first tried to mitigate the horrors of the Span-
ish conquest, but ultimately acquiesced in the brutalities of the
conquerors.

It would have been well indeed for Cuba to have remained in the

22 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.

hands of the English after the capture of Havana in 1762. The res-
toration to Spain under the treaty of 1763 was simply a reversement
to Spanish control, which meant a reversion to the old state of things.
Cuban ports were closed to foreign ships and the commerce of the
island limited to Spain, and within these legislative Chinese walls
people were born who grew up in dense ignorance.

Eighty-five years ago Spain practically awakened to the fact that
she had not been exercising a wise and liberal government over her
dominions outside of her own borders, for the spirit of revolution had
become so frequent in Spanish America that a more generous policy
was at last determined upon for Cuba; so the ports of the island were
thrown w^ider open to general commerce, and a decree was issued
doing away with the monopoly on tobacco, which had a very mar-
velous efifect on its growth. Sugar, too, experienced prosperity from
this policy, so that four times as much was exported of these products
as before. If the same liberality had been shown in the political gov-
ernment of Cuba, to-day's history of that island might have been very
different, and the breach promptly healed between those citizens who
were born in Spain, and who were called in Cuba *' Peninsulars," and
those who were born in Cuba, termed ''Insulars"; and there would
have been no record on the pages of history of the many attempts at
rebellion in the island.

There was no attempt ever made to give it its own government, but
the Captain Generals were sent from Madrid, who exercised despotic
power. And to increase the antagonism springing up between these
two classes, smoldering political fires were ever present, and at stated
intervals broke out into rebellious flames.

Havana, the principal city of '' The Ever-faithful Isle " (as it will
no longer be called), has many interesting incidents in its early history.

Away back in 1538 French pirates burned the town and destroyed
the inhabitants. Santiago' de Cuba, which has lately become so promi-
nent to the public mind, was then the capital.

Ill 1555 we find Havana was again destroyed, this time by a French
corsair, De Sores, who landed at San Laraza and destroyed the city by
fire, killing many of its inhabitants. It was in consequence of these
hostile raids that the idea obtained a footing to give to the city per-
manent fortifications, so as to make it more secure from attacks by sea.
The construction of Morro Castle was commenced as far back as 1589,
the work on which occupied eight years. It did not, however, prevent
the siege and capture of Havana by the English in 1762.

DISCOVERY AND SETTLEMENT. 23

An expedition under Lord Albemarle sailed from Spithead, Eng-
land, March 5th of that year. The expeditionary forces were rendez-
voused in Martinique, and sailed from that point on the 27th of May
through the old Bahama passage on the north side of Cuba.

There were 200 vessels of all classes which passed the bay of Ma-
tanzas on the 5th of June, and the next day began to debark fifteen
miles east of Havana.

While the troops were landing, the admiral, with 13 ships of the line,
2 frigates, and 36 small boats made a feint attack at the mouth of Ha-
vana harbor. At that time 12 Spanish ships of the line were laying
inside of the harbor, besides a number of smaller vessels. The Span-
iards were taken by surprise at the unexpected appearance of the Eng-
lish, who had 9000 seamen and marines, 1400 militia of all colors, 3500
infantry, 300 artillery, 810 cavalry, making a force of 27,610 men.

These troops were finally landed about six miles east of Morro
Castle. Most of the Spanish force was stationed in Guanabacoa, on
the bay opposite Havana, for the purpose of resisting any attempt of
the English to march around the city and take it from the south
side.

Albemarle went straight at the Cabafias Fortress, carried it, and
drove the Spaniards into the Morro, a feint being made by the English
admiral at the same time west of the mouth of Havana harbor. The
naval and military forces, which seem to have been in complete har-
mony, co-operated with each other.

Batteries were then planted by the English on this neck of land for
the purpose of reducing the Morro, as it was easily seen that after the
capture of that stragetic point the city would be at the mercy of the
English land guns as well as the guns of the fleet. The English had
thirty-four guns including the mortars and howitzers, and the Span-
iards even a greater number; but the firing of the English was more
effective.

On the 1st of July, twenty-three days after landing, the English guns
opened on the Morro; at the same time three of their ships of the line
cannonaded it on the sea front. There had been no rain falling for two
weeks, and the troops were suffering much from extreme heat. The
English army was reduced to one-half of its effective force, but on the
I2th of July re-enforcements were received from Jamaica. The Span-
iards made a brave defense, in spite of the fact that sapping and min-
ing operations were gradually bringing the English close to their walls.
At one time the Spanish troops were carried across the harbor, and

24 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.

the attempt made to assault the EngHsh near the Morro, but they were
repulsed and beaten back.

About this time a ship arrived from New York with the first division
of troops from the English-American colonies. On the 29th of June
the British mine was exploded, and a breach made large enough for
the assaulting party to march into, which they did with great dash and

courage.

The Spanish commander of the Morro was a naval officer named
Don Luis de Valesco. A desperate resistance was made, Valesco
falling mortally wounded. He was shown every mark of respect on
the part of his British captors during the short time that he lived.
After his death his son was made commander of the Morro by His
Spanish Majesty, and it was ordered that there should always be a ship
named Valesco.

The Spanish lost about 130 killed; 400 laid down their arms; and
the remainder, it is said, were drowned in attempting to escape the
city.

The Marquis de Gonzales, second in command of the Morro, was
also killed. The English only lost 2 officers and 30 men.

There is no question of the bravery of the Spanish defenders of the
Morro. When Valesco was requested by Albemarle to surrender the
fortress, he declined, deciding to abide the fate of arms.

The capture of the Morro was the beginning of the end, and on the
loth of August Albemarle sent a demand to the Governor of the city
of Havana to capitulate. The bearer of his flag of truce was kept from
sunrise to four in the afternoon, and then sent back without an answer.
The next day forty-five English guns opened upon the city. The
Spanish batteries at the Punta were soon silenced, and at two that
afternoon the Spaniards sent a committee to propose a capitulation to
Albemarle, and arrangements were made, and by the 14th the Eng-
lish had entered and hoisted the British flag over the city of Havana.

The total loss by the English amounted in all to 1799. These facts
are interesting, as recent operations by the American Army at Santiago
de Cuba show similar soldierly traits in the Spaniards of to-day. The
idea then and now seemed to prevail that it is necessary, however grave
the situation and certainty of results, to fight desperately for a time for
what they are always calling " The honor of Spain."

It will be remembered that France, Austria, and Russia were at
war against Great Britain and Prussia; Spain added her arms to
those of the former, and, as a result, the English captured Havana.

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DISCOVERY AND SETTLEMENT. 2/

It was restored to Spain by the treaty of 1763, in exchange for
Florida, which, in another treaty ten years later, was restored to Spain.
Had the island remained in England's possession the interests of civili-
zation and good government in Cuba would have made of that island a
very different country.

As soon as the British left, the construction of the present Cabanas
fortress began, and the defenses of the harbor were thus greatly
strengthened. This work was completed in 1841, at a cost of fourteen
million dollars. Fort Atares and the Castillo del Principe were also
constructed about the same time. Hundreds of slaves and convicts
were brought to Havana to work on these forts; and, being brought
over in foul ships, packed closely with no regard to health or cleanli-
ness, a terrible pestilence broke out among them never before known.
It proved most contagious, and soon became a permanent epidemic at
Havana and other coast towns, and gave to the world, it is said, the
dreadful scourge now called yellow fever.

In the latter part of the eighteenth century many handsome public
buildings were erected in Havana, including the Palace, which has
been occupied ever since by the Captain Generals. Fine parks and
boulevards were also constructed, and the whole place gi;^eatly im-
proved and adorned.

Las Casas, so well known in the early history of Cuba, first began
to work for the abolition of native slavery. He returned to Spdin and
appealed to his Government, with the result that a commission was
sent from Spain to investigate the condition of the natives, and effect
such a reform as might be desirable, with Las Casas at the head of the
Commission with the title of " Protector of the Indians."

His associates on the commission, it seems, were indifferent at that
day, just as the Spaniards of the present day have been, to reform, so
nothing practically was accomplished. Las Casas then conceived the
idea of abolishing slavery of the Indians by substituting negro slavery,
and proposed a system of emigration from Spain under which each
Spanish settler in Cuba should have the privilege of taking there twelve
negro slaves from Africa; but it was a hopeless failure, because the
Spaniards demanded that the Indians should purchase their freedom
with gold-dust, which was impossible because the Indians did not have
the gold-dust.

The slight physique of these Indians rapidly succumbed to ill treat-
ment, and those who sought to escape from slavery were hunted down
with bloodhounds and were worried, and torn to death in some in-

28 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.

Stances, by the dogs. In about half a century the population was
exterminated.

Early testimony, including that of Columbus, will show that these
natives were affectionate, tractable, and peaceable. " The Discov-
erer " says of those he found in Hayti, who were of the same race and
habits as the natives of Cuba, that there was not a better race of men
in the world. '' They love their neighbors as themselves, their conver-
sation is the sweetest and mildest in the world, and always accom-
panied with a smile. And although it is true that they go naked, yet
Your Highnesses may be assured that they have commendable cus-
toms ; the king is served with great state, and his behavior is so decent
that it is pleasant to see him, as it is likewise the wonderful memory
which these people have, and their desire of knowing everything, which
leads them to inquire into its causes and effects."

As long as Isabella lived it is said the Indians found a protector, but
'' her death," says the venerable Las Casas, '' was the signal for their
destruction." So much so that it has also been said that " Every step
of the white man's progress in the New World may be said to have
been on the corpse of a native." It will thus be seen that the Span-
iards did not begin their early settlements in Cuba in the true Christian
spirit. A writer has said that '* Their behavior to the Indians, and, in-
deed, to those who afterward became in their term ' The Natives,'
brought down the retribution of Heaven, which has seen fit to turn this
fountain of inexaustible wealth and prosperity to the nation into the
waters of bitterness."

Irving, in his history of Columbus, gives a weird picture of Span-
ish treatment of slaves, in which is pictured the suffering of these poor
people under their conquerors.

Much labor and little food was given them ; and if they fled from in-
cessant toil and insufficient nourishment, and took refuge in the moun-
tains, they were hunted out and scourged, and laden with chains to
prevent a second escape. Las Casas says he found many dead in the
road, and others, gasping under the trees in the pangs of death, faintly
crying "Hunger! Hunger!" ''The toils and sufferings," says Las
Casas, " of this weak and unoffending race dissolved them, as it were,
from the face of the earth. Even mothers forgot the powerful instincts
of nature, and destroyed the infants at their breasts to spare them a life
of wretchedness." This history has repeated itself in many cases
among that portion of the present natives of Cuba styled " Reconcen-
trados."

113326

DISCOVERY AND SETTLEMENT. 29

MacKenzie charges ten million victims to inhumanity, against the
Sp :nish conquerors. Vasco Nunez wrote that on one expedition he
had hanged thirty chiefs, and would hang as many as he could seize,
because, he says, the Spaniards were so few in proportion to the
natives that there was no other means of securing their safety. '' The
native orphans," wrote a merciful Spaniard, '' are as numerous as the
stars of the heavens and the sands of the sea." And yet the conquer-
ors often slew the children and parents together.

When Columbus first beheld the splendid beauty and luxuiiant land-
scape and received the hospitality of the gentle and docile inhabitants
of Cuba, that island contained a population of one million souls; about
fifteen years afterward the number of inhabitants did not amount to
over sixty thousand. It is doubtful v/hether human history has ever
recorded more blood causelessly and wantonly shed than in the de-
struction of the native population of Cuba by the Spaniards. The
genial climate and rich soil of Cuba naturally attracted many colo-
nists from Spain, and rapid advance was made in settlement and pros-
perity. Towns were founded, and the island became the center of
commerce for the Western Hemisphere. In spite of this fact, the
adventurous newcomers were actuated by a desire for new conquest
and the attainment of wealth by quicker methods than those of agri-
culture and grazing.

It was Diego Velasquez who conceived and proposed the conquest
of Mexico and Florida, although the work was done and the fame
enjoyed by Cortez and De Soto. The expeditions led by these two
adventurers took from Cuba many of its most enterprising settlers.
Then came the conquest of Peru by Pizarro, and many were attracted
there because there was no gold or silver in Cuba; indeed, a Cuban
official declared that, with the news from Peru, Cuba was threatened
with depopulation. So the island fell into a state of lethargy and
neglect, and became a sort of way-station between Spain and Mexico;
and for a century and a half it had little history of any kind. The
colonists merely devoted themselves to fruit-growing and cattle-
raising.

There being no gold or silver on the island prevented raids from
buccaneers, so that it escaped the attacks which were made upon
Hayti and the cities of the Spanish Main, and seemed almost forgotten
alike by friends and foes.

In the early part of the eighteenth century Cuba contained scarcely
one hundred thousand inhabitants, and twenty or thirty thousand
negro slaves, for the original natives had all been exterminated.

30 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.

The British siege and capture of Havana in 1762, and its possess-
ion by the Enghsh for nine months, brought most important results.
Pezuela, the Spanish historian, says: ''During the nine months the
British held the capital of Cuba they introduced nearly one thousand
loaded vessels in a port which up to that time had received only ten or
twelve a year. They also imported several thousand negroes, began
the establishment of extensive agricultural operations, and augmented
the productions and exports of the island." '* After the restitution of
Havana," says this historian, " the Government then secured its pos-
sessions, with the superb fortifications which now defend it, and slowly
and jealously began the concessions of commercial privileges."

The revolution in Hayti in 1796, under the famous Toussaint
L'Ouverture, drove a large number of white people from that island,
and a multitude of families and individuals. Some with considerable
fortunes took refuge in Cuba. The concurrence of this unexpected
prosperity was most fortunate, inasmuch as, in 1818, the freedom of
commerce had been decreed for Cuba. This measure was the true be-
ginning of the prosperity of the island. From the time of its cession,
excepting a short period during the constitutional agitation of Spain
from 1820 to 1823, there has been to a certain extent some progress
made in Cuba in wealth and population.

To this record we niLy add that a second Las Casas became Gov-
ernor General of Cuba in 1790, and that under his administration
many great public works were executed, and fine progress was made
in the island in arts and industry, which should have proved a fountain
of blessing, because the ports of Cuba were opened to foreign com-
merce and the Spanish monopoly of the tobacco trade was revoked;
but unfortunately for Cuba, Spain, having lost all of her colonial posses-
sions in the Western Hemisphere except Cuba and Porto Rico, en-
deavored to make these two supply her with the revenue which had
been previously obtained from a continent, and acts of oppression and
injustice soon began to counteract the promise of prosperity and
happiness.

The island was managed as a conquered province for the selfish
profits of the conquerors. Even the national constitution adopted in
Spain in 1812, in Vv^hich Cuba was to be represented in the Cortes on
equal terms with other parts of Spain, w^as abrogated by the des-
potic Spanish king Ferdinand VHI., and not restored until three years
after his death in 1863.

The appeal to the President of the United States in 181 7 by the

DISCOVERY AND SETTLEMENT. 3 1

fourteen Americans who were captured by the Spaniards on the charge
of being privateers furnishes a striking proof of the manner and
methods of those days. They said that they were '' cut and mangled
to pieces with cutlasses, bound back to back until blood ran from under
their finger-nails, and were at present in a Cuban jail on an allowance
of Spanish ration of one pint of rice and beans, half cooked, for twenty-
four hours, and without clothing."

'' The Ever-faithful Isle," as it was called because it refused allegi-
ance to Napoleon Bonaparte in 1808, when he drove the Spanish king
from his throne, began to attract about this time the close scrutiny and
attention of the United States; and that Government took the position
that Cuba must do' one of three things, become independent, remain
Spanish, or join the United States. The American Republic was
scarcely then able tO' interfere, in case some European Power should
take the island, so practically declared that she would not interfere
with affairs upon the island, except to prevent the overthrow of Span-
ish authority. The ardor of the Cuban people for liberty began to
display itself more and more. In 18 19 there was an insurrection in
which a number of Americans took part, and no less than twenty-two
American citizens were arrested and thrown into prison at Havana for
complicity in the revolt.

It is true that Cuban deputies were permitted at last to sit in the
Cortes at Madrid, and in 182 1 they made a vigorous protest against
the burdensome and oppressive tariff which the Spanish Government
proposed to place on the islands. Commercial freedom, they said,
should be of the greatest interest to Spain as well as to Cuba; that the
island had not the twelfth part of the population it was capable of
maintaining; and urged such measures as would attract more settlers.
Indeed, they told Spain frankly that, if she persisted in her present
policy, she would lose Cuba altogether. Oppressive measures con-
tinued to be adopted, and the spirit of discontent and disaffection
steadily grew. The Spanish Government repelled instead of welcomed
the settlers.

At the beginning of 1822 the Captain General decreed that every
newcomer must, before landing, present a mem.orial to the Government
setting forth the object of his visit to the island, which memorial had to
be indorsed by some responsible person, who would be answerable for
his conduct while he was in the island. Soldiers enforced all rules
of the Captain General, and frequently took the law into their own
hands and became a mob. For example, in 1822 a paper in Havana

32 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.

printed temperately what was thought by many to be a well-deserved
criticism upon some features of the policy of the Captain General.
The next day soldiers took the office of the paper, destroyed the press
and type, and personally abused the editor and staff. The Captain
General approved, if he did not incite this outrage; and the people of
the city were made to feel that they were at the mercy of a violent and
lawless soldiery.

In a wTitten remonstrance over three thousand of the best citizens
of Havana warned the Government that if such practices prevailed
there must be sooner or later a revolution, but the only effect of this
paper was increased tyranny. Then, for the first time, two political
parties were formed, one being composed of native Cubans, and one
of Spanish officers; the Cuban party being committed to the principle
of home rule, and independence — if necessary to secure it.

Anyone familiar with the history of the Spanish Government on the
island of Cuba up tO' the present day will recognize that there has
been no material change in the policy of the Spanish rulers from that
time to this. The Governor, or Captain General, of Cuba is appointed
by the Crown, and the office is considered a most desirable one from a
financial standpoint. His power under the decree of the Spanish Gov-
ernment issued May 28, 1825, is absolute; and practically he holds in
the hollow of his hand the life and liberty of all the citizens of the
island.

" His Majesty the King, our Lord, desiring to obviate the incon-
veniences that might in extraordmary cases result from a division of
command, and from the interferences and prerogatives of the respect-
ive officers: for the important end of preserving in that precious island
his legitimate sovereign authority, and the public tranquillity, through
proper means, has resolved, in accordance with the opinion of his
council of ministers, to give to your Excellency the fullest authority,
bestowing upon you all the powers which by the royal ordinances are
granted to Governors of besieged cities. In consequence of this his
Majesty gives to your Excellency the most ample and unbounded
power, not only to send away from the island any person in office,
whatever their occupation, rank, class, or condition, whose continu-
ance therein your Excellency may deem injurious, or whose conduct,
public or private, may alarm you; replacing them with persons faith-
ful to his Majesty, and deserving of all the confidence of your Excel-
lency; and also to suspend the execution of any order whatsoever, or
any general provision made concerning any branch of the administra-

DISCOVERY AND SETTLEMENT. 33

tion, as your Excellency may think most suitable to the Royal
service."

This decree, placing in office a despotic ruler clothed with full
authority, did not have the effect intended, but, on the contrary, was
another step toward setting in motion a series of insurrections which
have at last culminated in the present war, and which at last has ended
in the displacement of the Spanish flag from the island.

We find that the first real insurrection occurred in 1823, being
organized by a secret association called the '' Soles de Bolivar," and
was inspired tO' some extent by the example of the '' Great South
American Liberator." The attempt, it is true, was frustrated by the
authorities before it reached maturity, and all of the leaders and par-
ticipants who did not escape from the island were punished, but it did
not prevent other revolutions from breaking out in 1826, 1828, 1830,
1848, 1850, 185 1, 1855, 1S68, 1879, ^^^ finally in 1895.

Secret organizations were prohibited by law after 1823, especially
Freemasons, and those who persisted in belonging to such organiza-
tions were judged guilty of high treason and put to death ; and many
innocent men were garroted therefor.

A military commission was established for the purpose of ferreting
out and punishing suspected cases of treason, a sort of Holy Inquisi-
tion applied to politics. The king himself suggested this commission,
in order, as he said, the more effectually to preserve his dominions in
America from the horror of ruin with which they were threatened by
the spirit of reform, for all spirits of reform were regarded as disloyal
to Spain.

Even at that day Spain had become uneasy about the fate of the
island. The Bishop of Havana had been compelled to flee to New
Orleans for safety, as he was suspected by the Governor General of
being liberal in his political opinions, and an English paper in 1825
declared that Cuba was the " Turkey of transatlantic politics, tottering
to its fall, and kept from falling only by the struggles of those who
contend for the right to catch her in her descent."

The revolution in 1826 was planned in 1826 by Cuban refugees in
Mexico and Colombia, and it was led by no less person than Simon
Bolivar himself. It failed to receive the expected encouragement from
the United States, and came to naught.

Two years later a more serious attempt was made by the same
parties by organizing a secret league called " The Black Eagle," with
headquarters in Mexico and branches in the United States. A con-

34 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.

siderable army was recruited, but the United States opposed this
scheme, and many of the soldiers of the plot were captured by the
Spanish and put to death.

In 1844 we find another outbreak — not to be classed, however,
among attempts at independence. It was an uprising of the negro
slaves in and about Matanzas. A general revolt was planned, but
resulted in thousands of slaves being arrested and put to the torture
of the thumbscrew and rack to make them testify, and on the
strength of evidence thus obtained some 1346 persons were convicted,
of whom 78 were put to death.

*In 1848 the famous Narciso Lopez of Venezuela appeared on the
scene, the base of his operations being in the United States, where
was organized a band of 600 well-drilled soldiers who were to serve
as the nucleus of his army in Cuba. He evaded the neutrality laws
and m^ade a landing in Cuba with this force, and w^as joined by a con-
siderable number of Cubans, both black and white; but his army was
too small to hold its own against the Spaniards, and a precipitate
flight from the island was necessary. It is said that the of^er by this
Government, made directly after the return of Lopez from Cuba, to
buy the island for one hundred million dollars in cash was due largely
to Lopez's representations and w^ork.

This adventurous spirit attempted to organize another expedition
in 1849, t>ut was not successful, as the United States Government pre-
vented the sailing of his men; but in the following year Lopez got ofi
with some 600 men, which he landed safely at Cardenas. There he
was attacked by an overwhelming Spanish force and compelled to
flee back to his ships, and upon reaching Key West disbanded his
party.

In 185 1 this indomitable revolutionist went from New Orleans to
Cuba with Colonel Crittenden of Kentucky and 450 men, landing near
Havana, where they were attacked by a superior force. Lopez was
put to death, but a portion of his men were released, and a detach-
ment of 150 men under Crittenden fought until they were reduced to
50 men and out of ammunition, when they were captured and all put
to death.

Colonel Logan Crittenden was a nephew of the Hon. John J. Crit-
tenden, so long a distinguished United States Senator from Kentucky,
and was a brother of ex-Governor Thomas T. Crittenden of Missouri.
He behaved most courageously. His hands, and the hands of his men,
were tightly bound with cords, and they were kept in this condition

/

X

^/

QUEEN REGENT CHRISTINA AND HER SON, KING ALPHONSO XIII.

DISCOVERY AND SETTLEMENT. 37

for eighteen hours, when on the morning of the i6th of August, 185 1,
they were taken out and shot in platoons of six at a time, after having
been made to kneel with their backs to the firing squad. Crittenden,
who was reserved to be executed last, when ordered to kneel declined
to do so, and with a curl of scorn upon his lips, said, " An American
kneels only to his God, and always faces his enemy! " They shot him
down, but with his face to his foe.

In 1855 there was another insurrection led by a Spaniard named
Pinto and two comrades, Estambes and Aguero. They were cap-
tured ahd put to death.

Proclamations of the Governor and Captain Generals have been
curious productions from time immemorial in giving flattering pic-
tures of " The Ever-faithful Isle," calling it an abode of peace and
plenty and loyalty, because it had always enjoyed the mild government
of a king and the blessings which spring from security of property
and the uninterrupted progress of arts and sciences. " All men of
sense," one of them said, " in this isle are faithful to the king, our
master, from affection and a conviction that loyalty to the parent state
was the only guarantee for their well-being, and that the day which
severs these sacred bonds will be the last day of the happiness of Cuba,
and even of her existence; and that the heart of the king only throbbed
with pleasure when it contemplated the people of Cuba as contented
and happy."

These oft-repeated revolutions produced more and more friction
between the United States and Spain, and the feeling between these
two countries was intensified in 1850 by the " Black Warrior "
incident.

The " Black Warrior " was a steamship regularly plying between
American ports and Havana. Under strict interpretation of the Span-
ish law, a steamer touching at a Cuban port was required to exhibit
a manifest of her cargo, but this provision had been passed over in the
case of regular liners.

The " Black Warrior " had thirty-six times in succession entered
and left Havana without making a manifest, but calling herself " in
ballast." All of this was done with the full knowledge and at the sug-
gestion, it is said, of the Spanish authorities, who wished to save them-
selves needless work. On this occasion the ship entered the port
with a cargo of cotton from Mobile for New York. As before, she was
reported "in ballast "; then the authorities seized her, confiscated the
'".argo and took it ashore, and levied a fine against her for twice the

38 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.

value of her cargo. The captain refused to pay it and protested
ai^ainst the whole performance as illegal. He finally pulled down his
flag and abandoned the ship, and reported to the United States that
the Spanish had forcibly seized her. After five years the United
States succeeded in making Spain pay an indemnity of three hundred
thousand dollars.

Hon. J. P. Benjamin of Louisiana, in a speech in the United States
Senate in 1859, speaking about the grievance of the island of Cuba,
said:

" That with arms General Tacon despoiled the island of Cuba of
the Constitution of Spain, proclaimed by the powers of the monarchy,
and which these powers had ordered to be sworn to, as the funda-
mental law of the entire monarchy.

*' That the Cortes deprived the Cubans of the rights which all Span-
iards enjoy, and which are naturally conceded to persons the least
civilized.

*' That the decree was issued which deprived the sons of Cuba of
all right of being chosen to occupy public offices or of employment in
the state.

** That military commissions existed which, in other countries, the
law permits only in extraordinary cases, during the time of war, and
then only for offenses against the state.

" That the continual increase of the army and the creation of the
new mercenary bodies, under the pretext of public security, are put
upon the natives for the purpose of augmenting the burdens that lie
upon Cuba, and of exercising with greater vexation the system of sub-
ordination and espionage over its inhabitants.

" That obstacles and difficulties are placed in the way of each indi-
vidual for exercising any industry, nobody being sure that he will not
be seized and fined, by reason of some defect of authorization or want
of license at every step that he makes in the island.

*' That exactions of all kinds are imposed upon its inhabitants by
inferior officers with the greatest disregard to the opinion of mankind.

" I return now, sir," he said, " to the year 1836, when the Cuban
deputies were convoked to a meeting of the constituent Cortes at
Madrid. The Cortes assembled in 1837, but the Cuban deputies were
not admitted to their seats. Cuba was deprived of her representation,
nor was this the only outrage inflicted on her rights. It was decided
that she should be governed in the future by exceptional laws, and not

DISCOVERY AND SETTLEMENT. 39

by the laws common to the rest of the monarchy. These special laws
were never passed, but the royal ordinance has continued in force until
the present hour, maintaining martial law, and Cuba has thus re-
mained ever since a helpless victim, subject to the despotic control of
a single man, the extent of whose powers can only be described by the
word invented to express them — omni-modas (of all kinds).

" Ever since this monstrous system has been adopted, Cuba has not
been blessed with one year of peace. Constantly attempts have been
made to shake off the Spanish yoke, but all in vain. Twenty thou-
sand bayonets on the land, and a powerful fleet otf Cuba's coasts keep
the dread watch of the tyrant and suppress the first symptoms of revolt.
The whites have been disarmed, and four companies of colored men
have been added to each of the sixteen regiments of peninsular troops
stationed on the island, thus holding before the unfortunate inhabi-
tants the constant threat of a war of races, a renewal of the horrors of
San Domingo. Their pride of race has been shocked by a Governor's
decree authorizing marriages between the twO' races, except when one
of the parties is a noble.

'' The army is maintained faithful solely by a rigorous isolation,
all communication between the inhabitants and troops being inter-
dicted. No security for life, person, or liberty against the caprice of a
despot, no arms of self-defense; the size of a w^alking stick being
limited to dimensions small enough to pass through a ring furnished
the policeman.

" The Cubans have not even the idea of a trial by jury. Cases are
tried before the judges of royal appointment, the venal favorites of the
Spanish court, who are speedily removed to make room for more
hungry aspirants.

"' The Captain General, himself a mere soldier, presides by law
over the supreme court of justice. All ofBces, with the exception of a
few of the lowest order, are in the hands of Spaniards. The penalty
for carrying weapons of any description is six years' hard labor in the
chain-gangs of the penal colonies of Africa.

" The Cuban cannot have company at home without a permit, for
which he must pay $2.50, and he must be provided with a license at
the same cost if he is to absent himself from town or from his home in
the country. Neither can he change his domicile without notifying
the police, obtaining a permit, and paying for the same.

" He cannot lodge any person, whether foreigner or native, stran-
ger, friend, or relative, in his house without previous notice to the
police.

40 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SiPAlN.

" Mayors of cities are not elected by the people, but by the alder-
men of the common councils and under the dictation of the Spanish
Governors. These aldermen serve for life, and their offices are either
inherited or purchased from the Crown at public auction for prices
varying according to the perquisites thereof.

" Thus it happens that even they who should be the immediate
guardians of the people often become speculators, who, far from ex-
tending them protection, extort the full interest of the capital invested
in the purchases of their ofBces.

"No affidavit is required in Cuba; but a suspicion, or a secret
denunciation, is sufficient to tear a man from the bosom of his family
at any hour of the day or night, throw him into a dungeon, there to
linger for days or months, if it so please the authorities, and then to
set him free with the mere acknowledgment of his innocence, or send
him to transatlantic exile, if, though innocent, he still remains
suspicious.

" Such is the sad, the dreadful condition of the unfortunate
islanders."

So it will seem that the condition of Cuba and its future history
was receiving already the scrutiny of some of our leading statesmen.
John Quincy Adams, while he was Secretary of State, in 1823, wrote
to the United States Minister at Madrid that, " It will be taken for
granted that the dominion of Spain upon the American Continents,
North and South, is irrevocably gone. But the islands of Cuba and
Porto Rico still remain nominally, and so far really, dependent upon
her that she yet possesses the power of transferring her own dominion
over them, together with the possession of them, to others."

It was inevitable that from an early date the United States should
take a deep interest in the affairs of Cuba. The nearness of the island
to our southern coast made it naturally a part of our domain. At any
rate, it was seen that commercial intercourse between the two coun-
tries must be very close and that the possession of Cuba by a hostile
power would be a dangerous menace to the peace and welfare of this
country. The great question to be solved was the duration of the
Cuban conditions, and how long a time should elapse before the United
States should interfere in the interest of humanity, law, order, and
peace. The state of afifairs described by Senator Benjamin, with but
few changes, still existed from year to year — a repetition of the past,
without a change of Spanish policy. There must be sooner or later

DISCOVERY AND SETTLEMENT. 4 1

outside interference. No foreign Power shall interfere, said the
United States. So the responsibihty rested alone with our Govern-
ment, and at last has been taken.

'' Cuba and Porto Rico, from their local position [writes Mr. J. Q,
Adams, when Secretary of State in 1823], are natural appendages to
the North American Continent, and one of them, almost in sight of
our shores, from a multitude of considerations has become an object
of transcendent importance to the commercial and political interests
of our Union. Its commanding position, with reference to the Gulf
of Mexico and the West Indian seas; the character of its population;
its situation midway between our southern coasts and the island of
San Domingo; its safe and capacious harbor of Havana, fronting a
long line of our shores destitute of the same advantages; the nature
of its productions and of its wants, furnishing the supplies and needing
the returns of a commerce immensely profitable and mutually bene-
ficial, give it an importance in the sum of our national interests with
which that of no other foreign territory can be compared, and little
inferior to that which binds the different members of this Union
together. Such indeed are, between the interests of that island and
this country, the geographical, commercial, moral, and political re-
lations formed by nature, gathering, in the process of time, and even
now verging to maturity, that, in looking forward to the probable
course of events for the short period of half a century, it is scarcely
possible to resist the conviction that the annexation of Cuba to our
Federal Republic will be indispensable to the continuance and integrity
of the Union itself. There are laws of political, as well as physical,
gravitation. And if an apple, severed by the tempest from its native
tree, cannot choose but fall to the ground, Cuba, forcibly disjoined
from its own unnatural connection with Spain, and incapable of self-
support, can gravitate only toward the North American Union, which,
by the same law of nature, cannot cast her off from her bosom."

To this Mr. Adams added that the transfer of Cuba to any other
power would be an event unpropitious to the interest of this Union,
which we should prevent, if necessary, by force.

Thomas Jefferson, a few weeks later, expressed almost exactly the
same ideas in a letter to President Monroe, saying that the addition
of Cuba to this Union '' is exactly what is wanted to round out our
power as a Nation to the point of its utmost interest."

42

CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.

Henry Clay also put himself on record, in 1825, to the same effect.
He was then Secretary of State, and in an official letter to the various
American ministers in Europe, he said: '' We could not consent to the
occupation of those islands [Cuba and Porto Rico] by any other Euro-
pean Power than Spain under any contingency whatever."

Mr. Van Buren, in one of his state papers, said, on this same
subject:

'' The Government has always looked with the deepest interest upon
the fate of those islands, but particularly of Cuba. Its geographical
position, which places it almost in sight of our southern shores, and,
as it were, gives it the command of the Gulf of Mexico and the West
Indian seas, its safe and capacious harbors, its rich productions, the
exchange of which for our surplus agricultural products and manu-
factures constitute one of the most extensive and valuable branches
of our foreign trade, render it of the utmost importance to the United
States that no change should take place in its condition which might
injuriously affect our political and commercial standing in that
quarter. Other considerations connected with a certain class of our
population make it to the interest of the southern section of the Union
that no attempt should be made in that island to throw off the yoke of
Spanish dependence, the first effect of which would be the sudden
emancipation of a numerous slave population, which result could not
but be very sensibly felt upon the adjacent shores of the United
States."

The United States Government also played the part of Spain's
friend and protector. On more than one occasion other European
Powers were at the point of seizing Cuba from Spain by force. They
were restrained simply by the w^arning that such a proceeding would
be regarded by the United States as an unfriendly act. The American
Secretary of State wote to the American minister at Madrid, in 1840,
as follows:

" You are authorized to assure the Spanish Government that in
case of any attempt, from whatever quarter, to wrest from her this
portion of her territory, she may securely depend upon the military
and naval resources of the United States to aid her either in preserving
or recovering it."

Again Mr. Buchanan, when Secretary of State in 1847, wrote:

DISCOVERY AND SETTLEMENT. 43

" The United States will not tolerate any invasion of Cuba by citizens
of neutral states."

OFFERS TO PURCHASE.

The question of acquiring Cuba by purchase had long been con-
sidered by the United States, and in 1848 it was put into concrete
form. In that year the Secretary of State, Mr. Buchanan, wrote to the
American minister at Madrid on the subject, as follows:

'' With these considerations in view, the President believes that the
crisis has arrived when an efifort should be made to purchase the island
of Cuba from Spain, and he has determined to intrust you with the
performance of this most delicate and important duty. The attempt
should be made, in the first instance, in a confidential conversation
with the Spanish minister for foreign affairs ; a written ofifer might pro-
duce an absolute refusal in writing, which would embarrass us here-
after in the acquisition of the island. Besides, from the incessant
changes in the Spanish cabinet and policy, our desire to make the pur-
chase might thus be made known in an official form to foreign gov-
ernments and arouse their jealousy and active opposition. Indeed,
even if the present cabinet should think favorably of the proposition,
they might be greatly embarrassed by having it placed on record, for
in that event it would almost certainly, through some channel, reach
the opposition and become the subject of discussion in the Cortes.
Such delicate negotiations, at least in their incipient stages, ought
always to be condifcted in confidential conversation, and with the
utmost secrecy and dispatch.

'' At your interview with the minister for foreign affairs you might
introduce the subject by referring to the present distracted condition
of Cuba and the danger which exists that the population will make an
attempt to accomplish a revolution. This must be well known to the
Spanish Government. In order to convince him of the good faith
and friendship toward Spain with which this Government has acted,
you might read to him the first part of my dispatch to General Camp-
bell and the order issued by the Secretary of War to the commanding
general in Mexico and to the officer having charge of the embarkation
of our troops at Vera Cruz. You may then touch delicately upon the
danger that Spain may lose Cuba by a revolution in the island, or that
it may be wrested from her by Great Britain, should a rupture take

44 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.

place between the two countries, arising out of the dismissal of Sir
Henry Bulwer, and be retained to pay the Spanish debt due to the
British bondholders. You might assure him that while this Govern-
ment is entirely satisfied that Cuba shall remain under the dominion
of Spain, we should in any event resist its acquisition by any other
nation. And, finally, you might inform him that, under all these cir-
cumstances, the President had arrived at the conclusion that Spain
might be willing to transfer the island to the United States for a fair
and full consideration. You might cite as a precedent the cession of
Louisiana to this country by Napoleon, under somewhat similar cir-
cumstances, when he was at the zenith of his power and glory. I have
merely presented these topics in their natural order, and you can fill
up the outline from the information communicated in this dispatch,
as well as from your own knowledge of the subject. Should the
minister for foreign afifairs lend a favorable ear to your proposition, then
the question of the consideration to be paid would arise, and you have
been furnished with information in this dispatch which will enable you
to discuss that question.

" The President would be willing to stipulate for the payment of
one hundred million dollars. This, however, is the maximum price;
and if Spain should be willing to sell, you will use your best efforts to
purchase it at a rate as much below that sum as practicable. In case
you should be able to conclude a treaty, you may adopt as your model,
so far as the same may be applicable, the two conventions of April 30,
1803, between France and the United States, for the sale and purchase
of Louisiana. The seventh and eighth articles of the first of these
conventions ought, if possible, to be omitted; still, if this should be
indispensable to the accomplishment of the object, articles similar to
them may be retained."

The ofifer was declined by the Spanish Government, with an air of
being offended at the very making of it.

THE OSTEND MANIFESTO.

But the matter was not permitted to rest there. In the summer of
1854 the American ministers at London, Paris, and Madrid, Mr.
Buchanan, Mr. Mason, and Mr. Soule, met together at Ostend, and
from that fashionable watering-place issued the famous " Ostend
Manifesto." This was a letter signed by them and addressed to the

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DISCOVERY AND SETTLEMENT. 4/

Secretary of State, urging that immediate steps be taken for the acqui-
sition of Cuba. Their plan was first to offer to purchase the island
for one hundred and twenty million dollars. If Spain declined to sell
it, the United States should seize it by force. They said:

'* Our past history forbids that we should acquire the island of
Cuba without the consent of Spain unless justified by the great law of
self-preservation. We must, in any event, preserve our own conscious
rectitude and our self-respect. Whilst pursuing this course, we can
afford to disregard, the censures of the world, to which we have been
so often and so unjustly exposed. After we shall have offered Spain
a price for Cuba, far beyond its present value, and this shall have been
refused, it will then be time to consider the question, ' Does Cuba,
in the possession of Spain, seriously endanger our internal peace and
the existence of our cherished Union?' Should this question be an-
swered in the affirmative, then by every law, human and divine, we
shall be justified in wresting it from Spain, if we possess the power;
and this upon the very same principle that would justify an individual
in tearing down the burning house of his neighbor if there were no
other means of preventing the fiames from destroying his own home.
Under such circumstances we ought neither to count the cost nor re-
gard the odds which Spain might enlist against us."

This advice was not followed by the Government. But a few years
later, when he became President, Mr. Buchanan in his messages more
than once recurred to the subject and urged the desirability of Ameri-
can ownership of Cuba. Indeed, in every one of his annual messages
he strongly recommended the purchase of the island.

LATER UTTERANCES.

Then the Civil War in the United States came on, and attention was
drawn away from Cuba for a time. But soon after the restoration of
peace here the Ten- Years' War broke out there, and the subject of
Cuba was forced upon us again in a very direct manner. What the
feeling of the Government then was may be judged by some of the
utterances of Mr. Fish, the Secretary of State under President Grant.
He wrote in 1874 to the American Minister at Madrid that

" Cuba ought to belong to the great family of American Republics.
The desire of independence on the part of the Cubans is a natural and

48 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.

legitimate aspiration of theirs, because they are Americans. That the
ultimate issue of events in Cuba will be its independence, however that
issue may be produced, whether by means of negotiation, or as the
result of military operations, or of one of those unexpected incidents
which so frequently determine the fate of nations, it is impossible to
doubt. It is one of those conclusions which have been aptly termed
the inexorable logic of events. Entertaining these views, the Presi-
dent at an early day tendered to the Spanish Government the good
otifices of the United States for the purpose of effecting, by negotiation,
the peaceful separation of Cuba from Spain, and thus putting a stop
to the further effusion of blood in the island, and relieving both Cuba
and Spain from the calamities and charges of a protracted civil war,
and of delivering the United States from the constant hazard of incon-
venient complications on the side either of Spain or of Cuba. But the
well-intended proffers of the United States on that occasion were un-
wisely rejected by Spain, and, as it was then already foreseen, the
struggle has continued in Cuba, with incidents of desperate tenacity
on the part of the Cubans, and of angry fierceness on the part of the
Spaniards, unparalleled in the annals of modern warfare.

" Meanwhile this condition of things grows, day by day, more and
more insupportable to the United States. The Government is com-
pelled to exert constantly the utmost vigilance to prevent infringement
of our law on the part of Cubans purchasing munitions or materials
of war, or laboring to fit out military expeditions in our ports; we are
constrained to maintain a large naval force to prevent violations of our
sovereignty, either by the Cubans or the Spaniards; our people are
horrified and agitated by the spectacle, at our very doors, of war, not
only with all its ordinary attendance of devastation and carnage, but
with accompaniments of barbarous shooting of prisoners of war, or
their summary execution by military commissions, to the scandal and
disgrace of the age; we are under the necessity of interposing continu-
ally for the protection of our citizens against wrongful acts of the
local authorities of Spain in Cuba; and the public peace is every mo-
ment subject to be interrupted by some unforeseen event, to drive us
at once to the brink of war with Spain. In short, the state of Cuba
is the one great cause of perpetual solicitude in the foreign relations of
the United States."

The Cuban patriots sought and thought they had found their
opportunity in the distress of Spain. In September, 1868, the long-

DISCOVERY AND SETTLEMEMT. 49

Standing disgust of the Spanish people with the corrupt govern-
ment of Queen Isabella came to a culmination in open revolution. A
few weeks afterward the Cubans also rose in revolution for their own
independence. It was on October 10, 1868, that Carlos M. de Ces-
pedes, a lawyer of Bayamo, Cuba, with 128 poorly armed men at his
back, raised the standard of revolt and of Cuban freedom. He issued
a formal proclamation of his intentions and of the reasons therefor, as
follows :

" The laborers, animated by the love of their native land, aspire to
the hope of seeing Cuba happy and prosperous by virtue of its own
power, and demand the inviolability of individuals, their homes, their
families, and the fruits of their labor, which it will have guaranteed by
the liberty of conscience, of speech, of the press, by peaceful meetings;
in fact, they demand a government of the country for and by the
country, free from an army of parasites and soldiers that only serve
to consume it and oppress it. And, as nothing of that kind can be
obtained from Spain, they intend to fight it with all available means,
and drive and uproot its dominion on the face of Cuba. Respecting
above all and before all the dignity of man, the association declai'es
that it will not accept slavery as a forced inheritance of the past; how-
ever, instead of abolishing it as an arm by which to sink the island
into barbarity, as threatened by the Government of Spain, they view
abolition as a means of improving the moral and material condition of
the workingman, and thereby to place property and wealth in a more
just and safe position.

" Sons of their times, baptized In the vivid stream of civilization
and therefore above preoccupation of nationality, the laborers will rcr
spect the neutrality of Spaniards, but among Cubans will distinguish
only friends and foes, those that are with them or against them. To
the former they offer peace, fraternity, and concord; to the latter hos-
tility and war — war and hostility that will be more Implacable to the
traitors in Cuba where they first saw the day, who turn their arms
against them, or offer any asylum or refuge to their tyrants. We, the
laborers, do not ignore the value of nationality, but at the present mo-
ment consider it of secondary moment. Before nationality stands liberty,
the indisputable condition of existence. We must be a people before
becoming a nation. When the Cubans constitute a free people they
will receive the nationality that becomes them. Now they have
none."

50 Cuba's struggle against spain.

PROGRESS OF THE INSURGENTS.

A week after this proclamation was issued the insurgents were
sufficiently increased in number to capture the town of Bayamo. Ten
days after that the entire district of Holguin was in revolt against
Spain, and by the end of the month Cespedes was at the head of an
army of 15,000 men, poorly armed and drilled, but resolute. Among
those who joined him were the Marquis of Santa Lucia, General Que-
sada, Maximo Gomez, Calixto Garcia, Antonio Maceo, and many
others who have been identified with Cuba's latest fight for freedom.
The patriots were quickly recognized by most of the South American
republics as belligerents, and by April 10, 1869, they were able to
organize a regular government, with an elected legislature, and to
promulgate a national constitution. Cespedes was elected President
of the republic.

The Spanish Captain General at Havana was seriously alarmed,
as he had cause to be. He at first tried to check the movement by
appealing to the people of Cuba to remain loyal to Spain, promising
them all possible reforms and frvors if they would do so. " I will,"
he said, '* brave every danger, accept every responsibility for your wel-
fare." He congratulated them on the fact that the revolution in Spain
had swept away the Bourbon dynasty, *' tearing up by the roots a
plant so poisonous that it putrefied the air we breathed." He told
them they should receive all the reforms which they required and that
Cubans and Spaniards should henceforth be brothers; Cuba would be
considered a province of Spain; freedom of the press, the right of pub-
lic meeting, and equal representation in the Spanish Cortes should be
granted to them. The only effect of this proclamation was to arouse
the contempt and derision of the Cuban people and to strengthen their
determination to free their country once for all from the Spanish yoke.

Then, finding that soft words produced no good effect, the Captain
General sent to Spain for troops in large numbers. The freedom of
the press was abolished throughout the island and martial law was
proclaimed everywhere. The citizens of Havana were compelled at
the point of the bayonet to contribute the sum of twenty-five million
dollars for the use of the Government.

Serious fighting began in February, 1869, and for several months
continued, the rebels being almost uniformly successful. Their first
important victory was at San Cristobal, about 65 miles west of Havana.
The second took place at Guanajay, not far from Havana, on the

DISCOVERY AND SETTLEMENT. 5 1

coast. Santiago de Cuba narrowly escaped capture, General Valma-
seda arriving with re-enforcements just in time to save the city. In a
few weeks Havana was threatened.

The insurgents pursued very much the same plan that has proved
so troublesome to Spain in the last war. When they found the Span-
ish army too strong for them to meet in the open field, they resorted to
guerrilla warfare, moving swiftly from point to point, baffling pur-
suit and striking heavy blows wherever they could. The Spanish Gov-
ernment hurried tens of thousands of troops to the island and began
a campaign of savagery. This policy appeared to be that no quarter
should be granted; that all prisoners should be immediately killed, and
even sick and wounded men captured in hospitals should be put to the
sword. The Spanish garrisons managed to keep possession of the
cities, large towns, and fortified camps, but the vast bulk of the open
country and small towns had soon to be abandoned to the rebels.

In March, 1869, the Insurgent Government issued a formal decree
absolutely abolishing slavery. It arranged that the patriots should
receive pay for the loss of their slaves, and that the liberated slaves
might become farmers or enter the army, according to their pleasure.
A great many of them did enter the army and made good soldiers.
The Cuban President then sent an address to the President of the
United States explaining the object of the insurrection and the causes
that provoked it, and arguing strongly in favor of recognition of the
insurgents as belligerents and as an independ*ent power. It was an
eloquent document and strong in logic. Its appeal to the American
President and to the American people was effective, yet the stability
of the Insurgent Government did not seem at that time sufBcient to
warrant the recognition that was asked. Mexico, however, recog-
nized the Cubans as belligerents, and Peru recognized their govern-
ment as an independent sovereignty, on June 13, 1869.

Three brief addresses are worthy of record here, as indications of
the spirit in which the war was waged on both sides. The first is an
inaugural address of President Cespedes. He said:

'* Compatriots: The establishment of a free Government in Cuba,
on the basis of democratic principles, was the most fervent wish of my
heart. The effective realization of this wish was, therefore, enough to
satisfy my aspirations and amply repay the services which, jointly with
you, I may have been able to devote to the cause of Cuban independ-
ence. But the will of my compatriots has gone far beyond this, by

52 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.

investing me with the most honored of all duties, the supreme magis-
tracy of the republic.

'' I am not blind to the great labors required in the exercise of the
high functions which you have placed in my charge in these critical
moments, notwithstanding the aid that may be derived from the other
powers of the State. I am not ignorant of the grave responsibility
which I assume in accepting the Presidency of our new-born repub-
lic. I know that my weak powers would be far from being equal to the
demand if left to themselves alone. But this will not occur, and that
conviction fills me with faith in the future."

Address to the Army.

The second is the proclamation issued to the Cuban army by Gen-
eral Queseda, who was appointed its commander-in-chief. He said:

'' In the act of beginning the struggle with the oppressors, Cuba
has assumed the solemn duty to consummate her independence or
perish in the attempt; and, in giving herself a democratic government,
she obligates herself to become a republic. This double obligation,
contracted in the presence of free America, before the liberal world,
and, what is more, before our own conscience, signifies our determina-
tion to be heroic and to be virtuous. On your heroism I rely for the
consummation of our independence, and on your virtue I count to
consolidate the republic.

'' I implore you, sons of Cuba, to recollect at all hours the proclama-
tion of Valmaseda. That document will shorten the time necessary
for the triumph of our cause. That document is an additional proof
of the character of our enemies. Those beings appear deprived even
of those gifts which nature has conceded to the irrational — the instinct
of foresight and of warning. We have to struggle with tyrants, always
such — the very same ones of the Inquisition, of the Conquest, and of
Spanish domination in America. We have to combat with the assas-
sins of women and children, with the mutilators of the dead, with the
idolators of gold. If you would save your honor and that of your
families, if you would conquer forever your liberty, be soldiers."

Valmaseda' s Bloody Order.

The third is the hideous proclamation of Valmaseda, the Spanish
Captain General, who has ever since been known as '' The Butcher."
He said:

DISCOVERY AND SETTLEMENT. 53

" Inhabitants of the country! The re-enforcements of troops that
I have been waiting for have arrived; with them I shall give protection
to the good, and punish promptly those that still remain in rebellion
against the government of the metropolis.

'' You know that I have pardoned those who have fought us with
arms; that your wives, mothers, and sisters have found in me the un-
expected protection that you have refused them. You know, also,
that many of those we have pardoned have turned against us
again.

'' Before such ingratitude, such villainy, it is not possible for me
to be the man that I have been; there is no longer a place for a falsi-
fied neutrality: He that is not for me is against me; and that my soldiers
may know how to distinguish, you hear the order they carry."

It was thereafter war to the knife, and the knife to the hilt.
Throughout 1869 the Cubans were generally successful. Many out-
rages were perpetrated by the Spaniards, and a large part of the island
was laid desolate. In the fall of that year a Cuban junta was organized
in New York and thereafter did excellent work for the patriot cause in
enlisting American sympathy and securing and forwarding supplies
of arms and ammunition. By the summer of 1870 it was evident that
war would be a long and bitter one. The insurgents then had more
than 50,000 men in the field. These were chiefly in small parties,
poorly armed and carrying on a irregular system of warfare, which was,
however, most effective in annoying and injuring the Spanish Gov-
ernment.

The first serious blow to the insurrection occurred in the spring of
1 87 1, when a considerable number of their troops operating in the
district of Camaguey, in the central part of the island, surrendered to
the Spanish Government on the condition that their lives should be
spared. Their Commander, General Agramonte, would not surrender,
but organized another force and maintained the conflict for two years
longer, when he was killed in battle.

• The year 1873 was perhaps the most bloody of the whole war.
Fighting was almost incessant, and, though the engagements were in-
dividually small, in the aggregate they meant a vast amount of blood-
shed. In the fall of that year President Cespedes was removed from
his office by the Cuban Congress and retired to private life. Some
time afterward he was found by the Spaniards, living in peace and
quiet and taking no part in the war, and was brutally put to death.

54 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.

The Marquis of Santa Lucia was elected President in his place. His
estates had already been confiscated by the Spanish Government and
he now renounced his title and became known thereafter simply as
Senor Cisneros.

The war was conducted on the Spanish side with all the severity
and cruelty hinted at in Valmaseda's order, and deliberate attempt was
made to exterminate the entire population of the island. No excep-
tion was made in behalf of sex or age — helpless women, infants in the
cradle, and infirm old men were alike put to death, often with every
possible insult and torture. One of the officers of the Spanish army
wrote in the fall of 1869 concerning a certain engagement:

"We captured seventeen, thirteen of whom were shot outright;
on dying they shouted: ' Hurrah for free Cuba! hurrah for independ-
ence!' A mulatto said, 'Hurrah for Cespedes!' On the following
day we killed a Cuban officer and another man. Among the thirteen
that we shot the first day were found three sons and their father; the
father witnessed the execution of his sons without even changing color,
and when his turn came he said he died for the independence of his
country. On coming back we brought along with us three carts filled
with women and children, the families of those we had shot; and they
asked us to shoot them, because they would rather die than live among
Spaniards."

Another wrote a few days later: " Not a single Cuban will remain
in this island. We shoot all those we find in the fields, on the farms,
and in every house. We do not leave a creature alive where we pass,
be it man or animal."

In these statements there was no exaggeration. The acts de-
scribed were repeated a thousand times throughout the island during
that dreadful war.

** It could not," says one of the most trustworthy observers of the
war, " be expected that the insurgents on their own side should ab-
stain from taking a fearful revenge." The practice with them when
a prisoner, especially an officer, fell into their hands, was to hang
him by his feet to the branch of a tree and build a fire beneath his
head.

" Indeed, it would not be easy to ascertain on which side the atroci-
ties first began, or are carried to greater lengths. The rule is that all
prisoners be shot without discrimination. Nay, the conquerors even

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DISCOVERY AND SETTLEMENT. 57

grudge their powder and shot, and the victims are usually dispatched
with machetes, a kind of long chopping-knife or cutlass peculiar to a
cane-growing country, and to be almost invariably seen at the side
of- every combatant as well as in every laborer's hand. Some of the
soldiers and volunteers have acquired such skill in the use of this
weapon that they cut ofif a man's head with all the mastery of a pro-
fessional executioner. These men march in the rear of their detach-
ments; and upon any suspected person being apprehended, the ofificer
in command, after a brief examination, orders the prisoner to the rear,
where he is immediately hacked to pieces by the inexorable macheteros.
As a rule also, the bodies of the slain are left unburied on the spot
where they fall. The turkey buzzards swarming everywhere in the
island, and whose life is protected by law on account of their use-
fulness as public scavengers, fatten on the rotting human carcasses;
and it is not without a shudder that one sees these foul birds hovering
everywhere in the air, and poising themselves on their wings above
the forests where the remnants of their hideous feasts in every stage of
decomposition still attract them."

Throughout the war the insurgents received much aid from the
United States. That is to say, their friends and sympathizers here
sent them arms and ammunition whenever possible. Under the neu-
trality laws of the United States it was perfectly legitimate to do this,
but of course there was much danger of the vessels carrying such sup-
plies being seized by the Spaniards upon their arrival in Cuban waters.
Some were thus seized, but many more succeeded in eluding the
Spaniards and landing their supplies upon the Cuban coast.

Case of the " Virginhts."

About twenty-six years ago the civilized world in general, and the
United States especially, were greatly shocked and stirred up by the
capture of the " Virginius," and the murder of a portion of her crew.
The " Virginius " was said to be an English-built, side-wheel steamer
originally called the '' Virgin," and was distinguished as a daring
blockade runner during the war between the States. In 1870, it is
said, she was sold in Washington to an agent of the Cuban junta, and
her name was changed to the " Virginius." For three years there-
after she made a number of successful and daring expeditions to the
Cuban coast, carrying clothing, food, ammunition, and arms to the
insurgents. On the 23d of October, 1873, the " Virginius " cleared

58 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.

from the U. S. Consulate in Kingston, Jamaica, as a United States
vessel bound for Port Limon, Costa Rica. On board were a number
of Cuban insurgents, and the crew was composed of Americans,
Cubans, and some others. On board, too were a number of enlisted
men to join the insurgent army. The commander oi the '' Virginius "
was named Captain Joseph Fry, a citizen of the United States. A
Spanish gunboat, '' Tornado " — constructed, it is said, by the same
English firm that built the '' Virginius " — discovered the latter on the
31st day of October, as she was approaching the Cuban coast, and
chased her for eight hours, capturing her about ten o'clock that night,
and taking her to Santiago de Cuba; Captain Fry claiming that his
boat flew American colors, had an American crew, and was an Ameri-
can ship. The 155 men captured were taken ashore, placed in close
confinement, and court-martialed, and the most of them sentenced to
be shot.

The whole proceedings were very summary and rapid. Four
days thereafter the first four were shot, Brigadier General Ryan being
one, though he claimed to be a Canadian, and therefore a British
citizen. These men, according to the usual Spanish style, were shot
in the back, and afterward their neads were cut ofif and displayed on
spikes, while their bodies were trampled by horses. After an inter-
val of twelve days, twelve more of them were shot, and five days later
thirty-seven were executed, these last being the officers and crew of
the *' Virginius " and some of them American citizens. It is said that
the American flag was not flying from its stafT and that the American
consul was directed to keep in his of^ce. Captain Fry was among the
first ten who were shot; and some of the men, it is reported, were not
killed by the firing, but were shot afterward through their mouths by
the Spanish soldiers. Burriel, the Spanish general, seemed to have
been a regular butcher. He promptly refused all protests of the
American and British vice consuls, and would not allow them to use
the telegraph to communicate with their governments. It is said the
American vice consul, Schmidt, wrote repeated communications to
General Burriel, but failed to get replies, except in one instance when
this blood-thirsty Spaniard told him that he should have known that
the day previous was religious festival, during which he and all of his
officers were engaged in meditation on the divine mysteries, and could
no't consider temporal affairs. Fortunately news of what was going
on reached Jamaica, and the British gunboat " Niobe," Captain Sir
Lambton Lorraine, left for the scene of massacre. The captain was on

DISCOVERY AND SETTLEMENT. 59

shore at Santiago almost before his ship had dropped anchor, and
declared that he would bombard the city if there was another man ex-
ecuted. Ninety-three men were still alive, and their execution he
demanded should be suspended.

These acts at Santiago were in keeping with much else which had
been done of similar nature, but perhaps on not so large a scale, and
aroused the public indignation of the United States, and mass meetings
w^ere held demanding vengeance on Spain. Admiral Polo de Bernabe,
the father of the last Spanish minister who succeeded De Lome,
wanted to submit the matter to arbitration, but Hamilton Fish, then
Secretary of State, very properly replied to him that the capture on the
high seas in a time of peace of a vessel bearing the register and papers
of an American ship was not deemed referable to other powers to de-
termine. The nation must be the judge and custodian of its own
honor. And on November 4 Fish cabled to Sickles, then American
minister to Madrid, that, " In case of refusal of satisfactory reparation
within twelve days from this date, close your legation and leave
Madrid. If Spain cannot redress these outrages the United States
will." The matter was finally settled by Spain agreeing to surrender
to an American ship the '' Virginius " and the survivors of those who
had been captured with her, and that on the 25th of September the
United States flag should be saluted by the " Tornado." Of course
these terms contemplated that the " Virginius " should be surrendered
in Santiago, or taken to Havana for that purpose, but the Spanish took
the vessel to an obscure harbor, Bahia Honda, and there delivered her
to Captain W. D. Whiting, chief of staff of the North Atlantic Squad-
ron. Lieutenant Marix was his flag lieutenant, the same ofiiicer who
was recently judge advocate on the court of inquiry oji the " Maine "
disaster. The salute to the flag never took place, and no indemnity
was ever paid for the lives of the American citizens who had been
executed. Right then and there the United States should have de-
clared war on Spain; but, in lieu thereof, she allowed the incident to
be closed and the vessel to be surrendered in a little obscure place in
order to avoid the publicity of the ''Virginius " being returned; and
this publicity was one of the principal subjects the United States was
supposed to have in mind when she arranged the terms. Spain came
out of the afifair with flying colors. The " Virginius " was of no use
to her, or, indeed, to anybody else, because she was not seaworthy, and
a little later sank on her way to New York. The United States went
through the form of exacting certain conditions in order to appease

6o CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.

some of her people, but at the same time was very careful not to insist
upon conditions which Spain might refuse, and thus leave her the
alternative of declaring war. An eye-witness of this transfer of the
"' Virginius " writes:

" While the Spanish officer was courtesy itself, we were all im-
pressed with the fact that the ceremony was lacking in dignity and that
the Spaniards had purposely n.ade that lack as conspicuous as they
dared. It appeared that the ' Virginius ' was towed from Havana by
the first-class man-of-war ' Isabella la Catolica,' the commander of
which retired immediately and left the surrender to be made by the
commander of the ' Favorita,' which had been in the vicinity of Bahia
Honda for several months engaged in surveying duty. The surrender
should have taken place either at Santiago de Cuba or at Havana, and
a Spanish officer of like rank with Captain Whiting should have dis-
charged the duty. A quick survey by our officers showed the ' Vir-
ginius ' to be in a most filthy condition. She was stripped of almost
everything movable save a few vermin, which haunted the mattresses
and cushions in cabin and staterooms, and half a dozen casks of water.
The decks were caked with dirt, and nuisances recently committed,
combined with mold and decomposition, caused a foul stench in the
forecastle and below the hatches. In th-e cabin, however, the odor of
carbolic acid gave evidence that an attempt had been made to make
that part of the vessel habitable for the temporary custodians of the
ship. Our officers were reluctant to put the men into the dirty fore-
castle and stowed them away into hardly more agreeable quarters
afforded by the staterooms of Ryan and his butchered companions.
Some attempt seemed to have been made, as shown by the engineering
survey, to repair the machinery, but a few hours' work put the engines
in workable order. The ship was leaking considerably and the pumps
had to be kept going constantly to keep the water down. After a few
hours of hard work we got under way, but had only gone two hundred
yards when the engine suddenly refused to do duty, and it became
necessary for the ' Dispatch ' to take us in tow. As we passed the
fort at the entrance to the harbor the Spanish flag was rather defiantly
displayed by that antiquated apology for a fortification, and there was
no salute for the American flag, either from the fort or the surrender-
ing sloop of war.

'' We had a hard time that night, those of us who were aboard the
* Virginius.' It seemed hardly possible that we could keep afloat until

DISCOVERY AND SETTLEMENT. 6l

morning. During the night the navy tug ' Fortune ' from Key West
met us and remained with the convoy. At noon the next day, when
we were about thirty miles south-southeast of Dry Tortugas, the ves-
sels separated, the ' Virginius ' and ' Dispatch ' going to Tortugas and
the ' Fortune ' returning, with me as a solitary passenger, to Key
West, whence I had the honor of reporting the news to the admiral
and of sending an exclusive report of the surrender.

A Scurvy Spanish Trick.

" It was the general opinion among the naval officers that Spain
had endeavored to belittle the whole proceeding ordering the smug-
gling of the * Virginius ' out of Havana, by selecting an obscure harbor
not a port of entry as the place of surrender, and by turning the duty
of surrender over to a surveying sloop, while the ' Tornado,' which
made the capture, lay in the harbor of Havana and the ' Isabella la
Catolica,' which had been selected as convoy, steamed back to
Havana under cover of the night. The American officers and Ameri-
can residents in Cuba and Key West agreed that our government
ought to have required that the ' Virginius ' should be surrendered
with all the released prisoners on board either at Santiago de Cuba,
where the ' Tornado ' brought her ill-gotten prey and where the in-
human butcheries were committed, or in Havana, where she was after-
ward taken in triumph and greeted with the cheers of the excited
Spaniards over the humiliation of the Americans.

'' An attempt was made to take the ' Virginius ' to some Northern
port, but the old hulk was not equal to the journey. On the way no
pumping or calking could stop her leaks, and she foundered in mid-
ocean. The Government had been puzzled to know what disposition
to make of her, and there was great relief in official circles to know
that she was out of the way.

'' The surrender of the surviving prisoners of the massacre took
place in course of time at Santiago, owing more to British insistence
than to our feeble representations. As to the fifty-three who were
killed, the Madrid Government unblushingly denied that there had
been any killing, and when forced to acknowledge the fact they put us
off with preposterous excuses. ' Butcher Burriel,' by whose orders
the outrage was perpetrated, was considered at Madrid to have been
justified by circumstances. It was pretended that orders to suspend
the. execution of Ryan and his associates were ' unfortunately ' received

\

62 CUBA*S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.

too late, owing to interruption of telegraph lines by the insurgents, to
whose broad and bleeding shoulders an attempt was thus made to shift
the responsibility. There was a normal repudiation of Burriel's act,
and a promise was made to inflict punishment upon those who have
offended, but no punishment was inflicted upon anybody. The Span-
ish Government, with characteristic double-dealing, resorted to pro-
crastination, prevarication, and trickery, and thus gained time until
new issues effaced in the American mind the memory of old wrongs
unavenged. Instead of being degraded, Burriel was promoted.
Never to this day has there been any adequate atonement by
Spain."

This war dragged on for ten years, and was finally ended by nego-
tiations conducted by General Martinez de Campos, who was sent to
Cuba as Captain General for the express purpose of ending the war.
How he did his work has been told by himself at great length. The
simple fact is that he prevailed upon the leaders of the insurgents to
lay down their arms, partly through bribery and partly through
promises of reforms in the government of the island. The final bar-
gain was made at a place called Zanjon, and has since been known
as the " Treaty of Zanjon."

General Campos was undoubtedly sincere in his promises to the
Cubans. He urged upon the Spanish Government the desirability of
fulfilling them to the letter. In his report to the Government he said:

Campos' Wise Words.

" I do not wish to make a momentary peace. I desire that this
peace be the beginning of a bond of common interests between Spain
and her Cuban provinces, and that this bond be drawn continually
closer by the identity of aspirations and the good faith of both.

" Let not the Cubans be considered as pariahs or minors, but put
on an equality with other Spaniards in everything not inconsistent with
their present condition.

" It was on the other hand impossible, according to my judgment
and conscience, not to grant the first condition; not to do it was to
postpone indefinitely the fulfillment of a promise made in our pres-
ent constitution. It was not possible that this island, richer, more
populous, and more advanced morally and materially than her sister,
Porto Rico, should remain without the advantages and liberties long
ago planted in the latter with good results; and the spirit of the age, and

DISCOVERY AND SETTLEMENT. 63

the decision of the country gradually to assimilate the colonies to the
Peninsula, made it necessary to grant the promised reforms, which
would have been already established, and surely more amply, if the
abnormal state of things had not concentrated all the attention of gov-
ernment on the extirpation of the evil which was devouring this rich
province.

'' I did not make the last constitution; I had no part in the discus-
sion of it. It is now the law, and as such I respect it, and as such en-
deavor to apply it. But there was in it something conditional, which
I think a danger, a motive of distrust, and I have wished that it might
disappear. Nothing assures me that the present ministry will con-
tinue in power, and I do not know whether that which replaces it
would believe the fit moment to have arrived for fulfilling the precept
of the constitution.

*' I desire the peace of Spain, and this will not be firm while there is
war or disturbance in the richest jewel of her crown. Perhaps the in-
surgents would have accepted promises less liberal and more vague
than those set forth in this condition; but even had this been done, it
would have been but a brief postponement, because those liberties are
destined to come for the reasons already given, with the difference that
Spain now shows herself generous and magnanimous, satisfying just
aspirations which she might deny, and a little later, probably very
soon, would have been obliged to grant them, compelled by the force
of ideas and of the age.

*' Moreover, she has promised over and over again to enter on the
path of assimilation, and if the promise were more vague, even though
the fulfillment of this promise were begun, these people would have
the right to doubt our good faith and to show a distrust unfortunately
warranted by the failings of human nature itself.

'' The not adding another 100,000 to the 100,000 families that
mourn their sons slain in this pitiless war, and the cry of peace that
will resound in the hearts of the 80,000 mothers who have sons in
Cuba, or liable to conscription, would be a full equivalent for the pay-
ment of a debt of justice."

Results of the War.

It remains to be said that the Spanish Government quickly re-
pudiated almost every promise that had been made by General Cam-
pos, and that the state of the island soon became as bad as it had
been before the war.

V

64 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.

What the war cost Cuba and cost Spain can never be exactly told.
According to official Spanish statements, 145,000 soldiers were sent
from Spain to the island. It is known that the losses of the patriots,
in killed, were more than 45,000. The majority of these were mur-
dered in cold blood in prison after they had surrendered or been cap-
tured. Some 13,000 estates belonging to Cubans were confiscated.
The cost of the war in money has been estimated at about one billion
dollars. It is believed that the Spanish losses, in killed and from dis-
ease, amounted to fully 85,000. During the war a university professor
at Havana kept a careful record of the number of Cubans the Span-
iards officially reported as killed, wounded, or captured. He found
at the end of the war that the totals amounted to considerable more
than the entire population of the island. This was a fair illustration of
the truthfulness of Spanish reports.

After the end of this Ten-Years' War, as it is called, Spanish mis-
government was continued as badly and in many respects worse than
before. All the cost of the war was charged against Cuba as a public
debt. Dishonesty and corruption became more flagrant than ever be-
fore. This was recognized by Spanish leaders at Madrid themselves.
Sefior Romero Robledo said in the Cortes in 1890 that certain defalca-
tions by the public officers at Havana amounted to nearly
twenty-three million dollars. The Government knew of it, but
did nothing. General Pando at about the same time said in the
Cortes: '* How can anyone doubt that corruption exists in the island
of Cuba? " General Prendergrast has furnished a list of 350 persons
employed in the customhouse and the administration, against whom
proceedings have been taken for fraud, and not one of whom has been
punished.

Another member of the Cortes in 1895 asserted that since 1878
customhouse frauds in Cuba had amounted to more than one hundred
million dollars.

In this manner the Government at Madrid repudiated its own
solemn pledges and drove the people of Cuba to despair. Thus the
way was cleared for the latest and last rebellion in the '' Ever-faithful
Isle."

X.

tiOfrHIGHT, 1898, BY THE INTtHNA f lONAL SOCIETY.

PRISON OF EVANGELTNA CISNEROS

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THE CUBA OF TO-DAY.

CHAPTER II.

Size, Shape, and Situation of the Island — Its Rivers and Harbors — The Vege-
tation and Climate — Agricultural Products — Mineral Resources — Something
about the People — The Negro Population — Religion and Education — The
Spanish Government a Military Despotism — Revolting Tyranny.

The island of Cuba is by far the largest and most important of all the
West Indies. Its area is much larger than that of any other; its natu-
ral resources are more varied and valuable; and its population, in spite
of the ravages of war and the discouragements of bad government, is
more numerous than that of any of its neighbors. Its position,
w^hether from the point of view of commerce or of war, lends it especial
importance. It is less than loo miles from the southern extremity of
the United States and 130 from Mexico. It commands three impor-
tant maritime gateways — viz., the Straits of Florida, leading from the
Atlantic Ocean into the Gulf of Mexico; the Windward Passage, which
leads from the Atlantic into the Caribbean Sea, and the Yucatan Chan-
nel, which connects the Caribbean Sea with the Gulf of Mexico.

The general outline of the island has been compared by the Span-
ish with that of a bird's tongue. It also resembles that of a hammer-
headed shark, the head of which forms the straight south coast of the
east end of the island, while the body extend's tO' the westward in a
great curve. This analogy is made still more striking by two long,
fin-like strings of small islands which extend along the opposite coasts,
parallel with the main body of the island. The island extends through
II degrees of longitude, from the 74th to the 85th meridian, and
through nearly 4 degrees of latitude, from 19° 40' to 23° 33'. Its
length is 730 miles, and its width varies from 90 miles at the eastern
end to less than 20 miles at Havana. Cape Maysi, the eastern ex-
tremity, lies directly south of New York, and Cape San Antonio, at
the extreme west, is exactly south of Cincinnati. The area of the main
island is nearly 43,000 square miles, and that of the smaller adjacent
islands about 2600 square miles.

The total area, therefore, is about equal to that of the State of New

York.

67

68 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.

On this area are to be found almost all kinds of land, including
swamps, level plains, plateaus, hills, and high mountains. About one-
fourth of the total area is mountainous, while three-fifths are plains,
valleys, and low hills. The remainder is swampy. The coast line,
with its many curves and indentations, measures nearly 2200 miles.
In some parts it is high and steep and at others low and marshy.
Along the north coast, between the cities of Havana and Matanzas, are
ranges of hills which Humboldt declared to contain some of the most
beautiful scenery in the world. In the central part of the island these
hills change into extensive plateaus, and at the south side become
mountainous and reach a high altitude.

RIVERS AND HARBORS.

The rivers of Cuba are necessarily short, but are numerous and
afiford excellent drainage to the entire island. The heavy rainfall gives
them a copious volume, despite the limited area of watershed. No
island in the world of comparable size has anything like so many
good harbors as Cuba. Indeed, no equal stretch of coast line in the
world is blessed with so many. They are not only numerous, but
capacious, deep, and safe. Most of them are pouch-shaped, entrance
to them being gained through a comparatively narrow gateway, with
high headlands on each side and the interior harbor almost entirely
landlocked, expanding into a large open bay. Chief among these
harbors are Havana, Matanzas, Nuevitas, Gibara, Nipe, and Baracoa
on the north coast, and Guantanamo, Santiago de Cuba, Manzanillo,
Trinidad, and Cienfuegos on the south. The last-named is said to be
one of the very finest harbors in the world.

THE FLORA.

The surface of the island, as described by Professor Robert T. Hill
of the United States Geological Survey (from whom this chapter is
largely quoted), is clad in a voluptuous floral mantle which, from its
abundance and beauty, first caused Cuba to be designated as the Pearl
of the Antilles. In addition to those introduced from abroad, over
3350 native plants have been catalogued. Humboldt said: '' We might
believe the entire island was originally a forest of palms, wild limes,
and orange trees." The flora includes nearly all the characteristic
forms of the other West Indies, the southern part of Florida, and the
Central American seaboard. Nearly all the large trees of the Mexican

THE CUBA OF TO-DAY. 69

Tierra Caliente, so remarkable for their size, foliage, and fragrance,
reappear in western Cuba. Over 30 species of palm, including the
famous royal palm {Orcodoxa rcgia), occur, while the pine tree, else-
where characteristic of the temperate zone and the high altitudes of the
tropics, is found associated with palms and mahoganies in the province
of Pinar del Rio and the Isle of Pines, both of which take their names
from this tree.

Among other woods are the lignum vitse, granadilla, the cocoa
wood, out of which reed instruments are made, mahogany, and
Cedrela odorata, which is used for cigar boxes and linings of cabinet
work.

Although three hundred years of cultivation have exterminated the
forests from the sugar lands of the center and west, it is estimated that
in the hills of those districts and the mountains of the east nearly
thirteen million acres of uncleared forest remain.

Rich and nutritious grasses are found throughout the island, afiford-
ing excellent forage for stock. The pineapple, manioc, sweet potato,
and Indian corn are indigenous to the island. When the flora of Cuba
is studied geographically, it will doubtless be divided into several sub-
divisions.

THE CLIMATE.

Climatologic records are not available, except for Havana,
and these are not applicable to the whole island, where it is
but natural to suppose that the altitudes and positions of the high
mountains produce great variations in precipitation and humidity, such
as are observable in adjacent islands. The Sierra Maestra probably
presents conditions of temperature very nearly the same as the Blue
I Mountains of Jamaica, where the thermometer at times falls almost

to the freezing point.

Everywhere the rains are most abundant in summer, from May to
October — the rainy season. As a rule, the rains, brought by the trade
winds, are heavier and more frequent on the slopes of the eastern end.
At Havana the annual rainfall is 40 inches, of which 28 inches fall in
the wet season. This rainfall is not excessive, being no greater than
that of our Eastern States. The air at this place is usually charged with
85 per cent, of moisture, which under the tropical sun largely induces
the rich mantle of vegetation. The average number of rainy days in
the year is 102. There is but one record of snow having fallen in
Cuba, namely, in 1856.

JO CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.

At Havana, in July and August, the warmest months, the mean
temperature is 82° F., fluctuating between a maximum of SS"" and a
minimum of 76°; in the cooler months of December and January the
thermometer averages ^2^ , the maximum being 78°, the minimum 58°;
the mean temperature of the year at Havana, on a mean of seven years,
is yj"', but in the interior, at elevations of over 300 feet above the sea,
the thermometer occasionally falls to the freezing point in winter, hoar
frost is not uncommon, and during north winds thin ice may form.
The prevailing wind is the easterly trade breeze, but from November
to February cool north winds {los nortes, or " northers ") — the south-
ern attenuation of our own cold waves — rarely lasting more than forty-
eight hours, are experienced in the western portion of the island, to
which they add a third seasonal change. From 10 to 12 o'clock are
the hottest hours of the day; after noon a refreshing breeze (/a virazon)
sets in from the sea. In Santiago de Cuba the average is 80°; that of
the hottest month is 84° and that of the coldest 73°.

The whole island is more or less subject to hurricanes, often of
great ferocity. The hurricane of 1846 leveled nearly 2000 houses in
Havana and sank or wrecked over 300 vessels. In 1896 the banana
plantations of the east were similarly destroyed. Earthquakes are sel-
dom felt in the western districts, but are frequent in the eastern.

All in all, the climate of Cuba is much more salubrious than it has
been painted. The winter months are delightful — in fact, ideal — while
the summer months are more endurable than in most of our own terri-
tory. The current impressions of insalubrity have arisen from an erro-
neous confusion of bad sanitation with the weather. While it is true
that sickness follows the seasons, the former would be greatly allayed
— almost abated — if public hygiene received proper official con-
sideration.

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS.

Cuba is almost exclusively an agricultural country. Its chief
products are sugar from the sugar-cane, tobacco, cofifee, bananas, corn,
oranges, and pineapples, v/hich are of importance in the order named.
The production of cane-sugar is incomparably the most important of
all, and heretofore has been the mainstay of the island. This industry
had its origin as long ago as 1523, when the king of Spain gave a
bounty to everyone who engaged in it. In times of peace the whole
vast central plain of the island has been practically one continuous
field of sugar-cane. In the year 1892-93 it yielded more than one

i

THE CUBA OF TO-DAY. /I

million tons, valued at eighty million dollars. The Cuban sugar lands
are all on upland soils, far different from the swamps of Louisiana, and
excel in fertility all others in the world. It is necessary to replant the
cane only once in seven years, instead of every year or two as else-
where. The plantations vary in extent from one hundred to one thou-
sand acres each, and employ an average of one man to every two acres.
Before the plantations were ravaged by the revolution, they were
equipped with the most perfect manufacturing machinery in the world.

Tobacco stands next to sugar in importance, and far exceeds it in
the profit per acre. It grows well in all parts of the island, but is
chiefly cultivated in the extreme western end, which produces the finest
tobacco in the world. In addition to plantations for growing leaf
tobacco, there are numerous cigar factories in Havana, giving employ-
ment to thousands of people. In 1893 more than six million pounds
of tobacco and one hundred and thirty-five million cigars were ex-
ported.

Coffee growing has declined in importance in recent years. The
coffee plantations have all given way to sugar. Bananas and oranges
of the finest quality grow wild in all parts of the island. Pineapples
are extensively cultivated. Mahogany and logwood have also been
among the exports, and at one time indigo formed a considerable
article of commerce.

In the eastern provinces of the island, the cattle industry, owing to
the fertile grazing lands, reaches large proportions. Horses, goats,
and sheep are also bred, though the latter do not do well. Poultry
flourishes everywhere, and was, before the war, abundant in all mar-
kets. In 1895 the island contained more than one hundred thousand
farms and plantations, valued at more than twenty million dollars.

MINERAL RESOURCES.

The mineral resources of the island are iron ores, asphaltum, man-
ganese, copper, and salt. A little gold and silver were mined in past
centuries, but never in large quantities. The silver mines of Santa
Clara yielded in 1827 140 ounces to the ton, but were soon worked
out. The iron mines situated in the mountains a few miles east of
Santiago de Cuba are of importance. The production of the Juragua
Iron Company in 1890 was 362,068 tons, and constituted one-fourth
of the total importation of iron ores into the United States for the same
period. These mines were owned by an American company, which

72 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.

had invested extensive capital in them, but the production has been
almost destroyed by the present revolution. The ores are mineralog-
ically peculiar, being the result of replacement in limestone. They
are mixed brown and red hematite (turgite).

Asphaltum (chapatote) of unusual richness occurs in several parts
of the island, in the beds of late Cretaceous and early Eocene age. At
Villa Clara occurs an unusually large deposit of this material, w^hich
for forty years has supplied the material for making the illuminating
gas of the city. American investors bought these mines the year pre-
ceding the revolution, and their investment up to date, which would
otherwise have been profitable, has proved a total loss.

Copper of extraordinary richness has been worked on the leeward
side of the Sierra Maestra range, twelve miles from Santiago de Cuba.
In former years these mines yielded as high as fifty tons per day. Cur-
rent report asserts that they are still very valuable, but are awaiting
the return of peace and development. Salt of great purity is found in
the cays adjacent to the north coast.

No manufacturing industries except those of tobacco and sugar
have been encouraged, the persistent policy of Spain having been to
promote the importation of manufactured articles from the mother
country. In the writer's travels over the island only a single indus-
trial establishment was seen, namely, a mill at Baracoa for extracting
oil from cocoanuts and making soap.

COMMERCE.

The shipping trade of Cuba, both foreign and coastwise, has been
very extensive, the American tonnage alone amounting to 1,000,000
tons a year. About 1200 ocean-going vessels annually clear from the
Port of Havana. In 1894 the tonnage of the largest nine ports of the
island amounted to more than 3,500,000 tons, carried by 31,181 vessels.

The island is not well supplied with roads. There are less than
1000 miles of railroad — none of it first-class. Wagon roads are poor.
Telegraph lines in 1895 measured something more than 2800 miles,
including nearly 1000 miles of cables along the coast.

THE CHIEF CITIES.

The capital city, Havana, which boasts of the title of Key of the New
World, lies on the west and south side of a splendid harbor, which,

THE CUBA OF TO-DAY. 73

however, has been sadly neglected. It is a picturesque and beautiful
city, presenting a brilliant appearance of a European capital. Its com-
merce is ordinarily enormous, and its extensive parks, drives, and
numerous clubs and public institutions give it picturesque variety. It
comprises extensive wharfs, fortifications, hospitals, university, a
botanical garden, government palaces, and several churches — includ-
ing a cathedral, which contains the tomb of Columbus, although his
dust is not certainly known to repose therein.

West of Havana are several small ports of secondary importance,
such as Mariel, Cabanas, and Bahia Honda. Seventy-five miles east
is the second city and seaport of northern Cuba, Matanzas. This is
the chief outlet for an extensive sugar region. Nature endowed it
with a superb harbor, but Spanish neglect has allowed it to become
filled up with silt and rubbish, until it is no longer able to receive the
largest steamships.

Cardenas is one of the few towns in Cuba founded as late as the
present century. It dates back only to 1828.

Cienfuegos, on the southern coast, has a superb harbor, which was
first visited in 1508. It is second in commercial importance only to
Havana. Trinidad, east of Cienfuegos, has three harbors and is of
much importance, dating back to the earliest years of the Spanish con-
quests.

The great port of the eastern end of the island is Santiago de
Cuba. It lies at the inner extremity of one of the largest and finest
of the pouch-shaped harbors and commands one of the most mag-
nificent views of land and water to be had in the whole world. There
are also numerous inland cities of importance — such as Santa Clara,
Esperanza, Puerto Principe, Holguin, and Bayamo.

Upon few subjects connected with Cuba is the world at large so ill-
informed as that of its population. No trustworthy census has been
taken by the Government for half a century. One was taken in 1887,
but is probably filled with errors. It showed the total population to
be something more than 1,600,000, of whom more than two-thirds were
white and only thirty-two per cent, of the negro race.

Of the total population of Cuba about 30,000 are Chinese male
laborers. The Spanish-born, not counting the present army of in-
vasion, probably do not exceed 30,000, while counting all others there
are not over 50,000 Caucasian foreigners. This foreign population,
except the Chinese, is engaged in office-holding, trade, and shipping,
and is largely confined by residence to the cities, which contain fully

74 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.

one-third of the total population. These foreigners, having no other
interest in the welfare of the country than gain of wealth, and possess-
ing no intention of permanent residence, should not be considered in
any manner as representative of the Cuban people, although, alas! their
voice has, in recent political events, almost drowned that of the true
inhabitants.

To the Cubans the foreign Spaniards are known as Intransigentes,
and between the two classes, the governors and the governed, owing
to the despotism of the former, a bitter hatred has existed since 1812,
and has been more strongly accentuated since the surrender of Zan-
jon, in 1876, when the rebellious Cubans laid down their arms under
unfulfilled promises of autonomy and local self-government similar to
schemes lately presented.

THE CUBANS.

Seventy-five per cent, of the native population of the islands is
found outside of the Spanish capital of Havana, which, being the seat
of an unwelcome foreign despotism, is no more representative of Cuban
life or character than is the English city of Hong-Kong of the rural
Chinese. While the Havanese have had the freest communication
with the United States during the last three years of the revolution,
Americans have had little opportunity to hear from the true white
Cuban population. The Cubans are mostly found in the provinces
and provincial cities, especially in Pinar del Rio and the eastern prov-
inces of Santa Clara, Puerto Principe, and Santiago. Although of
Spanish blood, the Cubans, through adaptation to environment, have
become a different class from the people of the mother country, just
as the American stock has differentiated from the English. Under the
influence of their surroundings, they have developed into a gentle, in-
dustrious, and normally peaceable race, not to be judged by the com-
bativeness which they have developed under a tyranny such as has
never been imposed upon any other people. The better class of
Camagueynos, as the natives are fond of calling themselves, are cer-
tainly the finest, the most valiant, and the most independent men of
the island, while the women have the highest type of beauty. It is
their boast that no Cuban woman has ever become a prostitute, and
crime is certainly almost unknown among them.

While these people may not possess our local customs and habits,
they have strong traits of civilized character, including honesty, family
attachment, hospitality, politeness of address, and a respect for the

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THE CUBA OF TO-DAY. *]^

Golden Rule. While numerically inferior to the annual migration of
Poles, Jews, and Italians into the eastern United States, against which
no official voice is raised, they are far too superior to these people to
justify the abuse that has been heaped upon them by those who have
allowed their judgment to be prejudiced by fears that they might by
some means be absorbed into our future population.

Notwithstanding the disadvantages under which the Cubans have
labored, they have contributed many members to the learned profes-
sions. To educate their sons and daughters in the institutions of the
United States, England, and France has always been the highest am-
bition of the Creoles of Cuba and Porto Rico. The influence of their
educated men is felt in many countries: the most distinguished pro-
fessor of civil engineering, two leading civil engineers of our navy,
and the most eminent authority on yellow fever in our country be-
long to this class. Thousands of these people, driven from their
beloved island, have settled in Paris, London, New York, Mexico,
and the West Indies, where they hold honorable positions in society,
and even the exiles of the lower classes, with their superior agricul-
tural arts, have been eagerly welcomed in countries like Jamaica, Mex-
ico, and Florida, which hope to share with Cuba the benefits of its
tobacco culture.

The negro population of Cuba, both pure black and mulatto, are
much more independent and manly in their bearing than their kins-
men in the United States. Their social privileges are also much
greater, and, indeed they are largely treated almost as the equals of the
white race. They belong to several distinct classes. Most of them are
descendants of slaves imported during the present century. Many of
them, however, are descendants from slaves brought into the island by
the earliest Spanish settlers. There are also a few who have migrated
hither from the United States. As there are no more than half as many
negroes as whites in Cuba, and the proportion of negroes is steadily
growing smaller and will continue to do so at an increasingly rapid
rate, all fear of " negro domination " in the island may be dismissed
as idle.

RELIGION AND EDUCATION.

The Roman Catholic religion prevails throughout Cuba. The
island is divided into two dioceses. One, under the Archbishop of San-
tiago de Cuba, contains 55 parishes; the other, under the Bishop of
Havana, contains 144 parishes. In the whole island there are prob-

78 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.

ably not a dozen priests of Cuban birth; the ecclesiastical, as well as the
political, functionaries of the island, being imported from Spain.

Education is much neglected. There is not a parish on the whole
island that supports an endowed school. At Havana there is a uni-
versity and four or five professional schools, and, of course, a number
of private and public schools of common grade, but for the mass of the
people educational facilities are most meager, while all who are able
to do so send their children away from the island to the United States
or to Europe for instruction.

Since its first settlement Cuba has been treated as a subordinate
crown colony. The central and absolute authority of the Crown has
been exercised by a Captain General, who has generally wielded the
arbitrary power of a czar. He has had the right even to set aside, at
will, any judgment of the courts. His authority has been backed, even
in times of peace, by a Spanish army much larger than the army of the
United States, and with police powers unknown in this country. In
addition to the army, there have been thousands of ofifice-holders, high
and low, attending to all the public business of the island and draw-
ing all the salaries, and of these ninety-nine per cent, have been mere
" carpet-baggers " from Spain.

The lower classes of the Havana male population — porters, dray-
men, and clerks — are organized into a dangerous and oftentimes un-
controllable military force, known as the Volunteers, who, while never
having been known to take the field, are a serious menace to the peace
of the city, being feared equally by the authorities, over whose heads
they wave the threat of mutiny, especially upon any indication of grant-
ing reforms, and by the resident and unarmed Cubans, over whom they
hold the threat of massacre. Up to date the record of this organized
mob has been a series of horrible crimes, such as shooting down a
crowd of peaceable citizens as the}^ emerged from the theater, firing
into the office and dining room of a hotel, assaulting the residences of
Cuban gentlemen, and in 1871 forcing the authorities to execute forty-
three medical students, all boys under twenty, because one of them
had been accused of scratching the glass plate on a vault containing
the remains of a volunteer. Fifteen thousand volunteers witnessed
with exultation this ignoble execution.

While the primary functions of the Government have been to
attend to the prerogatives of the Crown and the collection of revenues,
its attention has been largely devoted t(?the personal enrichment of the
officials through misfeasance and the prevention of the secession of

THE CUBA OF TO-DAY. 79

the island. It has practically ignored the other functions of govern-
ment, such as the collection of statistics, the promotion of education,
and the establishment of public works and proper public sanitation.
Few, if any, educational institutions have been erected at public ex-
pense; no public highways have been constructed, nor have any
improvements of a public character been made outside of the city of
Havana. Even when the Cubans have undertaken such improve-
ments, they have been heavily taxed for the benefit of the Spanish
officials. The administration of Cuba is and has been since the set-
tlement of the island an absolute military despotism on the part of the
mother country. At periods, dependent upon the personality of the
Captain General, there have been epochs of peace and prosperity, but
since the middle of the present century the island has been in a state
of insurrection, dormant or eruptive, accompanied by a growing hatred
between the governing and the governed classes, with constantly in-
creasing restrictions upon the latter. At times the revolting people
were reduced to subjection by promises of local self-government, which
have invariably been broken.

MILITARY DESPOTISM.

During the present century the Spanish Crown has made various
pretenses of giving to the inhabitants of the island greater political
privileges, but all of these, down tO' the latest and present autonomy
scheme, have been the merest subterfuges, void of the true essence of
local self-government, with a string attachment by which absolute and
despotic power remained in the hands of the Spanish Governor Gen-
eral. Thus it was that in February, 1878, the ten-years' revolution was
ended by General Campos. Under the stipulations of the treaty the
island was allowed to be represented in the Spanish Cortes by 16
senators and 30 deputies; but restrictions were so thrown around their
selection that Cubans were practically debarred from participating in
the choice of these members, notwithstanding that these so-called rep-
resentatives were utterly powerless to press any Cuban measure in the
Cortes of over 900 members or to put it to a vote.

This military despotism has been accompanied by a system of ex-
orbitant taxation, such as has never been known elsewhere in the
world. This has included at times an average of 40 per cent, on all
imports, in addition to taxes upon real estate, the industries, arts, pro-
fessions, the slaughtering of meats, and an odious system of stamp

8o CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.

taxes, which even included in its far-reaching application the affixing
of an impost stamp upon every arrival at a hotel. The processes of
possible direct taxation being exhausted, the Government even resorted
to the establishment of a most nefarious and contaminating lottery sys-
tem, which yielded a profit of $4,000,000 annually.

In 1879 the total revenue collected was about $35,000,000, or $25
per capita, all of which, except $98,000, was spent — mostly in the pay-
ment of the parasitic horde of intransigente soldiers and office-holders
and the Spanish debt. In addition to the legal taxation, the com-
merce is burdened by a system of illegal taxation in the form of bribes,
which are necessary to the securing of any legal action. Little or none
of this money was devoted to education, science, public construction,
harbor improvements, highways, sanitation, or other benevolent pur-
poses, such as those to which our free government devotes its per
capita tax of $13.65. It is also a remarkable fact, notwithstanding the
extravagant taxation, that only about $100,000,000 have been remitted
to the mother country during the past century, most of the revenue
having been diverted to maintain the official classes. It is a common
assertion that, with the exception of Martinez Campos, no captain
general has ever returned to Spain after a four years' intendency except
as a millionaire.

REVOLTING TYRANNY.

The right of free speech on the part of the individual citizen has not
only been restricted, but the rigorous press law of 188 1 requires every
editor or manager of a paper to send, duly signed by him, two copies
of each issue to government headquarters and two other copies to the
district attorney as soon as printed, that it may be seen whether any
objectionable remarks are contained therein. Nearly every publica-
tion in Cuba has been suspended at some time or other, and its editor
fined, imprisoned, or deported to the penal colonies.

The American who undertakes to investigate the history of the
Spanish Government in Cuba inevitably finds he has undertaken an
unpleasant task. Greed, injustice, bribery, and cruelty have been prac-
ticed with such frequency that volumes could be filled with details.
Beyond and above all this, however, prominently stands the fact that
Spain has thrice endeavored to extinguish the entire native population.
The first of these attempts, practiced in former centuries upon the
aborigines, was successful. The second attempt was made during the
Ten- Years' War by Valmaseda, who wrote:

THE CUBA OF TO-DAY. 8l

*' Not a single Cuban will remain on this island, because we shoot
all those we find in the fields, on their farms, and in every hovel. . .
We do not leave a creature alive where we pass, be it man or animal.
If we find cows, we kill them; if horses, ditto; if hogs, ditto; men,
women, or children, ditto. As to the houses, we burn them. So
everyone receives what he deserves — the men with bullets, the animals
with the bayonet. The island will remain a desert."

The intentions of this ofBcer were only foiled by the arousal of
foreign public sentiment against him, and his replacement by the
humane General Campos, who tried to restore peace. The third
attempt at extermination, a matter of present history, was made by
Weyler, who expressed sentiments as ferocious as those of Val-
maseda.

How successful Weyler^s policy has been, partially carried out, can
be answered by the graves of a fourth of the population, which have
been recently filled with victims. The sole remnant of the Cuban peo-
ple would at this time have consisted of the soldiers of Gomez if
Weyler's policy had been continued.

Martinez Campos, who has the reputation of being the best Span-
iard ever placed in high authority in Cuba, was sincere when he nego-
tiated the treaty of Zanjon, and thought the Spanish Government was
sincere in the liberal plan of reforms, which were generally expected
in good faith by a large majority of the people, but as the years went
on it became manifest that the whole plan was an illusion and a
mockery.

The few deputies Cuba was allowed to send to the Cortes had no
weight or position there, and any protests that they made were either
ignored or derided. The government of the island became worse and
worse. Taxes increased, public works were more neglected, and job-
bery and corruption prevailed in all parts of the government. The
peninsula stood first — the island last.

Spain, however, recognized the fact that her hold on this colonial
possession was gradually weakening, and that something would have
to be done to prevent the sword being unsheathed there. Impelled by
these considerations, and hearing the first growl of a new '' dog of
war," she determined to go through certain forms which wo'uld give
her colonies some faith in her assertions that a more just and liberal
government should be meted out to them. So she concocted a farci-
cal home rule for Cuba, put forward in all apparent seriousness, but

82 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.

only to be a grim joke. Under the name of " home rule," as it was
called, it would have fastened the Spanish yoke more firmly than ever
upon the island. It must have taken considerable labor and work to
get it up, for it was diffuse and extensive. Many rumors reached Cuba
of this great and generous act on the part of Spain, and many reports
came also that it would soon be put into operation. At last it was
acknowledged that a huge document labled " Home Rule " had been
received in the palace by General Valeriano Weyler, then Governor
and Captain General, which this ofBcer had been instructed in due
time to put into operation by properly starting . its cumbersome
machinery.

Weyler, being bitterly opposed to any and every thing that savored
of local Cuban government, found no difficulty in letting this first
bundle of " Home Rule " sleep quietly in his official desk. Indeed
the time had passed for Spain to make any proposal of this sort. It
was too late, and the memory of recent broken pledges too fresh.
The Cubans regarded this proposal as a mockery and an insult, and
began to see that they would have to fight again before they ever ex-
pected to get freedom and justice. Then Spain began to find out that
it would be necessary to grant fuller reforms than she had ever granted
before. Indeed the idea was conceived in the brain of a statesman at
Madrid that the Cubans must have an autonomistic government, pur-
porting to be a real liberal, general, local self-government controlled
by a majority of the voters. This autonomistic government was a
very curious mechanical contrivance. It looked just and fair, but, on
examination, the close observer could see a string attached to almost
all of its most important features, one end of the string being in Madrid
after passing through the hands of the Spanish Captain General at
Havana.

But at that time the storm had gathered; heavy clouds, dark with
discontent and rebellion against the Spanish authorities, were ready to
burst, and war was an accomplished fact. " We have not counted the
number of our enemies," said one of the Cuban leaders, " but we have
cast up an account of our grievances, we have weighed the mass of
injustice which crushes us." '' We may find ruin and death a few steps
ahead; so be it, we do our duty." '' The people of Cuba require liberty
and independence to become a factor in the community of civilized
nations." '' The field lies entirely with Spain." " Cuba is the de-
fender of its rights."

The first '' Home Rule " bill was finally published on the 24th of

THE CUBA OF TO-DAY. 83

February, 1895, and a few weeks thereafter the new Cuban Republic,
was proclaimed.

Jose Marti was the chief organizer of this movement. He had
been in New York City for many years, gaining knowledge in literary
and artistic pursuits. After making an attempt to get up an expe-
dition, which was stopped by the United States authorities at Fernan-
dina, Fla., he went to San Domingo to see Maximo Gomez, who had
been one of the leaders in the Ten- Years' War, and with him landed
in the month of May, and raised the flag of the Cuban Republic at
Cubitas, a small town among the mountains of the province of Puerto
Principe, near the eastern end of the island. At that time there were
some 19,000 Spanish troops on the island in addition to 50,000 volun-
teers. It was not until Marti, Gomez, and other leaders arrived in
Cuba that the magnitude of the movement was appreciated. As soon
as the Madrid authorities were informed that another revolution was in
progress they sent over 7000 additional troops at once, making on the
island about 76,000 men.

Marti, at the outbreak of the Ten- Years' War, was only thirteen
years old, but seemed to be considered a dangerous person, because
he was sent to Spain for conspiring against the Government, and was
kept him in an unwholesome prison until his life was in danger, and
was then released under the condition that he would remain in Spain
the rest of his life.

While in Spain he went to the University of Saragossa, where he
graduated with much honor; after that he went to France, and then
came to the United States. The Ten- Years' War was then nearly at
its end, but he immediately joined it.

An expedition which he organized and brought from Mexico
proved a failure, but Marti escaped and went to Central America,
where he became a university professor.

As is known, he came to Cuba afterward and lost his life in defense
of her cause.

During the summer or rainy season practically a truce prevailed.
The prevalence of yellow fever and other diseases, the intense heat and
daily thunderstorms, forced to a great extent the suspension of active
operations, though the Cubans were afifected less by these climatic
changes than were the Spaniards. The Spanish army was largely in-
creased before the opening of the fall campaign, for the purpose of
promptly suppressing this insurrection. The Cubans upon their side
had been recruiting and drilling, and thus were made more effective.

84 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.

On the 19th of September at Anton, in the province of Puerto Prin-
cipe, a formal proclamation of the mdependence of Cuba was made,
and a form of republican government was organized, and the Consti-
tution promulgated. The officers of state were the following:

President, Salvador Cisneros Betancourt of Puerto Principe; Vice
President, Bartolome Maso of Manzanillo; Secretary of War, Carlos
Roloff of Santa Clara; Vice Secretary of War, Mario Menocal of
'Matanzas; Secretary of Foreign Relations, Rafael Portuondo y Ta-
mayo of Santiago de Cuba; Vice Secretary of Foreign Relations,
Fermin Valdis Dominguez of Havana; Secretary of Finance, Joaquin
Castillo Duany of Santiago de Cuba; Secretary of the Interior, Santi-
ago Canizares of Remedios; Vice Secretary of the Interior, Carlos du
Bois of Baracoa; General in Chief, Maximo Gomez; Lieutenant General,
Antonio Maceo. Jose Maceo, Maso, Capote, Serafin Sanchez, and
Rodrigues were appointed Major Generals: Jose Maceo to lead the
operations in Baracoa, Guantanamo, Mayari, and Santiago de Cuba;
Maso in Manzanillo, Bayamo, and Holguin; Sanchez in the Villas; and
Rodrigues in Camaguey.

Betancourt, the President, was also the President during the Ten-
Years' War, and was known as the Marquis of Santa Lucia. Maso,
the Vice President, has been noticed before. Roloff, the War Secre-
tary, was born in Poland, but came to Cuba at an early age. He was
also in the Ten-Years' War, and afterward became a leading citizen of
Cienfuegos. Menocal came of a well-known family, one of whose
members has long been in the United States service, and has been
much heard of in connection with the Nicaragua Canal.

A battle was fought in the later part of August midway between
Santiago de Cuba and Guantanamo, where the Spanish Colonel,
Canellas, attacked the camp of Jose Maceo, the Spaniards being vic-
torious. After this another battle was fought at Peralejo, Marshal
Campos commanding the Spanish troops, and Antonio Maceo the
Cubans. In this encounter the Spaniards were routed with heavy
loss, Campos himself narrowly escaping capture.

The town of Baire was next taken by the Cubans, and another vic-
tory was won at Decanso del Muerto. Gomez then desired to march
west in the direction of Havana, declaring he would eat his Christmas
dinner between Havana and Matanzas.

An order was issued by him to the sugar planters in the provinces
of Havana, Matanzas, and Santa Clara, forbidding them to grind cane
or to manufacture sugar. This was done in order to deprive the Span-

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ish Government of the revenue received from the sugar trade. The
order was as follows:

" In accordance with orders of the Provisional Government, and to
the end that no one may allege ignorance, I hereby make known to the
sugar manufacturers, cane planters (Colonos) and proprietors of the
zone under my command:

" First. The building and cane fields of all plantations will be con-
sidered and respected, provided no work is given to any able-bodied
laborer, nor the operations of grinding begun.

" Second. When there are no fortifications nor forces located in the
same for their protection.

'' Third. A term of ten days is hereby granted for the suspension
of all work, the destruction of the fortifications, and the withdrawal of
the troops.

" Fourth. Those who contravene this order will be severely pun-
ished and their buildings and cane fields reduced to ashes."

Campos met this with a counter proclamation, ordering the plant-
ers to go on with their usual work, and promising them full protection.
The richest parts of the island were desolated, and they were filled day
and night with the smoke of burning plantations along Gomez's line
of march. The planters obeyed Gomez and stopped grinding, where-
upon he issued the following proclamation:

" Headquarters of the Liberating Army of Cuba,

'' Sugar estate, ' Mirosa,' January lo, 1896.

** In consideration that the crop has been suspended in the western
districts, and, whereas, it is not necessary that the burning of the cane
fields should continue, I dispose the following:

" Article i. The burning of the cane fields is now prohibited.

" Article 2. Those who contravene this disposition, whatsoever be
their category or rank in the army, will be treated with the utmost
severity of military discipline in behalf of the moral order of the revo-
lution.

" Article 3. The buildings and machinery of the sugar estates will
be destroyed, if in spite of this disposition they should intend to renew
their works.

" Article 4. The pacific inhabitants of the island of Cuba, what-

88 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.

soever be their nationality, will be respected, and agricultural laborers
will not be interfered with.

*' The General in Chief,

'' M. Gomez."

To prevent the insurrectionists from continuing their march to the
western end of the island, and invading the rich tobacco plantations of
Pinar del Rio, the Spaniards constructed clear across the island a
trocha or ditch with a barb-wire fence on one side of it, and block-
houses at intervals. It did not seem, however, to answer the purpose,
because Antonio Maceo finally reached the province of Pinar del Rio,
and upon this march proved that he was an excellent soldier and pos-
sessed daring and dashing qualities.

Marshal Campos was too conscientious and honest a man to deal
with the questions now rapidly coming up for solution as Spain would
like to have them dealt with, or to carry out the instructions his Gov-
ernment thought necessary to give to meet the situation, and was too
humane to please the Spanish official ring.

Valeriano Weyler, who had been one of Valmaseda's lieutenants
in the Ten- Years' War, was then made Governor and Captain Gen-
eral. It is reported that Campos said of him at the time that if he ever
returned to Cuba the very dead would rise to fight against him, and a
Spanish soldier also said of him in the Saturday Review:

*' When Don Valeriano Weyler came out to command us he got
together the greatest rascals in the country under the name of Volun-
teers, and if the regular soldiers under Weyler were cruel to the coun-
try folk, the Volunteers were far worse. They perpetrated every crime
on the defenseless country folk, and the women and children sufifered
every outrage at their hands.

" Weyler believed in killing people wholesale to strike terror into
the insurgents, but it did very little good. The insurgents played the
same game. They killed all of our men whom they took prisoners.
When Gomez broke through the ' trocha ' between Jucaro and Moron
a couple of years ago, he shot all of his prisoners. We had been doing
the same by Weyler's orders, and indeed he forced us to shoot down
defenseless non-combatants.

" It was enough to be discovered to be a distant relation of an
insurgent to receive sentence of death. Boys and women were shot,
sick and wounded in Cuban hospitals were bayoneted, and when once

THE CUBA OF TO-DAY. 89

or twice a lad in the ranks, fresh from Spain, refused to obey the order
to kill, he was promptly shot by his own officer.

'' We soldiers, however, generally got into the habit of killing, and
did not think much of it, but we were never such savages as the Volun-
teers. Who were the Volunteers? They were the fellows enlisted
from the Spaniards of the towns, and were ten times as bitter as we
soldiers against the Cubans, and the Cubans hated them worse than
they hated us.

" He was certainly a strong man, Weyler, and a great deal harder
and cruder than Martinez Campos; but he was just like the others;
he filled his pockets while he was in office, and they say he came home
with a big fortune."

Weyler reached Havana on the loth of February, 1896, on the
steamer '' Alfonso XHL," and was received with great enthusiasm by
the Spaniards.

In landing he made a short speech to the soldiers, " You know my
record; well, I intend to live up to it." The next day he issued a for-
mal address to the army in which he said:

'' The address which I made yesterday will give you an idea of the
spirit and policy of your new Governor General, and similarly the di-
rection of the general opinion in Spain favoring the bringing of all
necessary means to bear upon the suppression of the insurrection.
Knowing these and knowing my character, I would add nothing else
to direct the line of conduct which you may follow. But I think it
convenient to add some instructions at present, and to state that the
insurrection and the recent march of the principal leaders thereof with-
out its being possible for the Spanish columns to prevent it, indicates
indifference on the part of the inhabitants, and also fear and dis-
couragement. I cannot understand their inactivity while their prop-
erty is being destroyed. Spaniards cannot sympathize with insur-
gents. It is necessary, at any cost, to oppose this state of things, and
reanimate the spirit of the inhabitants.

" I have come disposed to help all loyal citizens. I am at the same
time disposed to make use of all the rigor of the law against those who
in any form help the enemy, speak well of them, or discredit the pres-
tige of Spain, of its army, or volunteers. All who are with our side
must demonstrate the fact with acts, and leave in their attitude no
place for doubt in proving that they are Spaniards.

*' Because the defense of the country demands sacrifices, it is neces-

go CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.

sary that towns should estabhsh their own defenses. They should not
fail to provide guides for the army, and to give news of the enemy when
they are in the vicinity. The case should not be repeated that the
enemy be better informed than ourselves. The enemy and the vigor
which they employ should serve as an example to show us the line of
conduct which we must follow in all circumstances.

" You will detain and put at my disposal, or submit to the tribunals,
those who, in any way I have described, show help or sympathize with
the rebels. I promise myself that you, by fulfilling these instructions,
will give valuable help to the good of the Spanish cause."

He also issued an address to the people of Cuba, in which he
said:

" I take charge with the confidence which never abandons the
cause of preserving the island for Spain. I shall be always generous
with those who surrender, but will have the decision and energy to
punish rigorously those who in any way help the enemy.

" Without having in mind any political mission, I would not oppose
the government of his Majesty when in its wisdom, having peace in
Cuba, it should think it convenient to give this country reforms with
the same spirit of love in which a mother gives all things to her chil-
dren. People of Cuba, lend me your help! So you will defend your
own interests, which are the interests of the country."

We are. told General Weyler promised to end the war in thirty
days. He told the delegation of sugar planters who called upon him
on the 15th of February that by the 15th of March he would have peace
and order established throughout the island so that they could go to
work everywhere without fear of molestation. Twenty per cent, of the
crop had already been destroyed, but if he could keep his promise it
meant the saving of forty-five million dollars' worth of sugar, but the
difficulty of these planters commencing grinding lay in the fact that
they did not have Weyler's promise indorsed by Gomez and Maceo.
The new Captain and Governor General issued at this time the follow-
ing proclamation; defining those who were to be subject to trial by
court-martial :

" First. Those who invent or circulate by any means whatever
news or information directly or indirectly favorable to the rebellion

THE CUBA OF TO-DAY. 9I

will be considered guilty of acts against the security of the country,
as defined by Article 223 of the military code, as they thereby facilitate
the operations of the enemy.

'' Second. Those who destroy or damage railroads, telegraphs or
telephones, or interrupt the operation of the same.

'' Third. Those who are guilty of arson.

" Fourth. Those who sell, carry, or deliver arms or ammunition to
the enemy or in any other way facilitate their introduction through the
customhouses. Parties failing to cause the seizure of such arms or
ammunition will incur criminal responsibility.

'* Fifth. Telegraph operators delivering war messages to other per-
sons than the proper officials.

" Sixth. Those who by word of mouth, through the medium of the
press, or in any manner, shall belittle the prestige of Spain, the army,
Volunteers, firemen, or other forces operating with the army.

" Seventh. Those who by the same means shall praise the enemy.

" Eighth. Those who shall furnish the enemy with horses or other
resources of warfare.

'' Ninth. Those who act as spies will be punished to the fullest
extent of the law.

'' Tenth. Those who shall act as guides to the enemy and fail to
surrender themselves immediately, and give proof of their loyalty and
report the strength of the force employed by the enemyo

'' Eleventh. Those who shall adulterate the food of the army or
alter the prices of provisions.

'' Twelfth. Those using explosives in violation of the decree of
October 17, 1895.

" Thirteenth. Those who shall use pigeons, rockets, or signals to
convey news to the enemy.

" Fourteenth. The ofifenses above mentioned are punishable by
the penalty of death or life imprisonment, the judges to take summary
proceedings."

In another proclamation he commanded all the inhabitants of the
provinces of Santiago and Puerto Principe to present themselves at
army headquarters and obtain passports. To go about the country
it would be necessary to have these passes. All stores in the country
were to be closed and their contents given up. And all persons not
obeying these orders were to be arrested and sent to Havana for mili-
tary trial as traitors. The result of these orders was that thousands

92 CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.

of innocent non-combatants were arrested and rnany of them put to
death.

Still another proclamation followed:

" The authorities of the villages who will show themselves friendly
within a term of ten days, and those of the vicinity of the same, and all
those within its limits that are engaged in the insurrection, are warned
to surrender themselves within the space of fifteen days from the publi-
cation of this proclamation, otherwise they will be subject to arrest; and
well-disposed persons will be held to their civil responsibilities, and to
effect this it will be proposed to the Governor General to nominate a
body which will see to carrying this out. If in the case of insurgent par-
ties vv'ho have sacked, robbed, burned, or committed other outrages dur-
ing the rebellion, anyone will give information as to the participation
that such persons may have had in them, not only those who may have
been in the rebel ranks, but also those who have succored them, or who
have not remained in their homes, they will be fittingly punished; and,
moreover, if any town or other place where robberies have been
effected is known to them, they will be required to make identification
that proper responsibility may be fixed."

Weyler's policy was quickly put into execution. On February 22
occurred the hideous massacre of Guatao, the first of a series of such
affairs which shocked the world. A small body of insurgents fell in
with a large Spanish force and took to flight after a little firing. Near
Guatao they scattered and took to the woods. The Spanish troops,
enraged at not being able to capture them, went on to the village
of Guatao, which the rebels had not even entered, and wreaked their
wrath upon it. They deliberately massacred all the inhabitants they
could find, men, women, and children. A milkman who was making
his rounds was the first victim. They then came to a cottage where
a man lay sick. His wife came to the door to see what was wanted.
They clubbed her to death with musket butts, and then went in and
bayoneted the sick man in his bed. This was only a few miles from
Havana. A report of the case was made to Weyler, praising the sol-
diers for their bloody crimes, and saying, " they have done to-day what
your Excellency did so gloriously thirty years ago."

Nor was this the only massacre, but, as we have said, merely the
first of many. Weyler gave his officers the power of life or death over
all the people they came in contact with. A large portion of these

THE CUBA OF TO-DAY.

93

commanders believed Weyler to be a man who would quickly approve
any extreme on their part. They looked for no punishment for
summary executions of Cubans who sympathized with the insurgents.
They expected praise and promotion for shooting prisoners, and for
any and every act of brutality, committed under the guise of suo-
pressing the insurrection.

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" NEW YORK " AND " PORTER " INTERRUPTING ITALIAN MAN-OF-WAR OFF

HAVANA.

CUBA, 1 492-1 800.

By Joseph Wheeler, Major-General, U. S. V.

CHAPTER III.

Cuba, the " Queen of the Antilles," the key of the Gulf of Mexico,
was for centuries the fairest gem in the crown of Spain. Fair and
luxuriant as the fabled isles of olden mythology, it burst upon the
admiring gaze of the Spanish explorers; for its discovery was coin-
cident with the first voyage of Columbus to the New World. Sailing
southwesterly from Guanahani, on the 28th of October, 1492, the
mariners sighted the rocky shores of Cuba, and after coasting west-
wardly for three days, entered the harbor of Maternillos. The length
of the coast line and the appearance of the land confirmed the belief
of Columbus that he had reached the eastern extremity of India, and
that he stood upon the shores of the continent which was the object
of his search. Finding that the country was inhabited, he sent a
number of oflftcers to visit the Cacique and open friendly negotiations
with him. The chieftain was found in a village consisting of about
fifty houses, with 1,000 inhabitants. These people are described as
gentle, friendly and hospitable, indolent and fond of ease, with little
industry, and expert only as hunters and fishers. They regaled their
visitors with abundance of native fruits, yams, and Indian corn.
They slept in hammocks and made an immoderate use of tobacco.
They were not acquainted with the use of iron, but used implements
of wood, stone or shell. They had no domestic animals; in fact the
only indigenous quadruped found on the island was the hutia, an
arboreal creature, about fifteen inches long, black in color and re-
sembling a rat.

It was discovered later that the government of these islands was
portioned among nine tribes, each having its own ruler, and all living
in harmony. Their religious belief was a very simple one, and
included but one supreme Deity; indeed they received the Spaniards
with open arms as messengers from God, and would have been
ready and willing converts to Christianity, had their friendly docility
later met with adequate response from the white, invaders, who
allowed their greed for gold and conquest to crush every sentiment
of justice and humanity.

COPYRIGHT, 1898, BY THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY

to MR. LEE. CONSUL GENERAL OF THE U. S., AS A SOUVENIR OF FRIENDSHIP AND GOOD WISHES OF VALO. WEYLER.

MAJOR-GENERAL JOSEPH WHEELER.

CUBA, 1 492- 1 800. 97

Columbus continued his explorations of the Cuban coast and
returned to Spain fully convinced that he had discovered the eastern
shore of Asia. He again visited the island, sailing thither April
4, 1494, from San Domingo. During this visit he discovered the
Isle of Pines, and visited Guantanamo, sighting Cape Cruz and nam-
ing the ocean reefs in that vicinity " Jardines de la Reyna," (The
Queen's Gardens). He first named the country Juana, in honor of
Prince John. It was consecutively named Ferdinandina, Santiago,
and Ave Maria; and it finally became known under its original Indian
name, Cuba. It was also known by some of the old geographers
as La Lengua de Pajaro, the Sparrow's Tongue, from a fancied re-
semblance in form to the shape of a bird's tongue.

Although Columbus and his ofilicers had signed a statement de-
claring this land to be a continent, in a few years it was deemed
necessary to prove this, and Sebastian Ocampa was sent to make fur-
ther explorations. He circumnavigated the island in 1508, and
strongly recommended its colonization, praising the fertility of
its soil and its excellent harbors, especially that of Havana. The
northern and western part was, however, for a long time neglected,
all the earlier settlements being along the southeastern coast as more
convenient and accessible from the islands already colonized by
Spain, as well as from the mainland of South America.

In 151 1, Diego Columbus, governor of San Domingo, sent Diego
Velasques to explore and colonize the Island of Cuba. Landing near
Cape Maysi he found himself opposed by the natives under the leader-
ship of the Cacique Hatuei, who, having learned by bitter experience
in San Domingo the real character of the white man, had fled to the
Cubans and endeavored to arouse these gentle and peaceful people
against the designs of the invaders. They were, however, easily sub-
jugated and soon found that resistance was hopeless. They were
either enslaved or exterminated, and in spite of the efiforts of Queen
Isabella, the many laws passed in favor of these unfortunate natives,
and the protests of the zealous missionaries, in the course of a few
years many thousands of these unfortunate people became victims
of the rapacious greed and inhumanity of their conquerors. In beau-
tiful contrast to the barbarous conduct of the Spanish cavaliers, stands
out the noble character of Bartholomew Las Casas, the first priest
ordained in the New World, the " Apostle to the Indians," whose
long life of ninety-two years was a saintly protest against the iniquity
of his fellow-countrymen. He made twelve voyages across the ocean

98 Cuba's struggle against spain.

in the service of his Indian proteges. In 1522 he wrote his Celebrated
book on '' The Destruction of the Indians." Twenty years later, fifty
years after the discovery of the West Indies, he wrote his history of
the rule of the Spaniards in these islands, and while the numbers of
the natives given by him are greatly exaggerated, still he is held to
be a trustworthy historian in other respects. In his celebrated thirty
*' Propositions " as to the duties of the Spanish sovereigns towards
their heathen subjects, he says:

*' The kings of Spain have from the first given and reiterated their
orders against war and the ill-treatment of the Indians."

Las Casas has been criticised for having countenanced the impor-
tation of negro slaves into Cuba. He afterwards acknowledged that
this was a mistake, and that .'le acted under a delusion. His impres-
sion at the time was that the negro slaves brought to America were
to be only those born in servitude, and that by using these stronger
and hardier laborers, the weak and delicate aborigines might be saved
from total destruction. He survived Columbus sixty years, and his
life and writings present a sad commentary upon the customs of the
age and nation in which he lived. The wholesale slaughter of natives
was checked by selfish motives only after there were a mere handful
of these " gentle savages " left.

Las Casas was not the only one to lift his voice in behalf of the
oppressed. Even before him the Dominicans, as early as 1501, in-
formed Ferdinand of the abuse of the natives by the system of reparti-
micnto, or dividing them among the white landholders ; and long after
his time there were repeated appeals made to the monarch, notably
one by Mendosa, in 1650. But as we have seen, the royal decrees
and the protests of the good were defied by these barbarous colonists;
and such has been the case in the Spanish colonies, with a few shining
exceptions, to the present day.

In considefing these events we must not lose sight of the fact that
the conditions of the age were so very dififerent from those under
which we live as to be difficult for us to realize. It is little more than
a century since the first regular mail, and that only one of " once in
three months " was established between Spain and her colonies. The
sixteenth century was in many respects a wild and lawless age; the
statute books of every country were disgraced by laws which at this
day would be looked upon as barbarous and inhuman ; voyages which
are now accomplished in a few days then occupied as many months;
there was no rapid nor reliable means of communication even be-

CUBA, 1 492- 1 800. 99

tween countries upon the same continent; land and sea swarmed with
reckless and daring brigands and freebooters, ready to waylay and
murder an inoffensive and defenseless traveler; and human rights
were held of small consequence by those who had the power to
tram^ple upon them. Centuries of war against an encroaching, in-
vidious foe in the fastnesses of Spain had developed in the Spanish
people an overmastering passion for war and conquest and tyrannical
oppression of the conquered, with a species of contempt for those
heroic and gentle men and women who appealed to the higher and
nobler attributes of man or threatened him with a retribution affecting
only his spiritual and eternal destiny.

Another cause of the degeneracy of the settlers in the West Indies
is found in the fact that the worst element of the Spanish population
swarmed witli the adventurers to the New World, drawn hither by
the greed of gold and conquest and the prospect of unrestrained law-
lessness. The very advantages of the country were against the moral
uplifting of the colonists. Abundance of gold could be wrung from
the timiid, defenseless natives; the rich soil gave forth an exhaustless
supply of fruit; the luxuriou.s, enervating climate invited indolence.
There was nothing in their surroundings to stimulate the austere vir-
tues cultivated by the Puritans of New England, who had sought a
retreat in the wilds of North America, and who were early trained to
patient endurance of hardships, industry, rigid economy and self-
reliance, and were checked by the very nature of their surroundings
in the intolerance which would have ruined their free institutions.

Spain was not at this time behind the other nations of Europe; in
fact she was at the zenith of her glory and excelled in diplomacy,
in arms and in letters. A brilliant galaxy of scholars and writers sur-
rounded the throne of Philip 11. For centuries of mediaeval history
Spain had been the stronghold of civil liberty in Europe, and had
held out stubbornly against the encroachments of feudalism; but
the centuries of wars with the Moors had brought a change; and the
narrow policy which confined the elevating and humanizing influ-
ences of intellectual culture to the priAaleged few, left the masses in
a state of ignorance. The magnificence of the king and his court
had to be maintained by gold and silver from the mines of the West.
Extravagant waste of treasures, neglect of agriculture and commerce,
made a constant demand for revenue which could, be supplied only
by grinding out the lives of the hapless Americans. The offices in
the colonies were portioned out among the most reckless and M'orth-

100 Cuba's strugglf. against spain.

less of the court favorites, and the governor who made the highest
record at home was he who wrung- from the wretched Cubans the
greatest amount of gold. Another cause of the decadence of Spain
in material wealth is found in the expulsion of the Moors by
Philip III. These conquered people had almost monopolized the
trades and commerce of Spain, pursuits scorned by the cavaliers, who
cared only for military renown, and their sudden and violent expul-
sion caused the destruction of the main source of home wealth.

These reflections explain, while they do not palliate, much less
excuse, the excesses of the men, who, while boasting of their faith
and chivalry, made of them but a cloak for the most sordid and de-
grading passions, and set at naught the labors of the virtuous, self-
sacrificing and devoted to be found in every nationality.

The capital of Cuba was established first at Baracoa in 1518. The
seat of government was transferred in 1522 to Santiago de Cuba,
Vv'hich for a long time was the most important city. Early in the
century, a town named San Cristobal de la Habana, in honor of the
great discoverer, was founded in the southern part of the island, but
the name was transferred in 15 19 to the place where the city of
Havana now stands. The city was destroyed by a French privateer
in 1538, was rebuilt and fortified, and in 1549 became the residence of
the governor; but the seat of government remained long in the South.
In 1538, Hernando de Soto was governor, and during his absence on
the continent the province was ruled by a lady. Dona Isabel de
Bobadilla.

The incursions of the French privateers became more alarmm.g
every year. In 1555 Jacques Sorie surprised Havana, plundered and
pillaged it; in 1599 Megander pillaged Port Rico, and John de la
Roche plundered the ships and battlements near Carthagena.

In 1578, under the governor, Don Francesco Carreno, vast quan-
tities of timber, we are told, were shipped from Cuba to the mother
country to contribute towards the construction of the convent and
palace of the Escurial. About this time the church of San Cristobal
was built in Havana on the spot now occupied by the residence of the
Captain-General. In 1589, Havana was formally made the seat of
government, and Don Juan de Tejida was appointed Captain-General.
During his administration the construction of the Morro and the
Punta w^s commenced, the place received the title of Ciudad, and a
coat of arms- was -granted consisting of three castles argent — alluding
tO' th^ '^Fuerza,; Morro and Punta — and a golden key, the whole

CUBA, I492-180O. lOI

surmounted by a crown. Cuba has been known since the time of its
first Governor, Velasques, as " The Key of the New World."

In 1607, the island was divided into two separate provinces. Pirati-
cal incursions increased to such an alarming extent that the seaboard
was continually menaced. Santiago was strongly fortified in 1630,
the defenses consisting of the fortresses Morro, on a rocky eminence
overlooking the harbor, and La Estrella, a fortification on the same
side of the bay, but much less elevated, being erected near the level
of the water.

In 1655, the attitude of the English commonwealth, and the
squadron sent to America by Cromwell, gave rise to apprehensions
for the safety of the Spanish possessions, and these fears were realized
when Jamaica was attacked, the Spanish defenders dispersed, the gov-
ernor killed, and the Spanish inhabitants compelled to flee to Cuba.

About this time, the pirates became more and more formidable;
the French by gradual encroachments got possession of San Do-
mingo, assisted by the English in Jamaica. Up to 1697 San Domingo,
where the first permanent Spanish settlements were planted, was a
Spanish colony; but in that year the western portion was ceded to
France; in 1785 that country obtained possession of the whole island;
in 1801 it was abandoned by Spain; and with the exception of a fleet-
ing sovereignty there, from 1806 to 1821, she never recovered posses-
sion of it.

In 1658 Puerto Principe ahd Santiago were sacked by pirates, and
Puerto Principe a second time, shortly after. During the whole of
this century piracy reigned supreme; and it was not for many years
that, by erecting stronger fortifications and adopting the most forcible
measures, the governors of the island began to get control of and
finally exterminated piracy on their borders. In 1675 the city of San-
tiago was destroyed by an earthquake.

In the eighteenth century, riots broke out on the island, caused by
some oppressive measures of the royal governors.

In 1 716 the government of Havana was so arranged by royal de-
cree that in case of the absence, illness or death of the Captain-
General, the chief authority should devolve successively upon the
Triente Rey, the castellano of the Morro, the sergeant-major of the
garrison, the senior captain of infantry. By this arrangement the
clashing of authority in time of disaster was effectually prevented.

In 1 74 1 Admiral Vernon, with an English fleet, attempted the
seizure of Santiago, but was repulsed. American colonists took part

I02 Cuba's struggle against spain.

in this expedition. It is thought that Lawrence Washington accom-
panied some Virginia troops thus engaged. Admiral Vernon was
the officer in whose honor Mt. Vernon was named.

In 1755 the EngHsh made a landing and attempted to take Havana
by storm; but, as the Spanish story goes, the noise made by the land-
crabs and the lights of the fireflies impressed them with the idea that
an immense army of defense was opposing them, and the invaders
retreated precipitately to their ships. This was called by the Cubans
" The miracle of the crabs." Those who have heard the march of
the land-crabs and seen the display of the phosphorescent insects of
Cuba will not find this story incredible.

June 6, 1762, Havana was attacked by the English under Admiral
Pocoke and Lord Albemarle. The city was at that time protected by
a mediaeval wall, flanked by the three fortresses already m.entioned.
Dense forests, which have since been cleared away, grew in the
vicinity. The Spanish troops were hastily massed at Guanabacoa,
but were driven back into the city, which was besieged for more than
two months. In the course of the siege the Spaniards caused three
large warships to be sunk in the mouth of the harbor to prevent the
entrance of the English vessels, which anchored outside, thinking the
channel was completely obstructed. After the fall of the city, they
entered without difficulty, proving the uselessness of the sacrifice,
which had not been made without loss of life on the part of the
Spanish seamen.

The efforts of the English to overcome the fire from the forts by
their naval guns was unsuccessful and resulted in great destruction
to their vessels; but by feints at points where the noncombatants of
the city had taken refuge, they so diverted the attention of the be-
sieged as to gain a secure footing on shore, and gradually surrounded
the city. They gained possession of an em-inence which commanded
the guns of the Morro; and the opportune arrival of a convoy from
Jamaica enabled them to reduce the Spanish guns so effectually that
.by July i6th they were silenced altogether.

July 27th the spirits of the besiegers were raised by the arrival
of long-expected reinforcements from North America, Colonial
troops from New York, New Jersey and Connecticut, under General
Phineas Lyman and Colonel Israel Putnam. On the 29th the in-
vestment of the city being completed and the Captain-General having
positively refused to surrender, a breach was made in the walls and
the victorious English troops swarmed in. The gallant Captain-

CUBA, 1 492- 1 800. 103

General Velasco and the Marquis Gonzales, next in command, fell
mortally wounded, and Morro Castle was taken after a siege of forty-
four days; but the capitulation of the city was not accomplished until
the 13th of August, and included the territory surrounding the city,
nine ships of war, more than a thousand prisoners and property
amounting to about three million pounds sterling. The Spaniards
had lost besides about one thousand killed and wounded, and five
battle ships destroyed. The loss of the English was 1,790 killed,
wounded and dead from exposure to the diseases incident to a sum-
mer campaign in the tropics. The brave Velasco was mourned and
honored by both friend and foe; and it was ordered that to com-
memorate his heroism, there should always be a ship in the Royal
Armada bearing the name of Velasco. His son was afterv/ards made
Visconde del Morro, by the king of Spain.

The terms of the capitulation were very favorable to the van-
quished, but they were not strictly complied with. Some of the
church property was seized by the English governor, onerous taxes
were imposed, and those who protested against these measures were
expelled from the province as seditious characters, and were otherwise
maltreated; but the foreign occupation came to an end with the
declaration of peace in 1763, and the English garrison returned to
Europe. The forts, hospitals and other institutions were rebuilt,
and customs duties were established in 1764. About 1768 the Jesuits
were expelled by Governor Bucarly, and their church became the
cathedral.

In 1790, San Domingo was racked by a bloody revolution, but the
Island of Cuba enjoyed profound peace, and welcomed with open
arms many of the refugees from her sister isle. This is known as the
golden age of Cuba, owing to the wise and beneficent rule of the
Captain-General Don Luis de las Casas. The city was paved, schools
were established, the administration of justice was improved, public
roads were constructed, the first public library and the first news-
papers were founded and the Casa de Beneficiencia, a noted charitable
institution, was built. This is one of the most remarkable institu-
tions, and it is said that similar ones exist in the other Spanish colo-
nial possessions. Many hundreds of young people are educated and
provided for, the young women being allowed to remain there as lono:
as they wish, and if they marry from the institution being provided
with dowries as daughters of the house. A descrintinn of Cuba,
written about the year 1830, speaks of 230 young inmates at this
home.

I04

CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.

Another circumstance very beneficial to Cuba about the opening
of the century was the influx of Spanish population of the better class
from the possessions alienated from the mother country. Many of
the judges who' had continued to reside in San Domingo after the
cession of that island to the French, thus greatly obstructing the
administration of justice in Cuba, removed in 1797 to Puerto Prin-
cipe. About this time the French made a descent upon the island,
but were persuaded by diplomatic measures to depart without doing
much damage. It was about chis time that the cultivation of the
cofYee plant, which soon became the source of a most profitable
revenue, was introduced into Cuba. Bees from Europe were intro-
duced, and in 1772 the exportation of wax was commenced. The
most important industrial pursuits were the manufacture of sugar,
cofTee, tobacco and wax. Rice and maize were also raised in
abundance.

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CUBA, 1 800- 1 868.

CHAPTER IV.

The wise and humane administration of Captain-General Las Casas
confirmed the loyalty of the Cubans to the throne of Spain, a loy-
alty boldly attested and stoutly maintained throughout the stormy
days of revolution, when almost every country in Europe seemed
rocked by the waves of popular uprisings or foreign invasion. When
the news of the overthrow of the Spanish dynasty by Napoleon
reached Cuba in 1808, the municipal corporations of the island imani-
mously declared war against the French emperor; and Jose Aleman,
an emissary in the mterest of King Joseph, was captured and executed
in Cuba July 13, 1810. The loyalty of the island at the time merited
the title of '' Ever Faithful Isle."

Between the years 1810 and 1830 Spain lost one after another of
her American colonial possessions, not so much through the action
of a united people, inspired by the lofty motives of patriotism and a
love of liberty, as through European hostilities and political intrigues,
turned to advantage by more or less unscrupulous adventurers.
Venezuela, Buenos Ayres, Chili, Peru, Mexico and the states of
Central America followed one another in rapid succession, and with
rare exceptions have groaned ever since in the throes of alternate
anarchy and despotism.

Had Spain been as wise as England, and profited as the latter did
by experience, she could have retained with little difficulty the fairest
of her American possessions, the Pearl of the Antilles. But her
policy has never advanced an iota towards the ideal of colonial govern-
ment, Avhere the laws are in favor of the governed and the advantages
are on their side rather than on the side of the mother country. Cuba
has been always governed by foreigners; to be a native of the island
was in itself a mark of inferiority and a cause of being deprived of any
share in the government. Arbitrary governors and swarms of officials,
military and political, were always quartered upon the people with
the uniform hope of returning to Spain rich on the spoils of office.

Up to the second decade of the present century Cuba, while sub-
ject to many hardships, was governed well or ill according to the

io8 Cuba's struggle against spain.

personal character of those who were in authority, and not as a con-
sequence of laws bad and oppressive in themselves. She was not
treated as a colonial province to be ground down and plundered. But
as Spain gradually lost her power, and was racked by intestine strug-
gles, and harassed by outside foes, until one by one her colonies
slipped from her grasp, her government of Cuba became more selfish
and oppressive in proportion to her troubles at home.

In 1812, a liberal constitution was granted to the island, but it was
cast aside by Ferdinand VII in 1814 as soon as he regained power.
Had the constitution of 1812 been honestly administered, it would have
lifted Cuba at once into an enviable position; and prosperity and
contentment would have riveted the bonds of loyalty which bound
her to the mother country. She would have been recognized as an
integral part of Spanish territory, as important and as independent
as any of the provinces of the peninsula, which have from time
immemorial so jealously guarded their provincial rights. But the
brutal selfishness of Ferdinand VII caused him to overthrow the
fairest hopes of the Cubans at the most favorable and promising
period in the history of the island.

In 1836, after Ferdinand's death, a new constitution was granted
to Spain, and Cuba was included in its provisions.

September 2y, 1836, the barkentine " Guadaloupe " brought to
Santiago the good news of the promulgation of the liberal constitu-
tion, adopted by the Queen Regent, mother of Isabella. This was
immediately published by General Lorenzo, Governor of the Santiago
province and leader of the liberal party, amid the acclamations of the
delighted Cubans; but his action was instantly condemned by Captain-
General Ta^on, who brought the Avhole military and naval force
against Santiago and drove General Lorenzo from the island. Tagon
was armed with a commission enabling him to exercise supreme
authority over all subordinates and to suspend at his own discretion the
execution of any order concerning the general administration of the
government. Even a royal decree was but a dead letter in Cuba if
it conflicted with the judgment of the Captain-General, who was
really the supreme arbiter of the fate of the Cubans. Tagon knew
Spain well enough to appreciate that the action of the Queen Regent
was merely a temporary ebullition of liberal sentiment, and that her
majesty would be better served by a non-observance of the royal
decree. He knew that to attempt to show impartial justice to the
Cubans meant the loss of a princely revenue to the mother country;

CUBA, i8oo-i868. 109

and although outsiders could see that to continue her oppressive reigu
of plunder was sooner or later to " kill the goose that laid the golden
egg," yet Spain could not understand this and could never be led to
appreciate moral power as superior to brute force.

The three deputies who had been elected in spite of Tagon's prompt
protest, presented their credentials in Madrid the following January.
They were received with coldness and silence, and after vv^aiting several
months they were finalh denied the right of admission to the Cortes.
This action forever alienated the extreme party in Cuba, though
there has always been a conservative party working and hoping
to secure prosperity for their island without a forcible separation from
the mother country. The incessant warring between the Carlists
and the Queen Regent led to constant demands for money which
was extorted in every manner from the landholders, the real pro-
ducers of all the wealth of the island.

The captains-general were armed with despotic and almost unlim-
ited power, and by laws little less odious than the infamous penal
laws against Ireland, the natives were deprived of all rights and
excluded from all offices.

There is great diversity of opinion in regard to the real character
of the renov/ned Tagon. His name is associated with some of the
most famous buildings of Havana, and history records numberless
instances of an impartial administration of justice, correction of abuses
and appreciation of true heroism. By his efforts, persons guilty of
shameful misdemeanors were condemned to work on paving the
streets, and in this manner the vicious and degraded classes were com-
pelled to contribute to the comfort of the whole community. Assassin-
ation, which had become a very common crime, was so severely
dealt with, that it became rare, and extortion and venality in high
places were unmasked and punished. Yet, in spite of the benefits
accruing from his stern adminis4;ration of justice, the fact that he
was the tool of a grinding despotism, and that he represented a
policy v/hich entirely excluded the Cubans from advancing towards
their ideal of self-government has caused his memory to be held in
execration.

Volumes are written detailing his acts of high-handed despotism,
but it must be confessed that in many cases it was the guilty who
siifiered. It is further charged that he grew so rich on the spoils
of the office, thai he was recalled to Spain because the government
" feared that he would leave nothing on the island for any one else.'*

] lo Cuba's struggle against spain.

The statutes in regard to the treatment of the negro slaves were
lenient, but that they were not enforced is shown not only by the
mortality among them being so great that the only increase in the
slave population was from constant new importations of negroes and
coolies, but also by the frequent uprisings among the blacks them-
selves. And although the law of 1820 forbade the importation of
African slaves, we know that its violation was constantly tolerated —
for a consideration — by the captains-general, and also that for many
years of the present century the slave trade was the chief source of
Cuban revenue. Another effort was made in 1853 to abolish the
slave traffic, but slavery was not abolished until 1878, after the ten
years' war, and then emancipation was gradual.

A pleasant picture is presented in the character of the Captain-
General, appointed in 1841, — 'Valdez, who appears to have been liberal
and conscientious; but he was soon recalled and he returned to Spain
poor, a shining exception in the long list of Governors. He was
succeeded by O'Donnell, who is described as rapacious, tyrannical
and unscrupulous, one of the charges against him being the sup-
pression of infant schools, and the general discouragement of educa-
tion. Thus, Cuba was tossed to and fro like a shuttlecock from good
to bad, from one extreme to the other, her governors seeming to
come and go at the caprice of whichever party happened to be in
power at the Spanish capital, without the slightest regard for the weal
of the hapless natives.

Meanwhile one uprising succeeded another. An insurrection of
the blacks occurred in 1826, followed by the conspiracies of the Black
Eagle and kindred organizations, and a dangerous insurrection of
the blacks, said to have been instigated by Turnbull, the British Con-
sul at Havana, in the early forties.

In May, 1850, General Lopez organized an expedition, recruited to
some extent from the United States. The first detachment, two hun-
dred and fifty men, embarked at New Orleans April 25th on the
"Georgiana," under the command of Major Theodore O'Hara, a brave
soldier and a talented man, whose name is immortalized as the author
of the beautiful poem, "The Bivouac of the Dead." Tlie second
detachment; under Lopez, reached the rendezvous, the island of
'Contoy, oflf the coast of Yucatan, in Mexican territory, a few weeks
later, and all together set sail in the '' Creole " for Cardenas. Fifty men
under Major T. Pickett was the first to land. The railroad station
was captured and the garrison were nearly taken by surprise, had

CUBA, 1 800- 1 868. Ill

they not been awakened by the sudden discharge of a gun by a
sleepy sentry. The citizens did not respond to the appeal of the
liberating invaders, and the approach of the Spanish troops in large
numbers forced them to take flight. The filibusters were pursued,
but reached Key West and from there dispersed to their homes, having
lost of their number fourteen killed and fifteen wounded., The
Spaniards lost one hundred killed and nearly as many wounded.
Lopez made preparations to return the following year.

In 1852 he sailed from New Orleans in the steamer "Pampero," with
three hundred men. The second in command was W. S. Crittenden,
a graduate of West Point, who, although only twenty-eight years of
age, had already won renown as a hero of the Mexican war. The
purpose of the expedition was well known in the Southern States, and
the Spanish authorities in Cuba were informed. Letters were sent
to Lopez, purporting to come from Cuban patriots, persuading him
to land in the western province, where it was promised an uprising
of patriots would be ready to support him. Deceived by these forger-
ies he changed his course, landed at Bahia, and marched into the
interior, leaving a number of men with Crittenden at the seaside.
Finding they were betrayed, these men attempted to escape, but were
captured by the Spanish Admiral Brestillo. Crittenden and fifty men
were shot August 15 under the walls of Fort Atares. Lopez, after
two skirmishes, was captured and was executed as a malefactor, with
the garrote, at Havana, September i, forty-nine more of his men
being shot. About this time General Houston organized a band of
Cuban sympathizers, but the fate of Lopez and his men threw a
damper upon their enterprise, and they failed to set out.

Lopez had a remarkable career. He v/as born in Venezuela in 1798
when that country was still a Spanish colony. Early in life he became
embroiled in the strife which raged in the South American countries
and generally fought on the side of liberty; but becoming disgusted
with the conduct of some of the adventurers in these civil wars, he
entered the Spanish army. His services in securing a favorable
settlement of the w^ar induced the Venezuelans to offer him the com-
mission of colonel in the patriot army, the same rank he held in the
Spanish army. He, however, refused this and went to Cuba, where
he married and settled. During the administration of Tagon, he
was accused of favoring the independence of Cuba, was tried and ac-
quitted. Being in Spain at the time of a Carlist uprising, he fought
on the side of the Queen Regent and rose to the rank of General. He

112 Cuba's struggle against spain.

filled several offices in Spain; was Governor of Madrid, Chief of the
National Guard, and Senator. He retained his affection for Cuba,
but for some time was not allowed to return there, as his influence
was feared; but finally he obtained permission to return in 1839. ^^
became ambitious to lead a revolution to free Cuba, and for more
than ten years was silently making his preparations. He had many
friends and sympathizers in the United States, among them Crit-
tenden, shot by the Spaniards at Fort Atares, and General John A.
Quitman, Governor of Mississippi, Hon. John Henderson, Governor
of Louisiana, and others, who were indicted and restrained by the
United States authorities. The character of a man like Lopez must be
judged according to the point from which it is viewed; by some he
is considered a restless, visionary adventurer; by others a martyr to
the cause of freedom; but all agree in the opinion that his expedition
was ill-advised, not being supported by the Cubans themselves, and
was an unnecessary sacrifice of life.

During an uprising in 1854, the Cuban junta in New York had made
extensive preparations to assist the insurgents, but the prompt and
energetic measures of Captain-General Concha prevented a general up-
rising. He organized and drilled a large number of blacks, armed the
Spaniards and disarmed the natives. Ramon Pinto, the leader of the
Cubans, was captured and executed and many leading citizens were
banished. Concha was rewarded for his services by being created
Marquis of Havana. He advised the home government to conciliate
the Cubans, as the revolution was not confined to the negroes, but was
supported by the Creole planters; but the only means taken to con-
ciliate the Cubans was to tighten the shackles of the slaves, while the
slave-holders them.selves were becoming every day more and more
burdened with excessive taxation. In 1868 the revenue of the country
was about $26,000,000, $6,000,000 of which was sent to Spain, and
a very small portion of the remainder was expended for the benefit of
the island. This state of affairs was calculated to increase still
further the dissatisfaction of the Cubans and to foment the spirit of
rebellion against the mother country.

THE TEN YEARS' WAR.

CHAPTER V.

Meanwhile the revokitionary flame, which was temporarily smoth-
ered by the prompt and energetic poHcy of Concha, was not quenched,
but was smouldering, ready to break out at any moment. In the
summer of 1867, ^^ ^ meeting in Bayamo, an organization was
efiected preparatory to the inauguration of a fierce and stubborn
rebellion throughout the island of Cuba. The leading spirits in this
movement were Francesco Maceo Osorio and the brothers Aguilera.

The aimed conflict was deferred for more than a year, to give time
for a more perfect organization of the forces and arrangement of the
plan of campaign.

The revolution, under the command of Carlos Emanuel Cespedes,
commenced October 10, 1868, after the dethronement of Isabella, and
held out ten years. Cespedes was a graduate of the Un^'versity of
Havana and the School of Law in the University of Barcelona, In
1852, he had been imprisoned for five months in Morro Castle on a
charge of favoring the liberation of Cuba. In proclaiming the inde-
pendence of Cuba, he granted absolute, unconditional liberty to his
own slaves. Many other Cuban leaders did the same. The flag of
independence was unfurled on the field of Yara, and this outbreak
v/as followed by simultaneous attacks upon various small towns.

On October 18, Bayamo was captured by the insurgents and the
Spanish force sent to its relief was totally defeated. A republican
form of government was organized with Salvador Cisneros, Marquis
of Santa Lucia, and Ignacio and Eduardo Agramonte at its head.
Other native leaders were Manuel Quesada, Acosta, Maximo Gomez,
Sanguilly, Garcia and Maceo.

Captain-General Lersundi refused to treat with a committee of
Spaniards and Cubans who came interceding with him to inaugurate
a policy of reform. He continued to organize the volunteers, who,
being aliens and drawn from the lowest classes of the people, became
more obnoxious than ever to the Insulars, as the landholders called
themselves. Lersundi was replaced by Dulce, who was inclined to a
more liberal policy, but was hampered in his movements, and was
replaced in 1870 by De Rodas.

114 Cuba's struggle against spain.

Captain-General Valmaseda, who was in command for a time,
carried on the war with great inhumanity, shooting down every male
Cuban over fifteen years old found away from home without a pass,
and removing the women and children by force from their country
homes to the cities. This was the beginning of the horrible recon-
centrado measures, afterwards employed by Weyler, in his efforts to
depopulate the island. Under Valmaseda the volunteers committed
great atrocities upon the helpless people, and it is estimated that
during The Ten Years' War, not less than 50,000 prisoners and
non-combatants were murdered. But this massacre of the helpless
was not unavenged; for in addition to those killed in battle, many
thousands of Spanish soldiers perished from diseases incident to
campaigns in a tropical climate.

Thomas Jordan, an ex-confederate soldier and a graduate of West
Point, was for a time in command of the insurgents, having landed
at Mazari with a force of 175 men, ten pieces of artillery and amunition
for 2,500 men In 1873 the Cuban cause was considerably helped
by the battle of La Sacra, won by the insurgents, in addition to ad-
vantages gained by Gomez. Cespedes was betrayed and killed in
1874. In that year Captain-General Jovellar was sent out, and he
was relieved by Captain-General Martinez Campos in 1876. Both
these commanders carried on the war vigorously, and in 1877 the
fortunes of the insurgents rapidly declined. The diplomacy of General
Campos, not less than his military superiority, assisted in bringing
this disastrous rebellion to a close; but the promises made by him
were shamefully disregarded by the government of Spain, and the
pacification was only temporary. Even had these measures been
strictly carried out, it is doubtful whether the affection of the insur-
gents could ever have been regained after the cruel and bloody meas-
ures which had been enforced against them during the war.

There were several filibustering expeditions from the United States
about this time, but one of the most tragic and lamentable occurrences
of the period was the unfortunate " Virginius " affair, under the
leadership of Captain Fry, an ardent sympathizer with the Cuban
cause. Captain Joseph Fry was born at Tampa Bay, June 14, 1826.
He was the son of Major Fry, who was killed in the Florida war
with the Indians, and was himself a graduate of Annapolis and a
gallant officer in the Confederate service. He left Port au Prince
October 7, 1783, on the "Virginius," a wooden side-wheel steamer,
with a crew of fifty-two men and carrying 113 passengers and a cargo

THE TEN YEARS WAR. II7

of war material for the Cuban insurgents. While on the open sea
the " Virginius " was sighted by the '' Tornado," a Spanish gunboat,
and attempted to run back to Jamaica, meanwhile throwing overboard
the contraband goods; but she was overtaken and captured, still re-
taining unmistakable signs of her mission. The captain claimed that
the " Virginius " was ** an American ship, carrying American colors
and papers, with an American captain and crew," and that the pas-
sengers were going to Costa Rica; but the Spaniards protested
that the ship was a ** pirate," the American colors were torn down
and replaced by the Spanish flag, and the prize towed into Santiago.
Four Cuban generals arrested on board, Bambetta, Cespedes, Del
Sol and Ryan, were immediately shot; their heads were cut oft and
displayed on spikes, while their bodies were trampled by horses. The
American Consul, who attempted to protest against this outrage, was
restrained in his house by a guard. After this barbarous exhibition.
Captain Fry and his crew were put through the form of a trial by
court-martial and were condemned to be shot. They were executed
in the afternoon of November 7, 1873 Fifty-three men in all were
killed, and there were ninety-three passengers under sentence of death
when the proceedings were arrested by the arrival of the British
steamer " Niobe," under the command of Captain Sir Lampton Lor-
raine, who indignantly demanded that the wholesale massacre be
stopped. The timely arrival of the American warship '' Wyoming,"
and later on the Juanita," added to the moral effect of this demand,
and the Spaniards desisted from their purpose. The surviving pas-
sengers were restored to the custody of the United States December
I, 1873. The vessel was given up to the United States, being de-
livered to Captain Whiting, commanding the " Dispatch " at Bahia
Honda, and she was taken north, but being unseaworthy, she
foundered in a storm and was sunk ofif Cape Fear.

At this time General Grant was President of the United States,
General Sickles was Minister to Spain, and Castelar was President
of Spain. It was claimed that the authorities at Madrid ordered the
execution not to take place, but, if so, the order did not reach
Santiago in time, and General Burrlel, who superintended the trial,
was never reprimanded nor censured for his action.

Before his execution, Captain Fry wrote a most beautiful and touch-
ing letter to his wife, in which he spoke of the fearful sacrifice of life
on the *' Virginius." The beautiful character of the chief victim and

ii8 Cuba's struggle against spain.

the heroic manner in which he met his fate increased the sympathy
felt for him and his companions by the people of the United States;
and they loudly demanded the punishment of the gOv'ernment permit-
ting such atrocities. There was an animated exchange of letters and
protests, and a serious straining in the diplomatic relations between
the United States and Spain; but the latter government insisted that
the vessel was piratical and that the American papers were fraud-
ulently obtained; and, as usual, Spanish diplomacy scored another
triumph, and no atonement save the payment of $80,000 to the heirs
of the victims was ever made. The undeniable fact that the expedition
was an unlawful one made it impossible for the United States to se-
cure the satisfaction demanded by many of the American people.

While in Santiago, after the capitulation of that city in the summer
of 1898, I visited the place made famous by the execution of Captain
Fry and his comrades, and had the guides point out to me the spot
where these brave men fell. They were made to kneel with their faces
to the wall of a lc*rge butcher pen, and the place is known as '' the
slaughter-house." Captain Fry was allowed to Vv^alk along and tell
the men goodbye before taking his own station in the line. It will be
remembered that one of the last things he did, besides writing the letter
to his wife alluded to above, was to write to General Grant, his old
friend, asking him to secure for his wife some pay which was due him
when he resigned from the United States Navy.

In the insurrection of 1868, bands of roving insurgents roamed
throughout the wooded sections of the eastern part of the island, burn-
ing cane-fields and destroying the outlying farms. The Spanish
government sent more than 150,000 men to Cuba and spent about
$700,000,000 in efforts to suppress this rebellion.

The treaty of Zanjon, secured in 1878 by Captain-General Martinez
Campos, called the Pacificator, guaranteed the abolition of slavery
and promised constitutional reforms. The title of Captain-General
was changed to that of Governor-General, but the power of the in-
dividual remained imchanged. Provincial reforms v/ere inaugurated
and privileges promised, but the grinding taxation continued even
worse than ever, augmented as it was by an enormous war debt.
The tariff system, ruinous to Cuba, but profitable to Spain, continued
without any change, its effect being to exhaust every industry and
paralyze every enterprise; and while the Cubans were daily growing
poorefj the Spanish officials were increasing their private fortunes.

THE TEN YEARS^ WAR. IIQ

The poll-tax was very large and the voting age was twenty-five years.
The island was divided into two parties, the Conservatives and the
Liberal Autonomists, but the whole power of the government was
thrown on the side of the rulers and against the ruled.

No doubt Governor-General Campos, who is described as a humane
and generous man, was sincere in his desire to fulfill the stipulations
of the treaty whereby he had secured the cessation of hostilities, but
the government of Spain acted with despicable falseness in the matter.
Thousands of laws were enacted, but they were mere empty words.
The government offices in a short time became the property of the
highest bidder and the Cubans were gradually forced out of any
opportunity to contend in a lawful way for self-government. Re-
strictions of all kinds were placed upon education and business enter-
prises, and the country people were deprived of all liberty of action.
A short rebellion, called '' the little war," took place in 1879, but was
quickly suppressed. In 1885 a revolt broke out in Santa Clara and
Santiago provinces while Blanco was Governor-General. It was put
down with great cruelty, many of the Cubans being executed or
assassinated without the slightest formality of a trial. General Seyti
Vidal, a Cuban leader, was murdered when about to embark for
Kingston under agreement with the authorities.

An economical crisis arose in 1889-92, owing to the depression of
the sugar market. Sugar is the staple production of Cuba. The
manufacture of beet sugar in Europe and the McKinley tariff in
America, caused the complete stagnation of this industry and great
distress prevailed. It was a question interesting to both Cubans and
Spaniards, and promised to make a new bond of union between the
contending factions, but the government discountenanced this policy
and little relief could be obtained. The people lost heart and the
elections proving only a farce, they ceased to trouble themselves to
go to the polls. The abolition of slavery had made matters worse
in an economical way, and the reckless extravagance of the govern-
ment piled up the debt upon the people of Cuba until it became
unbearable. The heavy poll-tax disfranchised the greater number
of the natives, so that the right of suffrage was restricted to 53,000
out of a population of 1,600,000; and while there was a pretense of
representation, the number of native Cubans in the Cortes lias never
exceeded six and seldom been more than three. The offices were
distributed among the Spaniards; there was no personal safety, no
freedom of speech nor of the press. Such was the corruption in the

I20 CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.

collection of duties that in 1887 the Havana custom-house was cleared
at the point of the bayonet by order of Captain-General Marin. Span-
ish products paid no duties, while foreign articles were heavily taxed
and the Cubans paid enormous duties in Spain. Before 1895 Cuba
groaned under a debt of $295,707,264, most of which was incurred
by Spain in foreign wars or the Carlist insurrections. This debt
included " the expense of Spain's occupation of San Domingo, the
invasion of Mexico, expedition against Peru, money advanced during
Carlist wars, all that Spain had spent to uphold domination in Cuba
and to cover lavish expenses since 1868," including the enormous
military force sent to the island. The debt absorbed nearly 41 per
cent.; after deducting other expenses, there was less than 3 per cent,
left for internal development and improvement. While a subsidy of
$471,836.68 was paid to one company alone, the Spanish Trans-
Atlantic Company, the island was allowed less than $200,000 for
education.

In 1894 a bill of reforms acceptable to the majority of the Cubans
was introduced into the Cortes, but being discouraged by Sagasta
failed to pass, and a very unsatisfactory one was substituted and be-
came a law in January. The very terms of this bill, showing the
reforms that Vv^ere demanded, prove the niter falsity of the claims
put forth by the government of Spain in vindication of her policy
towards the Cubans.

Provision was made for a council of administration to consist of the
Governor-General and fifteen councillors appointed by royal decree.
The members of the council were to be selected from men having
been for four years resident in the country, and having been one
among the fifty largest taxpayers in the island, whether on real estate
or for the exercise of a profession. In addition they must have occu-
pied certain high positions enumerated in the bill. There were also
to be fifteen councillors elected according to the same census as are
the provincial deputies. Public works, telegraphic and postal com-
munications, agriculture, industry and commerce, immigration, pub-
lic instruction, beneficence and health, all were to come under the
decrees of this administrative council, which was also to make up and
approve the annual budget.

The law provides that —

" It shall be incumbent on the Governor-General, as the supreme
head of the government of the island, to execute all the decrees of
the council."

THE TEN years' WAR. 121

But it continues:

** Whenever the Governor-General shall judge any decision of the
council to be contrary to the laws, or to the general interest of the
nation, he shall suspend its execution, etc."

And, for certain reasons, the Governor-General may suspend the
council of administration. He may also suspend the publication and
fulfillment of royal decrees, suspend the guarantees granted in the
interests of the people, and apply the riot act.

It will be seen that the authority of the Governor-General was not
at all abridged, and his power remained as arbitrary as ever; for in
addition to the privileges enumerated, he was given supreme com-
mand of all the armed forces on land and sea stationed in the island;
and he was the acknowledged delegate of the minister of the colonies,
of state, of war and marine ; and all the other authorities of the island
were made subordinate to him.

If the reforms allowed by the bill were any improvement on the
existing state of affairs, it is not surprising that the Cubans found
their condition unbearable. The law of January, 1895, precipitated
the brewing storm and the banner of Cuban liberty was again un-
furled February 24, 1895.

The law, when received in Cuba, was loudly applauded by the
Autonomist party, which issued, April, 1895, a circular praising its
provisions and stigmatizing the revolutionists, and affirming " faith
in the means afforded by the Constitution, in the effectual agency of
work, in the indisputable force of ideas." After enumerating the
evils already caused in the islands by the threatened rebellion, such
as the suspension of the constitutional guarantees, preventing free
use of rights already secured, the circular describes the insurgents
as " men who belong to the most ignorant and miserable classes,
victims of the lamentable want of advancement in which they were
left to live in that fine section of Cuba (the eastern province), as an
easy prey for agitators, having no cohesion or discipline, for which
reason it is expected they will have to disband or surrender." The
people are exhorted to unite in assisting the " pacifier " of 1878, " who
has come once more to solve the present problems in the same spirit
of noble, righteous and generous confidence in the people."

THE REBELLION OF 1895.

CHAPTER VI.

After the close of the Ten Years' War, many of the chiefs of the
rebellion left Cuba and continued their plans for the liberation of
the island. The failure of Spain to keep the terms of the treaty of
Zanjon still further embittered the partisans of free Cuba, and it was
not difficult to organize revolutionary clubs. By 1890 there were
150 such clubs organized in the United States, Mexico, Cuba, Central
and South America, with a war fund of $1,000,000, and arms for
8,000 men.

The outbreak of the rebellion of 1895 was signalized by the simul-
taneous uprising of n' merous small bands of insurgents in various
parts of the island. Manuel Garcia, a chieftain of the previous war,
gave the signal for revolt in Matanzas; he was betrayed and killed.
A planter named Brooks, subsequently killed, led a large band in
Santiago province. The governors of Matanzas and Santiago hav-
ing reported these outbreaks to the Governor-General, Calleja, martial
law was declared on the 28th of February, and free pardon offered
to all who should surrender within eight days. Other bands of rebels
under the command of Antonio Lopez Coloma, Dr. Martin Marrero
and Joaquin Pedrosa did not make much headway, many of the
leaders being captured and their men dispersed; but it was soon
found that the organizations in Santiago were of a more formidable
nature, especially that under the leadership of Bartolome Masso, one
of the most influential chiefs of the Ten Years' War. Nearly all the
insurgents in the initial uprising were dispersed and fled to the
mountains or swamps to perfect their organization and gather re-
cruits, which were daily pouring in from the country homes and
from the ranks of the militia.

The Cuban autonomists or home rulers threw their whole strength
and influence on the side of the government, and used every means
possible to prevent the spread of the revolution. They sought an
interview with Masso, who requested ten days' time for consultation

THE REBELLION OF 1895. I^j

with Other Cuban leaders, but General Lachambre, the military conri-
niander of tlie province, demanded immediate surrender. A com-
mittee went to Havana to ask the Captain-General to stop hostilities,
but he upheld the action of Lachambre, and all the efforts of the
peace party were useless to stay the progress of the civil war.

The number of the insurgents was insignificant, and they were
poorly armed, their principal weapon being the machete, a long-
bladed sv/ord-knife, which they used with great strength and dex-
terity. They relied for firearms upon what they could capture from
the Spaniards, or could secure from friends abroad. They were
generally mounted, being fine riders, and in small bands scoured the
country, attacking outposts or blockhouses where weak garrisons
were stationed, and raiding plantations, where they levied contribu-
tions of food, stock and ammunition. The formation of the country
was favorable to this style of guerilla warfare and immense damage
could be done with impunity by very small forces.

Meanwhile, Governor-General Calleja was recalled, and Marshal
Martinez Campos was sent over to replace him, April lo. He
landed at Guantanamo April i6, and visited the southeastern cities
before proceeding to Havana he gave the most elaborate instruc-
tions in regard to every subject — the diet and medical attendance for
his own soldiers, the protection of noncombatants, and the treatment
of prisoners He placed the troops in the eastern district under
Generals Salcedo, Lachambre and Valdez, with headquarters, re-
spectively, at Santiago, Bayamo and Gibaro. General J. Garrich
was made military and civil governor of Santiago In August, the
same year. General J. J. Morena succeeded Salcedo, and General A.
G. Munoz succeeded Lachambre. Campos had control not only of
the military forces, but the men-of-war were at his disposal. He
was very active, constantly moving from place to place, sometimes
by special train, but generally by water.

Almost simultaneously with his appointment, two formidable
enemies appeared on the southeastern coast. Antonio and Jose
Maceo, Frank Agramonte and Flor Crombert, with a small body
of insurgents, arrived from Costa Rico, landed near Baracoa March
31, and joined Perez near Guantanamo, after losing several of their
number on the way. Jose Marti and Maxim^o Gomez, ffom San
Domingo, landed at Cabonico April 14, and after perilous adven-
tures reached the main body of insurgents, where Gomez was re-
ceived and recognized as commander-in-chief. The revolt was at

124 CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.

this time centered in Santiago province. The insurgents numbered
over 6.000 men, scattered in small bands over the country, while the
standing colonial army of 20,000 soldiers and something like 50,000
volunteers or militia, was already reinforced by more than 25,000
fresh troops. There was heavy fighting in the southeast during the;
latter part of the spring. Flor Crombert, commanding about 300
of Maceo's men, was ambushed by a large force of Spaniards near
Palmerito, early in April, and was killed by one of his own men.
He was an able and enthusiastic leader and his loss was greatly
deplored. Maceo attacked and nearly annihilated 400 Spaniards
near Guantanamo, May 14; and, on the following day, the Spanish
escort to a provision train to Bayamo was dispersed by a body of
800 insurgents. Gomez and Jose Marti rode into Carmaguez, while
Maceo was diverting the attention of the Spaniards by terrorizing
Holquin. Marti was killed in a skirmish at Dos Rios, May 19,
and Gomez was wounded, but escaped capture. The corpse of Marti
v/as embalmed and taken to Santiago, where it was identified and
honorably buried. Marti was not a soldier, but he was a devoted,
successful and enthusiastic organizer and civil leader. He had in-
tended to leave Cuba and work for her from abroad after seeing the
revolution well launched. Henri Rochefort speaks of him as '' the
Antillian Mazzini," and he is commonly known as the father of
the Cuban rebellion. His death was a severe blow to the cause for
which he gave his life. His place as organizer was filled by T. E.
Palma, of New York.

Early in June, Gomez invaded the province of Puerto Principe
and in a few days there was a general uprising throughout the
province. The Marquis of Santa Lucia, an ex-Cuban president,
joined the insurgents, whose ranks were daily increasing, and active
hostilities were carried on, a regular plan of campaign on each side
being commenced. The orders of Gomez to his followers were to
attack all small Spanish posts and secure arms, to destroy railroads
and telegraph lines, Spanish forts or buildings where resistance was
made, to destroy all crops or mills whose owners refused to con-
tribute to the Cuban war fund, and to keep on the defensive unless
they could fight at great advantage.

Campos' orders were to protect sugar estates and railroads; to
attack unless the enemy's forces were three to one, to release all
rebels who surrendered unless they held rank as officers, and^to keep
the towns supplied with provisions.

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The rainy season did not put an end to the conflict, although the
Spanish troops suffered severely from the tropical climate. The first
serious check given to -the royal troops Vv^as at the battle of Bayamo,
July 12, where General Santocildes was killed. The fight was long
and bloody; the insurgent forces were skillfully managed by Maceo,
and they claimed to have killed and disabled 300 Spaniards. The
immediate presence and good generalship of Campos alone saved the
army from a disastrous rout. In August, the revolt had spread to
the Santa Clara province, a rich, level district where many Americans
own property, and Gomez was preparing to invade the western prov-
inces. Late in this month, the expedition of Rolof and Rodriquez
from Key West, Florida, landed on the shores of Santa Clara prov-
ince; and before long the insurgents were traversing the provinces
of Matanzas, Havana, and Pinar del Rio, a portion of the island here-
tofore regarded as sacred from the torch of insurrection. The revo-
lutionary government elected the Marquis of Santa Lucia, president,
and Bartolome Masso, vice-president; Maximo Gomez was confirmed
as general-in-chief of the liberating army, and Antonio Maceo, gen-
eral-in-chief of the invading army, with the rank of lieutenant-general.
After the defeat of General Suarez Valdez by Gomez, General Pando
was sent over from Spain with 30,000 men.

The favorite method of repressing the Cubans seems to have been
the construction of the trocha, a kind of fortified wall w^hich the
Spaniards seemed to regard as impregnable, but to their surprise it
was broken through, and by the end of the rainy season, the rebel
army was swarming over the western provinces. November 17,
Maceo, with a force of 1,900 men, defeated General Navarro near the
city of Santa Clara, and Gomez won another victory in the same
neighborhood November 19 and 20. General Campos made a
stand at Coliseo, in Matanzas province, and met with a severe check.
Gomez attacked him with 7,000 men, and being reinforced by 1,500
insurgents, he made a bold charge, at the same time firing a cane-
lield in which the Spaniards attempted to make a flank movement,
and thus driving them back to Havana province. This victory
enabled the insurgents to carry the war to the very gates of Havana,
for the burning fields fired by them could be seen from the city, and
before the end of the year 1895, Maceo had a large force massed in
the Province of Pinar del Rio^ west of Havana.

The extent and consequences of the insurrection became so alarm-
ing that Campos was recalled January 17, 1896, and General Weyler,
a man with a reputation for great sterness and severity, was sent

...J

128 Cuba's struggle against spain.

to take his place. This was to prove the end of civilized warfare in
the island. General Campos had acted with humanity, and the
Cubans, in the beginning of the conflict, had treated their prisoners
in the same way; but after Weyler took command, February 10, 1896,
such a carnival of blood was commenced that the cruelty exhibited
on both sides was fiendish in its malignity.

At this time the Cubans claimed, in the various provinces, a total
of 60,722 men, sixty per cent, of whom were white, and forty per
cent, colored. Of their officers above the rank of captain, fifty were
white, ten black, three mulatto, and one Indian. The sugar-cane
plantations all over the island were laid waste by the insurgents; the
country homes and stores were pillaged and destroyed, first by one
side and then by the other, until the beautiful island became one vast
scene of ruin and desolation; laborers were arrested in the fields and
executed on the charge of being insurgents; women and children and
aged men were killed or driven into the cities and corraled there
to starve, not being allowed to go beyond a certain line under pain
of death. The press was so restricted, and the. accounts of all that
took place in the island from the opening of the year 1896 are so
garbled and contradictory that it is impossible to form a correct idea
of the campaign.

The insurrection was at first very much underestimated, both at
home and abroad, while public interest in this country was for a
time greatly excited over the Venezuelan controversy, and the dis-
covery of gold in the Klondike. But gradually the rebellion began
to assume larger proportions, and attracted the attention of the nations
of Europe as well as of the people of the United States. The humane
and conciliatory policy of Campos was unsuccessful, and it was evi-
dent that nothing but absolute independence or the extermination
of the Cubans would end the conflict.

The great difficulty of the insurgents was to get recognition as
belligerents, but owing to the peculiar nature of the conflict, they
found it hard to prove the existence of a local government. On this
subject the greatest diversity of opinion prevailed. The Spaniards
invariably characterized them as an unorganized mob of negroes, and
>et within one year, in the face of more than 100,000 Spanish soldiers,
the insurgents had traA^ersed the whole length of the island and made
more headway than they had been able to do in the whole Ten Years'
War. They had almost undisputed possession of the eastern half of
the island. Before the beginning of 1897, they had a civil admin-

THE REBELLION OF 1895. ^^9

islration organized for the provinces of Santiago, Puerto Principe
and part of Santa Clara. These provinces wtve divided into districts,
with regular officials, known as prefects. Salvador Cisneros was
president, and Bartolome Masso, vice-president. Sundry laws had
been enacted dealing with marriages cjid collection of taxes, a mail
service was established and set in operation, four newspapers were
printed, and primary schools were opened.

The seacoast was patrolled and a large part of it used by the
insurgents, more than thirty shipments ot arms and ammunition hav-
ing been safely landed; still, on account of want of artillery, they
could not hold a single seaport against Spanish men-of-war. The
Spanish garrisons had to be withdrawn from the interior towns as
soon as the insurgents received a few pieces of light artillery. Yet,
in spite of these facts, it seemed impossible to prove that the Cuban
rebels had an organized form of government and a capital city.
Cubitas, the capital, was inaccessible to the outside world.

Captain-General Marin was in command for a fev/ weeks before
the arrival of the new governor. Captain-General Weyler reached
Cuba February lo, 1896. The reputation he bore as a stern and
relentless character had produced such consternation among the non-
ccmbatants that thousands of Cuban citizens in sympathy with the
rebellion left the island before he arrived. On the day after reach-
ing Cuba, he made a proclamation urging all the citizens to uphold
the cause of Spain. March 8, another proclamation was issued in
which he gave the insurgents fifteen days to surrender, offering pardon
to those who would prove they were forced into the ranks of the in-
surgents and who would take the oath of allegiance to Spain.

March II, Monteguelo was burned by the insurgents. In April,
Maceo broke through the trocha line between Havana and Pinar
del Rio and gained an important victory at the battle of Cacarajicara,
which was given out as the usual Spanish victory. Maceo, however,
remained undisturbed in his mountain fastness, while it required
30,000 men to keep the vicinity of Havana itself safe from the in-
cursions of the rebels. About this time. General Garcia, who had
been intercepted and detained in the United States in February, suc-
ceeded in reaching Cuba and was put in command in the extreme
southeast, while General Gomez commanded in the center. On April
21, at a fight near Manzanillo, the Spaniards received a severe
check. Generals Pando and Bernal, about this time, returned to
Spain, not being in accord with the new regime introduced by Wey-

130 Cuba's struggle against spain.

Icr. In May the exportation of leaf-tobacco from Havana and Pinar
del Rio was prohibited. Early in May, the *' Bermuda " landed two
Catling guns, 1,000 rifles, 500,000 rounds of ammunition and i,ooo
pounds of dynamite for the insurgents. The '* Competitor " was not
so successful, but was captured on a similar mission and carried to
Cuba by a Spanish gunboat. In June the Spanish government
made strenuous efiforts to raise funds with which to carry on the
expenses of the war, which were enormous. With the setting in
of the rainy season, the campaign was for a time suspended, the
insurgents holding their own, while the king's soldiers were being
mowed down by thousands before the resistless advances of disease.

When Weyler reached Cuba, he sent back a demand for more
troops, and they continued to pour into Cuba until there was an
army of Spanish soldiers there exceeding 200,000. He began by
scattering 150,000 of these in fortifications in the cities and in the
numberless small forts along the trochas.

These defenses are so often mentioned in the course of a history
of the Cuban War that a more detailed description of them will assist
in understanding the situation. The trocha resembles a fortified wall.
It is a cleared space between one and two hundred yards wide, stretch-
ing through an impassable jungle. The felled trees are piled up in
rows about as wide as an ordinary street and some six feet high.
Between these barriers runs a road and in some cases a single track of
military railway protected by a- line of forts and blockhouses; beyond
them a maze of barbed wire and another barrier of felled trees and
jungle. Ditches are generally dug parallel to the trocha. The princi-
pal trochas cross the island in its narrowest parts, one of fifty miles
across the western part of the province of Puerto Principe, the other
of twenty-five miles across the eastern part of the province of Pinar
del Rio, hardly twenty miles from the city of Havana. The fortifi-
cations on the trochas are unique. Every half mile there is a large
stone fort, painted white, so as to be easily seen from a great distance.
Half way between these forts are blockhouses, and between the block-
houses and forts are what might be compared to large, fortified sentry
boxes, very vStrongly built and skillfully protected by entanglements
of barbed wire. It is evident that such obstructions as the trochas
v/ould prove very formidable to opponents without artillery, while
of little value against the use of artiller}^ In point of fact, they were
frequently crossed by spies and couriers, and several times by large
bodies of insurgents.

THE REBELLION OF 1895. I3I

In the fall, after the rainy season, Weyler himself took the field
and there were continual bulletins announcing the pacification of the
j-rovince or the fact that the insurgents were surrounded, and prom-
ising that the sugar plantations should be protected and that the
grinding of the cane should be recommenced; but as soon as the
rebels disappeared from one side they sprang up on the other.

In December rhe insurgents sustained a severe loss in the death
Ci' Maceo. It has been impossible to verify the accounts of his death,
as the circumstances are represented so very differently. The Span-
iards charge that he was killed in open fight; the insurgents that
he was lured into ambush and treacherously murdered. The news
of his death was received with great delight at Havana, was cele-
brated by illuminations and processions, and Don Francisco Cirujeda,
who led the troops that killed the Cuban leader, was honored and
promoted. Maceo was succeeded in command by General Juan Ruiz
Rivera. Weyler's campaign in Pinar del Rio was continued with
great ostentation and parade, accompanied by continual proclama-
tions of pacification, while in fact the rebels were daily increasing in
strength. January 19, Weyler started east with 19,000 men, in-
creased from the garrisons to 25,000. He reached Santa Clara Feb-
ruary I, and issued concentration orders February 9, and marched
to Placitas, thence to Sancti Spiritus. The concentration orders
required all the noncombatants to go to certain towns within a limited
period, or be considered as rebels and shot at sight. Indeed, the
chief fury of the Spaniards seemed to be directed against these un-
armed and helpless pacificos, who were herded like cattle in the most
unhealthy locations, where they died by hundreds from contagious
diseases and starvation. Frequently, unarmed laborers were shot in
the fields or brought to the towns and executed as rebels, while every
dwelling in the open country was burned to the ground and not a
living creature was left in the devastated region.

Meanwhile Gomez and Cisneros crossed the central trocha in Janu-
ary and attacked Arroyo Blanco, whose garrison was relieved Febru-
ary 3. Gomez then sent Rodriguez in Weyler's rear to threaten the
provinces of Havana and Matanzas, while he established himself at
Arroyo; and, although the Spaniards reported three battles as vic-
tories, they failed to dislodge him. Gomez was so expert in mis-
leading his adversaries that he acquired the name of '' the wily fox."
He seldom came to an open fight, but led his pursuers a roundabout
chase, until fear of being ambushed obliged them to give up the
pursuit, and he would return in safety to his headquarters.

1^2 Cuba's struggle against spaim.

In February the Queen Regent signed reform decrees, and in
March Weyler was ordered to negotiate with the rebels. March 28,
reaching Cienfuegos, he sent three Cuban leaders of the Ten Years'
War to negotiate with Gomez, but the latter refused to receive them.

In April, Weyler returned to Havana, declaring the province of
Santa Clara pacified. The rainy season was again approaching and
the insurgents were prepared to recuperate in the well-guarded fast-
ness, while the Spanish numbers dwindled daily from the effects of
disease. The insurgents of Santiago province, under the leadership
of General Garcia, were living on supplies captured from the Spanish
columns. In the case of Bayamo, about twenty or thirty miles from
Manzanillo, it is estimated that the Spaniards must have lost at least
5,000 men in the efTort to keep the garrison supplied with provisions,
and, after the insurgents secured artillery, many of these interior
towns had to be abandoned.

July 31, General Weyler announced amnesty to the exiled Cubans.
There was great opposition to his course and demands were made
for his recall. In August, Canovas was assassinated and was suc-
ceeded by General Azcarraga. The Spanish policy remained for
some time unchanged and Weyler was not recalled until October 9.
General Blanco, his successor, arrived in Havana October 30. In
November, Spain extended the suffrage and offered concessions to
Cuba. The starving condition of the Cuban reconcentrados could
no longer be denied and the authorities were compelled to accept the
help of charitable Americans in caring for these destitute creatures.
This was galling to the Spaniards in Cuba, and riots occurred in
Havana early in the year 1898, when the American consulate had to
be protected by a large body of troops. General Lee informed the
authorities of the critical situation of Americans in Cuba, and the
White Squadron, under the command of Admiral Sicard, was ordered
to rendezvous in the neighborhood of Key West. Excitement all
over the country r?n high and urgent measures were taken to improve
the navy and protect our seaboard in case of hostility.

Meanwhile, Marshal Blanco had proceeded to carry out the re-
forms suggested by the Sagasta cabinet, and the promised plan of
autonomy was inaugurated. Cabinet officers were selected to assist
the Governor-General in the home government. Jose Maria Galvez
was president of the cabinet; Antonio Covin, minister of the interior;
the Marquis of Montoro, leader of the autonomist party in Cuba,
minister of finance; Laureano Rodiguez, minister of commerce;

THE REBELLION OF 1895. 133

Francesco of Zayas, minister of education, and Eduardo Dolz, min-
ister of posts and telegraphs. In addition to the estabhshment of
the new form of government, commissioners, or more properly speak-
ing, emissaries were sent to the various rebel headquarters to endeavor
to persuade or bribe the leaders into accepting the new regime. The
messengers were badly received; in fact, they failed to return, and it
was soon made known tliat one of them, Col. D. Joachin Ruiz, aide-
de-camp to General Blanco, and sent by him to the camp of the
insurgent chief, Rodriguez, had been court-martialed and shot as a
spy. The sacrifice of this brave and popular young officer was deeply
deplored and aroused great indignation; but it was justified by the
Cubans on the ground that he came as an emissary to corrupt the
loyalty of a subordinate commander; that the Spaniards had already
published false reports as to the defection and desertion of various
rebel leaders, and that the only way to offset this treachery was by
dealing summarily v/ith any agent attempting to treat with them, or
offering to make any concessions short of the absolute independence
they had proclaimed.

On January 25, by order of the Navy Department, the battleship
" Maine " took leave of the rest of the fleet at Key West, and pro-
ceeded to the harbor of Havana. There had been serious riots in
Havana and it was considered that the presence of an American man-
of-war would be a safeguard to American interests there. The plan
was acquiesced in by the Spanish Government and arrangements
were made that the courtesy should be returned by the visit of the
'' Vizcaya," a large, heavily-armed Spanish cruiser, to the port of New
York. The unfortunate De Lome matter fanned the flame of dis-
cord and the relations between Spain and the United vStates were
strained to a degree which needed not such a terrible catastrophe
as the destruction of the " Maine " to produce an irreparable breach.
The officers of the '' Maine'' were: Captain, Charles D. Sigsbee;
executive officer, Lieutenant-Commander Richard Wainv/right; navi-
gator. Lieutenant George F. W. Holman; lieutenants, John Hood
and Carl W. Jungen; lieutenants, junior grade, George P. Blow,
John J. Blandin and Friend W. Jenkins; naval cadets, Jonas H.
Holden, Watt T. Cluverius, Amon Bronson and David T. Boyd, Jr.;
surgeon, Lucien G. Heneberger; paymaster, Charles M. Ray; chief
engineer, Charles P. Howell; passed assistant engineer, Frederick C.
Bowers; assistant engineers, John R. Morris and Darwin R. Merritt;
naval cadets (engineer division). Pope Washington and Arthur Cren-

134 Cuba's struggle against spain.

shaw; chaplain, John P. Chidwick; first lieutenant of marines, Al-
bertus W. Catlin; boatswain, Francis E. Larkin; gunner, Joseph Hill;
carpenter, George Helms; pay clerk. Brent McCarthy. The crew
numbered 328.

The night of the explosion was overcast, hot and sultry. The
*' Maine," lying peacefully at the buoy where she was moored by the
Spanish pilot on her entrance into the port, had swung around into
an unusual position; in fact, she was in e^^actly the position she would
have had to take to open fire on the shore fortifications. Nearly astern
of the '' Maine " was the American steamer ''City of Washington; " on
the starboard side were the '' Alfonso XH " and the " Legazpi."
Suddenly, at forty minutes past nine, an awful explosion shook the
vessel, which caught on fire and instantly commenced to sink. The
electric lights went out and the quarters were left in intense darkness
and smoke. All the crew were on board, and, except those on duty,
had turned in. Only four of the officers were absent — • Assistant
Engineer Bowers, Cadet Washington, Paymaster's Clerk McCarthy
and Gunner Joseph Plill. Some of the officers were in their state-
rooms or the messrooms below, in the officers' smoking quarters, or
on the main deck. The captain was in his cabin writing. The force
of the explosion being on the side occupied by the men's sleeping
quarters, made the escape of the majority of the crew impossible.
Those of the officers and crew who were able hurried to the deck,
and, without confusion or disorder, reported for duty and did all that
could be done to save the vessel and the crew.

Only three of the fifteen boats were found available; three manned
and went to the work of rescuing the men who were floating in the
water and crying for help. Boats from the American and Spanish
ships also aided in the work of rescue. Meanwhile, the vessel was
burning and was sinking rapidly. It was supposed that the maga-
zines were flooded, but there was momentary danger of explosion of
ammunition, which had become mingled with the wreckage; and
the group of officers who had remained on deck until the last moment,
having done all that was possible, sadly and reluctantly left the wreck
and took refuge on the " City of Washington," a Ward Line steamer,
commanded by Captain Stevens, who did good service in behalf of
his unfortunate countrymen. The injured men were cared for on this
vessel and the Spanish men-of-war in the neighborhood, and were
afterwards sent to the Spanish hospitals in Havana, where they were
nursed with great kindness and consideration..

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THE REBELLION OF 1895. 137

A few moments after reaching safe quarters, Captain Sigsbee sent
the following dispatch:

"Secretary Navy, Washington, D. C:

'' ' Maine ' blown up in Havana harbor at nine forty to-night and
destroyed. Many wounded and doubtless more killed or drowned.
Wounded and others on board Spanish man-of-war and Ward Line
steamer. Send lighthouse tenders from Key West for crew and the
few pieces of equipment above water. No one has clothing other
than that upon him. Public opinion should be suspended until fur-
ther report. All officers believed to be saved. Jenkins and Merritt
not yet accounted for. Many Spanish officers, including representa-
tive of General Blanco^ now with me to express sympathy.

" SIGSBEE.'^

Consul-General Lee, upon hearing of the disaster, im.raediately
i-astened on board to offer sympathy and assistance. Several Span-
ish officers, including General Salano, chief of staff to General Blanco,
also called upon Captain Sigsbee immediately after he boarded the
' City of Washington/' expressed their great sympathy, and asserted
that the authorities in Havana vv^ere entirely ignorant of the cause
of the explosion.

Two hundred and fifty-four were lost that night, seven of the
wounded afterwards died, and many were crippled for life. Only two
of the officers were lost — Lieutenant Jenkins and Assistant Engineer
Merritt. The Spanish authorities offered to give public burial to the
dead whose bodies had been recovered; the offer was accepted, and,
on the afternoon of February 17, the funeral of nineteen of the victims
took place amid demonstrations of profound sympathy and respect.
The funeral cortege was very imposing; thousands of all ranks took \,
part in the vast procession which followed the dead, who were laid
to rest in the beautiful Colon cemetery just outside the city of Havana.
Most of the remaining bodies, as they were recovered, were buried
there. Chaplain Chidwick identifying them and conducting the funeral
services. After it became possible to forward the bodies to Key
West, they were buried there, and the wounded were also sent back
to the United States, as soon as they were able to travel, with the
surviving officers and men, except seven officers and two men, who
remained in Havana with the captain.

The divers arrived on the 19th, and among the first articles recov-
ered from the captain's cabin were the keys of all the magazines and

138 , Cuba's struggle against spain.

shellrooms, showing that these keys had been safely turned in upon
the night of the accident. The work of diving for the bodies may
be better imagined than described, and conspicuous among the many
brave deeds of cfBcers and men was the heroic fortitude of the gentle
chaplain in personally inspecting and identifying the remains of these
unfortunate men, who in life had found in him a warm and sympa-
thetic friend. He also answered fully and kindly the hundreds of
sad and terrible letters received from sorrowing relatives of the dead.

By the 21st of February 143 bodies had been recovered, and several
more were brought up later. The remains of the two officers who
were lost were among the last recovered.

The life of Captain Sigsbee, during the days succeeding the disaster,
was full of the most harrowing details and distressing scenes, but
through it all he had the consolation of knowing that he was upheld
by the entire confidence of the American people, who exonerated
him from all charges of carelessness long before the court of inquiry
met. He remained in Havana until March 26, when he returned to
Washington, where he was received by the Secretary and the Presi-
dent with every mark of respect and sympathy, and some weeks after
was assigned to another command.

It was uncertain at first whether the accident was due to an internal
explosion, caused by the firipg of the magazines, or to some external
cause. A board of inquiry was immediately appointed by the United
States authorities to investigate the matter, and it seemed decided
beyond question, based upon evidence that the hull was bent in-
wardly, that the destroying agency was an external one, probably
a submarine mine in the harbor. This construction was always de-
nied by Spain, excepting a short and perfunctory examination, but
no serious efforts were made by that government to investigate the
matter or to place the guilt. This was natural. If they did not
admit the findings of the American board as correct, but persisted in
maintaining that the explosion was from some internal cause, it was
hardly to be expected that they would seek to throw blame, which
they did not admit to exist, upon one of their own officials in the city
of Havana. The indignation felt in the United States, on account of
this terrible affair, was little less than that felt in Spain over what
the Spanish people considered an unjust and unproven charge; and
feelings of intense bitterness were engendered between the two nations.

The destruction of the " Maine " was not the alleged reason for
war, but it was the most important factor in precipitating the inevi-
table conflict.

RELATIONS OF CUBA AND THE UNITED
STATES IN THE PAST.

CHAPTER VII.

The geographical situation of Cuba is remarkable, commanding as
it does the two most important approaches to the Gulf of Mexico.

With an area of about the same as that of Alabama, its configuration
is pecuHar and almost crescent-shaped. It is 790 miles long, 117 miles
wide in its broadest part and 22 in its narrowest. It is 50 miles from
Hayti, 95 miles from Jamaica, 124 miles from the extremity of Florida
and about an equal distance from Yucatan. Early in its history, the
strategic value of the island was recognized, and it was the base of
the most important expeditions to the Gulf Coast, those of Cortez and
De Soto, and, at a later date, the expedition of tlie Prince de Joinville
against Mexico. It was here also that General Packenham's forces
stopped on their way home after liis disastrous encounter with the
Americans at New^ Orleans.

The position of Cuba, the Key to the Gulf of Mexico, or, as it is
called by Mr. Murat Halstead the '' Guardian of the gates of the
American Mediterranean," renders the island an object of intense in-
terest to the citizens of the United States, and while there has never
been any question as to Spain's right of possession, the cession of
Cuba to a foreign power has always been considered a '' purely Ameri-
can question." In the same degree the secession of Cuba from the
mother country and the securing of her absolute independence, has
always been a question more interesting to Americans than to any
others. The paramount importance of its commanding position has
always been acknowledged, although- our statesmen have been divided
in their views with regard to the advisability of annexation, particu-
larly during ante-bellum days before the abolition of slavery, when the
economic conditions of our country w^ere vastlv different from those
since existing. But even in those early days, Jefiferson thus expressed
himself (Jefferson's Works, Vol. 7, p. 316):

I candidly confess that I have ever looked upon Cuba as the most inter-
esting addition that can be made to our systei;^ of States, the possession of

140 CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.

which (with Florida Point), would give us control over the Gulf of Mexico
and the countries and isthmus bordering upon it, and would fill up the measure
of our political well-being.

' April 2.J, 1809 (Ibid, Vol. V, p. 444), JefTferson wrote as follows:

He (Napoleon) will with diiBculty consent to our receiving Cuba into our
Union, to prevent our aid to Mexico and other provinces. That would be a
price, and I would immediately erect a column on the southernmost limit of
Cuba, and inscribe on it a ne plus ultra as to us in that direction. We should
then have only to include the North in our confederacy, which would be, of
course, in the first war, and we should have such an empire for liberty as she
has never surveyed since the creation; and I am persuaded no Constitution was
ever so well calculated as ours for extensive empire and self-government.
* * * It will be objected to our receiving Cuba, that no limit can then be
drawn to our future acquisitions. Cuba can be defended by us without a Navy,
and this develops the principle which ought to limit our views. Nothing
should ever be accepted which would require a Navy to defend it.

June II, 1823 (Ibid, Vol. 7, p. 288), he wrote to the President:

Cuba alone seems at present to hold up a speck of war to us. Its possession
by Great Britain would, indeed, be a great calamity to us. Could we induce
her to join us in guaranteeing its independence against all the world, except
Spain, it would be nearly as valuable to us as if it were our own. But should
she take it, I would not immediately go to war for it; because the first war on
other accounts will give it to us; or the island will give itself to us, when able
to do so.

And again, on June 23d, the same year (Ibid, Vol. 7, p. 300), he
wrote, speaking of Cuba:

It is better then to lie still in readiness to receive that interesting incorpora-
tion when solicited by herself. For, certainly, her addition to our confederacy
. is exactly what is wanting to round out our power as a nation to the point of
its utmost interest.

Our Secretaries of State since the time of JefTerson have always
watched with jealous care the development of foreign interests upon
this continent and have always insisted that Cuba should never be
sulYered to pass into the hands of any other European pjower, if_re-
leased from the dominion of Spain.

John Quincy Adams, Monroe's Secretary of State from 1817 to
1825, said:

RELATIONS OF CUBA AND THE UNITED STATES. I4I

* * * Looking forward to the probable course of events for the short
period of half a century, it is scarcely possible to resist the conviction that the
annexation of Cuba to our Federal Republic will be indispensable to the con-
tinuance and integrity of the Union itself. * * * Cuba, forcibly disjointed
from its own unnatural connection with Spain and incapable of self-support,
can gravitate only toward the North American Union, which by the same law
of nature can not cast her ofif from its bosom.

This letter was written to the United States Minister in Spain and
shows plainly how naturally the inference was drawn that Cuba no
longer dependent on Spain would seek alliance with or entrance into
the American Union. Spain was at this time losing her American
possessions, and that she would retain Cuba for a very long period
was considered highly improbable.

The celebrated Monroe Doctrine about which there has been so
much controversy, was announced about this time, and showed plainly
that any attempt at interference by European powers on the American
continent, or any attempt to recover lost dominion over states which
had achieved their independence, would be regarded by the United
States as unfriendly.

Henry Clay, while Secretary of State during the administration of
John Quincy Adams, 1824- 1829, writing to the United States Minister
in Spain, said:

If the war should continue between Spain and the new Republics, and those
islands (Cuba and Porto Rico) should become the theatre of it, their fortunes
have such a connection with the prosperity of the United States that they
could not be indifferent spectators, and the possible contingencies of such a
protracted war might bring upon the Government of the United States duties
and obligations, the performance of which, however painful it should be, they
might not be at liberty to decline.

In 1825, Spain endeavored to secure a treaty with the United States
oflering commercial advantages in exchange for a guarantee to Spain
of perpetual possession of Cuba. The effort coupled with an attempt
to recover her lost colonies, was unsuccessful, the utmost concessions
made being an expression from the President that all our efforts
should be to preserve the existing state of things. At the same time
the United States discountenanced attempts made by the Spanish-
American Republics to carry their war with Spain into Cuba.

In 1826, the Minister of Foreign Affairs was instructed that the
United States would not countenance the passage of Cuba to any other

142 CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.

European power. Thus it seems there has always been a mutual dis-
trust in regard to Cuba, and the attitude of the United States seems to
have been tolerance of Spain's claims so long as the mother country
was able to enforce them. It seems to have gone much further dur-
ing the last thirty years, for the condition of Cuba has been a serious
menace to the conmierce and welfare of the United States; at the
same time it must be admitted that while the Government did its full
duty in keeping faith with Spain, the people of the United States did
much to foment and encourage the uprisings upon the island, and
without the moral support and material assistance derived from . Ameri-
can sympathizers, Cuba could never have successfully defied Spain,
because a vast number of the better class of Cubans were not dis-
affected, but clung with unshaken loyalty to the mother country.

In 1852, Mr. Everett, Secretary of State, protested against Euro-
pean interference in Cuba, and in 1853, Governor Marcy, then Secre-
tary of State, said that Cuba '' must be to the United States no cause
of annoyance in itself, nor must it be used by others as an instrument
of annoyance." He wrote July 23, 1853, that it was very difficult
for Spain to retain Cuba or to sustain without assistance her connec-
tion with the island, but he declared that while Spain remained in fact
as well as in name the sovereign of Cuba, she could depend on us
*' maintaining our duty as a neutral nation towards her, however dif-
ficult it might be." It was contended that neutrality laws could not
be made more restrictive without violating the constitutional rights
of our citizens. Reference w^as also made by Governor Marcy to the
idea of purchase, and it was stated that there had been no intention
of purchase " unless the inhabitants were very generally disposed to
concur in the transfer."

The seizure of tlie steamer '' Black Warrior," packet ship of the
New York and Alabama line, in February, 1854, on some technical
charge of irregularity, aroused great indignation, and Soule, United
States Minister to Spain, presented this claim in. terms which the
Spanish Minister of State considered '' harsh and imperious." Soule
then referred to the great carelessness of the Spanish Government in
making redress for former claims of the same character. A bitter
correspondence ensued. The Secretary of State advised a conference
between the ministers to Madrid, Paris and London, and this took
place at Ostend in October of the same year and resulted in the
famous document known as the Ostend Manifesto.

RELATIONS OF CUBA AND THE UNITED STATES. I43

THE OSTEND MANIFESTO.

Aix-la-Chapelle, October 18, 1854.

Sir. — The undersigned, in compliance with the wish expressed by the
President in the several confidential dispatches you have addressed to us
respectively, to that effect, we have met in conference, first at Ostend, in
Belgium, on the 9th, loth, and nth instant, and then at Aix-la-Chapelle, in
Prussia, on the days next following, up to the date hereof.

There has been a full and unreserved interchange of views and sentiments
between us, which we are most happy to inform you has resulted in a cordial
coincidence of opinion on the grave and important subjects submitted to our
consideration.

We have arrived at the conclusion, and are thoroughly convinced that an
immediate and earnest effort ought to be made by the Government of the
United States to purchase Cuba from Spain at any price for which it can be
obtained, not exceeding the sum of $

The proposal should, in our opinion, be made in such a manner as to be
presented through the necessary diplomatic forms to the Supreme Constituent
Cortes about to assemble. On this momentous question, in which the people,
both of Spain and the United States, are so deeply interested, all our pro-
ceedings ought to be open, frank, and public. They should be of such a
character as to challenge the approbation of the world.

We firmly believe that, in the progress of human events, the time has
arrived when the vital interests of Spain are as seriously involved in the sale,
as those of the United States in the purchase of the island, and that the
transaction will prove equally honorable to both nations.

Under these circumstances we can not anticipate a failure, unless possibly
through the malign influence of foreign powers who possess no right whatever
to interfere in the matter.

We proceed to state some of the reasons which have brought us to this
conclusion, and for the sake of clearness, we shall specify them under two
distinct heads:

1. The United States ought, if practicable, to purchase Cuba with as little
delay as possible.

2. The probability is great that the Government and Cortes of Spain will
prove willing to sell it, because this would essentially promote the highest
and best interests of the Spanish people.

Then, first. It must be clear to every reflecting mind that, from the peculiarity
of its geographical position, and the considerations attendant on it, Cuba is as
necessary to the North American Republic as any of its present members, and

144 CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.

that it belongs naturally to that great family of States of which the Union is
the providential nursery.

From its locality it commands the mouth of the Mississippi and the immense
and annually increasing trade which must seek this avenue to the ocean.

On the numerous navigable streams, measuring an aggregate course of some
30,000 miles, which disembogue themselves through this magnificent river into
the Gulf of Mexico, the increase of the population within the last ten years
amounts to more than that of the entire Union at the time Louisiana was
annexed to it.

The natural and main outlet to the products of this entire population, the
highway of their direct intercourse with the Atlantic and Pacific States, can
never be secure, but must ever be endangered whilst Cuba is a dependency of
a distant power in whose possession it has proved to be a source of constant
annoyance and embarrassment to their interests.

Indeed, the Union can never enjoy repose, nor possess reliable security, as
long as Cuba is not embraced within its boundaries.

Its immediate acquisition by the Government is of paramount importance,
and we can not doubt but that it is a consummation devoutly wished for by
its inhabitants.

The intercourse Vv^hich its proximity to our coast begets and encourages
between them and the citizens of the United States, has, in the progress of
time, so united their interests and blended their fortunes that they now look
upon each other as if they were one people and had but one destiny.

Considerations exist which render delay in the acquisition of this island
exceedingly dangerous to the United States.

The system of immigration and labor lately organized within its limits, and
the tyranny and oppression which characterize its immediate rulers, threaten
an insurrection at every moment which may result in direful consequences to
the American people.

Cuba has thus become to us an unceasing danger, and a permanent cause of
anxiety and alarm.

But we need not enlarge on these topics. It can scarcely be apprehended that
foreign powers, in violation of international law, would interpose their in-
fluence with Spain to prevent our acquisition of the island. Its inhabitants are
now suffering under the worst of all possible governments, that of absolute
despotism, delegated by a distant power to irresponsible agents, who are
changed at short intervals, and who are tempted to improve the brief oppor-
tunity thus afforded to accumulate fortunes by the basest means.

As long as this system shall endure, humanity may in vain demand the
suppression of the African slave trade in the island. This is rendered im-

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RELATIONS OF CUBA AND THE UNITED STATES. I47

possible whilst that infamous traffic remains an irresistible temptation and a
source of immense profit to needy and avaricious offtcials, who, to attain their
ends, scruple not to trample the most sacred principles under foot.

The Spanish Government at home may be well disposed, but experience has
proved that it can not control these remote depositaries of its power.

Besides, the commercial nations of the world can not fail to perceive and
appreciate the great advantages which would result to their people from a
dissolution of the forced and unnatural connection betv/een Spain and Cuba,
and the annexation of the latter to the United States. The trade of England
and France with Cuba would, in that event, assume at once an important and
profitable character, and rapidly extend with the increasing population and
prosperity of the island.

2. But if the United States and every commercial nation would be benefited
by this transfer, the interests of Spain would also be greatly and essentially
promoted.

She can not but see what such a sum of money as we are willing to pay for
the island would effect in the development of her vast natural resources.

Two-thirds of this sum, if employed in the construction of a system of
railroads, would ultimately prove a source of greater wealth to the Spanish
people than that opened to their vision by Cortes. Their prosperity would
date from the ratification of the treaty of cession.

France has already constructed continuous lines of railways from Havre,
Marseilles, Valenciennes, and Strasburg, via Paris, to the Spanish frontier, and
anxiously awaits the day when Spain shall find herself in a condition to extend
these roads through her northern provinces to Madrid, Seville, Cadiz, Malaga,
and the frontiers of Portugal.

This object once accomplished, Spain would become a centre of attraction
for the traveling world, and secure a permanent and profitable market for her
various productions. Her fields, under the stimulus given to industry by re-
munerative prices, would teem with cereal grain, and her vineyard would bring
forth a vastly increased quantity of choice wines. Spain would speedily become
what a bountiful Providence intended she should be, one of the first nations
of continental Europe — rich, powerful, and contented.

Whilst two-thirds of the price of the island would be ample for the com-
pletion of her most important public improvements, she might with the re-
maining 40,000,000 satisfy the demands now pressing so heavily upon her
credit, and create a sinking fund which would gradually relieve her from the
overwhelming debt now paralyzing her energies.

Such is her present wretched financial condition, that her best bonds are
sold upon her own bourse at about one-third of their par value; whilst another

148 Cuba's struggle against spain.

class, on which she pays no interest, have but a nominal value, and are quoted
at about one-sixth of the amount for which they were issued. Besides, these
latter are held principally by British creditors, who may, from day to day,
obtain the effective interposition of their own Government for the purpose of
coercing payment. Intimations to that effect have been already thrown out
from high quarters, and unless some new sources of revenue shall enable
Spain to provide for such exigencies, it is not improbable that they will be
realized.

Should Spain reject the present golden opportunity for developing her
resources and removing her financial embarrassments, it may never again
return.

Cuba, in her palmiest days, never yielded her exchequer, after deducting the
expense of its government, a clear annual income of more than a million and
a half of dollars. These expenses have increased to such a degree as to leave
a deficit, chargeable to the treasury of Spain, to the amount of $600,000.

In a pecuniary point of view, therefore, the island is an incumbrance instead
of a source of profit to the mother country.

Under no probable circumstances can Cuba ever yield to Spain one per cent,
on the large amount which the United States are willing to pay for its
acquisition. But Spain is in imminent danger of losing Cuba without
remuneration.

Extreme oppression, it is now universally admitted, justifies any people in
endeavoring to relieve themselves from the yoke of their oppressors. The
sufferings which the corrupt, arbitrary, and unrelenting local administration
necessarily entails upon the inhabitants of Cuba can not fail to stimulate and
keep alive the spirit of resistance and revolution against Spain which has of
late years been so often manifested. In this condition of affairs it is vain to
expect that the sympathies of the people of the United States will not be
warmly enlisted in favor of their oppressed neighbors.

We know that the President is justly inflexible in his determination to
execute the neutrality laws; but should the Cubans themselves rise in revolt
against the oppression which they suffer, no human power could prevent
citizens of the United States and liberal-minded men of other countries from
rushing to their assistance. Besides, the present is an age of adventure in
which restless and daring spirits abound in every portion of the world.

It is not improbable, therefore, that Cuba may be wrested from Spain by a
successful revolution; and in that event she will lose both the island and the
price which we are now willing to pay for it — a price far beyond what was ever
paid by one people to another for any province.

It may also be remarked that the settlement of this vexed question, by the

RELATIONS OF CUBA AND THE UNITED STATES. I49

cession of Cuba to the United States, would forever prevent the dangerous
complications between nations to which it may otherwise give birth.

It is certain that, should the Cubans themselves organize an insurrection
against the Spanish Government, and should other independent nations come
to the aid of Spain in the contest, no human power could, in our opinion,
prevent the people and Government of the United States from taking part in
such a civil war in support of their neighbors and friends.

But if Spain, dead to the voice of her own interest, and actuated by stubborn
pride and a false sense of honor, should refuse to sell Cuba to the United
States, then the question will arise, What ought to be the course of the
American Government under such circumstances?

Self-preservation is the first law of nature with States as well as with indi-
viduals. All nations have, at different periods, acted upon this maxim.
Although it has been made the pretext for committing flagrant injustice, as in
the partition of Poland and other similar cases which history records, yet the
principle itself, though often abused, has always been recognized.

The United States has never acquired a foot of territory except by fair pur-
chase, or, as in the case of Texas, upon the free and voluntary application of
the people of that independent State, who desired to blend their destinies v/ith
our own.

Even our acquisitions from Mexico are no exception to this rule because,
although we might have claimed them by the right of conquest in a just war,
yet we purchased them for what was then considered by both parties a full
and ample equivalent.

Our past history forbids that we should acquire the island of Cuba without
the consent of Spain, unless justified by the great law of self-preservation. We
must, in any event, preserve our conscious rectitude and our own self-respect.

Whilst pursuing this course we can afford to disregard the censures of the
world, to which we have been so often and so unjustly exposed.

After we have offered Spain a price for Cuba far beyond its present value,
and this shall have been refused, it will then be time to consider the questions.
Does Cuba, in the possession of Spain, seriously endanger our internal peace
and the existence of our cherished Union?

Should this question be answered in the affirmative, then, by every law,
human and divine, we shall be justified in wresting it from Spain, if we
possess the power; and this upon the very same principle that would justify
an individual in tearing down the burning house of his neighbor if there were
no other means of preventing the flames from destroying his own home.

Under such circumstances we ouq-ht neither to count the cost nor regard the
odds which Spain might enlist against us. We forbear to enter into the

150 CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.

question, whether the present condition of the island would justify such a
measure. We should, however, be recreant to our duty, be unworthy of our
gallant forefathers, and commit base treason against our posterity, should we
permit Cuba to be Africanized and become a second San Domingo, with all its
attendant horrors. to the white race, and suffer the flames to extend to our
own neighboring shores, seriously to endanger, or actually to consume, the
fair fabric of our Union.

We fear that the course and current of events are rapidly tending toward
such a catastrophe. We, however, hope for the best, though we ought certainly
to be prepared for the worst.

We also forbear to investigate the present condition of the questions at issue
between the United States and Spain, A long series of injuries to our people
have been committed in Cuba by Spanish officials, and are unredressed. But
recently a most flagrant outrage on the rights of American citizens,- and on the
flag of the United States, was perpetrated in the harbor of Havana under
circumstances which, without immediate redress, would have justified a resort
to measures of war in vindication of national honor. That outrage is not only
unatoned, but the Spanish Government had deliberately sanctioned the acts of
its subordinates, and assumed the responsibility attaching to them.

Nothing could more impressivly teach us the danger to which those peaceful
relations it has ever been the policy of the United States to cherish with foreign
nations, are constantly exposed, than the circumstances of that case. Situated
as Spain and the United States are, the latter have forborne to resort to
extreme measiires.

But this course can not, with due regard to their own dignity as an inde-
pendent nation, continue; and our recommendations, now submitted, are
dictated by the firm belief that the cession of Cuba to the United States, with
stipulations as beneficial to Spain as those suggested, is the only effective
mode of settling all past differences, and of securing the two countries against
future collisions.

We have already witnessed the happy results for both countries vv^hich
followed a similar arrangement in regard to Florida.

Yours, very respectfully,

JAMES BUCHANAN,
J. Y. MASON.
PIERRE SOULE.

Hon. Wm, L. Marcy, Secretary of State.

It was contended bv many that the hostile tone of this document
was owing to the feeling of Soule toward Spain. It was also con-

RELATIONS OF CUBA AND THE UNITED STATES. I5I

tended that the move was in the interest of the slave-holding States,
and, although not acted upon by the American Government, did
much towards shaping the results of the next election which found
Buchanan, one of its signers, the successful candidate for the
Presidency. Soule, who had become obnoxious to the Spanish
Government, sent in his resignation as soon as he found that the
Manifesto was repudiated by the administration; no redress was
obtained for the outrages complained of, and thus the diplomacy
of Spain was again triumphant. This was not long after the Lopez
expedition; and the execution of Crittenden and his companions had
caused intense feeling throughout this country and came near pro-
ducing war with Spain.

President Buchanan in his annual message to Congress at the
opening of the Thirty-sixth Congress, December 6, 1858, says:

The island of Cuba, from its geographical position, commands the mouth of
the Mississippi and the immense and annually increasing trade, foreign and
coastwise, from the valley of that noble river, now embracing half the sovereign
States of the Union. With that island under the dominion of a distant foreign
power, this trade, of vital importance to these States, is exposed to the danger
of being destroyed in time of war, and it has hitherto been subjected to
perpetual injury and annoyance in time of peace. Our relations with Spain,
which ought to be of the most friendly character, must always be placed in
jeopardy while the existing colonial government over the island shall remain
in its present condition.

Whilst the possession of the island would be of vast importance to the
United States, its value to Spain is comparatively unimportant. Such was the
relative situation of the parties when the great Napoleon transferred Louisiana
to the United States. Jealous as he ever was of the national honor and in-
terests of France, no person throughout the world has imputed blame to him
for accepting a pecuniary equivalent for this cession.

The publicity which has been given to our former negotiations upon this
subject and the large appropriation which may be reqK.iired to effect the pur-
pose render it expedient before making another attempt to renew the negotia-
tion that I should lay the whole subject before Congress. This is especially
necessary, as it may become indispensable to success that I should be en-
trusted with the means of making an advance to the Spanish Government
immediately after the signing of the treaty, without awaiting the ratification of
it by the Senate. I am encouraged to make this suggestion bv the examnle of
Mr. Jefferson previous to the purchase of Louisiana from France and by that

152 CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.

of Mr, Polk in view of the acquisition of territory from Mexico. I refer the
whole subject to Congress and commend it to their careful consideration, —
IMessages and Papers of the Presidents; James Buchanan (page 511).

The following extracts refer to an offer of $100,000,000 which was
indignantly refused by Spain:

Washington City, January 22, 1854.
To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit herewith a report from the Secretary of State in answer to the
resolution of the Senate of the i8th instant, requesting the President, if not
incompatible with the public interest, " to communicate to the Senate any and
all correspondence between the Government of the United States and the
Government of Her Catholic Majesty relating to any proposition for the
purchase of the island of Cuba, which correspondence has not been furnished
to either house of Congress." From this it appears that no such correspond-
ence has taken place which has not already been communicated to Congress.
In my late annual message I stated in reference to the purchase of Cuba that
" the publicity which has been given to our former negotiations on this subject
and the large appropriation which may be required to effect the purpose
render it expedient, before making another atempt to renew the negotiations,
that I shall lay the whoV subject before Congress." I still entertain the same
opinion, deeming it highly important, if not indispensable to the success of
any negotiation which I might institute for this purpose, that the measure
should receive the previous sanction of Congress. — Messages and Papers of
the Presidents; James Buchanan (pages 535-537).

In his annual Message of December 19, 1859, the President again
refers to the matter of purchase of Cuba. He says :

I need not repeat the arguments which I urged in my last annual message
in favor of the acquisition of Cuba by fair purchase. My opinions on that
measure remain unchanged. I, therefore, again invite the serious attention of
Congress to this important subject. Without a recognition of this policy on
their part it will be almost impossible to institute negotiations with any reason-
able prospect of success. — Messages and Papers of the Presidents; James
Buchanan (page 561).

And in his message of December 3, i860, he says J

I reiterate the recommendation contained in my annual message of Decem-
ber, 1858, and repeated in that of December, 1859, in favor of the acquisition

RELATIONS OF CUBA AND THE UNITED STATES. 1 53

of Cul}a from Spain by fair purchase. I firmly believe that such an acquisition
would contribute essentially to the well-being and prosperity of both countries
in all future time, as well as prove the certain means of immediately abolishing
the African slave trade throughout the world. I would not repeat this recom-
mendation upon the present occasion if I believed that the transfer of Cuba
to the United States upon conditions highly favorable to Spain could justly
tarnish the national honor of the proud and ancient Spanish monarchy. Surely
no person ever attributed to the first Napoleon a disregard of the natic
honor of France for transferring Louisiana to the United States for a fair
equivalent, both in money and commercial advantages. — Messages and Papers
of the Presidents; James Buchanan (page 642).

During the Ten Years' War, the United States offered to guarantee
the debt of the island, if Spain would grant its independence. At this
time General Grant was President of the United States and Spain
was a Republic, but she was not an iota less tyrannical and grasping
in one form than another. The proposition was promptly declined
by General Prim who was temporarily in power; and General Grant,
throughout his administration, scrupulously adhered to the policy of
non-intervention. During the stormy days following the terrible
affair of the '' Virginius," General Sickles was our Minister to Spain.
His efforts to obtain an honorable settlement of the difficulty not
having been successful, he resigned. Copies of some of the letters
exchanged at this time will doubtless be of interest in this connection.
It will be seen there was a conflict between the expressions made to
our Minister at Madrid, and those made to the State Department by
Spanish diplomats in Washington.

United States Legation in Spain.

Madrid, November 14, 1873.
Sir. — • I have the honor to forward herewith a copy of a note this day passed
to the minister of State, in which, in obedience to your instruction of the 12th
inst.. by cable, I have protested against the summary execution of the captain
and thirty-six of the crew of the " Virginius " and sixteen others, by order of
the Spanish authorities at Santiago de Cuba. You were advised in my telegram
of last evening that Mr. Carvajal, in our interview of yesterday, confirmed
the report published in the Havana papers.

I am, etc.,

SICKLES.
(Received December nth.)

154 CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.

Madrid, November 15, 1,873.
Received an ill-tempered note to-day from the minister of State, rejecting
protest, and saying Spain would, nevertheless, consider and decide questions
according to law and her dignity.

SICKLES.

Madrid, November 18, 1873.
Minister of State informs me, in note of this date, that the reports mentioned
in your cable of 15th are not confirmed, and that, on the contrary, as soon as
the captain-general could submit to Santiago the orders sent by this Govern-
ment on the 6th, the executions were suspended.

SICKLES.

Madrid, November 19, 1873.
Popular feeling runs high here against United States and this legation.
Press violent and abusive, advising Government to order me out of Spain.
Last night a mob was collected to attack and sack the legation. The author-
ities interfered and preserved the peace.

SICKLES.

Washington, November 20, 1873.
Instructions sent yesterday by cable authorize you to defer closing legation
in order to allow a reasonable time to Spanish Government to ascertain facts
in response to their request through minister here, presented on the i8th inst.
No other postponement has been agreed to, and minister was informed that a
satisi.ictory settlement would be expected by the 26th.

FISH.

Madrid, November 20, 1873.
Have received rejoinder of minister to my reply to his note in answer to our
protest. Neither this nor either of the three communications in writing so far
received, contains any expression of regret or disapproval of the capture or the
slaughter at Santiago. The press approves the whole business, and denies that
any censure or regret has been expressed by this Government. The ministerial
journals acquiesce.

SICKLES.

Madrid, November 21, 1873.
Constant efforts are made by this Cabinet to conciliate England. Castelar
is every day at British legation. The press has received an official hint to

RELATIONS OF CUBA AND THE UNITED STATES. 1 57

contrast the moderation of England with our impatience. I suspect overtures
have also been made to Germany for her good offices.

SICKLES.

Washington, November 23, 1873.
Have telegraphed to Rome for authority to Italian minister to take custody
of library and property. Spanish Government, through minister here, proposed
arbitration, which has been declined, on the ground that the question is not one
for arbitration, the subject being one of national honor, of which the nation
must be the judge and custodian.

FISH.

Department of State,

Washington, November 25, 1873.
If upon the close of to-morrow no accommodation shall have been reached
in the case of the " Virginius," you will address to the foreign office a note
expressing regret at the delay of the reparation asked for, and stating that, in
conformity with instructions from your Government, you were under the
necessity of withdrawing from Madrid, for which purpose you request the
usual passport for yourself, your family and suite. If, however, the accom-
modation desired should be brought about in the course of to-morrow, either
here or in Madrid, you will, until otherwise directed, abstain from addressing
the note adverted to. Should a proposition be submitted to you to-morrow,
you will refer it here, and defer action until it be decided upon. A telegram
has just now been read to me by Admiral Polo, which gives reason to hope
for a satisfactory accommodation. You will, therefore, allow the whole of
to-morrow to pass before addressing your note.

FISH.

Madrid, November 25, 1873.
Layard says Granville has expressed his sense of the justice and moderation
of the reparation we have demanded, and this has been communicated to
Castelar, England reserves her reclamation for the present, and endeavors
to promote a settlement of the question pending between the United States
and Spain.

SICKLES.

Madrid, November 26, 1873.

At half-past two this afternoon, half an hour after I had asked for my pass-
ports, I received a note, dated to-day, from minister of State, in which he says:

First. If it appear, on or before the 25th of December next, that the
" Virginius " rightfully carried the American flag, and that her documents

158 Cuba's struggle against spain.

were regular, Spain will declare the seizure illegal, salute the flag as requested,
and return the ship with the surviving passengers and crew.

Second. If it he proved that the authorities of Santiago de Cuba, in their
proceedings and sentences pronounced against foreigners, have essentially
infringed Spanish legislation or treaties, this Government will arraign those
authorities before competent tribunals.

Third. Any other reclamations growing out of the affair, which either of the
respective governments may have to present, will be considered diplomatically,
and, if no agreement be reached, they will be- submitted to the arbitration of a
third power, named by mutual consent.

Fourth. If the 25th day of December shall have expired without the Spanish
Government having resolved, in so far as comes within its province, the
questions arising out of the demand for reparation, it will hold itself bound to
accord such reparation the same as if the right of the United States to receive
it were recognized, and such reparation will be given in the form specified in
the first and second paragraphs.

SICKLES.

Madrid, November 28, 1873.
Last night it was agreed here informally that, accepting my declaration of
the nationality of the " Virginius," reparation would be made in accordance
with our demand of the 15th inst. This was ratified by the council of ministers
at 3 this morning, and I was promised an official communication in that sense
to-day. I am now informed in a note from minister of State that yesterday
you authorized the Spanish minister at Washington to convey to this Govern-
ment a different proposition on the part of the United States, and that it has
been accepted, of which you have been notified through Admiral Polo. Please
let me know whether this statement is true. The only instruction I have had
from you since my four telegrams of the 26th, is a copy of the Senate resolu-
tions passed in fifty-six.

SICKLES.

Washington, November 29, 1873.
Remain at post. Further instructions soon. Settlement being effected here.

FISH.

Madrid, December 15, 1873, 4:30 P- m.
President Castelar called at the legation this afternoon and informed me
that the " Virginius " and survivors had been surrendered to those authorized
to receive them on the part of the United States.

SICKLES.
(Received 3:20 p. m.)

RELATIONS OF CUBA AND THE UNITED STATES. 1 59

Madrid, December 20, 1873, 12:30 a. m.

It is stated here by authority that in consequence of a communication this
Government has received from that of the United States, in which it appears
the " Virginius " is not an American ship, a reclamation will be made by Spain
for the restoration of the vessel and passengers.

SICKLES.

(Received December 20, 10:20 a. m.)

Washington, December 20, 1873, 11:20 a. m.

Official advices received of surrender of survivors from " Virginius."

FISH.

Madrid, December 26, 1873.

My resignation having been accepted, I now respectfully renew my request
for the publication of the correspondence relating thereto, comprising my
telegrams of the 6th, i6th and 20th inst., and your replies of the 6th, 17th and
20th. I beg that this request may be submitted to the President.

SICKLES.

(Received December 26th, p. m.)

Department of State,

Washington, December 31, 1873.

Sir. — On the 26th ult., General Sickles' No. 893 arrived at this Department
during my absence for the holidays. In it he states that it was informally
agreed, on the night of the 27th of November last, that on a declaration made
by him of the American nationality of the " Virginius," the vessel and sur-
viving passengers and crew would be delivered up, the flag saluted, and the
other measures of reparation accorded in conformity with our demands of the
15th inst. It is greatly to be regretted that General Sickles did not state
with whom this informal agreement was made.

The note of Mr. Carvajal, minister of foreign affairs, whi(!;li accompanies
General Sickles' dispatch, does not convey the idea that he had been a party to
that agreement, but does intimate that he would have discussed some of the
points raised in General Sickles' note but for the arrangement which was
made here.

General Sickles further says, that at noon on the 28th of November, Mr.
Carvajal sent him a copy of a telegram from Admiral Polo, containing what
purported to be a fresh proposal from me respecting the " Virginius," which

i6o Cuba's struggle against spain.

General Sickles appears to have supposed was in conflict with the informal
arrangement of the previous evening.

Without more accurate information concerning the person with whom the
informal arrangement was made, I can not permit myself to think that the
Spanish Government receded from any undertaking which it had once assumed.

So far, however, as General Sickles' statement may be supposed to affect
this Government, it is proper to say that the changes from the original demands
of the United States, which were agreed to in the protocol of the 29th of
November, were adopted on the suggestion of the Spanish Government, under
the belief that they did not affect the principles upoix which our demands were
founded, and were calculated to promote a peaceful settlement of the un-
fortunate differences which had arisen between the two powers.

Spain having admitted (as could not be seriously questioned), that a regu-
larly documented vessel of the United States is subject on the high seas, in
time of peace, only to the police jurisdiction of the power from which it
receives its papers, it seemed to the President that the United States should not
refuse to concede to her the right to adduce proof to show that the " Virginius "
was not rightfully carrying our flag. When the question of national honor
was adjusted, it also seemed that there was a peculiar propriety in our con-
senting to an arbitration on a question of pecuniary damages.

This happy adjustment of the difference between two sister Republics on a
basis honorable to both, fortunately makes the matters referred to by General
Sickles of little importance. I have thought it right, however, to correct the
misapprehensions under which his dispatch seems to have been written.

I am, sir, etc.,

HAMILTON FISH.

Department of State,

Washington, November 14, 1877.
The Secretary of State, to whom was referred the resolution of the House of
Representatives of the 12th inst., requesting him to " inform the House, if not
incompatible with public interests, what amount of indemnity has been paid to
this Government by the Government of Spain on account of the execution of
General Ryan and others, at Santiago de Cuba, November 4, 1873, and what
disposition has been made of such funds as may have been received," has the
honor to report to the President that the amount of indemnity paid by the
Government of Spain on that account was 80,000 Spanish dollars, yielding, less
exchange, the sum of $77,794.44 in coin; that claims thereon have been settled
and paid to the amount of $38,102: that a claim for $2,500 has been settled, but
is not yet paid; and that the unexpended balance of the "Virginius" in-

RELATIONS OF CUBA AND THE UNITED STATES. l6l

demnity is invested at 5 per cent, registered bonds of the United States. The
Secretary of State has also to state that, as the heirs of General Ryan failea to
prove that he was a citizen of the United States, nothing has been paid to
ihem from said indemnity funds.

Respectfully submitted,

WM. M. EVARTS.

To the President.

It will be seen that in the report of Mr. Evarts, Secretary of State
in 1877, i^ regard to the matter, he states that the indemnity paid
by Spain on account of the execution of General Ryan and others at
Santiago, November 4, 1873, was $77,794.44; that claims thereon
amounting to $38,102 had been settled and paid, and that the unex-
pended balance was invested in 5 per cent, registered United States
bends. The vessel and the surviving passengers were given up to
the authorities of the United States. Spanish diplomacy had the
better chance in this disastrous matter from the fact that the President
was fully conscious of the illegality of the proceedings of the " Vir-
ginius," and this knowledge formed an element of weakness in the
negotiations.

In the general instructions to General Sickles' successor, Mr.
Gushing, before his departure to Madrid, he was informed by the
Secretary of State that '' The President can not but regard independ-
ence and emancipation, of course, as the only certain and even neces-
sary solution of the question of Guba."

In 1875 the American Government addressed strong protests to the
Spanish Government and to the European powers asking intervention
in the interest of terminating the war in Guba. The foreign powers
refused to Interfere, but Spain promised reforms and the immediate
suppression of the rebellion. It required more than two years lon^^er
to accomplish this, but General Grant adhered strictly to the estab-
lished policy of nonintervention.

Those who wonder that Spain should have stubbornly and indig-
nantly refused to entertain the idea of parting with Cuba, little ap-
preciate the tie connecting the coimtries. To the great bulk of the
Spanish people, Guba was as much a part of Spain as any one of
the provinces of the Peninsula itself. Its separation from Spain was
looked upon as a national dismemberment. It was as impossible
for Spain to make of Cuba a matter of bareaining, as it would be for
the United States to entertain the idea of selling one of the States

i62 Cuba's struggle against spain.

whose star shines in the constehation gracing our national banner.
In addition to this, Spain feU very bitterly the loss of her other Ameri-
can possessions. The South American colonies were lost to her
one after another, owing in a great measure to her own bad manage-
ment and comphcations with foreign powers. Louisiana, ceded to
France with the understanding it was not to be alienated, almost im-
mediately passed to the United States. Florida was sold by Fer-
dinand VII, and this action on his part produced a revolution in Spain.
In addition to this, the unconcealed sympathy of the American people
for the insurgents in every Cuban rebellion greatly increased the
obstinate attachment of Spain to the fairest and last of her American
possessions.

In President Cleveland's message to Congress in December, 1895,
he thus refers to the war in Cuba:

Cuba is again gravely disturbed. An insurrection, in some respects more
active than the last preceding revolt, w^hich continued from 1868 to 1878, novir
exists in a large part of the eastern interior of the island, menacing even some
populations on the coast. Besides deranging the commercial exchanges of the
island, of which our country takes the predominant share, this flagrant con-
dition of hostilities, by arousing sentimental sympathy and inciting adventurous
support among our people, has entailed earnest effort on the part of this
Government to enforce obedience to our neutrality laws and to prevent the
territory of the United States from being abused as a vantage ground from
which to aid those in arms against Spanish sovereignty.

Whatever may be the traditional sympathy of our countrymen as individuals
with a people who seem to be struggling for larger autonomy and greater
freedom, deepened as such sympathy naturally must be in behalf of our neigh-
bors, yet the plain duty of their Government is to observe in good faith the
recognized obligations of international relationship. The performance of this
duty should not be made more difficult by a disregard on the part of our
citizens of the obligations growing out of their allegiance to their country,
which should restrain them from violating as individuals the neutrality which
the nation of which they are members is bound to observe in its relations to
friendly sovereign States. Though neither the warmth of our people's
sympathy with the Cuban insurgents, nor our loss and material damage con-
sequent upon the futile endeavors thus far made to restore peace and order,
nor any shock our humane sensibilities may have received from the cruelties
which appear to especially characterize this sanguinary and fiercely conducted
war, have in the least shaken the determination of the Government to honestly

RELATIONS OF CUBA AND THE UNITED STATES. 163

fulfill every mternatioiaal obligation, yet it is to be earnestly hoped, on every
ground, that the devastation of armed conflict may speedily be stayed and
order and quiet restored to the distracted island, bringing in their train the
activity and thrift of peaceful pursuits.

ft will be seen that President Cleveland counseled good faith, neu-
trality and non-intervention. In the following February, resolutions
recognizing the belligerency of the Cubans were introduced into the
Senate and they were adopted February 28th, by a vote of 64 to 6.
These resolutions, favored by Senators Sherman, Morgan, Davis,
Lodge and others, were opposed by Senators Hale and Hoar. Dif-
ferent resolutions on the same subject were passed by the House, the
matter went to conference, was discussed again to a considerable ex-
tent in the Flouse and Senate, and finally the Conference Committee
adopted the original Senate resolutions and they were finally passed
by the House by a vote of 245 to 2y, April 6th.

WAR IN CUBA.
54th Congress, SENATE. Con. Res. 19,

1st Session. Part 5.

Concurrent Resolution:

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring therein), That,
in the opinion of Congress, a condition of public war exists between the
Government of Spain and the government proclaimed and for some time
maintained by force of arms by the people of Cuba; and that the United States
of America should maintain a strict neutrality between the contending powers,
according to each all the rights of belligerents in the ports and territory of the
United States.

Resolved farther, That the friendly of^ces of the United States should be
ofYered by the President to the Spanish Government for the recognition of the
independence of Cuba.

Passed the Senate, February 28, 1896.

Passed the House of Representatives, April 6, 1896.

These resolutions were not in a form which made action by the
President necessary, and they amounted to nothing further than to
show the drift of public sentiment. The long and violent discussion
of the matter aroused a very bitter feeling in Spain, and riotous dem-
onstrations took place in Valencia, Madrid, Barcelona, Cadiz and

A

164 Cuba's struggle against spain.

Bilboa. These outbreaks were disavowed by the Spanish Govern-
ment and some of the colleges whose students had been engaged in
them were closed on that account. Spain endeavored in every way
to avoid diplomatic entanglements.

Meanv/hile, the international obligations of the United States were
strictly complied with, and much money was expended in guarding the
coast to intercept the departure of filibustering expeditions. One
of these was captured about to leave New York, February 25th, and
General Garcia and others were detained in this country. But in
spite of these precautions, Cuban sympathizers were constantly elud-
ing the authorities, and Garcia himself reached Cuba safely in the
spring. April 8th, vSenator Turpie boldly urged intervention by the
United States. There had been some dissatisfaction with the course
of Consul-General Williams in Cuba, owing to his alleged inactivity
in behalf of Americans arrested or ill-treated in Havana, and on April
T3th, he was replaced by General Fitzhugh Lee. April i6th, the
I^iaz Brothers, American citizens, were arrested and imprisoned.
April 24th, Dygert, an American prisoner in Havana, was released
upon the intervention of the Consul-General. xApril 27th, the '' Ber-
muda," with arms and ammunition for the Cubans, sailed from Jack-
sonville, Fla., and safely accomplished her mission; but the schooner
'' Competitor," on the same business, was captured by a Spanish gun-
boat. American citizens on board were tried by court-martial and
sentenced to be shot, and a repetition of the '' Virginius " affair was
feared; but at the solicitation of the United States, Spain agreed to
postpone the execution, and after a delay of more than a year, they
were finally released from prison, November 18, 1897. On July 4,
1896, a filibustering expedition under Captain Colby, an American,
was safely landed in Cuba and contributed greatly to the Cuban cause.

President Cleveland's last annual message to Congress, December,
1896, was conservative and not aggressive; still it hinted that inter-
vention might soon become necessary, and the idea of purchasing
Cuba was again suggested. The following extracts contain the gist
of his remarks on the subject:

The insurrection in Cuba still continues with all its perplexities. It is diffi-
cult to perceive that any progress his thus far been made toward the pacifica-
tion of the island or that the situation of affairs, as depicted in my last annual
messapre, has in the least improved. If Spain still holds Havana and the seaports
and all the considerable towns, the insurgents still roam at will over at least

COPYRIGHT, 1898, BY THE INl tKNAT lONAL SOCIETY.

COLONEL JOAQUIN RUIZ (IN FIREMAN'S UNIFORM).

Killed by Insurgent Chief Araufruren.

RELATIONS OF CUBA AND THE UNITED STATES. 167

two-thirds of the inland country. If the determination of Spain to put down
the insurrection seems but to strengthen with the lapse of time, and is evinced
by her unhesitating devotion of largely increased military and naval forces to
the task, there is much reason to believe that the insurgents have gained in
point of numbers, and character, and resources, and are none the less inflexible
in their resolve not to succumb, without practically securing the great objects
for which they took up arms. If Spain has not yet re-established her authority,
neither have the insurgents yet made good their title to be regarded as an
independent State. Indeed, as the contest has gone on, the pretense that civil
government exists on the island, except so far as Spain is able to maintain it,
has been practically abandoned. Spain does keep on foot such a government,
more or less imperfectly, in the large towns and their imm.ediate suburbs. But,
that exception being made, the entire country is either given over to anarch}'
or is subject to the military occupation of one or the other party. It is re-
ported, indeed, on reliable authority that, at the demand of the commander-in-
chief of the insurgent army, the putative Cuban Government has now given up
all attempt to exercise its functions, leaving that Government confessedly
(what there is the best reason for supposing it always to have been in fact), a
government merely on paper.

The spectacle of the utter ruin of an adjoining country, by nature one of the
most fertile and charming on the globe, would engage the serious attention
of the Government and people of the United States in any circumstances. In
point of fact, they have a concern with it which is by no means of a wholly
sentimental or philanthropic character. It lies so near to us as to be hardly
separated from our territory. Our actual pecuniary interest in it is second
only to that of the people and Government of Spain. It is reasonably
estimated that at least from $30,000,000 to $50,000,000 of American capital are
invested in plantations and in railroad, mining, and other business enterprises
on the island.
**********

The insurgents are undoubtedly encouraged and supported by the wide-
spread sympathy the people of this country always and instinctively feel for
every struggle for better and freer government, and which, in the case of the
more adventurous and restless elements of our population, leads in only too
many instances to active and personal participation in the contest. The
result is that this Government is constantly called upon to protect American
citizens, to claim damages for injuries to persons and property, now estimated
at many millions of dollars, and to ask explanations and apologies for the acts

1 68 Cuba's struggle AtsAiNsx spain.

of Spanish officials, wlioce zeal for the repression of rebelHon sometimes blinds
them to the immunities belonging to the unoffending citizens of a friendly
power. It follows from the same causes that the United States is compelled lo
actively police a long line of seacoast against unlawful expeditions, the esca^pe
of which the utmost vigilance will not always suffice to prevent.
**********

It is now also suggested thot the United States should buy the island — a
suggestion possibly worthy of consideration if there were any evidence of a
desire or willingness on the part of Spain to entertain such a proposal. It is
urged, finally, that, all other methods failing, the existing internecine strife in
Cuba should be terminated by our intervention, even at the cost of a war
between the United States and Spain — a war which its advocates confidently
prophesy could be neither large in its proportions nor doubtful in its issue.

The correctness of this forecast need be neither affirmed nor denied. The
United States has, nevertheless, a character to maintain as a nation, which
plainly dictates that right and not might should be the rule of its conduct.

Referring- to the conduct of the United States toward Spain during
the existing- rebellion and during the Ten Years' War, President
Cleveland continues:

No other great power, it may safely be said, under circumstances of similar
perplexity, .would have manifested the same restraint and the same patient
endurance. It may also be said that this persistent attitude of the United
States toward Spain in connection with Cuba, unquestionably evinces no
slight respect and regard for Spain on the part of the American people. They
in truth do not forget her connection with the discovery of the Western
Hemisphere, nor do they underestimate the great qualities of the Spanish
people, nor fail to fully recognize their splendid patriotism and their chivalrous
devotion to the national honor.

3|( 3fC 3(< 3fC 3JC 3)C S^ 3|€ 5(K J|»

And yet neither the Government nor the people of the United States have
shut their eyes to the course of events in Cuba, or have failed to realize the
existence of conceded grievances, which have led to the present revolt from
the authority of Spain — grievances recognized by the Queen Regent and by
the Cortes, voiced by the most patriotic and enlightened of Spanish statesmen,
without regard to party, and demonstrated by reforms proposed by the exec-
utive and approved by the legislative branch of the Spanish Government. It
is in the assumed temper and disposition of the Spanish Government to remedy

RELATIONS OF CUBA AND THE UNITED STATES. 1 69

these grievances, fortified by indications of influential public opinion in Spain,
that this Government has hoped to discover the most promising and effective
means of composing the present strife, with honor and advantage to Spain
and with the achievement of all the reasonable objects of the insurrection.

It was intimated by this Government to the Government of Spain some
months ago that, if a satisfactory measure of home rule were tendered the
Cuban insurgents, and would be accepted by them upon a guaranty of its
execution, the United States would endeavor to find a way not objectionable
to Spain to furnishing such guaranty. While no definite response to this
intimation has yet been received from the Spanish Government, it is believed
to be not altogether unwelcome, while, as already suggested, no reason is
perceived why it should not be approved by the insurgents. Neither party can
fail to see the importance of early action, and both must realize that to prolong
the present state of things for even a short period will add enormously to the
time and labor and expenditure necessary to bring about the industrial
recuperation of the island. It is, therefore, fervently hoped on all grounds that
earnest efforts for healing the breach between Spain and the insurgent Cubans,
upon the lines above indicated, may be at once inaugurated and pushed to an
immediate and successful issue. The friendly offices of the United States,
either in the manner above outlined or in any other way consistent with out
Constitution and laws, will always be at the disposal of either party.

Whatever circumstances may arise, our policy and our interests would con-
strain us to object to the acquisition of the island or an interference with its
control by any other power.

It should be added that it can not be reasonably assumed that the hitherto
expectant attitude of the United States will be indefinitely maintained.

When the inability of Spain to deal successfully with the insurrection has
become manifest, and it is demonstrated that her sovereignty is extinct in
Cuba for all purposes of its rightful existence, and when a hopeless struggle
for its re-establishment has degenerated into a strife which means nothing
more than the useless sacrifice of human life and the utter destruction of the
very subject-matter of the conflict, a situation will be presented in which our
obligations to the sovereignty of Spain will be superseded by higher obliga-
tions, which we can hardly hesitate to recognize and discharge.

s|c^ H< 5!- ******

Until we face the contingencies suggested, or the situation is by other
incidents imperatively changed, we should continue in the line of conduct here-
tofore pursued, thus in all circumstances exhibiting our obedience to the

i7o Cuba's struggle against spain.

requirements of public law and our regard for the duty enjoined upon us by
the position we occupy in the family of nations.

A contemplation of emergencies that may arise should plainly lead us to
avoid their creation, either through a careless disregard of present duty or even
an undue stimulation and ill-timed expression of feeling. But I have deemed
it not amiss to remind the Congress that a time may arrive when a correct
policy and care for our interests, as well as a regard for the interests of other
nations and their citizens, joined by tionsiderations of humanity and a desire
to see a rich and fertile country, intimately related to us, saved from complete
devastation, will constrain our Government to such action as will subserve the
interests thus involved and at the same time promise to Cuba and its in-
habitants an opportunity to enjoy the blessings of peace.

The message was adversely criticised in Spain where it aroused
great bitterness. From the beginning of the session of Congress the
debates on Cuban matters were the all-absorbing topic. Early in
December, the country was greatly agitated by the accoimts received
of the assassination of Maceo by the Spanish troops. He was suc-
ceeded in command by General Juan Ruis Rivera.

In February, 1897, the Queen Regent signed a decree granting re-
forms to the Cubans. In the same month, two American prisoners,
Scott and Sanguilly were released. A Hst of American citizens, either
native or naturalized, who had been arrested in Cuba, was presented
to Congress by President Celeveland and comprised seventy-four per-
sons, seven of whom were newspaper correspondents. One of the
most affecting cases, which created widespread indignation, was that
of Dr. Ricardo Ruiz who was imprisoned and died before his release
could be secured, presumably from the effects of ill-treatment. In
February, Secretary Olney demanded a full investigation. Later on,
in April, President McKinley appointed William J. Calhoun as special
commissioner to investigate the case. While there was strong pre-
sumption that death was due to ill-treatment, there was no direct
evidence to prove this, and the report gave the cause of death as
congestion of the brain.

The agitation of the Cuban question was continued all during the
winter and it was confidently expected by many that President McKin-
ley*s first move would be a strong war measure; but this hope was
quickly dissipated by the conservative tone of his inausfural message
which reiterated the policy of nonintervention adhered to by his
predecessor.

RELATIONS OF CUBA AND THE UNITED STATES. I/I

The selection of Senator Sherman, as Secretary of State, again
raised the hopes of the Cuban sympathizers for he had been a strong
advocate of Cuban interests when in the Senate; but as soon as he
entered the cabinet, he announced his pohcy to be the preservation of
peace in every direction.

March 28th, General Rivera was captured by the Spanish troops
and would have been summarily dealt with had it not been for the
interference of the United States. On April ist, Senator Allen intro-
duced a resolution protesting against the purpose of the Spanish
Government to court-martial him. Secretary Sherman accordingly
made a protest, and the Spanish Government replied that General
Rivera would be treated as a prisoner of war.

During the month of May, 1897, while Congress was in extra
session, Cuban matters were extensively discussed, and as there was
no further possibility of concealing the suffering existing in Cuba,
at the suggestion of the President $50,000 was appropriated for the
relief of the Americans who were starving in that island.

Among the many speeches m.ade at this time in Congress in regard
to affairs in Cuba, I copy the following from the Congressional Record
of May 20, 1897, Vol. 30, part II, pp. 1196 and 1197:

Mr. WHEELER of Alabama. Mr. Speaker, the highest parliamentary body
of the greatest government on earth is called upon to determine from the
evidence before it whether war does or does not exist on the island of Cuba.

That is the only question, Mr. Speaker.

Only on yesterday, at the very time prominent Republican statesmen were
asserting that war did not exist on that island, the distinguished Spanish
senator and ex-premier, Senor Sagasta, was making a speech in Madrid, in
which he asserted in tl.e most positive terms that war did exist; that Spain
had 200,000 troops in Cuba, but he painfully admitted that Spain was not master
even of the territory trodden by her soldiers. I read his exact words as they
appear in the cablegram from Madrid in the Post of this morning:

" Madrid, May 19.

"At a meeting of Liberal senators and deputies to-day Sefior Sagasta,
former premier, made an important speech, in the course of which he said:

" ' We have 200,000 troops in Cuba, but we are not even masters of the
territory trodden by our soldiers. At the same moment Carlism is organizing
itself in the peninsula and menaces us with a new war, thanks to the impunity
it enjoys, while the seeds of separatism are germinating in some of the
provinces.

1 72 CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.

* * The picture could not be gloomier. We have war in Cuba and in the
Philippines, and we have attempts at civil w^ar at home.' "

Two hundred thousand Spanish soldiers in arms and in line of battle in the
island of Cuba, and an official report before us stating that 800 American
citizens are driven from their homes, deprived of their property, despoiled of
their estates, impounded and corralled and starving in the towns and villages
of Cuba, and yet men who have forgotten that honor and chivalry are the
priceless heritage of the American people would make us believe that the island
of Cuba is blessed with profound peace.

For three years the Spanish bulletins have been reporting frequent engage-
ments with superior bodies of insurgents. They have told us of the slaughter
of the insurgents in battle, and the sound of musketry shooting down helpless
prisoners, including combatants and noncombatants, including Cubans and
Americans, has been heard every day of the reign of the Nero of the nineteenth
century: " King Weyler the First; " and yet, after all this slaughter, the dis-
tinguished Spanish senator and ex-premier proclaims in Madrid, the Spanish
capital:

" We have 200,000 troops in Cuba, but we are not even masters of the terri-
tory trodden by our soldiers."

This is an important statement from a Spanish senator and ex-premier, and
the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hitt] who has just taken his seat informs
us that Sefior Sagasta will in a few days again become the premier of that
Government, and this fact gives even more significance to his words. He tells
the people of Spain that because of an insurgent army of superior numbers the
200,000 Spanish troops are not even masters of the territory they stJind upon,
and the gentleman from Pennsylvania who spoke half an hour ago told us that
the warfare carried on by these 200,000 soldiers was brutal, cruel, and atrocious.

The statement by Sefior Sagasta that " Spain is not even master of the
territory trodden by her 200,000 soldiers," is an admission that the Cubans have
practically the control of the entire island. This alone entitles the struggling
patriots to the rights of belligerents.

All works on international law assert that actual possession of the territory
is sufficient.

Wildman, quoted approvingly by Halleck, page 68, says:

" When, in the result of a civil war, a state changes its government, or a
province, or colony, that before had no separate existence, is in the possession
of the rights of sovereignty, the possession of sovereignty de facto is taken to
be possession dc jure; and any foreign power is at liberty to recognize such
sovereignty by treating with the possessor of it as an independent State. In
international transactions possession is sufficient."

RELATIONS OF CUBA AND THE UNITED STATES. I73

Davis in international law, page 200, says:

" The parties to a war are called belligerents. The recognition of such rights
by foreign governments in no way involves the recognition of the rebellious
government as a separate political recognition. It only implies that the laws
of war are to prevail in the military operations."

Lorimer, Vol, i, page 142, says:

" By recognizing belligerent rights neutral powers pronounce no judgment
whatever, either on the merits of the claim or the probability of its ultimate
vindication. Belligerent recognition is a mere declaration of impartiality. To
withhold from the claimant for recognition the rights of belligerency, whilst we
extend them to the parent State, would plainly be to take part against it in
the war."

Notwithstanding all this, the money changers and owners of Spanish bonds
tell the people that there is no war in Cuba, and that we must not recognize
Cubans as entitled to belligerent rights.

From 1776 to 1781 the average enrolled force of our continental soldiers
was 38,263, while the average force of British troops in America during that
time, which I take from eleven different official reports, was 32,208, to which
force should be added their American adherents, which at one time numbered
8,954 nien, making the average British force somewhat in excess of 40,000
soldiers; yet all historical works, including our school histories, tell us that
the period from Lexington and Concord, April 19, 1775, to Yorktown, October
19, 1781, was a condition of bloody, cruel, and desolating war.

Our losses during that seven-years conflict was but 2,200 killed and 6,500
wounded, a less number than the Spaniards claim are killed each month, either
killed in battle or shot down in Weyler's slaughter pens. In the war of 1812
we had 1,877 killed and died of wounds, and Z^IZI were wounded and recovered;
and in the war Wxch Mexico 1,049 were killed and died from wounds, and 3,928
were wounded and recovered.

The greatest force commanded by General Taylor, with which he won the
victories of Palo Alto, Resaca de la Palma, and Monterey, was 6,650. and his
great victory at Buena Vista was accomplished with a force of 4,733 men, and
Santa Anna's entire army at that battle was reported on paper as 19.993 men.

General Scott carried the Stars and Stripes from Vera Cruz to the halls of
Montezuma with an army whose maximum strength was 12,776 rnen, and the
entire force brought against him by Santa Anna was estimated to be 30.000
strong Tapplausel ; and yet American history has dignified these occurrences
as real, actual, bloody warfare. Mr. Speaker, we have to either stop Fourth
of July celebrations and undo the elections of Old Hickory in 1848 and Pierce
in 1852, whom the people elected because they were told that old Zach Taylor

1/4 CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.

and Franklin Pierce were both heroes in actual war, or else we have got to
admit that the array of hostile armies five times as formidable as those which
fought the campaign in Mexico or tlie battles of the Revolution have created a
condition of actual war in Cuba.

Stonewall Jackson in his campaign in the Valley had less than 17,000 men,
and even less than that number in his engagements at Kernstown with General
Shields, at McDowell with General Milroy, at Front Royal and Winchester
with General Banks, and at Cross Keys and Port Republic with Generals
Fremiont and Shields, and yet all these gallant soldiers, driven from these fields
by the sagacity, skill, and courage of the superb Jackson, hastened forward
couriers, dispatches, and telegrams assuring the Government that the once
peaceful valley of the Shenandoah had become a theater of actual war.

If we are to vote that war does not exist in Cuba, we must also vote that
there was no war in the Shenandoah Valley.

Again, Mr. Speaker, the War Record Reports tell us that in 1863 the total
effective of all the Confederate force east of the Mississippi river was only
153.780 men. If we now decide that there are not a sufficient number of
Spanish troops in Cuba to create a condition of war, we must also decide that
war did not exist in this country from 1861 to 1865, and we must follow up
that by repealing all the pension laws, bringing the dead to life, making the
lame to walk, revising history, and teaching the children that there are no such
persons as Lincoln, McClellan, Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, Hancock, Schofield,
or Lee, Jackson, and Jefferson Davis. We must do one of these things, Mr.
Speaker, or else admit that the same facts which created a condition of war in
one country did not create it in another.

The SPEAKER. The time of the gentleman from Alabama has expired.

Mr. WLIEELER of Alabama. I ask two minutes more.

Mi*. BAILEY. I have yielded all the time under my control.

Mr. WHEELER of Alabama. I ask unanimous consent for an extension of
two minutes.

There was no objection.

Mr. WHEELER of Alabama. I thank the House for this courtesy.

The trouble is, Mr. Speaker, that the country has changed. From 1776 to
1865 the dominant spirit which controlled in this Republic was one of honor,
glory, chivalry, and patriotism. The dominant spirit of to-day is the pride of
gold, of palaces, of marriage alliances with dukes, and princes, and counts.

I do not know what others may say or how others may vote, but I for one
proclaim on this floor that war, cruel, brutal, murderous war, does exist in
that " gem of the ocean "— that beautiful " Queen of the Antilles "— and I

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RELATIONS OF CUBA AND THE UNITED STATES. 177

here assert that it is our duty as the greatest people upon earth to so declare
in the highest councils that exist under the canopy of heaven.

If this declaration will aid our brethren struggling for liberty, we are only
doing what we promised to do when God vouchsafed victory and liberty to us.
If we fail to do this, we are recreant to our pledges, to Christianity, to civiliza-
tion, to humanity, and to God. [Loud applause.]

It was not until later that the Spanish Government allowed Ameri-
can charity to be applied to the few siu'viving reconcentrados who could
be saved.

Early in June, 1897, there was a crisis in the Spanish Cabinet and
Canovas resigned, but was persuaded to withdraw his resignation.
He was assassinated August 8th, and his place as Premier was filled
by General Azcarraga, who in turn gave ,way to Sagasta. Hon.
Hannis Taylor of Alabama was replaced as Minister to Spain by Gen-
eral Stewart L. Woodford, who was appointed June i6th, and pre-
sented his credentials to the Queen Regent September 13, 1897.
He was authorized to attempt to adjust matters, but it was impossible
to make any arrangement satisfactory to either side. The feeling of
hostility between Spain and the United States was every day increas-
ing in intensity and the inevitable outbreak was only a question of
time.

On December 6th, President McKinley sent to Congress a message
in which he ably reviewed the condition of afifairs in Cuba in the
following words:

The most important problem with which this Government is now called
upon to deal pertaining to its foreign relations concerns its duty toward Spain
and the Cuban insurrection. Problems and conditions more or less in com-
mon with those now existing have confronted this Government at various
times in the past. The story of Cuba for many years has been one of unrest;
growing discontent; an efYort toward a larger enjoyment of liberty and self-
control; of organized resistance to the mother country; of depression after
distress and warfare and of ineffectual settlement to be followed by renewed
revolt. For no enduring period since the enfranchisement of the continental
possessions of Spain in the Western continent has the condition of Cuba or
the policy of Spain toward Cuba not caused concern to the United States.

The prospect from time to time that the weakness of Spain's hold upon tne
island and the political vicissitudes and embarrassments of the home govern-
ment might lead to the transfer of Cuba to a continental power called forth.

178 Cuba's struggle against spain.

between 1823 and i860, various emphatic declarations of the policy of the
United States to permit no disturbance of Cuba's connection with Spain unless
in the direction of independence or acquisition by us through purchase; nor
has there been any change of this declared policy since upon the part of the
Government.

The revolution which began in 1868 lasted tor ten years despite the strenuous
efforts of the successive peninsular governments to suppress it. Then as now
the Government of the United States testified its grave concern and offered
its aid to put an end to bloodshed in Cuba. The overtures made by General
Grant were refused and the war dragged on, entailing great loss of life and
treasure and increased injury to American interests, besides throwing enhanced
burdens of neutrality upon this Government. In 1878 peace was brought about
by the Truce of Zanjon, obtained by negotiations between the Spanish com-
mander, Martinez de Campos, and the insurgent leaders.

The present insurrection broke out in February, 1895. It is not my purpose
ai this time to recall its remarkable increase or to characterize its tenacious
resistance against the enormous forces massed against it by Spain. The revolt
and the efforts to subdue it carried destruction to every quarter of the island,
developing wide proportions and defying the efforts of Spain for its suppres-
sion. The civilized code of war has been disregarded, ro less so by the
Spaniards than by the Cubans.

Th2 existing conditions can not but fill this Government and the American
people with the gravest apprehension. There is no desire on the part of our
people to profit by the misfortunes of Spain. We have only the desire to see
the Cubans prosperous and contented, enjoying that measure of self-control
which is the inalienable right of man, protected in their right to reap the
benefit of the exhaustless treasures of their country.

The offer made by my predecessor in April, 1896, tendering the friendly
offices of this Government failed. Any mediation on our part was not accepted.
In brief the answer read: " There is no effectual way to pacify Cuba unless
it begins with the actual submission of the rebels to the mother country."
Then only could Spain act in the promised direction, of her own motion and
after her own plans.

The cruel policy of concentration was initiated February 16, 1896. The
productive districts controlled by the Spanish armies were depopulated. The
agricultural inhabitants were herded in and about the garrison towns, their
lands laid waste and their dwellings destroyed. This policy the late Cabinet
of Spain justified as a necessary measure of war and as a means of cutting off
supplies from the insurgents. It has utterly failed as a war measure. It was
not civilized warfare. It was extermination.

RELATIONS OF CUBA AND THE UNITED STATES. 1 79

Against this abuse of the rights of war I have felt constrained on repeated
occasions to enter the firm and earnest protest of this Government. There was
much of public condemnation of the treatment of American citizens by alleged
illegal arrests and long imprisonment awaiting trial or pending protracted
judicial proceedings. I felt it my first duty to make instant demand for the
release or speedy trial of all American citizens under arrest. Before the
change of the Spanish Cabinet in October last twenty-two prisoners, citizens
of the United States, had been given their freedom.

For the relief of our own citizens suffering because of the conflict the aid
of Congress was sought in a special message, and under the appropriation of
April 4, 1897, effective aid has been given to American citizens in Cuba, many
of them at their own request having been returned to the United States.

The instructions given to our new minister to Spain before his departure for
his post directed him to impress upon that Government the sincere wish of the
United States to lend its aid toward the ending of the war in Cuba by reaching
a peaceful and lasting result, just and honorable alike to Spain and to the
Cuban people. These instructions recited the character and duration of the
contest, the v/idespread losses it entails, the burdens and restraints it imposes
upon us, with constant disturbance of national interests, and the injury result-
ing from an indefinite continuance of this state of things. It was stated that
at this juncture our Government was constrained to seriously inquire if the
time was not ripe when Spain of her own volition, moved by her own interests
and every sentiment of humanity, should put a stop to this destructive war and
make proposals of settlement honorable to herself and just to her Cuban
colony. It was urged that as a neighboring nation, with large interests in
Cuba, we could be required to wait only a reasonable time for the mother
country to establish its authority and restore peace and order within the
borders of the island; that we could not contemplate an indefinite period for
the accomplishment of this result.

No solution was proposed to which the slightest idea of humiliation to
Spain could attach, and indeed precise proposals were withheld to avoid
embarrassment to that Government. All that was asked or expected was that
some safe way might be speedily provided and permanent peace restored. It
so chanced that the consideration of this offer, addressed to the same Spanish
Administration which had declined the tenders of my predecessor and which
for more than two years had poured men and treasure into Cuba in the
fruitless effort to suppress the revolt, fell to others. Between the departure
of General Woodford, the new envoy, and his arrival in Spain the statesman
who had shaped the policy of his country fell by the hand of an assassin, and
although the Cabinet of the late Premier still held office and received from our

i8o Cuba's struggle against spain.

envoy the proposals he bore, that Cabinet gave place within a few daj^s there-
after to a new Administration, under the leadership of Sagasta.

The reply to our note was received on the 23d day of October. It is in the
direction of a better understanding. It appreciates the friendly purposes of
this Government. It admits that our country is deeply affected by the war in
Cuba and that its desires for peace are just. It declares that the present
Spanish Government is bound by every consideration to a change of policy
that should satisfy the United States and pacify Cuba within a reasonable time.
To this end Spain has decided to put into effect the political reforms heretofore
advocated by the present Premier, without halting for any consideration in the
path which in its judgment leads to peace. The military operations, it is said,
will continue but will be humane and conducted with all regard for private
rights, being accompanied by political action leading to the autonomy of Cuba
while guarding Spanish sovereignty. This, it is claimed, will result in in-
vesting Cuba with a distinct personality; the island to be governed by an
executive and by a local council or chambers, reserving to Spain the control
of the foreign relations, the Army and Navy and the judicial administration.
To accomplish this the present Government proposes to modify existing legis-
lation by decree, leaving the Spanish Cortes, with the aid of Cuban senators
and deputies, to solve the economic problem and properly distribute the
existing debt.

In the absence of a declaration of the measures that this Government pro-
poses to take in carrying out its proffer of good offices it suggests that Spain
be left free to conduct military operations and grant political reforms, while
the United States for its part shall enforce its neutral obligations and cut off
the assistance which it is asserted the insurgents receive from this country.
The supposition of an indefinite prolongation of the war is denied. It is
asserted that the western provinces are already well nigh reclaimed; that the
planting of cane and tobacco therein has been resumed, and that by force of
arms and new and ample reforms very early and complete pacification is hoped
for.

The immediate amelioration of existing conditions under the new administra-
tion of Cuban affairs is predicted, and therewithal the disturbance and all occa-
sion for any change of attitude on the part of the United States. Discussion
of the question of the international duties and responsibilities of the United
States as Spain understands them is presented, with an apparent disposition
to charge us with failure in this regard. This charge is without any basis in
fact. It could not have been made if Spain had been cognizant of the constant
efforts this Government has made at the cost of millions and by the employ-
ment of the administrative machinery of the nation at command to perform

RELATIONS OF CUBA AND THE UNITED STATES. l8l

its full duty according to the law of nations. That it has successfully prevented
the departure of a single military expedition or armed vessel from our shores
in violation of our laws would seem to be a sufficient answer. But of this
aspect of the Spanish note it is not necessary to speak further now. Firm in
the conviction of a wholly performed obligation, due response to this charge
has been made in diplomatic course.

Throughout all these horrors and dangers to our own peace this Government
has never in any way abrogated its sovereign prerogative of reserving to itself
the determination of its policy and course according to its own high sense of
right and in consonance with the dearest interests and convictions of our own
people should the prolongation of the strife so demand.

Of the untried measures there remain only: Recognition of the insurgents
as belligerents; recognition of the independence of Cuba; neutral intervention
to end the war by imposing a rational compromise between the contestants,
and intervention in favor of one or the other party. I speak not of forcible
annexation, for that can not be thought of. That by our code of morality
would be criminal aggression.

Recognition of the belligerency of the Cuban insurgents has often been
canvassed as a possible if not inevitable step both in regard to the previous ten
years' struggle and during the present war. I am not unmindful that the
two Houses of Congress in the spring of 1896 expressed the opinion by con-
current resolution that a condition of public war existed requiring or justifying
the recognition of a state of belligerency in Cuba, and during the extra session
the Senate voted a joint resolution of like import, which, however, was not
brought to a vote in the House of Representatives. In the presence of these
significant expressions of the sentiment of the legislative branch it behooves
the Executive to soberly consider the conditions under which so important a
measure must needs rest for justification. It is to be seriously considered
whether the Cuban insurrection possesses beyond dispute the attributes of
Statehood which alone can demand the recognition of belligerency in its
favor. Possession, in short, of the essential qualifications of sovereignty by
the insurgents and the conduct of the war by them according to the received
code of war are no less important factors toward the determination of the
problem of belligerency than are the influences and consequences of the strug-
gle upon the internal polity of the recognizing State.

The wise utterances of President Grant in his memorable message of Decem-
ber 7, 1875, are .lignally relevant to the present situation in Cuba, and it may
be wholesome now to recall them. At that time a ruinous conflict had for
seven years wasted the neighboring island. During all those years an utter
disregard of the laws of civilized warfare and of the just demands of humanitv,

i82 Cuba's struggle against spain.

which called forth expressions of condemnation from the nations of Christen-
dom, continued unabated. Desolation and ruin pervaded that productive
re<2:ion, enormously affecting the commerce of all commercial nations, but
that of the United States more than any other by reason of proximity and
larger trade and intercourse. At that juncture General Grant uttered these
words, which now as then sum up the elements of the problem:

" A recognition of the independence of Cuba being, in my opinion, im-
practicable, and indefensible, the question which next presents itself is that
of the recognition of belligerent rights in the parties to the contest. In a
former message to Congress I had occasion to consider this question, and
reached the conclusion that the conflict in Cuba, dreadful and devastating as
were its incidents, did not rise to the fearful dignity of war. * * * It is
possible that the acts of foreign powers, and even acts of Spain herself, of
this very nature, might be pointed to in defense of such recognition. But
now, as in its past history, the United States should carefully avoid the false
lights which might lead it into the mazes of doubtful law and of questionable
propriety, and adhere rigidly and sternly to the rule, which has been its guide,
of doing only that which is right and honest and of good report. The ques-
tion of according or of withholding rights of belligerency must be judged in
every case, in view of the particular attending facts. Unless justified by
necessity, it is always, and justly, regarded as an unfriendly act and a
gratuitous demonstration of moral support to the rebellion. It is necessary,
and it is required, when the interests and rights of another government or of its
people are so far affected by a pending civil conflict as to require a definition
of its relations to the parties thereto. But this conflict must be one which will
be recognized in the sense of international law as war.

" Belligerence, too, is a fact. The mere existence of contending armed
bodies, and their occasional conflicts, do not constitute war in the sense re-
ferred to. Applying to the existing condition of affairs in Cuba the tests recog-
nized by publicists and writers on international law, and which have been
observed by nations of dignity, honesty and power, when free from sensitive
or selfish and unworthy motives, I fail to find in the insurrection the existence
of such a substantial political organization, real, palpable and manifest to the
world, having the forms and capable of the ordinary functions of government
toward its owm people and to other states, with courts for the administration
of justice, with a local habitation, possessing such organization of force, such
material, such occupation of territory as to take the contest out of the category
of a mere rebellious insurrection, or occasional skirmishes, and place it on
the terrible footing of war, to which a recognition of belligerency would aim
to elevate it.

1

RELATIONS OF CUBA AND THE UNITED STATES. 183

"The contest, moreover, is solely on land; the insurrection has not pos-
sessed itself of a single seaport whence it may send forth its flag, nor has it
any means of communication with foreign powers except through the mili-
tary lines of its adversaries. No apprehension of any of those sudden and
difficult complications which a war upon the ocean is apt to precipitate upon
the vessels, both commercial and national, and upon the consular officers of
other powers, calls lor th^ definition of their relations to the parties to the
contest. Considered as a question of expediency, I regard the accordance of
belligerent rights still to be as unwise and premature, as I regard it to be, at
present, indefensible as a measure of right.

" Such recognition entails upon the country according the rights which
flow from it difficult and complicated duties, and requires the exaction from ihe
contending parties of the strict observance of their rights and obligations. It
confers the right of search upon the high seas by vessels of both parties; it
would subject the carrying of arms and munitions of war, which now may
be transported freely and without interruption, in vessels of the United States,
to detention and to possible seizure; it would give rise to countless vex-
atious questions, would release the parent government from responsibility for
acts done by the insurgents, and would invest Spain with the right to exercise
the supervision recognized by our treaty of 1795 over our commerce on the
high seas, a very large part of which, in its traffic between the Atlantic and
the Gulf States, and between all of them and the States on the Pacific, passes
through the waters which wash the shores of Cuba. The exercise of this su-
pervision could scarce fail to lead, if not to abuses, certainly to collisions
perilous to the peaceful relations of the two States. There can be little doubt
as to what result such supervision would before long draw this nation. It
would be unworthy of the United States to inaugurate the possibilities of such
result, by measures of questionable right or expediency, or by any indirection."

Turning to the practical aspects of a recognition of belligerency and review-
ing its inconveniences and positive dangers, still further pertinent considera-
tions appear. In the code of nations there is no such thing as a naked recog-
nition of belligerency unaccompanied by the assumption of international neu-
trality. Such recognition without more will not confer upon either party to a
domestic conflict a status not theretofore actually possessed or afYect the re-
lation of either party to other States. The act of recognition usually takes
the form of a solemn proclamation of neutrality which recites the de facto
condition of belligerency as its motive. It announces a domestic law ri
neutrality in the declaring State. It assumes the international obligations of a
neutral in the presence of a public state of war. It warns all citizens and
others within the jurisdiction of the proclaimant that they violate those rigor-

184 Cuba's struggle against spain.

ous obligations at their own peril and can not expect to be shielded from the
consequences. The right of visit and search on the seas and seizure of ves-
sels and cargoes and contraband of war and good prize under admiralty law
must under international law be admitted as a legitimate consequence of a
proclamation of belligerency. While according the equal belligerent rights
defined by public law to each party in our ports disfavors would be imposed
on both, which while nominally equal would weigh heavily in behalf of Spain
herself. Possessing a navy and controlling the ports of Cuba her maritime
rights could be asserted not only for the military investment of the island, but
up to the margin of our own territorial waters, and a condition of things
would exist for which the Cubans within their own domain could not hope
to create a parallel; while its creation through aid or sympathy from within
our domain would be even more impossible than now, with the additional
obligations of international neutrality we would perforce assume.

The enforcement of this enlarged and onerous code of neutrality would
only be influential within our own jurisdiction by land and sea and applicable
b> our own instrumentalities. It could impart to the United States no juris-
diction between Spain and the insurgents. It would give the United States
no right of intervention to enforce the conduct of the strife within the para-
mount authority of Spain according to the international code of war.

For these reasons I regard the recognition of the belligerency of the
Cuban insurgents as now unwise and therefore inadmissible. Should that
step hereafter be deemed wise as a measure of right and duty the Executive
will take it.

Intervention upon humanitarian grounds has been frequently suggested and
has not failed to receive my most anxious and earnest consideration. But
should such a step be now taken when it is apparent that a hopeful change has
supervened in the policy of Spain toward Cuba? A new government has taken
office in the mother country. It is pledged in advance to the declaration that
all the effort in the world can not suffice to maintain peace in Cuba by the
bayonet; that vague promises of reform after subjugation afford no solution
of the insular problem; that Vv^ith a substitution of commanders must come a
change of the past system of warfare for one in harmony with a new policy
which shall no longer aim to drive the Cubans to the " horrible alternative of
taking to the thicket or succumbing in misery; " that reforms must be in-
stituted in accordance with the needs and circumstances of the time, and that
these reforms, while designed to give full autonomy to the colony and to create
a virtual entity and self-controlled administration, shall yet conserve and
affirm the sovereignty of Spain by a just distribution of powers and burdens
upon a basis of mutual interest untainted by methods of selfish expediency.

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RELATIONS OF CUBA AND THE UNITED STATES. 187

The first acts of the new government He in these honorable paths. The
policy of cruel rapine and extermination that so long shocked the universal
sentiment of humanity has been reversed. Under the new military com-
mander a broad clemency is proffered. Measures have already been set on foot
to relieve the horrors of starvation. The power of the Spanish armies it is
asserted is to be used not to spread ruin and desolation but to protect the
resumption of peaceful agricultural pursuits and productive industries. That
past methods are futile to force a peace by subjugation is freely admitted, and
that ruin without conciliation must inevitably fail to win for Spain the fidelity
of a contented dependency.

Decrees in application of the foreshadowed reforms have already been
promulgated. The full text of these decrees has not been received, but as
furnished in a telegraphic summary from our minister are: All civil and
electoral rights of Peninsular Spaniards are, in virtue of existing constitutional
authority, forthwith extended to Colonial Spaniards. A scheme of autonomy
has been proclaimed by decree, to become effective upon ratification by the
Cortes. It creates a Cuban parliament which, with the insular executive, can
consider and vote upon all subjects affecting local order and interests, pos-
sessing unlimited powers save as to matters of State, war and the navy as to
which the governor-general acts by his own authority as the delegate of the
central government. This parliament receives the oath of the governor-general
to preserve faithfully the liberties and privileges of the colony, and to it the
colonial secretaries are responsible. It has the right to propose to the central
government, through the governor-general, modifications of the national
charter and to invite new projects of law or executive measures in the interest
of the colony.

Besides its local powers it is competent, first, to regulate electoral registra-
tion and procedure and prescribe the qualifications of electors and the manner
of exercising sufYrage; second, to organize courts of justice with native judges
from members of the local bar; third, to frame the insular budget both as to
expenditures and revenues, without limitation of any kind, and to set apart
the revenues to meet the Cuban share of the national budget, which latter
will be voted by the national Cortes with the assistance of Cuban senators and
deputies; fourth, to initiate or take part in the negotiations of the national
government for commercial treaties which may affect Cuban interests; fifth, to
accept or reject commercial treaties which the national government may have
concluded without the participation of the Cuban government; sixth, to frame
the colonial tariff, acting in accord with the peninsular government in
scheduling articles of mutual commerce between the mother country and the
colonies. Before introducing or voting upon a bill, the Cuban government or

i88 Cuba's struggle against spain.

the chambers will lay the project before the central government and hear its
opinion thereon, all the correspondence in such regard being made public.
Finally, all conflicts of jurisdiction arising between the different municipal,
provincial and insular assemblies, or between the latter and the insular exec-
utive power, and which from their nature may not be referable to the central
government for decision, shall be submitted to the courts.

That the Government of Sagasta has entered upon a course from which
recession with honor is impossible can hardly be questioned; that in the few
weeks it has existed it has made earnest of the sincerity of its professions is
undeniable. I shall not impugn its sincerity, nor should impatience be suffered
to embarrass it in the task it has undertaken. It is honestly due to Spain and
to our friendly relations with Spain that she should be given a reasonable
chance to realize her expectations and to prove the asserted efficacy of the new
order of things to which she stands irrevocably committed. She has recalled
the commander whose brutal orders inflamed the American mind and shocked
the civilized world. She has modified the horrible order of concentration and
has undertaken to care for the helpless and permit those who desire to resume
the cultivation of their fields to do so and assures them of the protection of the
Spanish Government in their lawful occupations. She has just released the
" Competitor " prisoners heretofore sentenced to death and who have been the
subject of repeated diplomatic correspondence during both this and the
preceding Administration.

Not a single American citizen is now in arrest or confinement in Cuba of
whom this Government has any knowledge. The near future will demonstrate
whether the indispensable condition of a righteous peace, just alike to the
Cubans and to Spain as well as equitable to all our interests so intimately
involved in the welfare of Cuba, is likely to be attained. If not, the exigency
of further and other action by the United States will remain to be taken.
When that time comes that action will be determined in the line of indisputable
right and duty. It will be faced, without misgiving or hesitancy in the light
of the obligation this Government owes to itself, to the people who have
confided to it the protection of their interests and honor, and to humanity.

Sure of the right, keeping free from all ofifense ourselves, actuated only by
upright and patriotic considerations, moved neither by passion nor selfishness,
the Government will continue its watchful care over the rights and property of
American citizens and will abate none of its efforts to bring about by peaceful
agencies a peace which shall be honorable and enduring. If it shall hereafter
appear to be a duty imposed by our obligations to ourselves, to civilization
and humanity to intervene with force, it shall be without fault on our part and
only because the necessity for such action will be so clear as to command the
support and approval of the civilized world.

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JANUARY I TO MAY i, 1898.

CHAPTER VIII.

With the beginning of the year 1898,, a provisional government, in
accord with the reforms promised by the Sagasta cabinet, was inau-
gurated in Havana. Although there was very little chance of any
measure of autonomy proving satisfactory to the Cubans, the Ameri-
can people were advised to give the Spanish Government a chance of
testing the value of the attempted reforms. Thoughtful persons feared
that the policy of Spain was simply to keep the United States in a con-
dition of inaction until so late in the season that a campaign would
have to be made in the rainy season or deferred until the following
year. Meanwhile the country was fully awakened to the necessity of
increasing the navy and strengthening the coast defenses.

The White Squadron, under the command of Admiral Sicard, was
ordered to rendezvous at Key West. Riotous demonstrations against
the Americans in Cuba being reported by the consul-general, it was
deemed best to send a war vessel to the port of Havana, and on January
25th, the '' Maine," under command of Captain Sigsbee, was ordered to
that place. This was ostensibly a visit of courtesy, but was also a pre-
cautionary measure in behalf of Americans and American property in
Cuba. The hostility of the Spaniards was scarcely veiled, but in time
of peace they dared not object to the presence of an American war
vessel before Havana, and they immediately prepared to return the
courtesy by sending the " Vizcaya " to the port of New York. The
vessel was in fact present in New York harbor during the days of ex-
citement following the destruction of the '' Maine; " and the fact that :t
was protected from violence at the hands of irresponsible and excited
persons argued well for the self-control of the American people and
the administrative ability of those in authority at the port. Mean-
while both Consul-General Lee and Captain Sigsbee were aware of
the anti-American spirit existing in Havana, not on account of any
lack of courtesy on the part of the Spanish officials, but from the
indifference and apathy with which they were received by the Spanish
soldiers and the trades-people in the city. Several threatening pla-
cards were printed and distributed and rumors of ill-feeling were rife;

190 CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.

consequently the officers of the '' Maine," were constantly on the alert
for a popular outbreak; and the crew of the vessel were not allowed
to go ashore.

February 8th, it was learned that De Lome, the Spanish Minister at
Washington, had sent to a friend in Havana, Senor Coneljas, a Spanish
politician of high rank, a letter containing abusive and insulting lan-
guage about President McKinley. The publication of this letter
caused great indignation throughout the United States; and as De
Lome was unable to deny the authorship of the objectionable ex-
pressions, Spain was immediately requested to recall him, but he
promptly resigned and received his passports before action could be
taken at Madrid.

De Lome had not left New York when the co mtry was horrified by
the news of the blowing up of the '' Maine." The telegram from Captain
Sigsbee announcing the disaster, requested that judgment be sus-
pended until an investigation cojild be made; and everything possible
was done by the American authorities to allay the excitement naturally
aroused. A naval court of inquiry to investigate the matter was ap-
pointed by Admiral Sicard. The members of the court were Cap-
tain Sampson of the " Iowa," Captain Chadwick of the " New York "
Lieutenant-Commander William P. Potter, United States Navy, and
Lieutenant-Commander Adolph Marix also of the " New York, '
The last-named was appointed judge-advocate; he had at one time
been executive officer of the " Maine " and was thoroughly familiar
with the construction of the vessel and the disposition of her stores
and ammunition. The order appointing the court of inquiry reads
as follows:

U. S. Flagship " New York " (first rate).

Key West, Fla., February 19, 1898.
Capt. William T. Sampson, U. S. N., Commanding U. S. S. Iowa, Key West,
Fla.:

Sir. — A court of inquiry, consisting of yourself as president, and of Capt.
French E. Chadv/ick, and Lieut. -Commander William P. Potter, United
Stdtes Navy, as additional members, and of Lieut. -Commander Adolph
]\Iarix, United States Navy, as judge-advocate, is hereby ordered to convene at
noon on Monday, February 21, 1898, or as soon thereafter as practicable, for
the purpose of inquiring into the circumstances connected with the loss, by
explosion, of the United States battle ship " Maine," in the harbor of Havana,
Cuba, on the night of Tuesday, February 15, 1898.

JANUARY I TO MAY I, 1 898. I9I

The court is authorized to hold its sessions on board any ship of the North
Atlantic Squadron, or in the city of Key West, Florida, or in the harbor of the
city of Havana, Cuba.

The attention of the court is invited to the instructions, concerning the
particulars to be investigated in the case of the loss or grounding of a ship of
the Navy, contained in the United States Navy Regulations.

The following-described papers relating to the loss of the United States ship
" Maine " on the occasion referred to are attached to and made part of this
precept:

1. The copy of a telegram sent by Capt. C. D. Sigsbee, United States
Navy, at Havana, Cuba, to Commander James M. Forsyth, United States
Navy, at Key West, Florida, without date, but, probably, sent on the night of
February 15th, as it was received at Key West, Florida, by Lieut. -Commander
William S. Cowles, United States Navy, at i a. m. of February 16, 1898, and
by the commander-in-chief at 5:30 a. m. of February 16, at Dry Tortugas,
Florida.

2. A telegram sent by Capt. C. D. Sigsbee, United States Navy, 10 the
commander-in-chief at Key West, Florida, dated Havana, Cuba, February
16, 1898.

The court will diligently and thorougniy inquire into all the circumstances
attending the loss of said vessel on the date named, and upon the conclusion
of the investigation will report to the commander-in-chief its proceedings, all
the testimony taken, and the facts which it may deem established by the evi-
dence adduced, together with its opinion as to what further proceedings, if
any, should be had in the matter.

The court will also report whether or not the loss of said vessel was, on the
occasion named, in any respect due to fault or negligence on the part of any
of the officers or members of the crew of said vessel, and if so, the names of
such officers or members of the crew, and in what respect and to what extent
any or either of them were so at fault or negligent.

If the court shall be of opinion that further proceedings should be had in
the matter, it will include in its report a succinct statement as to the person or
persons against whom, and the specific matter upon which, such proceedings
should be had.

The court will also report its opinion as to the cause or causes of the ex-
plosion, or other incidents that bore directly or indirectly upon the loss of the
" Maine."

It will also record any information that it may be able to obtain by testimony
and evidence, as to any person or persons not connected with the Navy of the

192 CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.

United States, who are, in its opinion, responsible, in part or wholly, directly
or indirectly, for the explosion and loss of the " Maine," and will include their
names, in its opinion, together v/ith the degree of responsibility in each case.

M. SICARD,

Rear-Admiral, Commander-in-Chief,

United States Naval Force on North Atlantic Station.

I certify the above to be a true copy.

A. MARIX,
Lieut. -Com., U. S. N., Judge-Advocate.

The court commenced its sittings at Havana, February 21st, and
continued some time at that place, later moving to Key West where
many of the witnesses were located and it continued in session for a
month. The inquiry was thorough and exhaustive, and was made
with great fairness and deliberation; and the further it progressed,
the less doubt there seemed to be that the " Maine " was destroyed by
some external agency.

February 19th, the United States had declined the request of Spain
for a joint investigation of the disaster. The officials in Havana held
a short court of inquiry and transmitted the findings to Madrid; but
it was regarded in this coimtry as a mere perfunctory affair, and not
of serious weight as to the investigation or the result announced.

The following resolution was passed by Congress to defray the ex-
penses of the submarine work necessary on the wreck of the " Maine."

Joint Resolution To provide for recovering the remains of officers and men
and property from the wrecked United States ship " Maine," and making an
appropriation therefor.

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That the Secretary of the Navy be, and he is
hereby, authorized to engage the services of a wrecking company or com-
panies, having proper facilities for the prompt and efficient performance of
submarine work, for the purpose of recovering the remains of the officers
and men lost on the United States ship " Maine," and of saving the vessel or
such parts thereof, and so much of her stores, guns, material, equipment,
fittings, and appurtenances as may be practicable; and for this purpose the
sum of two hundred thousand dollars, or as much thereof as may be necessary,
is hereby appropriated and made immediately available.

Approved, February 23, 1898.

JANUARY I TO MAY I, 1898. I93

Meanwhile the Red Cross had begun effective work among the
starving Cubans. Spain having objected to the transporting of char-
itable supplies by Government cruisers, it was agreed to have them
carried on light-house tenders. Feeling having been aroused in Cuba
against Consul-General Lee, it was intimated by Spain that his with-
drawal was desirable, but the United States refused to recall him.
Senor Polo y Bernabe was appointed Spanish Minister to succeed De
Lome, and he arrived in Washington and presented his credentials to
the President, March 12th, being received with the utmost courtesy
and consideration.

On March 8th, a bill appropriating $50,000,000 to be expended by
the President for national defense, was reported to the House by
Hon. Joseph G. Cannon, Chairman of the Committee on Appropria-
tions. From among the short speeches delivered on this occasion, I
reproduce the following from the Congressional Record of that date.
(Con. Record, Vol. 31, part 3, page 2607.)

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Alabama is recognized. [Loud and
prolonged applause.]

The Chair must inform the House that the time taken up with applause
comes out of the gentleman's time.

Mr. WHEELER of Alabama. Mr. Speaker, 20,000,000 brave and true hearts
that dwell in that beautiful land south of yon river Join me in most earnest
support of this resolution, [Loud and prolonged applause.]

To those who insist that the diplomats of this Government should regard
the maintenance of peace as the paramount purpose, I beg to say that the
history of all nations shows that the best way to preserve peace is to te
always thoroughly prepared for war. Certainly it is the only way for a
nation to preserve peace and at the same time uphold its honor and retain the
respect of other nations.

I respectfully submit that it is time for the American people to halt for a
moment and stop the worship of Mammon and Mammon's kings, to cast a
glance backward and reflect upon that which formed the foundation of this
Great Republic. It, Mr. Speaker, was the teachings of the mothers who fled
from the oppressions of caste and class, braved an unfathomed ocean, and
landed upon these shores, confronted by wild beasts and savage Indians.
They taught their sons that the highest possible honor and greatest possible
privilege was to fight for country, its safety, and its honor. It was this spirit
which enabled our forefathers to successfully cope with the brave and wild
Indians. It was this that crowned our arms with glory and victory in the

194 CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.

war of the Revolution, the war of 1812, and the war with Mexico. It was thi.^.
that caused a milHon brave men to fly to arms in 1861.

For a century American mothers had taught their sons that an ounce of
glory earned in battle was worth more than a million pounds of gold. LLoud
applause.] This is the teaching which we must continue to impress upon our
children, and it is the best heritage we can give to tho^e who are to follow after
us. This and this alone will cause the flag of our country to continue to soar
higher and higher and the prestige of this Great Republic to extend its power
for good in the farthest corners of the earth, [Applause.]

After tv/enty years of war and turmoil in Europe, which terminated in 181 5,
Napier, in his closing words of the history of those events, showed how
thoroughly the English people appreciated that their greatness and power were
due to the glory achieved by the arms of Britain's chivalrous sons. This great
writer said:

" V/ellington was victorious; the great conqueror (Napoleon) was over-
thrown; England stood the most triumphant nation of the world, but with
an enormous debt, a dissatisfied people, gaining peace without tranquillity,
greatness without intrinsic strength, the present time uneasy, the future dark
and threatening. Yet she rejoices in the glory of her arms, and it is a stirring
sound." [Applause.]

And in illustration of the virtue developed and exercised in the pursuit of
m.artial glory. General Napier said:

" War is the condition of this world. From men to the smallest insect all
are at strife, and the glory of arms, which can not be obtained without the
exercise of honor, fortitude, courage, obedience, modesty, and temperance,
excites the brave man's patriotism and is a chastening corrective for the rich
man's pride."

And with striking truth this great historian continues:

*' It is yet no security for power. Napoleon, the greatest man of whom
history makes mention — Napoleon, the most wonderful commander, the most
sagacious politician, the most profound statesman, lost by arms, Poland,
Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and France. Fortune, that name for the
unknown combination of Infinite power, was wanting to him; and without her
aid the designs of man are as bubbles on a troubled ocean."

Change one word, and we In America will indorse this expression. For
"fortune" write "patriotism;" interpret that word to mean the exercise of
this great virtue In the spirit inspired by the teaching and example of Wash-
ington, Lincoln, Lee, and Stonewall Jackson — a patriotism which holds love
of country as dearer and sweeter than life, and as far above personal ambition
as the heavens are above the earth — I repeat, substitute that dearest of words

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JANUARY I TO MAY I, 1898. 197

and give it this interpretation, and then this sentiment which Napier applied
to monarchy and imperiahsm would express the emotion uppermost in the
hearts of the patriots of this the greatest country of the world. [Loud
applause.]

[Here the hammer fell.]

The bill passed the Senate without debate, and was signed by the
President March 9th. All the southern members of Congress were
warm in their advocacy of the measure, and the unanimity of the
action and the implicit confidence placed in the President had a good
moral effect, not only in the United States, but especially abroad
where it was hoped that a spirit of disunion might become manifest
in case of the declaration of war.

The administration took immediate measures to put the country
into a good state of defense ; vessels were bought and transformed into
armored cruisers, monitors were refitted, and steps were taken to get
the army into a thoroughly good condition. The military depart-
ments were rearranged and the troops in the west were on marching
orders in a short time.

Spain remonstrated against the presence of the American fleet at
Key West, but took immediate steps to increase her own navy and
prepare a hostile fleet for American waters. The " Massachusetts "
and the '' Texas " were ordered to Hampton Roads, and the sea-coast
was thoroughly patrolled by armed vessels. At this time the papers
were filled with descriptions of the preparation of two formidable
Spanish fleets, and their probable destination could only be con-
jectured. Every city on the Atlantic coast was more or less appre-
hensive of possible attack; the Engineer's Department devoted much
of its energy to strengthening the defenses of the sea-board, and our
navy-yards were kept busy day and night with the unusual demands
upon them.

March 17th, Senator Proctor spoke in the Senate on the Cuban
question, giving full descriptions of the condition of the people there,
as learned from his own personal observation. Senator Proctor had
been Secretary of War during President Harrison's administration,
and was highly respected for intelligence, integrity and good judg-
ment. Pie had just returned from Ctiba whither he had gone during
the last week of February on a tour of investigation to satisfy himself
as to the actual condition of- affairs in the island. He presented the
facts in a cool, deliberate, unimpassioned manner, showing that the

198 Cuba's struggle against spain.

estimated mortality among the noncombatants from starvation and ill-
treatment was about 200,000, and that thousands more were at that
moment in the throes of starvation and disease. He declared that the
issue was between 1,400,000 Cubans and 200,000 Spanish soldiers.

Senator Thurston had also visited Cuba with a party in a private
yacht, reaching there a few days after Senator Proctor. He was ac-
companied by Senator Money, Representatives Cummings and W. A.
Smith, Mrs. Thurston and several other ladies. Mrs. Thurston was
deeply impressed with the sad scenes witnessed in the course of their
visit and her sympathy was strongly aroused in favor of these suffer-
ing people. She died suddenly on board the yacht in Matanzas harbor
and the circumstances under which she died gave additional weight to
Senator Thurston's advocacy of the Cuban cause. Public indignation
was inflamed by his recital of the terrible state of afifairs in Cuba as
given in his speech in the Senate about a week after Senator Proctor
had spoken on the same subject.

March 21st, the House of Representatives passed a bill for the re-
lief of the survivors of the " Maine " disaster, and this bill was passed
by the Senate two days later. The Spanish report of the destruc-
tion of the " Maine " was received at Madrid, March 25th, and the
American report was transmitted to Madrid on the following day and
was sent to Congress, March 28th, the summing up of the case being
as follows:

U. S. S. "Iowa" (ist rate),
Key West, Fla., Monday, March 21, 1898 — 10 a. m.

The court met pursuant to the adjournment of yesterday.
Present — All the members and the judge-advocate.
The record of last day's proceedings was read over and approved.
The court was then cleared for deliberation.

After full and mature consideration of all the testimony before it, the court
finds as follows:

1. That the United States battle ship " Maine " arrived in the harbor of
Havana, Cuba, on the 25th day of January, 1898, and was taken to buoy No. 4,
in from five and one-half to six fathoms of water by the regular Government
pilot.

The United States consul-general at Havana had notified the authorities at
that place, the previous evening, of the intended arrival of the " Maine."

2. The state of discipline on board the " Maine " was excellent, and all orders
and regulations in regard to the care and safety of the ship were strictly
ca-ried out.

JANUARY I TO MAY I, 1 898. 1 99

All ammunition was stowed in accordance with prescribed instructions, and
proper care was taken whenever ammunition was handled.

Nothing was stowed in any one of the magazines or shellrooms which was
not permitted to be stowed there.

The magazines and shellrooms were always locked after having been opened,
and after the destruction of the " Maine " the keys were found in their proper
place in the captain's cabin, everything having been reported secure that
evening at 8 p. m.

The temperatures of the magazines and shellrooms were taken daily and
reported. The only magazine which had an undue amount of heat was the
after ten-inch magazine, and that did not explode at the time the " Maine "
was destroyed.

The torpedo war-heads were all stowed in the after part of the ship, under
the wardroom, and neither caused nor participated in the destruction of the
" Maine."

The dry gun-cotton primers and detonators were stowed in the cabin aft. and
remote from the scene of the explosion.

Waste was carefully looked after on board the " Maine " to obviate danger.
Special orders in regard to this had been given by the commanding oflficer.

Varnishes, driers, alcohol, and other combustibles of this nature were stowed
on or above the main deck and could not have had anything to do with the
destruction of the " Maine."

The medical stores were stowed aft, under the wardroom, and remote from
the scene of the explosion.

No dangerous stores of any kind were stowed below in any of the other
storerooms.

The coal bunkers were inspected daily. Of those bunkers adjacent to the
forward magazines and shellrooms four were empty, namely: B3, B4, B5, B6.
A15 had been in use that day, and A16 was full of New River coal. This coal
had been carefully inspected before receiving it on board. The bunker in
which it was stowed was accessible on three sides at all times, and the fourth
side at this time on account of bunkers B4 and B6 being empty. This bunker,
A16, had been inspected that day by the engineer ofHcer on duty.

The fire alarms in the bunkers were in working order, and there had never
been a case of spontaneous combustion of coal on board the " Maine."

The two after boilers of the ship were in use at the time of the disaster, but
for auxiliary purposes only, with a comparatively low pressure of steam, and
being tended by a reliable watch.

These boilers could not have caused the explosion of the ship. The four
forward boilers have since been found by the divers, and are in a fair
condition.

200 Cuba's struggle against spain.

On the night of the destruction of the " Maine," everything had been reported
secure for the night at 8 p. m. by reHable persons, through the proper author-
ities, to the commanding officer. At the time the " Maine " was destroyed
the ship was quiet, and, therefore, least liable to accident caused by move-
ments from those on board.

Explosions.

3. The destruction of the " Maine" occurred at 9:40 p. m. on the 15th day
of February, 1898, in the harbor of Havana, Cuba, she being at the time moored
to the same buoy to which she had been taken upon her arrival. There were
two explosions of a distinctly different character, with a very short but distinct
interval between them, and the forward part of the ship was lifted to a marked
degree at the time of the first explosion. The first explosion was more in the
nature of a report like that of a gun, while the second explosion was more
open, prolonged, and of greater volume. This second explosion was, in the
opinion of the court, caused by the partial explosion of two or more of the
forward magazines of the " Maine."

Condition of the Wreck,

4. The evidence bearing upon this, being principally obtained from divers,
did not enable the court to form a definite conclusion as to the condition of the
wreck, although it was established that the after part of the ship was practically
intact, and sank in that condition a very few minutes after the destruction of
the forward part.

The following facts in regard to the forward part of the ship are, however,
established by the testimony:

A portion of the port side of the protective deck, which extends from about
frame 30 to about frame 41, was blown up, aft, and over to port. The main
deck, from about frame 30 to about frame 41, was blown up, aft, and slightly
over to starboard, folding the forward part of the middle superstructure over
and on top of the after part.

This was, in the opinion of the court, caused by the partial explosion of
two or more of the forward magazines of the " Maine."

5. At frame 17 the outer shell of the ship, from a point eleven and one-half
feet from the middle line of the ship, and six feet above the keel v/hen in its
normal position, has been forced up so as to be now about four feet above
the surface of the water, therefore about thirty-four feet above where it would
be had the ship sunk uninjured.

The outside bottom plating is bent into a reversed V-shape (A), the after
wing of which, about fifteen feet broad and thirty-two feet in length (from

JANUARY I TO MAY I, 1 898. 201

frame 17 to frame 25), is doubled back upon itself against the continuation of
the same plating, extending forward.

At frame 18 the vertical keel is broken in two, and the flat keel bent into an
angle similar to the angle formed by the outside bottom plating. This break
is now about six feet below the surface of the water, and about thirty feet
above its normal position.

In the opinion of the court this effect could have been produced only by the
explosion of a mine situated under the bottom of the ship at about frame iS
and somewhat on the port side of the ship.

6. The court finds that the loss of the " Maine " on the occasion named was
not in any respect due to fault or negligence on the part of any of the officers
or members of the crew of said vessel.

7. In the opinion of the court the " Maine " was destroyed by the explosion
of a submarine mine, which caused the partial explosion of two or more of
the forward magazines.

8. The court has been unable to obtain evidence fixing the responsibility for
the destruction of the " Maine " upon any person or persons.

W. T. SAMPSON,
Captain, U. S. N., President.

A. MARIX,

Lieut. -Com., U. S. N., Judge-Advocate.
The court having finished the inquiry it was ordered to make, adjourned at
II A. M., to await the action of the convening authority.

W. T. SAMPSON,
Captain, U. S. N., President.
A. MARIX,
Lieut.-Com., U. S. N., Judge-Advocate.
U. S. Flagship " New York,"

Off Key West, Fla., March 22, 1898.
The proceedings and findings of the court of inquiry in the above case are
approved.

M. SICARD,
Rear-Admiral, Commander-in-Chief of the
United States Naval Force on the North Atlantic Station.

Minister Woodford, at Madrid, held a special conference with
Sagasta and used every possible measure to obtain a peaceftil settle-
ment of the Cuban question, but the time for diplomacy had passed.
Spain had no intention of yielding any of her claims over the Ctibans,
and the only possible result of diplomatic measures at this time was

202 Cuba's struggle against spain.

to defer the outbreak of hostilities until the rainy and unhealthy
season. It was incredible to any European power, especially to a
people so slow and procrastinating as the Spaniards habitually are,
that the United States in her unprepared condition could muster, arm
and mobilize a formidable army in the course of a few weeks. Mean-
while the Blanco administration endeavored to soften the condition of
affairs in Cuba. Mc-ney was donated to relieve the suffering, and the
reconcentrado edicts were abrogated; while the Red Cross agents in
co-operation with the American consuls were allowed to carry on their
humane work in the island. But it was impossible for the Spanish
authorities to give the relief they were evidently sincere in attempting
to give. Most of the reconcentrados had lost everything. Their
homes were destroyed, their live-stock scattered or killed; weak with
starvation, and penniless, it was impossible for them to return to the
places they once called home. Those who sought employment on the
plantations near the city, w^ere not secure; for the Government was
unable to prevent the burning of the fields and machinery by the in-
surgents, who were driven to desperation and refused to accept or
even to listen to any other terms save absolute independence.
^ The following letter from Consul- General Lee, partly describes the
situation and gives little hope of relief for the unfortunate condition of
affairs :

United States Consulate-General,

Havana, January 8, 1898.
Secretary of State:

Sir. — I have the honor to state, as a matter of public interest, that the
" reconcentrado order " of General Weyler, formerly Governor-General of this
island, transferred about 400,000 self-supporting people, principally women and
children, into a multitude, to be sustained by the contributions of others or die
of starvation or of fevers, resulting from a low physical condition, and being
massed in large bodies, v/ithout change of clothing and without food.

Their houses were burned, their fields and plant beds destroyed, and their
live stock driven away or killed.

I estimate that probably 300,000 of the rural population in the provinces of
Pinar del Rio, Havana, Matanzas, and Santa Clara, have died of starvation or
from resultant causes, and the deaths of whole families almost simultaneously
or within a few days of each other, and of mothers praying for their children
to be relieved of their horrible sufferings by death, are not the least of the
many pitiable scenes which were ever present. In the provinces of Puerto

JANUARY I TO MAY I, 1 898. 203

Principe and Santiago de Cuba, where the " reconcentrado order " could not

be enforced, the great mass of the people are self-sustaining.
**********

A daily average of ten cents' worth of food to 200,000 people would be an
expenditure of $20,000 per day, and, of course, the most humane efforts upon
the part of our citizens can not hope to accomplish such a gigantic relief, and
a great portion of these people will have to be abandoned to their fate.

I am, etc.,

FITZHUGH LEE.

Similar letters from consuls in the various provinces were being
daily received; and mention was made in some of the letters of organ-
ized bodies of charitable women who went from door to door carrying
relief, some families contributing hundreds of dollars each month to
feed the poor. Some of the letters and reports gave harrowing de-
tails of the suffering witnessed, and the following letters describe
the crowds coming to the consulates to receive the rations and med-
icines sent by the United States for distribution:

Consulate of the United States,

Santiago de Cuba, February 26, 1898.
Secretary of State:

Sir. — I have the honor to herewith inclose for your information a copy of a
letter sent yesterday by me to the New York Central Cuban Relief Committee,
showing the results of four days' work in distributing rations to the starving
poor.

Rations are issued in a court attached to the consulate, the people being
admitted by the police through a carriage driveway.

As I write the street is blocked by the hungry throng: for nearly a square
above and below the entrance.

I have requested the police to admit the most delicate and feeble subjects
first, as many of them are unable to stand very long in suph a crowd.

I shall, if possible, get a photographic view of the scene and forward it to
the President through your honorable Department.

I am, etc.,

PULASKI F. HYATT,

United States Consul.

Since writing this dispatch (No. 437), I have been informed that the ladies'
relief committee have estimated that in this city alone the number who need
help is at least 18,000. HYATT,

Consul.

204 CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.

Consulate of the United States,

Sagua la Grande, March 12, 1898.
Secretary of State:

Sir. — With reference to the distribution to and requirement for the con-
centrados in my consular district, I beg to submit the following for the in-
formation of the Department:

From the 15th of last month, through cash donations made to this consulate,
direct, through personal appeal, I cared for 1,200 persons. By the ist instant
these contributions increased so as to enable the committee to increase the
relief list to 2,000. This has been maintained until now; but as the " Fern,"
with thirty-five tons, should arrive to-morrow, the Sagua relief can be
continued.

About a week since I received the first shipment of supplies, about twenty
tons being sent from Havana under direction of the Red Cross branch in that
city. All this I distributed among ten of the twenty-two towns I had managed
to investigate, using none for Sagua; there being five others not yet looked
into out of the twenty-seven cities and towns in my zone. I believe that with
the assistance of a very able local committee, that I have this relief reduced to
a kind of system so as to avoid as little abuse as possible, and at the same
time care for the most deserving.

For instance, about sixty days ago, the mayors of these towns furnished, 'oy
request, this office with the number they claimed as actually destitute in their
several municipal districts, which footed up over 50,00-0 persons. Estimating a
decrease from death of 10,000, would leave, say, 40,000.

From the investigation so far made, I estimate if provision can be made to
care for 25,000, whatever may be left will manage to survive.

Upon this estimate I beg to say that to keep this number alive will require
eighty tons per month.

With the supplies reported in transit we can carry them through until the
I2th of the coming month (April),

While, as stated in a very recent dispatch to the Department, the military
have thrown every conceivable obstacle in the way of carrying out this humane
work, I have, when convinced of their sincerity, acted in conjunction with the
civil authorities.

Of the 5,000 utterly destitute in this city, the mayor, by popular subscription,
has made an effort to issue a scant ration of rice and beans to about one-third
of this number. Yesterday he called to say that he had a telegram from the
acting Spanish minister in Washington, suggesting that he offer to aid me in
the distribution of the supplies being sent from the United States; that he had
no funds with which to do anything.

GROUP PHOTOGRAPHED AFTER THE BREAKFAST TO OFFICERS
OF THE " MAINE," HAVANA YACHT CLUB, JAN. 30. 1898.

JANUARY I TO MAY I, 1 898. 207

Being a good, active man, I gladly accepted the offer of his services.

It is with pleasure that I say to the Department that Senor Leonardo Chia,
'' administrador " of the Sagua, as also the " administradores " of the Santa
Clara and Cienfuegos railroads, have not only transported free the supplies fo-'
the reconcentrados, but have used extra effort to have them reach destination
in due time.

I am, etc., Vv^ALTER B. BARKER,

Consul.
[Telegram.]

Sagua la Grande, March 24, 1898.
Day, Washington:

Closer investigation disclose larger number destitute than estimates sent.
Fifty tons needful now. Distress far greater than my reports show.

BARKER,

Consul.

On February 14th, the Senate had passed a resolution calling for
the diplomatic correspondence on this subject, and it was transmitted
to the Senate in April. The paper from which above extracts are
made was consolidated with the message of President McKinley,
Senate Document No. 405, Fifty-fifth Congress.

On April ist the House passed an appropriation of $39,000,000
for the building of three warships, six torpedo boats, six torpedo-boat
destroyers and a smokeless powder factory. On the 4th speeches
were made in both Houses of Congress favoring intervention in Cuba.
On the same day messages were received from Pope Leo XHI offer-
ing to mediate between the two countries, and he did in fact send
conciliatory messages to Spain in an effort to prevent the outbreak
of hostilities, but his efforts were fruitless. On the 5th, five Sen-
ators declared themselves in favor of war, and on the same day Consul-
General Lee was recalled. April 7th, representatives of six great
powers presented a joint note to the President in favor of peace.
They were courteously and kindly received, but the President de-
clared firmly that war in Cuba must cease.

At last, after great and trying delay in futile schemes of diplomacy,
the President sent a message to Congress April nth in favor of im-
mediate intervention.

2o8 Cuba's struggle against spain.

PRESIDENTS MESSAGE ON THE CONDITION OF AFFAIRS IN

CUBA.

To the Congress of the United States:

Obedient to that precept of the Constitution which commands the President
to give, from time to time, to the Congress information of the state of the
Union and to recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall
judge necessary and expedient, it becomes my duty now to address your body
with regard to the grave crisis that has arisen in the relations of the United
States to Spain by reason of the warfare that for more than three years has
raged in the neighboring island of Cuba.

I do so because of the intimate connection of the Cuban question with the
state of our own Union and the grave relation the course which it is now
incumbent upon the Nation to adopt must needs bear to the traditional policy
of our Government if it is to accord with the precepts laid down by the
founders of the Republic and religiously observed by succeeding Administra-
tions to the present day.

The present revolution is but the successor of other similar insurrections
which have occurred in Cuba against the dominion of Spain, extending over a
period of nearly half a century, each of which, during its progress, has sub-
jected the United States to great effort and expense in enforcing its neutrality
laws, caused enormous losses to American trade and commerce, caused irrita-
tion, annoyance, and disturbance among our citizens, and, by the exercise of
cruel, barbarous, and uncivilized practices of warfare, shocked the sensibilities
and offended the humane sympathies of our people.

Since the present revolution began, in February, 1895, this country has seen
the fertile domain at our threshold ravaged by fire and sword in the course of a
struggle unequaled in the history of the island and rarely paralleled as to the
numbers of the combatants and the bitterness of the contest by any revolution
of modern times where a dependent people striving to be free have been
opposed by the power of the sovereign State.

Our people have beheld a once prosperous community reduced to com-
parative want, its lucrative commerce virtually paralyzed, its exceptional
productiveness diminished, its fields laid waste, its mills in ruins, and its people
perishing by tens of thousands from hunger and destitution. We have found
ourselves constrained, in the observance of that strict neutrality which our
laws enjoin, and which the law of Nations commands, to police our own
waters and watch our own seaports in prevention of any unlawful act in aid
of the Cubans.

Our trade has suffered; the capital invested by our citizens in Cuba has been
largely lost, and the temper and forbearance of our people have been so sorely

JANUARY I TO MAY I, 1 898. 209

tried as to beget a perilous unrest among our own citizens which has inevitably
found its expression from time to time in the National legislature, so that
issues wholly external to our own body politic engross attention and stand in
the way of that close devotion to domestic advancement that becomes a self-
contained commonwealth whose primal maxim has been the avoidance of all
foreign entanglements. All this must needs awaken, and has, indeed, aroused
the utmost concern on the part of this Government, as well during my
predecessor's term as in my own.

In April, 1896, the evils from which our country suffered through the Cuban
war became so onerous that my predecessor made an effort to bring about a
peace through the mediation of this Government in any way that might tend
to an honorable adjustment of the contest between Spain and her revolted
colony, on the basis of some effective scheme of self-government for Cuba
under the flag and sovereignty of Spain. It failed through the refusal of the
Spanish Government then in power to consider any form of mediation or,
indeed, any plan of settlement which did not begin with the actual submission
of the insurgents to the mother country, and then only on such terms as Spain
herself might see fit to grant. The war continued unabated. The resistance of
the insurgents was in nowise diminished.

The efforts of Spain were increased, both by the dispatch of fresh levies to
Cuba and by the addition to the horrors of the strife of a new and inhuman
phase happily unprecedented in the modern history of civilized Christian
peoples. The policy of devastation and concentration, inaugurated by the
captain-general's bando of October 21, 1896, in the Province of Pinar del Rio
was thence extended to embrace all of the island to which the power of the
Spanish arms was able to reach by occupation or by military operations. The
peasantry, including all dwelling in the open agricultural interior, were driven
into the garrison towns or isolated places held by the troops.

The raising and movement of provisions of all kinds were interdicted. The
fields were laid waste, dwellings unroofed and fired, mills destroyed, and, in
short, everything that could desolate the land and render it unfit for human
habitation or support was commanded by one or the other of the contending
parties and executed by all the powers at their disposal.

By the time the present Administration took office a year ago, reconcentra-
tion — so called — had been made effective over the better part of the four
central and western provinces, Santa Clara, Matanzas, Havana, and Pinar
del Rio.

The agricultural population to the estimated number of 300,000 or more was
herded within the towns and their immediate vicinage, deprived of the means
of support, rendered destitute of shelter, left poorly clad, and exposed to the

2IO Cuba's struggle against spain.

most unsanitary conditions. As the scarcity of food increased with the devasta-
tion of the depopulated areas of production, destitution and want became
misery and starvation. Month by month the death rate increased in an alarm-
ing ratio. By March, 1897, according to conservative estimates from official
Spanish sources, the mortality among the reconcentrados, from starvation and
the diseases thereto incident, exceeded 50 per centum of their total number.

No practical relief was accorded to the destitute. The overburdened towns,
already suffering from the general dearth, could give no aid. So-called " zones
of cultivation " established \v^ithin the immediate areas of effective military
control about the cities and fortified camps proved illusory as a remedy for the
suffering. The unfortunates, Icing for the most part women and children,
with aged and helpless men, enfeebled by disease and hunger, could not have
tilled the soil without tools, seed, or shelter for their own support or for the
supply of the cities. Reconcentration, adopted avowedly as a war measure in
order to cut off the resources of the insurgents, worked its predestined result.
As I said in my message of last December, it was not civilized warfare; it was
extermination. The only peace it could beget was that of the wilderness and
the grave.

Meanwhile the military situation in tlie island had undergone a noticeable
change. The extraordinary activity that characterized the second year of the
war, when the insurgents invaded even the hitherto unharmed fields of Pinar
del Rio and carried havoc and destruction up to the walls of the city of Havana
itself, had relapsed into a dogged struggle in the central and eastern provinces.
The Spanish arms regained a measure of control in Pinar del Rio and parts of
Havana, but, under the existing conditions of the rural country, without imme-
diate improvement of their productive situation. Even thus partially restricted,
the revolutionists held their own, and their conquest and submission, put for-
ward by Spain as the essential and sole basis of peace, seemed as far distant as
at the outset.

In this state of affairs my Administration found itself confronted with the
grave problem of its duty. My message of last December reviewed the situa-
tion and narrated the steps taken with a view to relieving its acuteness and
opening the way to some form of honorable settlement. The assassination of
the prime minister, Canovas, led to a change of government in Spain. The
former Administration, pledged to subjugation without concession, gave place
to that of a more liberal party, committed long in advance to a policy of
reform involving the wider principle of home rule for Cuba and Puerto Rico.

The overtures of this Government, made through its new envoy General
Woodford, and looking to an immediate and effective amelioration of the con-
dition of the island, although not accepted to the extent of admitted mediation

JANUARY I TO MAY I, 1 898. 211

in any shape, were met by assurances that home rule, in an advanced phase,
would be forthwith offered to Cuba, without waiting for the war to end, and
that more humane methods should thenceforth prevail in the conduct of
hostilities. Coincidentally with these declarations, the new Government of
Spain continued and completed the policy already begun by its predecessor, of
testifying friendly regard for this Nation by releasing American citizens held
under one charge or another connected with the insurrection, so that, by the
end of November, not a single person entitled in any way to our National
protection, remained in a Spanish prison.

While these negotiations were in progress the increasing destitution of the
unfortunate reconcentrados and the alarming mortality among them claimed
earnest attention. The success which had attended the limited measure of
relief extended to the suffering American citizens among them by the judicious
expenditure through the consular agencies of the money appropriated ex-
pressly for their succor by the joint resolution approved May 24, 1897,
prompted the humane extension of a similar scheme of aid to the great body
of sufferers, A suggestion to this end was acquiesced in by the Spanish
authorities. On the 24th of December last, I caused to be issued an appeal to
the American people, inviting contributions in money or in kind for the
succor of the starving suft'erers in Cuba, following this on the 8th of January
by a similar public announcement of the formation of a central Cuban relief
committee, with headquarters in New York city, composed of three members
representing the American National Red Cross and the religious and business
elements of the community.

The efforts of that committee have been untiring and have accomplished
much. Arrangements for free transportation to Cuba have greatly aided the
charitable work. The president of the American Red Cross and representatives
of other contributory organizations have generously visited Cuba and co-
operated with the consul-general and the local authorities to make effective
distribution of the relief collected through the efforts of the central committee.
Nearly $200,000 in money and supplies has already reached the sufferers and
more is forthcoming. The supplies are admitted duty free, and transportation
to the interior has been arranged, so that the relief, at first necessarily con-
fined to Havana and the larger cities, is now extended through most, if not all,
of the towns where suffering exists.

Thousands of lives have already been saved. The necessity for a change In
the condition of the reconcentrados is recognized by the Spanish Government.
Within a few days past the orders of General Weyler have been revoked; the
reconcentrados, it is said, are to be permitted to return to their homes, and
aided to resume the self-supporting pursuits of peace. Public works have been

212 CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.

ordered to give them employment, and a sum of $600,000 has been appropriated
for their relief.

The war in Cuba is of such a nature that short of subjugation or extermina-
tion a final military victory for either side seems impracticable. The alternative
lies in the physical exhaustion of the one or the other party, or perhaps of
l)oth — a condition which in effect ended the ten years' war by the truce of
Zanjon. The prospect of such a protraction and conclusion of the present
strife is a contingency hardly to be contemplated with equanimity by the
civilized world, and least of all by the United States, affected and injured as
we are, deeply and intimately, by its very existence.

Realizing this, it appeared to be my duty, in a spirit of true friendliness, no
less to Spain than to the Cubans who have so much to lose by the prolongation
of the struggle, to seek to bring about an immediate termination of the war.
To this end I submitted, on the 27th ultimo, as a result of much representation
and correspondence, through the United States minister at Madrid, propo-
sitions to the Spanish Government looking to an armistice until October ist for
the negotiation of peace with the good offices of the President.

In addition, I asked the immediate revocation of the order of reconcentra-
tion, so as to permit the people to return to their farms and the needy to be
relieved with provisions and supplies from the United States, co-operating with
the Spanish authorities, so as to afford full relief.

The reply of the Spanish Cabinet was received on the night of the 31st
ultimo. It offered, as the means to bring about peace in Cuba, to confide the
preparation thereof to the Insular Parliament, inasmuch as the concurrence of
that body would be necessary to reach a final result, it being, however, under-
stood that the powers reserved by the Constitution to the Central Government
are not lessened or diminished. As the Cuban Parliament does not meet until
the 4th of May next, the Spanish Government would not object, for its part,
to accept at once a suspension of hostilities if asked for by the insurgents from
the general-in-chief, to whom it would pertain, in such case, to determine the
duration and conditions of the armistice.

The propositions submitted by General Woodford and the reply of the
Spanish Government were both in the form of brief memoranda, the texts of
which are before me, and are substantially in the language above given. The
function of the Cuban Parliament in the matter of "preparing" peace and the
manner of its doing so are not expressed in the Spanish memorandum; but
from General Woodford's explanatory reports of preliminary discussions pre-
ceding the final conference it is understood that the Spanish Government
stands ready to give the Insular Congress full powers to settle the terms of
peace with the insurgents — whether by direct negotiation or indirectly by
means of legislation does not appear.

JANUARY I TO MAY I, 1 898. 213

With this last overture in the direction of immediate peace, and its dis-
appointing reception by Spain, the Executive is brought to the end of his
effort.

In my annual message of December last I said:

" Of the untried measures there remain only: Recognition of the insurgents
as belligerents; recognition of the independence of Cuba; neutral intervention
to end the war by imposing a rational compromise between the contestants,
and intervention in favor of one or the other party. I speak not of forcible
annexation, for that can not be thought of. That, by our code of morality,
would be criminal aggression,"

Thereupon I reviewed these alternatives, in the light of President Grant's
measured words, uttered in 1875, when after seven years of sanguinary, de-
structive, and cruel hostilities in Cuba he reached the conclusion that the
recognition of the independence of Cuba was impracticable and indefensible;
and that the recognition of belligerence was not warranted by the facts accord-
ing to the tests of public law. I commented especially upon the latter aspect
of the question, pointing out the inconveniences and positive dangers of a
recognition of belligerence which, while adding to the already onerous burdens
of neutrality within our own jurisdiction, could not in any way extend our
influence or effective offices in the territory of hostilities.

Nothing has since occurred to change my view in this regard; and I recog-
nize as fully now as then that the issuance of a proclamation of neutrality, by
which process the so-called recognition of belligerents is published, could, of
itself and unattended by other action, accomplish nothing toward the one end
for which we labor — the instant pacification of Cuba and the cessation of the
misery that afflicts the island.

Turning to the question of recognizing at this time the independence of the
present insurgent government in Cuba, vv^e find safe precedents in our history
from an early day. They are well summed up in President Jackson's message
to Congress, December 21, 1836, on the subject of the recognition of the
independence of Texas. He said:

" In all the contests that have arisen out of the revolutions of France, out of
the disputes relating to the Crowns of Portugal and Spain, out of the separa-
tion of the American possessions of both from the European Governments,
and out of the numerous and constantly occurring struggles for dominion in
Spanish America, so wisely consistent with our just principles has been the
action of our Government, that we have, under the most critical circumstances,
avoided all censure, and encountered no other evil than that produced by a
transient estrangement of good-will in those against whom we have been by
force of evidence compelled to decide.

214 CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.

" It has thus made known to the world that the uniform poUcy and practice
of the United States is to avoid all interference in disputes which merely relate
to the internal government of other Nations, and eventually to recognize the
authority of the prevailing party without reference to our particular interests
and views or to the merits of the original controversy.

* * * " But on this, as on every other trying occasion, safety is to be found
in a rigid adherence to principle.

" In the contest between Spain and the revolted colonies we stood aloof, ati-:!
v/aited not only until the ability of the new States to protect themselves wan
fully established, but until the danger of their being again subjugated had
entirely passed away. Then, and not until then, were they recognized.

" Such was our course in regard to Mexico herself." * * * " Jt- {g true
that with regard to Texas the civil authority of Mexico has been expelled, its
invading army defeated, the chief of the Republic himself captured, and all
present power to control the newly-organized government of Texas annihilated
within its confines; but, on the other hand, there is, in appearance at least, an
immense disparity of physical force on the side of Texas. The Mexican
Republic, under another Executive, is rallying its forces under a new leader
and menacing a fresh invasion to recover its lost dominion.

" Upon the issue of this threatened invasion the independence of Texas may
be considered as suspended; and were there nothing peculiar in the relative
situation of the United States and Texas, our acknowledgment of its inde-
pendence at such a crisis could scarcely be regarded as consistent with that
prudent reserve with which we have hitherto held ourselves bound to treat all
similar questions."

Thereupon Andrew Jackson proceeded to consider the risk that there might
be imputed to the United States motives of selfish interest in view of the
former claim on our part to the territory of Texas, and of the avowed purpose
of the Texans in seeking recognition of independence as an incident to the
incorporation of Texas in the Union, concluding thus:

" Prudence, therefore, seems to dictate that we should still stand aloof and
maintain our present attitude, if not until Mexico itself, or one of the great
foreign powers shall recognize the independence of the new government, at
least until the lapse of time or the course of events shall have proved beyond
cavil or dispute the ability of the people of that country to maintain their
separate sovereignty and to uphold the government constituted by them.
Neither of the contending parties can justly complain of this course. By
pursuing it we are but carrying out the long-established policy of our Govern-
ment, a policy which has secured to us respect and influence abroad and
inspired confidence at home."

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JANUARY I TO MAY I, 1 898. 21/

These are the words of the resolute and patriotic Jackson. They are evi-
dence that the United States, in addition to the test imposed by public law as
the condition of the recognition of independence by a neutral State (to-wit,
that the revolted State shall " constitute in fact a body politic, having a govern-
ment in substance as well as in name, possessed of the elements of stability,"
and forming de facto, " if left to itself, a State among the Nations, reasonably
capable of discharging the duties of a State"), has imposed for its own
governance in dealing with cases like these the further condition that recog-
nition of independent statehood is not due to a revolted dependency until the
danger of its being again subjugated by the parent State has entirely passed
away.

This extreme test was, in fact, applied in the case of Texas. The Congress
to whom President Jackson referred the question as one '' probably leading to
war," and, therefore, a proper subject for " a previous understanding with that
body by whom war can alone be declared and by whom all the provisions for
sustaining its perils must be furnished," left the matter of the recognition of
Texas to the discretion of the Executive, providing merely for the sending of
a diplomatic agent when the President should be satisfied that the Republic
of Texas had become " an independent State." It was so recognized by
President Van Buren, who commissioned a charge d'affaires March 7, 1837,
after Mexico had abandoned an attempt to reconquer the Texan territory, and
when there was at the tim.e no bona fide contest going on between the
insurgent province and its former sovereign.

I said in my message of December last, " It is to be seriously considered
whether the Cuban insurrection possesses beyond dispute the attributes of
statehood which alone can demand the recognition of belligerency in its favor.''
The same requirement must certainly be no less seriously considered when the
graver issue of recognizing independence is in question, for no less positive
test can be applied to the greater act than to the lesser; while, on the other
hand, the influences and consequences of the struggle upon the internal policy
of the recognizing State, which form important factors when the recognition of
belligerency is concerned, are secondary, if not rightly eliminable, factors
when the real question is whether the community claiming recognition is or is
not independent beyond peradventure.

Nor from the standpoint of expediency do I think it would be wise or
prudent for this Government to recognize at the present time the independence
of the so-called Cuban Republic. Such recognition is not necessary in order
to enable the United States to intervene and pacify the island. To commit
this country now to the recognition of any particular government in Cuba
might subject us to embarrassing conditions of international obligation toward

2i8 Cuba's struggle against spain.

the organization so recognized. In case of iniervention our conduct would be
subject to the approval or disapproval of such government. We would be
required to submit to its direction and to assume to it the mere relation of a
friendly ally.

When it shall appear hereafter that there is within the island a government
capable of performing the duties and discharging the functions of a separate
nation, and having, as a matter of fact, the proper forms and attributes of
nationality, such government can be promptly and readily recognized and the
relations and interests of the United States with such nation adjusted.

There remain the alternative forms of intervention to end the war, either
as an impartial neutral by imposing a rational compromise between the con-
testants, or as the active ally of the one party or the other.

As to the first, it is not to be forgotten that during the last few months the
relation of the United States has virtually been one of friendly intervention in
many ways, each not of itself conclusive, but all tending to the exertion of a
potential influence toward an ultimate pacific result, just and honorable to all
interests concerned. The spirit of all our acts hitherto has been an earnest,
unselfish desire for peace and prosperity in Cuba, untarnished by differences
between us and Spain, and unstained by the blood of American citizens.

The forcible intervention of the United States as a neutral to stop the war,
according to the large dictates of humanity and following many historical
precedents where neighboring States have interfered to check the hopeless
sacrifices of life by internecine conflicts beyond their borders, is justifiable- on
rational grounds. It involves, however, hostile constraint upon both the
parties to the contest as well to enforce a truce as to guide the eventual
settlement.

The grounds for such intervention may be briefly summarized as follows:

First. In the cause of humanity and to put an end to the barbarities, blood-
shed, starvation, and horrible miseries now existing there, and which the
parties to the conflict are either unable or unwilling to stop or mitigate. It
is no answer to say this is all in another country, belonging to another nation,
and is, therefore, none of our business. It is specially our duty, for it is right
at our door.

Second. We owe it to our citizens in Cuba to afiford them that protection and
indemnity for life and property which no government there can or will afiford.
and to that end to terminate the conditions that deprive them of legal
protection.

Third. The right to intervene may be justified by the very serious injury to
the commerce, trade, and business of our people, and by the wanton destruc-
tion of property and devastation of the island.

JANUARY I TO MAY I, 1 898. 219

Fourth, and which is of the utmost importance. The present condition of
affairs in Cuba is a constant menace to our peace, and entails upon this
Government an enormous expense. With such a conflict waged for years in
an island so near us and with which our people have such trade and business
relations — ■ when the lives and liberty of our citizens are in constant danger
and their property destroyed and themselves ruined — where our trading
vessels are liable to seizure and are seized at our very door by war ships of a
foreign nation, the expeditions of filibustering that we are powerless to prevent
altogether, and the irritating questions and entanglements thus arising — all
these and others that I need not mention, with the resulting strained relations,
are a constant menace to our peace, and compel us to keep on a semi-war
footing with a nation with which we are at peace.

These elements of danger and disorder already pointed out have been strik-
ingly illustrated by a tragic event which has deeply and justly moved the
American people. I have already transmitted to Congress the report of the
naval court of inquiry on the destruction of the battle ship " Maine " in the
harbor of Havana during the night of the 15th of February. The destruction
of that noble vessel has filled the national heart with inexpressible horror.
Two hundred and fifty-eight brave sailors and marines and two officers of our
Navy, reposing in the fancied security of a friendly harbor, have been hurled to
death, grief and want brought to their homes and sorrow to the nation.

The naval court of inquiry, which, it is needless to say, commands the un-
qualified confidence of the Government, was unanimous in its conclusion that
the destruction of the " Maine " was caused by an exterior explosion, that of
a submarine mine. It did not assume to place the responsibility. That
remains to be fixed.

In any event the destruction of the " Maine," by whatever exterior cause,
IS a patent and impressive proof of a state of things in Cuba that is intolerable.
That condition is thus shown to be such that the Spanish Government can not
assure safety and security to a vessel of the American Navy in the harbor of
Havana on a mission of peace, and rightfully there.

Further referring in this connection to recent diplomatic correspondence, a
dispatch from our minister to Spain, of the 26th ultimo, contained the state-
ment that the Spanish minister for foreign affairs assured him positively that
Spain vv^ill do all that the highest honor and justice require in the matter of
the " Maine." The reply above referred to of the 31st ultimo also contained
an expression of the readiness of Spain to submit to an arbitration all the
differences which can arise in this matter, which is subsequently explained by
the note of the Spanish minister at Washington of the loth instant, as follows:

"As to the question of fact which springs from the diversity of views be-

220 Cuba's struggle against spain.

tween the reports of the American and Spanish boards, Spain proposes that the
facts be ascertained by an impartial investigation by experts, wliose decision
Spain accepts in advance."

To this I have made no reply.

President Grant, in 1875, after discussing the phases of the contest as it then
appeared, and its hopeless and apparent indefinite prolongation, said:

" In such event, I am of opinion that other nations will be compelled to
assume the responsibility which devolves upon them, and to seriously consider
the only remaining measures possible — mediation and intervention. Owing,
perhaps, to the large expanse of water separating the island from the peninsula,
* * * the contending parties appear to have within themselves no de-
pository of common confidence, to suggest wisdom when passion and excite-
ment have their sway, and to assume the part of peacemaker.

" In this view in the earlier days of the contest the good offices of the
United States as a mediator were tendered in good faith, without any selfish
purpose, in the interest of humanity and in sincere friendship for both parties,
but were at the time declined by Spain, with the declaration, nevertheless, that
at a future time they would be indispensable. No intimation has been received
that in the opinion of Spain that time has been reached. And yet the strife
continues with all its dread horrors and all its injuries to the interests of the
United States and of other nations.

*' Each party seems quite capable of working great injury and damage to the
other, as well as to all the relations and interests dependent on the existence
of peace in the island; but they seem incapable of reaching any adjustment, and
both have thus far failed of achieving any success whereby one party shall
possess and control the island to the exclusion of the other. Under these
circumstances, the agency of others, either by medium or by intervention,
seems to be the only alternative which must sooner or later be invoked for the
termination of the strife."

In the last annual message of my immediate predecessor during the pending
struggle, it was said:

" When the inability of Spain to deal successfully with the Insurrection has
become manifest, and it is demonstrated that her sovereignty Is extinct in
Cuba for all purposes of its rightful existence, and when a hopeless struggle
for Its re-establishment has degenerated into a strife which means nothing
more than the useless sacrifice of human life and the utter destruction of the
very subject-matter of the conflict, a situation will be presented in which our
obligations to the sovereignty of Spain will be superseded by higher obliga-
tions, which we can hardly hesitate to recognize and discharge."

JANUARY I TO MAY I, 189S. 221

In my annual message to Congress, December last, speaking to this ques-
tion, I said:

" The near future will demonstrate whether the indispensable condition of a
righteous peace, just alike to the Cubans and to Spain, as v/ell as equitable to
all our interests so intimately involved in the welfare of Cuba, is likely to be
attained. If not, the exigency of further and other action by the United States
will remain to be taken. When that time comes that action will be determined
in the line of indisputable right and duty. It will be faced, without misgiving
or hesitancy, in the light of the obligation this Government owes to itself, to
the people who have confided to it the protection of their interests and honor,
and to humanity.

" Sure of the right, keeping free from all offense ourselves, actuated only by
upright and patriotic considerations, moved neither by passion nor selfishness.
the Government will continue its watchful care over the rights and property
of American citizens and will abate none of its efforts to bring about by
peaceful agencies a peace which shall be honorable and enduring. If it shall
hereafter appear to be a duty imposed by our obligations to ourselves, to
civilization and humanity to intervene with force, it shall be without fault on
our part and only because the necessity for such action will be so clear as to
command the support and approval of the civilized world."

The long trial has proved that the object for which Spain has waged the
war can not be attained. The fire of insurrection may fiame or may smolder
with varying seasons, but it has not been and it is plain that it can not be
extinguished by present methods. The only hope of relief and repose from a
condition which can no longer be endured is the enforced pacification of Cuba.
In the name of humanity, in the name of civilization, in behalf of endangered
American interests which give us the right and the duty to speak and to act,
the war in Cuba must stop.

In view of these facts and of these considerations, I ask the Congress to
authorize and empower the President to take measures to secure a full and
final termination of hostilities between the Government of Spain and the people
of Cuba, and to secure in the island the establishment of a stable government,
capable of maintaining order and observing its international obligations, in-
suring peace and tranquillity and the security of its citizens as well as our own,
and to use the military and naval forces of the United States as may be
necessary for these purposes.

And in the interest of humanity and to aid in preserving the lives of the
starving people of the island I recommend that the distribution of food and
supplies be continued, and that an appropriation be made out of the public
Treasury to supplement the charity of our citizens.

222 CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.

The issue is now with the Congress. It is a solemn responsibility. I have
exhausted every effort to relieve the intolerable condition of affairs which is at
our doors. Prepared to execute every obligation imposed upon me by the
Constitution and the law, I await your action.

Yesterday, and since the preparation of the foregoing message, ofificial in-
formation was received by me that the latest decree of the Queen Regent of
Spain directs General Blanco, in order to prepare and facilitate peace, to
proclaim a suspension of hostilities, the duration and details of which have
not yet been communicated to me.

This fact with every other pertinent consideration will, I am sure, have
your just and careful attention in the solemn deliberations upon which you are
about to enter. If this measure attains a successful result, then our aspirations
as a Christian, peace-loving people will be realized. If it fails, it v/ill be only
another justification for our contemplated action.

WILLIAM McKINLEY.

Executive Mansion, April ii, 1898.

Consul-General Lee and other Americans arrived about this time
from Havana. General Lee expressed himself as positive that the
secret of the '' Maine " disaster w^as knov^n to some of the Spanish
officials at Cuba. His disclosures added somev^hat to the excitement
already aroused. On the 13th, amid a scene of w^ild disorder, the
House passed a resolution recognizing the independence of Cuba
and directing the President to intervene. It w^as debated for two
days by the Senate and passed with amendments; went to a confer-
ence committee, where the amendment recognizing the existing Re-
publican government of Cuba was stricken out, was thus accepted by
the Senate, passed on April 19th and was signed by the President on
the 20th. The bill, as it finally became law, reads as follows:

[Public Resolution — No. 21.]

Joint Resolution For the recognition of the independence of the people of
Cuba, demanding that the Government of Spain relinquish its authority and
government in the island of Cuba, and to withdraw its land and naval forces
from Cuba and Cuban waters, and directing the President of the United States
to use the land and naval forces of the United States to carry these resolutions
into effect.

Whereas the abhorrent conditions which have existed for more than three
years in the island of Cuba, so near our own borders, have shocked the moral
sense of the people of the United States, have been a disgrace to Christian

JANUARY I TO MAY I, 1 898. 223

civilization, culminating, as they have, in the destruction of a United States
battle ship, with two hundred and sixty-six of its oilicers and crew, while on a
friendly visit in the harbor of Havana, and can not longer be endured, as has
been set forth by the President of the United States in his message to Congress
of April eleventh, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, upon which the action
of Congress was invited: Therefore,

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, First. That the people of the island of Cuba are,
and of right ought to be, free and independent.

Second. That it is the duty of the United States to demand, and the Govern-
ment of the United States does hereby demand, that the Government of Spain
at once relinquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba and
withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters.

Third. That the President of the United States be, and he hereby is, directed
and empowered to use the entire land and naval force of the United States, and
to call into the actual service of the United States the militia of the several
States, to such extent as may be necessary to carry these resolutions into effect.

Fourth. That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention
to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island except for the
pacification thereof, and asserts its determination, when that is accomplished,
to leave the government and control of the island to its people.

Approved, April 20, 1898.

On the same day the Spanish Minister at Washington received his
passports. In Madrid at a meeting of the Cortes, the Queen Regent
from the throne, reail a speech appealing to the loyalty and devotion
of the people of Spain, and speaking of the injustice of the American
Government. She was received with the wildest enthusiasm. On
the following day, before Minister Woodford could deliver the ulti-
matum of the United States, he was informed by the Spanish Govern-
ment that diplomatic relations with the United States were at an end.
He left Madrid for Paris, being followed to the frontiers of Spain
by crowds of rioters from whom he was protected by a strong Spanish
guard; American affairs in Madrid were entrusted to the British
embassy.

The fleet at Key West, under command of Admiral Sampson, was
ordered to blockade Havana. The Asiatic squadron, under Commo-
dore Dewey, was ordered to blockade the Philippine Islands. Ad-
miral Sicard was detained at Washington as adviser to the Secretary of
the Navy. Captain Sigsbee, late in command of the '' Maine," was

224 Cuba's struggle against spain.

given command of the '' St. Paul," an auxiliary cruiser. Commodore
Schley was in command of the fieet at Hampton Roads; and a squad-
ron for the protection of the American coast was placed under the
command of Admiral Howard. Meanwhile the Army was rapidly
mobilizing. Chickamauga Park was made a general rendezvous for
troops, which were also being hurried to New Orleans, Key West,
Tampa and other points. The Twenty-fifth United States Infantry
reached Chickamauga and camped there April 15th.

At this time. Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Hon. Theodore
Roosevelt, resigned to accept active service in the Army and enlisted
as an officer of the First Volunteer Cavalry, generally knov/n of as
" Roosevelt's Rough Riders " under the command of Colonel Leonard
Wood.

April 22d, a bill was passed by both Houses, authorizing the call
for volunteers, and on the following day, the President issued a call for
125,000 men from the different States. The call was promptly re-
sponded to and recruits came pouring in from the different States.

The act authorizing this call is as follows:

[Public — No. 67.]

An Act To provide for temporarily increasing the military establishment of
the United States in time of war, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That all able-bodied male citizens of the United
States, and persons of foreign birth who shall have declared their intention
to become citizens of the United States under and in pursuance of the laws
thereof, between the ages of eighteen and forty-five years, are hereby declared
to constitute the national forces, and, with such exceptions and under such
conditions as may be prescribed by law, shall be liable to perform military duty
in. the service of the United States.

§ 2. That the organized and active land forces of the United States shall
consist of the Army of the United States and of the militia of the several
States when called into the service of the United States: Provided, That in
time of war the Army shall consist of two branches which shall be designated,
respectively, as the Regular Army and the Volunteer Army of the United
States.

§ 3. That the Regular Army is the permanent military establishment, which
is maintained both in peace and war according to law.

§ 4. That the Volunteer Army shall be maintained only during the existence
of war, or while war is imminent, and shall be raised and organized, as in this

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JANUARY I TO MAY I, 1 898. 22"]

act provided, only after Congress has or shall have authorized the President
to raise such a force or to call into the actual service of the United States the
militia of the several States: Provided, That all enlistments for the Volunteer
Army shall be for a term of two years, unless sooner terminated, and that all
of^cers and men composing said army shall be discharged from the service of
the United States when the purposes for which they were called into service
shall have been accomplished, or on the conclusion of hostilities.

§ 5. That when it becomes necessary to raise a volunteer army the President
shall issue his proclamation stating the number of men desired, within such
limits as may be fixed by law, and the Secretary of War shall prescribe such
rules and regulations, not inconsistent with the terms of this act, as may in
his judgment be necessary for the purpose of examining, organizing, and
receiving into service the men called for: Provided, That all men received into
service in the Volunteer A.rmy shall, as far as practicable, be taken from the
several States and Territories and the District of Columbia and the Indian
Territory in proportion to their population. And any company, troop,
battalion or regiment from the Indian Territory shall be formed and organized
under such rules and regulations as shall be prescribed by the Secretary of
War.

§ 6. That the Volunteer Army and the militia of the States when called into
the service of the United States shall be organized under, and shall be subject
to, the laws, orders, and regulations governing the Regular Army: Provided,
That each regiment of the Volunteer Army shall have one surgeon, two
assistant surgeons, and one chaplain, and that all the regimental and company
ofifiicers shall be appointed by the governors of the States in which their
respective organizations are raised: Provided further, That when the members
of any company, troop, battery, battalion or regiment of the organized militia
of any State shall enlist in the Volunteer Army in a body, as such company'-,
troop, battery, battalion or regiment, the regimental, company, troop, battery
and battalion ofBcers in service with the militia organization thus enlisting may
be appointed by the governors of the States and Territories, and shall, when
so appointed, be officers of corresponding grades in the same organization
when it shall have been received into the service of the United States as a part
of the Volunteer Army: Provided further, That the President may authorize
the Secretary of War to organize companies, troops, battalions, or regiments,
possessing special qualifications, from the nation at large not to exceed three
thousand men, under such rules and regulations, including the appointment of
the officers thereof, as may be prescribed by the Secretary of War.

§ 7- That all organizations of the Volunteer Army shall be so recruited from
time to time as to maintain them as near to their maximum strength as the

228 Cuba's struggle against spain.

President may deem necessary, and no new organization shall be accepted into
service from any State unless the organizations already in service from such
State are as near to their maximum strength of officers and enlisted men as the
President may deem necessary,

§ 8. That all returns and muster-rolls of organizations of the Volunteer
Army and of militia organizations while in the service of the United States
shall be rendered to the adjutant-general of the Army, and upon the disband-
ment of such organizations the records pertaining to them shall be trans-
ferred to and filed in the record and pension office of the War Department.
And regimental and other medical officers serving with volunteer troops in the
field or elsewhere shall keep a daily record of all soldiers reported sick, or
wounded as shown by the morning calls or reports, and shall deposit such
reports with other reports provided for in this section with the record and
pension office as provided herein, for other reports, returns and muster-rolls.

§ 9. That in time of war, or when war is imminent, the troops in the service
of the United States, whether belonging to the Regular or Volunteer Army
or to the militia, shall be organized, as far as practicable, into divisions of
three brigades, each brigade to be composed of three or more regiments; and
whenever three or more divisions are assembled in the same army the President
is authorized to organize them into army corps, each corps to consist of not
more than three divisions,

§ 10. That the staff of the commander of an army corps shall consist of one
assistant adjutant-general, one chief engineer, one inspector-general, one chief
quartermaster, one chief commissary of subsistence, one judge-advocate, and
one chief surgeon, who shall have, respectively, the rank of lieutenant-colonel;
one assistant adjutant-general, who shall have the rank of captain, and the
aids-de-camp authorized by law. The staff of the commander of a division
shall consist of one assistant adjutant-general, one engineer officer, one in-
spector-general, one chief quartermaster, one chief commissary of subsistence,
and one chief surgeon, who shall have, respectively, the rank of major, and the
aids-de-camp authorized by law. The staff of the commander of a brigade
shall consist of one assistant adjutant-general, one assistant quartermaster, and
one commissary of subsistence, each with the rank of captain, one surgeon, and
the aids-de-camp authorized by law. The staff officers herein authorized for
the corps, division, and brigade commanders may be appointed by the Presi-
dent, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, as officers of the
Volunteer Army, or may be assigned by him, in his discretion, from officers
of the Regular Army or the Volunteer Army, or of the militia in the service of
the United States: Provided, That when relieved from such staff service said
appointments or assignments shall terminate.

JANUARY I TO MAY I, 1 898. 229

§ II, That the President is hereby authorized to appoint in the Volunteer
Army, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, not exceeding one
major-general fo" each organized army corps and division, and one brigadier-
general for each brigade, and awy officer so selected and appointed from the
Regular Anny shail be entitled to retain his rank therein: Provided, That
each general officer of the Volunteer Army shall be entitled to the number of
aids-de-camp authorized for an officer of like grade in the Regular Army.

§ 12. That all officers and enlisted men of the Volunteer Army, and of the
militia of the States when in the service of the United States, shall be in all
respects on the same footing as to pay, allowances, and pensions as that of
officers and enlisted men of corresponding grades in the Regular Army.

§ 13. That the governor of any State or Territory may, with the consent of
the President, appoint officers of the Regular Army in the grades of field
ofificers in organizations of the Volunteer Army, and officers thus appointed
shall be entitled to retain their rank in the Regular Army: Provided, That
not more than one officer of the Regular Army shall hold a commission in any
one regiment of the Volunteer Army at the same time.

§ 14. That the general commanding a separate department or a detached
army is authorized to appoint from time to time military boards of not less
than three nor more than five volunteer officers of the Volunteer Army to
examine into the capacity, qualifications, conduct, and efficiency of any com-
missioned officer of said army within his command: Provided, That each mem-
ber of the board shall be superior in rank to the officer whose qualifications
are to be inquired into: And provided further, That if the report of such a
board is adverse to the continuance of any officer, and the report be approved
by the President, such officer shall be discharged from service in the Volunteer
Army, at the discretion of the President, with one month's pay and allowances.

§ 15. That all acts and parts of acts inconsistent with the provisions hereof
be, and the same are hereby, repealed.

Approved, April 22, 1898.

On the same day Congress passed a

Joint Resolution To prohibit the export of coal or other material used in
war from any seaport of the United States.

Resolved by the Septate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled. That the President is hereby authorized, in his
discretion, and with such limitations and exceptions as shall seem to him
expedient, to prohibit the export of coal or other material used in war from
any seaport of the United States until otherwise ordered by the President or
by Congress.

Approved, April 22, 1898.

230 CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.

This was followed by action upon the part of Great Britain de-
claring coal contraband of war.

The following is the important paragraph in the Proclamation of
Neutrality published by Great Britain, on April 26, 1898, making coal
contraband of war:

Rule 3. — No ship of war of either belligerent shall hereafter be permitted,
while in any such port, roadstead, or waters subject to the territorial jurisdiction
of Her Majesty, to take in any supplies, except provisions and such other
things as may be requisite for the subsistence of her crew, and except so much
coal only as may be sufficient to carry such vessel to the nearest port of her
own country, or to some nearer destination, and no coal shall again be supplied
to any such ship of war in the same or any other port, roadstead, or waters
subject to the territorial jurisdiction of Her Majesty, without special permis-
sion, until after the expiration of three months from the time when such coal
may have been last supplied to her within British waters as aforesaid.

War was declared by Spain April 24th,

PROCLAMATION OF WAR BY SPAIN.

Foreign Office, May 3, 1898.

The Secretar3'- of State for Foreign Affairs has received, through Her
Majesty's embassy at Madrid, the following translation of a decree issued by
the Spanish Government on the 23d of April, 1898:

ROYAL DECREE.

In accordance with the advice of my Council of Ministers; in the name of
my son. King Alfonso XHI, and as Queen-Regent of the Kingdom, I decree
as follows:

Article I. The state of war existing between Spain and the United States
terminates the treaty of peace and friendship of the 27th October, 1795, the
protocol of the 12th January, 1877, and all other agreements, compacts, and
conventions that have been in force up to the present between the two countries.

Art. II. A term of five days from the date of the publication of the present
royal decree in the Madrid Gazette is allowed to all United States ships
anchored in Spanish ports, during which they are at liberty to depart.

Art. III. Notwithstanding that Spain is not bound by the declaration signed
in Paris on the i6th April, 1856, as she expressly stated her wish not to adhere
to it, my Government, guided by the principles of international law, intends

I

JANUARY I TO MAY I, 1 898. 23 1

to observe and hereby orders that the following regulations for maritime law
be observed:

(a) A nentral flag covers the enemy's goods, except contraband of war.

(b) Neutral goods, except contraband of war, are not liable to confiscation
under the enemy's flag.

(c) A blockade to be binding must be effective; that is to say, maintained
with a sufficient force to actually prevent access to the enemy's ccast.

Art. IV. The Spanish Government, while maintaining their right to issue
letters of marque, which they expressly reserved in their note of the i6th May.
1857, ill reply to the request of France for the adhesion of Spain to the
declaration of Paris relative to maritime law, will organize for the present a
service of " auxiliary cruisers of the navy," composed of ships of the Spanish
mercantile navy, which will co-operate with the latter for the purposes of
cruising, and which will be subject to the statutes and jurisdiction of the navy.

Art. V. In order to capture the enemy's ships, to confiscate the enemy's
merchandise under their own flag, and contraband of war under any flag, the
royal navy, auxiliary cruisers, and privateers, if and when the latter are author-
ized, will exercise the right of visit on the high seas and in the territorial
waters of the enemy, in accordance with international law and any regulations
which may be published for the purpose.

Art. VI. Under the denomination contraband of war, the following articles
arc included:

Cannons, machine guns, mortars, guns, all kinds of arms and firearms, bul-
lets, bombs, grenades, fuses, cartridges, matches, powder, sulphur, saltpeter,
dynamite and every kind of explosive, articles of equipment like uniforms,
straps, saddles and artillery and cavalry harness, engines for ships and their
accessories, shafts, screws, boilers and other articles used in the construction,
repair, and arming of war ships, and in general all warlike instruments, utensils,
tools, and other articles, and whatever may hereafter be determined to be
contraband.

Art. VII. Captains, commanders, and officers of non-American vessels or of
vessels manned as to one-third by other than American citizens, captured while
committing acts of war against Spain, will be treated as pirates, with all the
rigor of the law, although provided with a license issued by the Republic of
the United States.

Art, VIII. The Minister of State and the Minister of Marine arc charged to
see the fulfillment of the present royal decree and to give the orders necessary
for its execution.

MARIA CRISTINA.

Madrid, April 23, 1898.

232 CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.

The United States declared war on the 25th, in the following words:

An Act Declaring that war exists between the United States of America and
the Kingdom of Spain.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, First. That war be, and the same is hereby,
declared to exist, and that war has existed since the twenty-fxrst day of April,
anno Domini eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, including said day, between
the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain.

Second. That the President of the United States be, and he hereby is, di-
rected and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the United
States, and to call into the actual service of the United States the militia of the
several States, to such extent as may be necessary to carry this act into effect.

Approved, April 25, 1898.

The European and South American powers proclaimed neutrality.
The Spanish squadron sailed from Cape Verde Islands; its destina-
tion was unknown, and caused much anxiety, but it was finally con-
jectured that it had sailed directly west to the Caribbean Sea.

April 25th, the same day that war was declared, Secretary Sher-
man resigned and was succeeded by William R. Day, as Secretary
of State. The following day, the President declared that he would
adhere to the anti-privateering agreement of the Declaration of Paris.
The Postmaster-General ordered no more mails sent to Spain.

The following act of Congress approved April 26th, authorized
an increase in the enlisted strength of the army to 62,597, more than
doubling its strength upon the peace basis:

[Public — No. 70.]

An Act For the better organization of the line of the Army of the United
States.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That hereafter the peace organization of each
regiment of infantry now in service shall embrace one colonel, one lieutenant-
colonel, two majors, ten captains, twelve first lieutenants, ten second lieu-
tenants, one sergeant-m.ajor, one quartermaster-sergeant, one chief musician,
two principal musicians, two battalions of four companies each, and two
skeleton or unmanned companies; the organized companies to be constituted
as now authorized by law: Provided, That nothing herein contained shall be

JANUARY I TO MAY I, 1 898. 233

construed as abolishing the office of chaplain in each regiment of colored
troops: And provided further, That the vacancies in the grade of major created
by this section shall be filled by promotion according to seniority in the
infantry arm.

§ 2, That upon a declaration of war by Congress, or a declaration by Congress
that war exists, the President, in his discretion, may establish a third battalion
for each infantry regiment, consisting of four companies, to be supplied by
manning the two skeleton companies and by organizing two additional com-
panies. The vacancies of commissioned officers in the additional companies
shall be filled by promotions by seniority in the infantry arm, and by appoint-
ments in accordance with existing law; and hereafter all vacancies occurring
in the cavalry, artillery, and infantry above the grade of second lieutenant shall,
subject to the examination now required by law, be filled by promotion
according to seniority from the next lower grade in each arm.

§ 3. That upon a declaration of war by Congress, or a declaration of Con-
gress that war exists, the enlisted strength of a company, troop, and battery,
respectively, may, in the discretion of the President, be increased to comprise
not exceeding:

For each company of infantry: One first sergeant, one quartermaster-
sergeant, four sergeants, twelve corporals, two musicians, one artificer, one
wagoner, and eighty-four privates; total enlisted, one hundred and six:
Provided, That in the event of a call by the President for either volunteers or
the militia of the country the President is authorized to accept the quotas of
troops of the various States and Territories, including the District of Columbia
and Indian Territory, as organized under the laws of the States and Territories,
including the District of Columbia, in companies, troops, and batteries, each to
contain so far as practicable the number of enlisted men authorized in this
act for each arm of the service, and battalions of not less than three such
companies and regiments of not less than ten nor more than twelve such
companies. But this proviso shall apply to companies, troops, batteries, bat-
talions, and regimental organizations and none other: Provided further. That
in volunteer organizations received into the service under this act and existing
laws, one hospital steward shall be authorized for each battalion.

For each troop of cavalry: One first sergeant, one quartermaster-sergeant,
six sergeants, eight corporals, two farriers and blacksmiths, two trumpeters,
one saddler, one wagoner, seventy-eight privates; total enlisted, one hundred.

For each battery of heavy artillery: One first sergeant, twenty-two sergeants,
ten corporals, two musicians, two artificers, one wagoner, one hundred and
sixty-two privates; total enlisted, two hundred.

For each battery of field artillery: One first sergeant, one quartermaster-

234 CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.

sergeant, one veterinary sergeant, six sergeants, fifteen corporals, two farriers,
two artificers, one saddler, two musicians, one wagoner, one hundred and
forty-one privates; total enlisted, one hundred and seventy-three.

For each company of engineers: One first sergeant, ten sergeants, ten
corporals, two musicians, sixty-four first-class privates, sixty-three second-
class privates; total enlisted, one hundred and fifty. In time of war there shall
be added to the Signal Corps of the Army ten corporals, one hundred first-
class privates, and forty second-class privates, who shall have the pay and
allowances of engineer troops of the same grade.

The quartermaster and veterinary sergeants provided for in this section shall
have the pay and allowances of sergeants of their respective arms.

§ 4. That when recruited to their war strength the President may add one
second lieutenant to each battery of artillery; such offices to be filled by
appointments, as prescribed by existing law.

§ 5. That in time of war the President shall cause the batteries of artillery
authorized by law to be organized as heavy or field artillery, as in his judg-
ment the exigencies of the service may require.

§ 6. That in time of war the pay proper of enlisted men shall be increased
twenty per centum over and above the rates of pay as fixed by law: Provided,
That in war time no additional increased compensation shall be aWowed to
soldiers performing what is known as extra or special duty: Provided further,
That any soldier who deserts shall, besides incurring the penalties now attach-
ing to the crime of desertion, forfeit all right to pension which he might other-
wise have acquired.

§ 7. That in time of war every officer serving with troops operating against
an enemy who shall exercise, under assignment in orders issued by competent
authority, a command above that pertaining to his grade, shall be entitled to
receive the pay and allowances of the grade appropriate to the command so
exercised: Provided, That a rate of pay exceeding that of a brigadier-general
shall not be paid in any case by reason of such assignment: Provided further,
That at the end of any war in which the United States may become involved
the Army shall be reduced to a peace basis by the transfer in the same arm of
the service or absorption by promotion or honorable discharge under such
regulations as the Secretary of War may establish of supernumerary commis-
sioned officers and the honorable discharge or transfer of supernumerary
enlisted men; and nothing contained in this act shall be construed as author-
izing a permanent increase of the commissioned or enlisted force of the
Regular Army beyond that now provided by the law in force prior to the
passage of this act, except as to the increase of twenty-five majors provided
for in section one hereof.

Approved, April 26, 1898.

JANUARY I TO MAY I, 1 898.

235

On the 27th, Admiral Sampson's blockading squadron silenced the
works at Matanzas, Cuba; and Commodore Dewey's squadron sailed
from Mirs' Bay to Manila. The steamer '' Paris," to be employed
as an auxiliary cruiser, reached New York safely, and the United
States battle ship '' Oregon," which had been hastily recalled from
the Pacific coast, was reported at Rio de Janeiro, Brazil on the 30th of
April.

THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY.

CHAPTER IX.

On the 1st day of May, the whole country was electrified by the
glorious news of Dewey's victory at Manila. The ''Asiatic " squadron,
under the command of Admiral, then Commodore, Dewey, consisted
of the cruisers " Olympia," " Raleigh," " Boston," '' Charleston," and,
"Baltimore;" gunboats ''Concord," " Monocacy," and "Petrel;"
the supply vessel "Zafiro;" colliers "Brutus," " Nashan," and
"Nero;" monitors " Monadnock " and "Monterey;" transports
" City of Pekin " and " Sydney," and the revenue cutter " McCul-
lough." With these vessels he entered Manila Bay and engaged a
Spanish fleet stationed there, destroying or capturing the entire
squadron under Admiral Montojo, consisting of the cruisers " Reina
Christina," "Castillo," "Don Antonio," " Ulloa," " Isla de Cuba,"
" Isla de Luzon," the gunboats " General Lezo," " Duero," " Correo,"
" Velasco," " Mindano," and one transport, with a loss to the American
fleet of seven wounded. The loss on the side of the Spaniards was
300 killed and more than twice that number wounded.

Commodore Dewey was at Hong Kong when war was declared.
Forced to leave British waters, with no coaling station nearer than
Honolulu, there was but one course for him to pursue, that is to say,
to make himself master of Manila by the defeat of the Spanish
squadron. Having a good insight into Spanish character, and a
thorough knowledge of the disposition of the enemy's forces, he left
Mirs Bay with his program fully prepared, and he carried it through
successfully.

The bay of Manila is one of the largest and deepest harbors m the
world, having an area of 125 miles, with an entrance twelve miles
wide, defended by the fortified islands Corregidor and Caballos.
Passing these fortifications during the night of Saturday, April 30th,
Dewey's fleet coolly sailed into the bay and at 5 o'clock Sundav
morning, the flagship " Olympia " was five miles from Manila, and as
soon as she was discovered, the shore batteries and the long-range
guns of the ships opened on the Americans and continued to bombard
the fleet for two hours, but without effect. The flagship, followed by

THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 237

the " Baltimore," the " Raleigh," the " Petrel," the " Concord," and
the " Boston," steamed directly for Cavite, and when about three
miles from that fortress, opened fire on the *' Reina Christina," the
flagship of the Spanish Admiral Montojo. Filing past the enemy five
times and countermarching in a circle with gradually decreasing
range, Dewey practically annihilated the Spanish fleet and fortifica-
tions in about two hours. Retiring to give his men a little needed
rest and food, he promptly returned to the attack and finished his
work.

The Spaniards fought with desperate bravery. When his flagship
was destroyed, the Spanish admiral, taking his flag in an open boat,
was transferred to the '' Isla de Cuba." Cadarso, captain of the vessel,
v/as mortally wounded and, refusing to leave, remained with his men
and went down with his ship. Their desperate valor availed nothing,
for their tactics and marksmanship were bad, while those of the
Americans were superb.

The temporary withdrawal of the American fleet was construed by
the Spaniards as a retreat. They could not imagine that a battle could
be waged with such enormous loss on one side and so few casualties
on the other. The news first cabled to Spain was that the American
fleet had been successfully repulsed.

Before a definite account of the action was received in this country,
Commodore Dewey had cut the cable to prevent communication with
Spain; but a few days later, full reports were received from the
despatch boat '' McCulloch," by way of Hong Kong.

The two brief messages sent by Dewey form the most concise and
comprehensive report that could well be made of an achievement
which has never been equalled in daring conception and magnificent
execution.

The first message, dated Manila, May ist, but sent only when the
second was forwarded, was as follows:

Squadron arrived at Manila at daybreak this morning. Immediately engaged
the enemy and destroyed the following Spanish vessels: " Reina Christina,"
" Castilla," " Don Antonio," "Isla de Ulloa," "Isla de Luzon," " Isla de Cuba,"
" General Lezo," " Marquis del Duero," " Correo," " Velasco," " Isla de Min-
danao," a transport and a water battery at Cavite. The squadron is uninjured;
and only a few men are slightly wounded. Only means of telegraphing is the
American consul at Hong Kong. I shall communicate with him.

2^.8 Cuba's struggle against spain.

tj

The second, dated at Cavite, May 4th, completed his record of the
action :

I have taken possession of the naval station at Cavite and destroyed its
fortifications. Have destroyed fortifications at the bay entrance, paroling the
garrison. I control the bay completely, and can take the city at any time.
The squadron is in excellent health and spirits. The Spanish loss not fully
known, but very heavy; 150 killed, including the captain of the " Reina
Christina." I am assisting in protecting the Spanish sick and wounded; 250
sick and wounded in hospital within our lines. Much excitement at Manila.
Will protect foreign residents.

Lieutenant L. J. Stickney, a former naval officer who was on the
bridge of the '' Olympia," as a volunteer aide to Commodore Dewey,
in writing of the battle, thus describes the combat after the first fire
of the Americans:

The Spaniards seemed encouraged to fire faster, knowing exactly our
distance, while we had to guess theirs. Their ships and shore guns were
making things hot for us. The piercing scream of shot was varied often by
the bursting of time fuse shells, fragments of which would lash the water like
shrapnel or cut our hull and rigging. One large shell that was coming
straight at the " Olympia's " forward bridge fortunately fell within less than
100 feet. One fragment cut the rigging; another struck the bridge gratings in
line with it; a third passed under Commodore Dewey and gouged a hole in
the deck. Incidents like these were plentiful.

Our men naturally chafed at being exposed without returning fire from all
our guns, but laughed at danger and chatted good-humoredly. A few nervous
fellows could not help dodging, mechanically, when shells would burs' right
over them, or close aboard, or would strike the water, or pass overhead with
the peculiar spluttering roar made by a tumbling rifled projectile.

Still the flagship steered for the center of the Spanish line, and, as our
other ships were astern, the " Olympia " received most of the Spaniards'
attention.

Owing to our deep draught, Commodore Dewey felt constrained to change
his course at a distance of 4,000 yards and run parallel to the Spanish column.

' Open with all guns,' he ordered, and the ship brought her port broadside
bearing. The roar of all the flagship's five-inch rapid-firers was followed by
the deep diapason of her turret eight-inchers. Soon our other vessels were
equally hard at work, and we could see that our shells were making Cavite
harbor hotter for the Spaniards than they had made the approach for us.

THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 239

Protected by their shore batteries and made safe from close attack by
shallow water, the Spaniards were in a strong position. They put up a
gallant fight.

One shot struck the " Baltimore " and passed clean through her, fortunately
hitting no one. Another ripped the upper main deck, disabled a six-inch gun,
and exploded a box of three-pounder ammunition, wounding eight men. The
" Olympia " was struck abreast the gun in the wardroom by a shell, which
burst outside, doing little damage. The signal halyards were cut from the
ofificer's hand on the after bridge. A sailor climbed up in the rain of shot and
mended the line.

A shell entered the " Boston's " port quarter and burst in Ensign Dodridge's
stateroom, starting a hot fire, and fire was also caused by a shell which burst in
the port hammock netting. Both these fires were quickly put out. Another
shell passed through the " Boston's " foremast just in front of Captain Wildes,
on the bridge.

After having made four runs along the Spanish line, finding the chart in-
correct, Lieutenant Calkins, the " Olympia's " navigator, told the commodore
he believed he could take the ship nearer the enemy, with lead going to watch
the depth of water. The fiagship started over the course for the fifth time,
running within 2,000 yards of the enemy, followed by all the American vessels,
and, as even the six-pounder guns were efTective at such short range, the
storm of shot and shell launched against the Spaniard was destructive beyond
description.

Following- are the ofi(icIal reports of the captains of the various
American warships which took part in the battle of Manila bay, and
also an English translation of the report of Admiral Montojo, the
Spanish commander-in-chief of the station and squadron of the
Philippines:

U. S. Flagship " Olympia,"

Of? Manila, Philippine Islands, May 3. 1898,

Sir. — I have the honor to make the following report of this ship's engage-
ment with the enemy on May ist:

On April 30th we stood down for the entrance to Manila bay. At 9:42 p. m.
the crew were called to general quarters (the ship having been previously
cleared for action) and remained by their guns, ready to return the fire of the
batteries if called upon.

At about 11:30 p. M. we passed through Boca Grande entrance of Manila
bay. The lights on Corregidor and Caballo islands and on San Nicolas banks
were extinguished. *

240 CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.

After this ship had passed in, the battery on the southern shore of entrance
opened fire at the ships astern, and the '' McCulloch " and the? " Boston "
returned the fire.

At 4 A. M. of May ist coffee was served out to ofBcers and men. At day-
break sighted shipping at Manila. Shifted course to southward and stood for
Cavite. At 5:06 two submarine mines were exploded near, Cavite bearing
south-southeast, distant four miles. At 5:15 battery on Shangly Point opened
fire, but the shell fell short. Other shells passed over us, ranging seven miles.
At 5:41 A. M. we opened fire on Spanish ships with forward eight-inch guns,
which were soon followed by the five-inch battery. A rapid fire was kept up
until the close of the action.

The range varied from 5,600 to 2,000 yards,

A torpedo boat ran out and headed for this ship, but was finally driven back
by our secondary battery. She came out a second time and was again re-
pulsed. This time she had to be beached, as several shots had hit her.

Batteries from Manila fired occasional shots at the ships during the action,
but did no damage.

At 6:20 turned to starboard and headed back in front of the Spanish line.
The " Olympia " led the column three times to the westward and twice to the
eastward in front of the Spanish ships and shore batteries. On one occasion
the Spanish flagship " Reina Cristina " was hit by an eight-inch shell from
our forward turret and raked fore and aft. At 7:35 ceased firing and stood
out into Manila bay.

The men went to breakfast.

Many of the Spanish ships were seen to be on fire, and when we returned
at 11:16 to complete the destruction of the Spanish fleet only one, the "Don
Antonio de Ulloa," and the shore batteries, returned our fire. The former was
sunk and the latter were silenced.

At 12:40 p. M, stood back to Manila bay and anchored.

Besides making the ordinary preparations of clearing ship for action, the
heavy sheet chains were faked up and down over a bufTer of awnings against
ihe sides in wake of the five-inch ammunition hoists and aft'orded a stanch
protection, while iron and canvas barricades were placed in various places to
cover gun's crews and strengthen moderate defenses.

The vessel was struck or slightly hulled as follov/s;

(i) Plate indented one and one-half inches starboard side of superstructure
just forv/ard of second five-inch sponson,

(2) Three planks torn up slightly in wake of forward turret on starboard
side of forecastle,

(3) Port after shrouds of fore and main rigging,

(4) Strongback of gig's davits hit and slightly damaged.

THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 24I

(5) Hole in frame of ship between frames 65 and 66 on starboard side below
maindeck rail; made by a six-pounder.

(6) Lashing of port whaleboat davit carried away by shot.

(7) One of the rail stanchions carried away outside of port gangway.

(8) Hull of ship indented on starboard side one foot below main-deck rail
and three feet abaft No. 4 coal port.

The forward eight-inch guns fired twenty-three shells. The ammunition hoist
was temporarily out of commission on account of the blowing of the fuse.
The right gun worked well with the electrical batteries. Battery of left gun
failed to explode the primer after the first shot; also resistance lamp in dynamo
circuit broken. Used percussion primers in this gun with good results after
the first shot.

The after turret fired thirteen shells. Had three misfires with battery of
right gun and two with dynamo circuit, as fuses blew out. In renewing fuses
they were immediately blown out; so shifted to percussion primers with good
results. In left gun one shell jammed, after which used half-full and half-
reduced charge, which fired it. Battery of this gun gave good results. One
primer failed to check gas.

The smoke from the five-inch battery and from the forward eight-inch guns
gave considerable trouble, and in both turrets the object glass of the telescopic
'sights became covered with a deposit from the powder and had to be wiped
off frequently. These are, nevertheless, considered good sights for heavy guns;
but it is recommended that bar sights be installed in case of emergency, as
there is no provision for sighting other than with the telescopes.

The batteries for the five-inch guns found to be unreliable. Used dynamo
circuit on three guns with good results. Ammunition poor. Many shell be-
cam.e detached from the cases on loading and had to be rammed out from the
muzzle. Several cases jammed in loading and in extracting. Guns and gun
mounts worked well. Fired about 281 five-inch shell.

The six-pounder battery worked to perfection, firing i,oco rounds. Fired
360 rounds of one-pounder and i.ooo rounds of small-arm ammunition.

From 9:42 p. M. of April 30th till 12:40 p. m., May ist, two divisions of the
engineer's force worked the boilers and engines, keeping up steam and working
well, notwithstanding the heat of the fire and engine rooms. The third division
worked at their stations in the powder division.

The ship needs no immediate repairs and is in excellent condition to engage
the enemy at any time.

There were no casualties nor wounded on this ship.

Where every ofricer and man did his whole duty there is only room for
general praise. Pay Inspector D. A. Smith. Fleet Pay Clerk Wm. J. Pight-
niire, and Pay Clerk W. M. Long, all volunteered for and performed active

242 CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.

service not required by their stations. Ensign PI. H, Caldwell, secretary to
the commander-in-chief, volunteered for fighting duty and was assigned to
the command of a subdivision of the five-inch battery. Mr. J. L. Stickney,
correspondent of the New York Herald (and formerly a naval officer of ex-
ceptional ability), served as a volunteer aid to the commander-in-chief and
rendered invaluable assistance in carrying messages and in keeping an accu-
rate account of the battle. One six-pounder was manned by a crew of marines,
and two relief crews for the five-inch guns and two for the six-pounders acted
as sharpshooters under Capt. W. Biddle, U. S. M. C.

The range was obtained by cross bearings from the standard compass and
the distance taken from the chart.

I am, sir, very respectfully,

CH. V. GRIDLEY,

Captain U. S. N., Commanding U. S. Flagship " Olympiad

The Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Station.

U. S. " Raleigh,"
Off Manila, Luzon, May 4, 1898. .

Sir. — I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of
this vessel of your squadron during the engagement with the Spanish squadron
and shore batteries at Cavite, near Manila, on the morning of May i, 1898:

At about 12:10 A. M. of May ist,when passing in column, natural order, abreast
of El Fraile island, at the entrance to the bay, I observed a flash, as of a signal
thereon, and at about 12:15 a. m. a shot was fired from El Fraile, passing, as
I think, diagonally between the " Petrel " and this vessel. A shot was fired
in return, but without effect, by the starboard after five-inch gun of this vessel.

At 5 A. M., when the squadron was nearly abreast the city of Manila and the
flagship was turning to pass down toward Cavite, the Lunetta battery, of
apparently heavy guns, at Manila, opened fire and continued so long as the
squadron was in action. This vessel shifted position from starboard to port
(inside) quarter of the " Baltimore," and held that position until retired at
7:35 A. M. At a few minutes after 5 a. m. this vessel, so soon as the Spanish
vessels at Cavite bore on the port bow, opened fire with the six-inch gun, and
then with the five-inch guns in succession, as fast as they would bear. The
secondary battery guns did not seem to reach the enemy, and their fire was
soon stopped and not again used until the distance was considerably lessened.
At 11:20 A. m., when signal was made to re-engage, this vessel started ahead
full speed (using reserve speed) to keep up with the flagship, but it was found

ADMIRAL DEWEY.

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THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 245

to be impossible, and falling behind all the time, I cut across to gain line
abreast of Cavite battery just as the flagship passed the " Baltimore " at that
port, at which time we opened fire with all guns. At 12, in obedience to
signal, this vessel attempted to get into the inner harbor to destroy enemy's
vessels, but getting into shoal water — twenty feet — was obliged to withdraw,
and so reported. While attempting to get inside, the battery was used, on an
enemy's vessel at anchor (supposed to be the " Don Antonio de Ulloa ") until
she sank. Not being able to find a channel farther inside, and everything in
sight having been destroyed, this vessel, at i :30 p. m., withdrew and later an-
chored near the flagship. I inclose a statement of the ammunition expended
during the engagement.

I am very pleased to report that the ofliccrs and crew behaved splendidly.
Each and every one seemed anxious to do his whole duty, and, so far as I
can learn, did it. Their whole conduct was beyond praise.

This vessel was struck but once, and then by a six-pounder shell, which
j)assed through both sides of the whaleboat (above her water line), and then
glanced along the chase of the starboard six-pounder on our poop. The gun
was not injured, and the whaleboat but slightly, and she is again ready for
service.

I am happy to report that there were no casualties of any kind.

This vessel at the close of the engagement was in as good condition as when
it began, and without any preparation could have fought it over again.

In conclusion, permit me to congratulate you upon the very brilliant victory
you achieved over a naval force nearly equal to your own and backed by
extensive shore batteries of very heavy guns, and this without the loss of a
single life. History points to no greater achievement.

Very respectfully,

J. B. COGHLAN,

Captain, U. S. N., Commanding.

Commodore George Dewev. U. S. N., Commandcr-in-Chid U. S. Naval
force, Asiatic Station.

U. S. S. " Concord,"

Manila, May 2, i8q8.

Sir. — In compliance with article 275, United States Navy Regulations, I
have to submit the following report of the late action so far as this vessel
was concerned:

In obedience to your orders I took position in line. In passing the city a
big gun opened on the fleet, to which I replied with, two shots. The " Con-
cord " held her position in the line until your order to withdraw from action.

246 Cuba's struggle against spain.

Later in the day I was ordered by you to burn a transport. To arrive at
the position of the transport my course lay so as to open the dockyard and
vessels therein, at which I took a few shots with the six-inch battery. I suc-
ceeded in firing the transport, which is still in flames.

Each and every one of my subordinates did his whole duty with an enthu-
siasm and zeal beyond all praise. I am particularly indebted to the executive
officer, Lieut. -Commander George P. Colvocoresses, for the cool, deliberate,
and efl'icient manner with which he met each phase of the action, and for his
hearty co-operation in my plans. Lieut. T. B. Howard, the navigator, proved
that, like his father, he was ready to offer his life to his country and flag.
The officers of divisions — ^ Lieut. P. W. Hourigan, powder; Lieut, (j. g.) C.
M. McCormick, third gun; Ensign L. A, Kaiser, second gun; and Ensign
W. C. Davidson, first gun — performed every duty with zeal and alacrity.
Ensign O. S. Knepper, in charge of signals, performed the duty as though he
were in the daily habit of being under fire. P. A. Paymaster E. D. Ryan
volunteered to take charge of the after powder division, and was most useful
therein. The steam department, under Chief Engineer G. B. Ransom and P.
A. Engineer H. W. Jones, was in a perfect condition, working as though on
parade. Pay Clerk F. K. Hunt volunteered to assist the surgeon. The crew,
one and ail, worked with enthusiasm. I have nothing but praise for each and
every man.

I am happy to report that there were no casualties. The " Concord " was
not hit.

The following is a list of the ammunition expended: One hundred and fif-
teen six-inch full charges, ^j six-inch reduced charges, 6 shrapnel, 176 six-inch
common shell, 220 six-pounder cartridges, 120 three-pounder cartridges, and
60 one-pounder cartridges.

I inclose a list of the ammunition remaining on board; also the report of
the executive officer and of the chief engineer.

Very respectfully,

ASA WALKER,
Captain, U. S. N., Commanding.

The Commander-in-Chief U. S. Naval Force, Asiatic Station.

THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 247

U. S. S. " Baltimore,"
Manila, Philippine Islands, May 4, 1898.

Sir. — I have the honor to make the following report, as required by article
437, Navy Regulations, of the engagement of this ship with the Spanish fleet
and shore batteries at Sangley Point, Cavite bay, on the ist instant.

At early daylight the fleet had reached a point close up to the shipping of?
the city of Manila, when the signal was made, " Prepare for general action."
Spanish batteries near Old Manila opened fire at long range at about the same
time. Flagship leading, with port helm, bore down on the right of Spanish
line of vessels, formed in a somewhat irregular crescent at anchor, extending
from oi¥ Sangley Point to the northeast, and in readiness to receive us, their
left supported by the batteries on Sangley Point.

Following your lead in close order, our fire commenced with the port battery
at about 5:40 a. m., at a distance of about 6,000 yards.

Our column passed down the enemy's line, turning with port helm as their
left was reached, engaging them with starboard battery on the return. This
maneuver was performed three times at distances from the enemy's ships vary-
ing from 2,600 to 5,000 yards, when you signaled to " withdraw from action "
at 7:35.

Upon reaching a convenient distance in the bay, you signaled, " Let the
people go to breakfast; " and at 8:40, " Commanding officers repair on board
the flagship."

While on board the flagship I received an order to intercept a steamer
coming up the bay, reported to be flying Spanish colors.

Soon after starting on this duty I discovered the colors of the stranger to
be British, and so reported by signal, you having in the meantime made gen-
eral signal to get under way and follow your motions, this ship being at the
time some two miles to the south-southwest of the flagship on her way to
intercept the supposed Spanish steamer.

At 10:55 you mar"- general signal, " Designated vessel will lead," with
*' Baltimore's " distinguishing pennant, and in a few minutes signal to " attack
the enemy's batteries or earthworks " and for fleet to " close up; " in obedience
to v/hich order this ship led in, with starboard helm, to a position of¥ the
Cafiacoa and Sangley Point batteries and opened fire with starboard battery
at a distance of about 2.800 yards, closing in to 2,200, between which and
2 700 yards our best work was done, slowing the ship dead slow, stopping the
engines as range was obtained, delivering a rapid and accurate fire upon the
shore batteries and a gun!ioat just inside of Sangley Point, since proven to
have been the " Don Antonio de Ulloa," practically silencing the batteries in

248 Cuba's struggle against spain.

question before the fire of another ship became effective, owing to the lead
we had obtained in our start for the supposed Spanish steamer.

The fire of ships and batteries having been silenced and the white flag dis-
played on the arsenal buildings at Cavite, you signaled, at i :20, to " prepare
to anchor," and at 1:30, "Anchor at discretion."

The victory was complete.

The wind was light and variable during the first engagement and from the
northeast; force, 2 to 3 during the second.

The firing devices gave considerable trouble, extractors^ sear springs, and
firing pins bending and breaking, and wedge blocks jamming. Electric firing
attachments gave trouble by the grease and dirt incident to firing insulating
the connections, so much so that shortly after the engagement commenced
they were abandoned for percussion, but coolness and steadiness replaced de-
fective parts in the shortest possible time.

The ammunition supply was ample, and the test was conclusive so long as
electric hoists are uninjured.

The behavior of officers and men was beyond all praise. The accuracy and
rapidity of their fire you were an eye-witness of. The steadiness and cool
bearing of all on board who came under my observation was that of veterans.

The fact that the ship was so rarely hit gave few opportunities for conspicu-
ous acts of heroism or daring, but the enthusiasm and cool steadiness of the
men gave promise that they would have been equal to any emergency.

I shall report later such detail of individual merit as has been mentioned
by officers of divisions or that came under my own observation.

I inclose (a) report of executive officer; (b) surgeon's report of casualties;
(c) carpenter's report of damages; (d) report of ammunition expended.

Very respectfully,

N. M. DYER,
Captain, U. S. N., Commanding.
The Commander-in-Chief U. S. Naval Force, Asiatic Station.

U. S. S. " Petrel,"
Manila Bay, May 4, 1898.
Sir. — I respectfully report as follows concerning my share in the action
fought by the fleet under your command in Manila bay, off Cavite, on the
morning of May i, 1898:

The ship had been partly cleared for action at Hong Kong and on the run
to Manila. Went to quarters for action at 9:45 p. m. of April 30th, and a^ll

THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 249

preparations were completed. Hammocks were not piped down, but men were
allowed to sleep at their guns.

The position of " Petrel " was fourth from head of column, astern of
" Raleigh " and ahead of " Concord." We passed in through Boco Grande,
about one mile from El Fraile. All lights were masked and only stern
lights showmg. At 11. 10 a rocket and light were shown from Corregidor
Island and just as the " Raleigh " and " Petrel " came abreast El Fraile three
shots were fired from a shore battery on the rock, these being promptly
replied to by the " Raleigh," " Concord " and *' Boston." We steamed slowly
up the bay, and just as day was breaking, about 5 o'clock, the shore bat-
teries below Manila began firing. It was scarcely light enough to distin-
guish vessels from this vessel when flagship made signal to " prepare for ac-
tion," so signal was repeated from the " Baltimore." During time column was
forming and closing up, the batteries from below Manila were firing. As
flagship stood to southward the ships and batteries at Cavite began their
firing, and gradually, as we approached, we could make out ships under
way in harbor and three guns on shore firing. The battery of this vessel
began firing at 5:22 by the deck clock at a range of 5,000 yards.

The column circled three times from east to west in front of shore, stand-
ing in a little nearer each time, the first time being 3,000 yards and the
third time 1,800 yards. During these three rounds this vessel expended
92 six-inch common shells, 82 six-inch full charges, 10 reduced charges,
and 253 three-pounders. Several times during rounds had to cease firing
on account of smoke and in order to economize ammunition. The greater
part of our great-gun fire was at the " Reina Cristina " and " Castilla," the
former steaming around the harbor^ and the latter anchored about 500 yards
ofif Sangley Point; but the other and smaller vessels were fired at when
opportunity offered. Especially was the fire of the rapid-fire guns aimed at
a yellow launch, which was apparently a torpedo boat trying to turn our flank.
The navigator, Lieutenant B. A. Fiske, was stationed in the top with a stadi-
meter to determine the distance and report upon the efficiency of the fire.

At 7:30 we ceased firing and withdrew from action in obedience co a signal
from flagship to fleet to that eftect. The men were given their breakfast.
While withdrawing, the enemy continued firing until we were well out of range,
and the batteries below Manila were firing at intervals during breakfast. At
II, when the signal was made to get under way, the " Petrel " followed the
" Olympia " and stood well in. While steaming across the fire the signal was
hoisted for the " Petrel " to pass inside.

This vessel left her station, passed outside of " Baltimore," and rounded
Sangley Point about 500 yards outside of where " Castilla " was burning.

250 Cuba's struggle against spain.

The fire was then directed at the " Don Antonio de Ulloa," and when it
was found that she was sinking and deserted, the ship passed farther inside
and opened fire upon the ships behind inner breakwater and whose masts
were seen above government buildings. During the firing on tlie '' Ulloa "
a white flag with a Geneva cross was discovered in range with her, and I
stood in further so as to get it out of range. After the first two or three
shots fired through the public building at ships behind the mole, the Spanish
flag was, at 12:30 p. m., hauled down and a white flag run up. The surrender
was immediately signaled to fleet and firing ceased.

In obedience to a signal from flagship to destroy all shipping in the harbor,
Lieutenant Hughes was sent with a whaleboat's crew of seven men, this
whaleboat being the only one on the ship which would float, and set fire
to the " Don Juan de Austria," " Isla de Cuba," " Isla de Luzon," " General
Lezo " and " Marques del Duero." Afterward Ensign Fermier was sent
to set fire to the " Velasco " and " El Correo." The " Isla de Cuba," " Isla
de Luzon " and " Don Juan de Austria " were aground and full of water
when they were fired. Their outboard valves were opened and the ships
allowed to fill. The breech plugs of four-mch guns had been taken of^ and
could not be found. During the night the magazines of the " Don Juan de
Austria " blew up. The " Manila " was not burned because the Spanish
officers begged that she be not destroyed because she was unarmed and a
coast-survey vessel. Lieutenant Fiske and Passed Assistant Engineer Hall
raised steam on the ship this morning, the 4th instant, and brought her out.
At the time she was aground. The " Don Antonio de Ulloa " was sunk and
the " Reina Cristina " and " Castilla " were burning in outer harbor.

Lieutenant Fiske was sent ashore ajid brought off two tugboats, tlie
" Rapido " and " Hercules," and three steam launches.

I was anchored in Cavite harbor from 12:50 to 5:20 p. m., when I got under
way and returned to the fleet.

There were no casualties or accidents of any kind, the ship having been
struck only once just beneath hawse pipe by a piece of shell which burst just
as it sank, and threw a column of water over the forecastle.

After the white flag was displayed, there was apparently the greatest con-
fusion in the arsenal. Parts of the crews of the various ships were there,
and all were armed and were constantly falling in and moving about; yet
there was no evidence of any desire to continue the fighting, and instead of
any resistance being offered to the destruction of the ships, they were rather
inclined to assist with their advice and evinced a desire to surrender to the
first officer they met.

The action of ammunition was exceedingly good. There was expended

THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 25 1

•
during action, 113 six-inch common shells, 3 six inch armor-piercing shells,
82 six-inch full charges, 34 six-inch reduced charges, and 313 three-pounder
ammunition. Owing to the heat due to firing, the pads swelled and made it
very difficult to lock the breech plug. Nothing would remedy this save shift-
ing plugs, replacing hot plug by the one from the other gun which was cool.
The wedge of firing lock jammed frequently, due to hot parts. Ihis was
remedied by shifting locks.

The percussion primers v/orked very unsatisfactorily; sometimes four
primers would be expended before one would act. Primers leaked badly,
causing excessive deposit in primer seat, hard extraction, and delay in prim-
ing of gun and requiring frequent boring of vent.

The action of no one can be censured, the conduct of each and every
officer and man being excellent. There was no confusion; I should say less
than at ordinary target practice.

The loading was rapidly done and the firing was deliberate. Due to your
caution to commanding officers that no ammunition should be wasted. Lieu-
tenant Plunkett fired the forward six-inch guns and Ensign Fermier the after
ones, and the work was thoroughly done. Lieutenant Hughes stationed
himself on the poop, as it was deemed essential that he should not be with
the commanding officer on the bridge. He materially assisted Ensign Fennier
by observing fall of shot and tendering advice regarding pointing. I wish
particularly to call to your attention Lieutenant Hughes, his gallantry in
taking a boat's crew of seven men and in the face of a large armed force
on shore setting fire to the five ships before mentioned. He was aware that
he had the only boat in the ship which would float, until the steam whaleboat
could be prepared.

Lieutenant Fiske stationed himself on the fore cross trees with stadimeter
to measure the range and report on the fall of shots. He also took charge
of the steam whaleboat to cover Lieutenant Hughes in his operations in
burning the ships.

Lieutenant Wood had charge of the powder division, assisted in the after
part by Assistant Paymaster Siebels. There was at no time a halt in the
firing due to failure of the powder division.

Ensign Montgomery was in charge of the signals, and materially assisted
me on the bridge. He also directed the fire of the forward three-pounder
when it was allowed to be fired. He also afforded assistance to Lieutenant
Plunkett by observing the fall of shots from the forward six-inch guns.

I desire also to mention the efficient service of the engines. Li order to
maintain our position and to take advantage of every oppurtunity, the engine
telegraph was in constant use from full speed to stop, and the engine never

252 Cuba's struggle against spain.

failed to respond in the quickest time possible. This I consider to be due
to the high state of efhciency of that department, and the whole credit is due
to Passed Assistant Engineer Hall.

I can make no statement regarding the services of Passed Assistant Surgeon
Brownell, as the " Petrel " was most fortunate in having no casualties.

I inclose the report of the executive officer.

Very respectfully,

E. P. WOOD,

Commander, U. S. N., Commanding.

The Commander-in-Chief U. S. Naval Force, Asiatic Station.

U. S. S. " Boston," 2d Rate,
Port Cavite, Manila Bay, May 3, i8g8.

Sir. — I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken
by this vesssel in the late action with the Spanish fleet on the morning of
May I St.

At daylight the merchant ships off Manila were seen, and soon after the
Spanish fleet, close into Cavite. This vessel was the sixth in the column and
brought up the rear. Several shots were fired by the batteries in Manila,
and two shots were given in reply. At 5:35 a. m. action with the enemy com-
menced and was continued at varying distances, steaming in a circle until
7:35 a. m., firing with a fair degree of deliberation and accuracy. At times
the smoke was dense, interfering very materially with maneuvering and firing.

The Spanish fleet and shore batteries replied vigorously, and an attempt
was made with an improvised torpedo boat, but our fire was overpowering
and the enemy received heavy damage and loss.

In obedience to signal I withdrew from action at 7:35 and gave the crew
breakfast and rest.

At 11:10 the action was lenewed and continued until the enemy ceased
firing and his ships were all burned, sunk or withdrawn beJiind the arsenal
of Cavite.

This vessel was struck four times by enemy's shot, doing no material damage.
Our own fire destroyed three of our own boats and badly damaged three
others.

No casualties occurred.

The conduct of officers and men on this trying occasion was of the very
highest quality, and they bore themselves with courage and spirit and entirely

THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 253

to my satisfaction. It also gives me pleasure to bear witness to the courage
and resolution of the Spanish fleet and to say that they defended themselves
creditably.

Very respectfully,

FRANK WILDES,

Captain, U. S. N., Commanding.

The Commander-in-Chief Commanding U. S. Naval Force, Asiatic Station.

Consulate of the United States,
Bay of Manila, PiiiLirpiNE Islands, May 4, 1898.

Sir. — • I have the honor to briefly report to you concerning the battle of
Manila Bay, fought on May i, 1898.

Heeding your mandate, and by repeated request of Commodore George
Dewey, of the United States Asiatic Squadron, I left Manila on Saturday,
April 23d, and on Wednesday, April 27th, at about i o'clock, p. m., boarded the
flagship " Olympia," in Mirs Bay, in Hong Kong. After meeting the Com-
modore and his captains and commanders in council, the Commodore at once
ordered his fleet to start at 2 p. m. for Manila Bay.

On Saturday, April 30th, Subig Bay was reconnoitered because of reported
hiding of Spanish fleet in its inner harbor, but no fleet being there found, the
Commodore proceeded at once to the south channel entrance to Manila Bay,
and while by many reports mines, torpedoes and land defenses obstructed
entrance, yet the flagship led the van, and between 10 p. m., April 30th, and 2
A. m., May ist, our fleet of six war ships, one dispatch boat and two coal-
l-aden transports passed all channel dangers unharmed, despite shots from forts,
and at 2 a. m. were all safe on the broad expanse of Manila Bay,

After my departure, April 23d, and by drawing fire, to save Manila if possible,
all Spanish war ships went to their strongly fortified naval station at Cavite,
where the inner harbor gave refuge, and where potential support could be
had from several forts and well-equipped batteries, which extended several
m.iles right and left from Port Cavite.

At about 5:30 A. m., Sunday, May ist, the Spanish guns opened fire at both
the Manila breakwater battery and at Cavite, from fleet and forts.

With magnificent coolness and order, but with the greatest promptness, our
fleet, in battle array, headed by the flagship, answered the Spanish attack, and
for about two and a half hours a most terrific fire ensued.

254 CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.

The method of our operations could not have shown greater system, our
guns greater effectiveness, or our officers and crews greater bravery; and
while Spanish resistance was stubborn and the bravery of Spanish forces such
as to challenge admiration, yet they were outclassed, weighed in the balance
of war against the methods, training, aim and bravery shown on our decks, and
after less than three hours' perilous and intense combat one of Spain's war
ships was sinking, two others were burning, and all others, with land de-
fenses, had severely suffered, when our squadron, with no harm done its
ships, retired for breakfast.

At about 10 o'clock, a. m.. Commodore Dev^ey renewed the battle, and with
effects most fatal with each evolution.

No better evidence of Spanish bravery need be sought than that, after the
castigation of our first engagement, her ships and forts should again answer
our fire. But Spanish efforts were futile. Ship after ship and battery after
battery went to destruction before the onslaught of American energy and
training, and an hour and a half of our second engagement wrought the
annihilation of the Spanish fieet and forts, with several hundred Spaniards
killed and wounded and millions in value of their Government's property
destroyed. While amazing, almost unbelievable, as it seems, not a ship or
gun of our fleet had been disabled, and, except on the " Baltimore," not a
m.an had been hurt.

One of the crew of the " Baltimore " had a leg fractured by slipping and
another hurt in the ankle in a similar manner, while four received slight flesh
wounds from splinters thrown b}-- a six-inch projectile, which pierced the
starboard side of the cruiser.

But in the battle of Manila Bay the United States squadron of six war
ships totally destroyed the Spanish fleet of eight war ships, many forts and
batteries, and accomplished this work without the loss of a man!

History has only contrasts. There is no couplet to form a comparison. The
only finish fight between the modern war ships of civilized nations has proven
the prowess of American naval men and methods, and the glory is a legacy
for the whole people. Our crews are all hoarse from cheering, and while we
suffer for cough drops and throat doctors, we have no use for liniment or
surgeons.

To every ship, officer and crew, all praise be given. As Victoria was an-
swered years ago, " Your Majesty, there is no second," so may I report to
your department as to our war ships conquering the Spanish fleet in the battle
of Manila Bay — there is no first — "there is no second." The cool bravery
and efficiency of the Commodore was echoed by every captain and commander
and down through the lines by every officer and man, and naval history of the

THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 255

dawning century will be rich if it furnishes to the world so glorious a display
of intelligent command and successful service as must be placed to the credit
of the United States Asiatic Squadron under date of May i, 1898.

It was my lot to stand on the bridge of the " Baltimore " by th3 side of
Captain Dyer during the first engagement, and to be called to the flagship
" Olympia " by the Commodore, at whose side, on the bridge, I stood during
the second engagement, and when the clouds roll by and I have again a set-
tled habitation, it will be my honor and pleasure to transmit a report show-
ing service somewhat in detail and for which commanders promise data.

Meanwhile our Commodore will officially inform you of events which will
rival in American history the exploits of Paul Jones.

I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient servant,

OSCAR F. WILLIAMS,
U. S. Consul, Manila, Philippine Islands.
(Not acting.)

Lion. Judge Day, Assistant Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.

Spanish Official Refort.
departure for subic.

On the 25th of April, at 11 p. m., says Seiior Montojo, I left the bay of
Manila for Subic with a squadron composed of the cruisers " Reina Cristina,"
** Don Juan de Austria," " Isla de Cuba," " Isla de Luzon," dispatch boat
" Marques del Duero," and the wooden cruiser " Castilla." This last could
merely be considered as a floating battery, incapable of maneuvering, on
account of the bad condition of her hull. The following morning, being at
Subic, I had a conference with Captain Del Rio, who, though he did not relieve
my anxiety respecting the completion of the defensive works, assured me that
they would soon be finished.

In the meanwhile the cruiser " Castilla," even on this short cruise, was mak-
ing much water through the bearings of the propeller and the opening astern.
They worked day and night to stop these leaks wilh cement, finally making
the vessel nearly water-tight, but absolutely impossible to use her engines.

On the morning of the 27th I sailed with the vessels to cover the entrance
to the port of Stibic. The " Castilla " was taken to the northeast point of

256 Cuba's struggle against spain.

the island of Grande to defend the western entrance, since the eastern entrance
had already been closed with the hulls of the " San Quintin " and two old
merchant vessels which were sunk there.

With much disgust, I found that the guns which should have been mounted
on that island were delayed a month and a half. This surprised me, as the
shore batteries that the navy had installed (with very little difficulty) at the en-
trance of the bay of Manila, under the intelligent direction of colonel of naval
artillery, Sefior Garces, and Lieutenant Beneavente, were ready to fight twenty-
four days after the commencement of the work.

I was also no less disgusted that they confided in the ef^cacy of the few
torpedoes which they had found feasible to put there.

The entrance was not defended by torpedoes nor by the batteries of the
island, so that the squadron would have had to bear the attack of the Ameri-
cans with its own resources, in forty meters of water and with little security.
Our vessels could not only be destroyed, but they could not save their crews.

1 still held a hope that the Americans would not go to Subic, and give us
time for more preparations, but the following day I received from the Spanish
consul at Hong Kong a telegram which said: " Enemy's squadron sailed at

2 p. M. for the bay of Mirs, and according to reliable accounts they sailed
for Subic to destroy our squadron, and then will go to Manila."

This telegram demonstrated that the enemy knew where they could find
my squadron and that the port of Subic had no defenses.

The same day, the 28th of April, I convened a council of the captains, and
all, with the exception of Del Rio, chief of the new arsenal, thought that the
situation was insupportable and that we should go to the bay of Manila in
order to accept there the battle under less unfavorable conditions.

THE RETURN TO MANILA.

I refused to have our ships near the city of Manila, because, far from de-
fending it, this would provoke the enemy to bombard the plaza, which doubt-
less would have been demolished on account of its few defenses. It was
unanimously decided that we should take position in the bay of Canacao,
in the least water possible, in order to combine our fire with that of the
batteries of Point Sangley and Ulloa.

I immediately ordered Del Rio to concentrate his forces in the most strat-
egic point of the arsenal, taking every disposition to burn the coal and stores
before allowing them to fall into the power of the enemy. I sent the " Don
Juan de Austria " to Manila to get a large number of lighters filled with sand
to defend the water line of the " Castilla " (which ^could not move) against the

THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 257

enemy's shells and torpedoes. At 10 a. m. on the 29th I left Subic with the
vessels of my squadron, towing the " Castilla " by the transport " Manila."

In the afternoon of the same day we anchored in the Gulf of Canacao in
eight meters of water. On the following morning we anchored in line ol
battle, the " Cristina," " Castilla," " Don Juan de Austria," " Don Juan
de Ullo," " Luzon," " Cuba " and " Marques del Duero," while the transport
" Manila " was sent to the Roads of Bacoor, where the " Velasco " and
*' Lezo " were undergoing repairs.

At 7 p. M. I received a telegram from Subic announcing that the enemy's
squadron had entered the port at 3, reconnoitering, doubtless seeking our
ships, and from there they sailed with course for Manila.

The mail steamer " Isla Mindanao " arrived in the bay. I advised her cap-
tain to save his vessel by going to Singapore, as the enemy could not get
into the entrance probably before midnight, as he was not authorized from the
trans-Atlantic he did not do so. and then I told him that he could anchor in
shallow water as near as possible to Bacoor,

At midnight gun fire was heard off Corregidor, and at 2 on the morning
of the 1st of May I received telegraphic advices that the American vessels
were throwing their search lights at the batteries of the entrance, with which
they had exchanged several shots. I notified the commanding general of the
arsenal, Sefior Sostoa, and the general-governor of the plaza, Capt. Senor
Garcia Pana, that they should prepare themselves. I directed all the artillery
to be loaded, and all the sailors and soldiers to go to their stations for battle,
soon to receive the enemy.

This is all that occurred since I sailed to Subic until the entrance of the
American squadron in the bay of Manila.

THE ARRIVAL OF THE ENEMY.

The squadron being disposed for action, adds Sefior Montojo, fires spread,
and everything in proper place, we waited for the enemy's arrival.

All the vessels, having been painted dark-grey color, had taken down their
masts and yards and boats to avoid the effects of projectiles and the splinters,
had their anchors buoyed and cables ready to slip instantly.

At 4 A. M. I made signal to prepare for action, and at 4:45 the "Austria"
signaled the enemy's squadron, a few minutes after which they were recog-
nized, with some confusion, in a column parallel with ours, at about 6.000
meters distant; the flagship " Olympia " ahead, followed by the "Baltimore,"
" Raleigh," " Boston," " Concord," " Helena," " Petrel" and " McCulloch,"
and the two transports " Zafiro " and " Nanshan."

258 Cuba's struggle against spain.

The force of these vessels, excepting transports that were noncombatant,
amounted to 21,410 tons, 49,290 horse-power, 163 guns (many of which were
rapid-fire) 1,750 men in their crews, and of an average velocity of about
seventeen miles. The power of our only five effective ships for battle was
represented by 10,111 tons, 11,200 horse-power, seventy-six guns (very short of
rapid-fire), 1,875 crew, and a maximum speed of twelve miles.

THE FIRE FROM SHORE.

At 5 the batteries on Point Sangley opened fire. The two first shots fell
short and to the left of the leading vessel. These shots were not answered
by the enemy, whose principal object was the squadron.

This battery only had two Ordonez guns of fifteen centimeters mounted, and
but one of these could fire in the direction of the opposing fleet.

In a few minutes one of the batteries of Manila opened fire, and at 5:15 I
made signal that our squadron open fire. The enemy answered immediately.
The battle became general. We slipped the springs and the cables and started
ahead with the engines, so as not to be involved by the enemy.

THE BATTLE.

The Americans fired most rapidly. There came upon us numberless pro-
jectiles, as the three cruisers at the head of the line devoted themselves
almost entirely to fight the " Cristina," my flagship. A short time after the
action commenced one shell exploded in the forecastle and put out of action
all those who served the four rapid-fire cannon, making splinters of the for-
ward mast, which wounded the helmsman on the bridge, when Lieutenant Jose
Nunez took the wheel with a coolness worthy of the greatest commendation,
steering until the end of rhe fight. In the meanwhile another shell exploded
in the orlop, setting fire to the crews' bags, which they were fortunately able
to control.

The enemy shortened the distance betv/een us, and, rectifying his aim,
covered us with a rain of rapid-fire projectiles. At 7:30 one shell destroyed
completely the steering gear. I ordered to steer by hand while the rudder was
out of action. In the meanwhile another shell exploded on the poop and put
out of action nine men. Another destroyed the mizzen masthead, bringing
down the flag and my ensign, which was replaced immediately. A fresh
shell exploded in the officers' cabin, covering the hospital with blood, de-
stroying the wounded who were being treated there. Another exploded in
the ammunition room astern, filling the quarters with smoke and preventing the
working of the hand steering gear. As it was impossible to control the

THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 259

fire, I had to flood the magazine when the cartridges were beginning to
explode.

Amidships several shells of smaller calibre went through the smokestack
and one of the large ones penetrated the fire room, putting out of action one
master gunner and twelve men serving the guns. Another rendered useless
the starboard bow gun; while the fire astern increased, fire was started for-
ward by another shell, which went through the hull and exploded on the deck.

The broadside guns, being undamaged, continued firing until there were
only one gunner and one seaman remaining unhurt for firing them, as the
guns' crews had been frequently called upon to substitute those charged with
steering, all of whom were out of action.

THE DESTRUCTION OF OUR SHIPS.

The ship being out of control, the hull, smoke pipe and mast riddled with
shot or confused with the cries of the wounded; half of her crew out of action,
among whom were seven officers, I gave the order to sink and abandon the ship
before the magazines should explode, making signal at the same time to the
" Cuba " and " Luzon " to assist in saving the rest of the crew, which they
did, aided by others from the '' Duero " and the arsenal.

I abandoned the " Cristina," directing beforehand to secure her flag, and ac-
companied by my staff, and with great sorrow, I hoisted my flag on the
cruiser " Isla de Cuba."

After having saved many men from the unfortunate vessel, one shell de-
stroyed her heroic commander, Don Luis Cadarso, who was directing the
rescue.

The " Ulloa," which also defended herself firmly, using the only two guns
which were available, was sunk by a shell which entered the water line, put-
ting out of action her commander and half of her remaining crew, those which
were left onl}^ remaining for the service of the two guns stated.

The " Castilla,'' which fought heroically, remained with her artillery useless,
except one stern gun, with which they fought spiritedly, was riddled with shot
and set on fire by the enemy's shells, then sunk, and was abandoned by her
crew in good order, which was directed by her commander, Don Alonzo
Algado. The casualties on this ship were 2-^ killed and 80 wounded.

The " Austria," very much damaged and on fire, went to the aid of the
" Castilla." The " Luzon " had three guns dismounted, and was slightly
damaged in the hull. The " Duero " remained with one of her engines useless,
the bow gun of twelve centimeters and one of the redoubts.

At 8 o'clock in the morning, the enemy's squadron having suspended its

2 DO

CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.

fire, I ordered the ships that remained to us to take positions in the botton*
of the Roads at Bacoor, and there to resist to the last moment, and that they
should be sunk before they surrendered.

THE SINKING.

At 10:30 the enemy returned, forming a circle to destroy the arsenal and
the ships which remained to me, opening upon them a horrible fire, which we
answered as far as we could with the few cannon which we still had mounted.

There remained tjie last recourse to sink our vessels, and we accomplished
this operation, taking care to save the flag, the distinguishing pennant, the
money in the safe, the portable arms, the breech plugs of the guns and the
signal codes.

After which I went with my staff to the Convent of Santo Domingo de
Cavite, to be cured of a wound received in the left leg, and to telegraph a
brief report of the action, with preliminaries and results,

THE JUDGMENT OF THE ADMIRAL.

It remains only to say that all the chiefs, officers, engineers, quarteru'astcrs,
gunners, sailors and soldiers rivaled one another in sustaining with honor
the good name of the navy on this sad day.

The inefficiency of the vessels which composed my little squadron, the
lack of all classes of the personnel, especially master gunners and seamen
gunners; the inaptitude of some of the provisional machinists, the scarcity of
rapid-fire cannon, the strong crews of the enemy, and the unprotected character
of the greater part of our vessels all contributed to make more decided the
sacrifice which we made for our country, and to prevent the possibility of
the horrors of the bombardment of the city of Manila, with the conviction
that with the scarcity of our force against the superior enemy we were going
to certain death and could expect a loss of all our ships.

Our casualties, including those of the arsenal, amounted to 381 men killed
and wounded.

Office of the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief of the
Station and Squadron of the Philippines,

Manila, April 24, 1898.

It having been resolved to go out with the squadron for the port of Subic.
not only for the defense of that important port but also as a strategic harbor

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THE GALLANT PART TAKEN liY OUR NAVY. 263

for operations which may occur, the staff is placed in charge of the necessary
orders from these headquarters.

As commandant of the Cavite arsenal I have nothing to say to your excel-
lency concerning its defense, as the chief commander and officers will know
how to defend the interests of the nation, trusting the valor, zeal and intelli-
gence of all those who, with the slight and feeble resources upon which we
can count, will do everthing possible to guard the honor of the flag and the
navy.

Go on, sir, in the ordering and equipping as much as you think necessary
for the common purposes which concern our interests.

You will use the telegraph to report to me all that you think important
for your affairs in all departments, as well as the cable to communicate with the
Government.

As long as possible communicate by way of Paranaque and Malate, and
also with the batteries of the coast by signals as well as by boats.

If you need merchant vessels to equip with torpedo tubes, which may be
effective in such vessels, you will also equip them, etc.

MONTOJO.

The Commandant of the Cavite Arsenal.

April 25. — Copy. SIGUILLY,

Secretary.

Commodore Dewey had already reported that it would be useless for
him to capture Manila without sufficient land forces to occupy the
place, and preparations were being made to send troops to the
Philippines to co-operate with the squadron; but three weeks elapsed
after his victory, before the first troops were embarked. Major-Gen-
eral Wesley Merritt, United States Army, was appointed military
governor of the Philippines. A force of 158 officers and 3,428 men
sailed to Dewey's assistance, May 25th. Others followed soon after,
and General Merritt went out himself on June 27th. It was a strange
and unlooked-for circumstance that the war declared for the purpose
of assisting the starving Cubans should have commenced in the far
East. The continuation of the Manila campaign, and its far-reaching
results, belong to the historians of the future. The immediate results
of Dewey's victory were to cripple the Spanish Navy so seriously as to
make our Pacific coast reasonably secure against attacks from that
source; while it established, or rather maintained, the prestige of the
American Navy and showed the superb training of our officers and

264 Cuba's struggle against spain.

seamen. Meanwhile the naval officers on this side of the world had
their hands full.

At the opening of hostilities, the Atlantic fleet, then cruising at
Key West, under the command of Admiral Sampson, was ordered
to blockade Havana, and to keep the coast of Cuba, as near as possible,
in a state of blockade. Admiral Sampson's squadron at first consisted
of three battle ships, two armored cruisers, four double-turreted
monitors, ten torpedo boats and more than eighty cruisers, tugs,
colliers, gunboats, auxiliary transports, scouts, supply, hospital, re-
frigerator, repair, and other boats. It was later reinforced by the
Flying Squadron under Schley.

After the Flying Squadron was merged into Sampson's, another
squadron called the Eastern was organized under Commodore J. C.
Watson, with a view to a possible European cruise. It consisted of
the cruiser '' Newark," auxiliaries '' Yankee," " Yosemite," and
" Dixie," collier '"Abaranda," and after July 5th, the " Oregon " and
" Iowa; " these vessels did good service in assisting the transportation
of troops, and the naval operations in the West Indies.

The enterprise intrusted to Sampson was of vast importance, his
squadron being required to blockade nearly 2,000 miles of coast.
Communication between the principal cities of Havana depended in
the main upon transportation by sea, on account of the limited railroad
facilities in the island.

April 29th, Admiral Cervera sailed from the Cape Verde islands
with the warships " Maria Teresa," ''Almirante Oquendo," " Vizcaya,"
" Cristobal Colon," and the torpedo-boat destroyers " Terror,"
" Furore," and " Pluton." The course taken by this fleet was very
uncertain, and there were various suggestions as to the intentions of
Admiral Cervera. There was great reason to suppose that he would
stop at Porto Rico and coal his vessels before sailing to Cuba. It was
also supposed that he might go to Martinique, as at that time there
was a suspicion of friendship for Spain among the French, and it was
feared that the Spanish fleet might be permitted to coal at that island.
There was also great fear that Cervera's squadron might attempt to
intercept the " Oregon," which was on the way from the Pacific
coast to the West Indies.

The sailing of this gallant vessel from San Francisco to Key West,
was one of the most extraordinary feats recorded during the war.
Leaving San Francisco on hurried orders, she steamed down the
Chilean coast, around the Horn, and proceeded up the Atlantic coast

THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 265

into the harbor of Buenos Ayres, which was reported to be mined
against her entrance. Without any encounter, she sailed out again
and reached Key West safely, a voyage of over 14,000 miles in less
than six weeks, through waters in which the enemy's cruisers were
supposed to be swarming.

Four converted Atlantic liners, the '' Harvard," " Yale," " St.
Louis," and " St. Paul," besides the fast commerce destroyers
"Columbia" and "Minneapolis," did magnificent service as scouts;
these vessels were constantly on the lookout to catch a glimpse of the
Spanish fleet, but it was very dif^cult for them to obtain any reliable
information. As the indications seemed to point out that Cervera
would stop at San Juan, Porto Rico, Admiral Sampson determined to
attack that port.

On the 4th of May, having provided for the blockade of Havana,
he left Nicholas Channel with the battle ships " New York," " Iowa,"
and "Indiana;" the monitors "Amphitrite " and "Terror;" the
lighter vessels " Detroit " and " Montgomery," and the torpedo boat
" Porter," and steamed for San Juan, being much delayed on the way
by the slowness of the monitors. He reached San Juan on the 12th of
May and bombarded that place to reduce the means of defense should
the Spanish ships arrive. His loss was one man killed and four
wounded on board the " New York," three wounded on the " Iowa,"
and one death from heat on the "Amphitrite," the other ships escaping
without casualties.

U. S. Flagship " New York," ist Rate.

Key West. Fla., May 18, 1898,

Sir. — Supplementary to my telegram No. ys, of the 12th instant, I have
the honor to submit the following report, more in detail, of the attack on
the defenses of Porto Rico, made by a portion of this squadron on the 12th
instant

Upon approaching San Juan it was seen that none of the Spanish vessels
were in the harbor. I was, therefore, considerably in doubt whether they had
reached San Juan and again departed for some unknown destination, or whether
they had not arrived. As their capture was the object of the expedition, and
as it was essential that they should not pass to the westward, I determined
to attack the batteries defending the port, in order to develop their positions
and strength, and then, without waiting to reduce the city or subject it to a
regular bombardment — which would require due notice — turn to the west-
ward.

266 Cuba's struggle against spain.

Our progress had been so much slower than I had reason to anticipate,
from Key West to Porto Rico, owing to the frequent breakdowns of the two
monitors, which made it necessary to tow them both the whole distance, and
also to the disabled condition of the " Indiana," that eight days had been
consumed instead of five, as I had estimated.

I commenced the attack as soon as it was good daylight. This lasted about
three hours, when the signal was made to discontinue the firing, and the
squadron stood to the northeast until out of sight of San Juan, when the course
was laid for the westward, with the view of communicating with the Depart-
ment at Port Plata and learn if the Department had obtained information as
to the movements of the Spanish vessels.

At Cape Haytien I received word from the Department that the Spanish
vessels had been sighted off Curagao on the 14th instant and directed me to
return with all dispatch to Key West.

As stated in my telegram, no serious injury was done any of the ships,
and only one man was killed and seven wounded slightly.

The following notes were taken during the attack:

Weather, fair; very light breeze; long swell from northward and westward.

3:30. — Breakfast.

4. — Call " All hands ". complete clearing for action. Squadron standing in
for San Juan, the lights of the town being plainly visible, " Detroit " leading;
" Wompatuck " on starboard bow to anchor boat for turning stake as pro-
vided in my "Order of battle" — second plan of action; the other ships in
column as follows: "Iowa," "Indiana," "New York," " Amphitrite," "Ter-
ror," and " Montgomery." Speed, four knots.

4:58. — " Detroit " inshore, standing across harbor entrance. In this passage
across the front of the harbor, and very close to rhe town, the "Detroit"
received no fire at all. No Spanish flag was ikying on the Morro or elsewhere.
No Spanish vessels could be seen in the harbor. There was one merchant
steamer in the inner harbor.

5. — Sounded " General quarters."

5:16. — -"Iowa" began firing on the Morro with forward six-pounder, and
then with all starboard battery. Smoke hanging over the ship made firing slow.

5:24. — First return shot from the shore batteries.

5:30. — '"Iowa" turned from the batteries, circling to the westward.

5:59. — Made signal, "Form column."

6:09. — Made telegraphic signal, "Use only large guns." The smoke from
the smaller guns had been interfering with the fire of the heavier guns. The
column was headed in for the batteries in the same line of attack as in 'the
fir3t rpund.

THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 267

6:15. — " Detroit" seen standing away from Morro, with the " Montgomery"
not far off her port beam. From the time when the shore batteries began
firing (5:24) until this time (6:15) the " Detroit " had been lying close inshore,
between the line followed by the squadron and the Morro, and she had been
subjected to what seemed a concentrated fire of all the shore batteries for all
this time, she in the meanwhile pouring in broadsides from her own rapid-fire
battery.

6:30.— Made signal to "Detroit" and " Montgomery" not to follow battle
ships. By this time all the shore batteries had been developed, and they were
more numerous than the information received had led me to suspect.

6:35.— "Iowa" began firing at Morro on the second round; range, 1,500
yards.

6:40. — "Iowa" ceased firing. Almost calm; smoke hanging over the shore
fortifications, pretty effectually screening them,

7:12. — " Amphitrite " signaled, "After turret disabled for to-day."

7:16. — • " Iowa " began firing on the third round.

7:38.— Signaled to "Detroit" and "Montgomery," "Report casualties."
Received replies as follows: "Detroit," " o; " "Montgomery," " o."

7:45. — " Iowa " sounded, " Secure."

7:45. — Made signal, "Form column, course northwest," and hauled down
the signal at 8:01.

8:12. — Made signal, " Report casualties."

8:15. — The "Terror," which had been lying close inshore engaged with the
fortifications, ceased firing.

8:47. — " New York " reports " i killed, 4 wounded." All other ships re-
ported no casualties, except the " Amphitrite," which reported the death of
one gunner's mate from the effects of heat.

I inclose copies of the reports of the commanding officers on the incidents
of the bombardment, including ammunition expended, and behavior of the
guns and ordnance material, etc.

Very respectfully,

W. T. SAMPSON,

Rear Admiral^ U. S. Navy,

C ommander -in-Chief U. S. Naval Force. North Atlantic Station.

The Secretary of the Navy, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

Meanwhile, other vessels of Sampson's sqiiadfon w^ere busily
engaged cutting the cable around the coast of Cuba. On May nth,
the '' Marblehead " and " Nashville " cut two cables at Cienfuegos

268 Cuba's struggle against spain.

under a galling fire, which resulted in a loss to the Americans of one
killed and eleven wounded. Several hundred of the Spanish soldiers
defending the coast at this place, were reported killed. On the same
day a fatal encounter took place at Cardenas where the " Winslow ''
was disabled and almost destroyed by fire from the forts, with a loss of
five killed and three wounded. Among the lost was Ensign Worth
Bagley, the first officer killed during the war.

Convent Hospital,
Key West, Fla., May i6, 1898.

Sir. — I respectfully submit the following report of the action off Cardenas,
Cuba, as participated in by the U. S. torpedo boat " Winslow," to supplement
the summarized statement submitted by me on the nth instant, the day of the
fight.

The "Winslow" arrived off Cardenas from Matanzas at 9 a. m. on the nth,
having left her station on the blockade to obtain an additional supply of coal,
the amount of fuel in her bunkers being reduced to five tons. The U. S. S.
" Machias " and " Wilmington " were found at Piedras Cay. Upon making
application to Captain Merry, the senior officer present, I was directed to
apply to Captain Todd, commanding U, S. S. " Wilmington," for necessary
supplies.

On boarding the U. S. S. " Wilmington " I was informed by her command-
ing officer of his intention to enter Cardenas harbor on the afternoon of that
day. Of the three channels leading through the cays two were believed to
be mined. There remained unexplored a third channel, between Romero and
Blanco cays, over which the minimum depth of water, as shown by the chart,
was one and three-fourths fathoms. As the rise of tide at this place was
about one and one-half feet, and the " Wilmington " drew scant ten feet, I
was directed to receive on board a Cuban pilot, Santos, to take with me the
revenue cutter " Hudson " to sound this channel, and, in company with the
" Hudson," to sweep the channel for torpedoes. This work I completed by
noon, except the sweeping of the channel, which could not be done on account
of the grounding of the " Hudson." That vessel touched lightly, but managed
to work off without injury. The *' Winslow," therefore, dragged the channel
with grapnels and returned to the " Wilmington," reporting to Captain Todd
upon the practicability of the entrance.

The entrance was begun at 12:30, high tide, the " Hudson " on the starboard
side and the " Winslow " on the port side of the " Wilmington " assisting in
marking out shoal water. No vessels were in sight on entering Cardenas bay

THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 269

save two square-rigged merchantmen with sails unbent, anchored directly off
the town. As it was thought possible that gunboats might attempt to escape,
the " Hudson " was sent along the western side and the " Winslow " along
the eastern side of the bay to intercept them in event of such movement; not
finding them the thre« vessels met off the town at a distance of about 3,500
yards. When in this position the '' Winslow " was signaled to approach the
" Wilmington " within hail and I was directed by Captain Todd to go in and
investigate a small gunboat then observed for the first time, painted gray with
black smokestack, apparently not under steam and moored to a wharf, to the
left of which arose a compact mass of buildings close to the water front.
Torpedoes were set for surface runs, the fans upon the war-noses were run
up so as to provide for explosion at short range for use alongside of the
gunboat, and all preparations were made for immediate action.

At a distance of about 1,500 yards, at which time the " Winslow " was ad-
vancing at about twelve knots, which seems her maximum speed in quite shoal
water, the first gun of the engagement was fired from the bow of the Spanish
gunboat, marked by a clear puff of white smoke. This shot, which passed over
the " Winslow," was at once replied to by that ship and was the signal for the
commencement from the beach of a rapidly sustained fire, characterized, pri-
marily, by a total absence of smoke. At the commencement of this firing I
received a flesh wound in the left thigh. As the action advanced a cloud of
haze collected on shore at the location of this battery and when closed I
detected one or two gun flashes from among the buildings, but at no time
could I detect the exact position of the guns. My uncertainty as to the posi-
tion of the enemy was attested to by the commanding oflicer of the " Hudson "
and by officers commanding gun divisions on the " Wilmington," who inquired
of me shortly after the action what I made out to be the enemy's exact position.
At this time the wind was blowing from the ships toward the shore. The
first shot that pierced the " Winslow " rendered her steam and hand-steering
gear inoperative and damaged them beyond repair. Efforts to work the hand-
steering gear from aft were frustrated by the wrecking of that mechanism and
the rupture of both wheel ropes; relieving tackles failed to operate the rudder.
For a short time the vessel was held in her bows on position by use of her
propellers. She then swung broadside to the enemy. A shot now pierced her
engine-room rendering one engine inoperative. 1 directed my attention to
maintaining fire from her one-pounder guns, to keeping the vessel constantly
in movement, so as to reduce the chances of her being hit. to endeavoring
to withdraw from close range, and to keeping clear of the line of fire of the
" Wilmington " and " Hudson." The use of the remaining engine, however,
had the effect of throwing her stern toward the enemy upon backing, while

270 CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.

going ahead threw her bow in the same direction. Under the heavy fire of
the " Wilmington " the fire of the enemy slackened. The Spanish gunboat
was silenced and put out of action early in the engagement.

The " Winslow " now being practically disabled, I signaled to the " Hudson "
to tow us out of action. She very gallantly approached us, and we succeeded
in getting a line to her. Previous to this, the alternate rapid backing and
steaming ahead of the '' Winslow " had had the effect of working her out
from under the enemy's batteries, and in this way a distance of about 300 yards
was gained. Finding that we were working out in this manner, I directed
Ensign Bagley to concentrate his attention upon the movement of the ship,
watching the vessel so as to keep her out of the " Wilmington's " way, and to
direct the movements of the man at the reversing gear, mechanical communi-
cation from deck to engine-room being impracticable. This necessitated Mr.
Bagley making repeated short trips from the deck to the foot of the engine-
room ladder while directing the vessel's course, and at the moment of being
on deck he stood abreast the starboard gun close to a group of men who had
been stationed below, but who had been sent on deck from the disabled ma-
chinery. A shell hitting, I believC; a hose-reel, exploded instantly, killing
Ensign Bagley and two others and mortally wounding two. This accident,
which occurred at the close of the action, was virtually its end; the enemy fired
a few more shots, but was soon completely silenced by the heavy fire of the
" Wilmington." The conduct of Ensign Bagley and the men with him, as
well as that of the crew who survived the fight, is beyond commendation.
After seeing the dead and wounded removed from the '' Winslow " and con-
veyed on board the " Wilmington," I turnec* over the command of the ship
to Gunner's Mate G. P. Brady, my own injury preventing me from performing
active duty for the time being.

I have the honor to remain, sir, your obedient servant,

JOHN B. BERNADOU,

Lieutenant, U. S. Navy.
The Secretary of the Navy.

On May i8th, the " St. Louis " and " Wompatuck " cut a cable near
Santiago, and on the following day made an unsuccessful attempt to
cut the cable at Guantanamo. A more successful attempt was made
at the latter place on June 7th, by the " St. Louis " and the " Marble-
head."

On the 15th of May, news was brought to Admiral Sampson that
the Spanish destroyer " Terror " had reached Martinique, and that

THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 2^1

Cervera's fleet had been seen off Curasao on the day before. It was
evident that his destination was either Santiago or San Juan, and the
admiral hastened back to Key West to coal, so as to be able to inter-
cept the Spanish squadron before it could reach the Windward
passage.

A Cuban pilot informed the Americans that there was probably
not more than i,ooo tons of coal at Santiago. About this time, May
25th, the '' St. Paul " captured the Spanish collier '' Restormal," hav-
ing on board 2,400 tons of coal; this must have been a severe blow
to the Spanish squadron.

Meanwhile, Commodore Schley had been ordered to the West
Indies with the Flying Squadron and arrived at Key West on the
morning of the i8th; he was dispatched in haste next day by way
of the Yucatan passage, to Cienfuegos, as- it was the very natural
surmise that Cervera was bringing munitions of war to that port, the
most important place on the coast having direct communication by
rail with Havana. Schley's squadron consisted of the '' Brooklyn,"
** Massachusetts," *' Texas," and '' Scorpion," to which were added
the '' Iowa," " Castine," '' Dupont," the collier '' Merrimac," and later
the '' Marblehead," '' Eagle," and '' Vixen." Commodore Schley im-
mediately proceeded to blockade Cienfuegos to prevent rhe entrance
of Cervera's squadron. It was not until sometime later he learned
that the Spanish admiral had reached Santiago on the day the Flying
Squadron left Key West. The American fleet arrived within block-
ading distance of Santiago on the evening of the 28th, and on the next
day vSchley reported in the following dispatch that four of Cervera's
vessels had been sighted inside the harbor.

Mole St. Nicholas, via Hayti.
Secretary of Navy, Washington:

Off Santiago de Cuba, May 29th, 10 a. m. Enemy in port. Recognized
" Cristobal Colon," " Infanta Maria Teresa," and two torpedo-boat destroyers
moored inside Morro, behind point. Doubtless the others are here. I have
not sufficient coal. Making every effort to get coal in. " Vixen " has blown
out manhole gasket. I have sent boiler makers on board to repair. Collier
repaired, machinery being put together. Have about 3,000 tons of coal in
collier, but not easy to get aboard here. If there is no engagement in next
two or three days, Sampson's squadron could relieve this one to coal at
Gonaives or Port au Prince. Hasten me dispatch vessels for picket work.

272 Cuba's struggle against spain.

The " Brooklyn," " Iowa," " Texas," " Massachusetts," " Marblehead,"
" Vixen," and collier compose squadron here. I am sending " St. Paul " to
communicate with Sampson.

SCHLEY.

Early during the blockade it was determined to obstruct the channel
to prevent any attempt at the escape of Cervera's squadron, and it
was suggested that the collier " Merrimac " would answer the purpose.
Lieutenant Hobson, assistant naval constructor, who had been on
duty on the flagship, was intrusted by Admiral Sampson, May 29th,
with the formation of a plan for obstructing the channel. This plan he
submitted to the admiral on May 30th, every point, even to the
smallest detail, having been thoroughly studied in regard to the
navigation and manoeuvering of the vessel as well as the method of
sinking her. It was decided to sink the collier by exploding a series
of torpedoes advantageously placed on the outside, these torpedoes to
be fired simultaneously from the bridge of the vessel by means of
electric cables. It was arranged with a view to additional ease in
sinking that all the ports and apertures should be opened at the same
time, and that the lashings holding the anchors should be instantly
cut so as to catch and hold the vessel in the desired position. The
crew was to be composed of picked men, strong, alert, experienced,
and positively reliable, for the slightest deviation from the program
would be fatal to success. Arrangements were to be made for the
crew to escape in a boat prepared for the purpose.

The preparation of the torpedoes was instantly begun under the
direction of Gunner Morgan of the " New York." The flagship,
accompanied by the '' Oregon," the '' Mayflower," and the ** Porter,"
reached Santiago early on June ist with the preparations — torpedoes,
fuses, etc. — completed, except as to the plan for adapting them to the
collier, which they then saw for the first time. The '^ Merrimac " was
immediately stripped, the torpedoes attached and all arrangements
made to have her taken into the entrance of the channel. Lieutenant
Hobson, having prepared the plan, and being thoroughly familiar with
every detail, was intrusted with its performance, Captain Miller of the
" Merrimac " having most reluctantly given way to the yotmger man
in the command of his vessel which was selected for the perilous
enterprise. When volunteers were called for, practically the whole
fleet responded, every mian seeming to consider it a priceless privilege
to take Dart. The crew finally selected was as follows: Naval Con-

THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 273

structor R. P. Hobson; D. Montague, chief master at arms, " New-
York; " George Charette, gunner's mate, third class, *' New York;"
R. Clausen, coxswain, '* New York; " G. F. Phillips, machinist, first
class, '' Merrimac; " F. Kelly, water tender, *' Merrimac; '"' O. Deig-
nan, coxswain, ''Merrimac;" and J. E. Murphy, coxswain, *' Iowa."

In order to secure sufficient light to enter the harbor, it was de-
termined to go in just before the setting of the moon, which would
occur a short time before daylight.

On the morning of June 2d, the first attempt to approach the
harbor was made, but to the great disappointment of Lieutenant Hob-
son and his gallant crew, the vessel was recalled, as the morning was
too far advanced, and they were obliged to wait until the next day.
The final start was made shortly before daybreak on June 3d, the
pilot remaining on board to take her as far as possible, and the former
assistant engineer, Mr. Crank, volunteered to look after the engines
and leave them in a condition to complete the trip without further care.
He and the pilot were taken ofT by a steam launch sent in near the
entrance of the channel, under the command of Naval Cadet Powell,
who was also directed to wait near the entrance of the harbor to pick
up any of the crew who might escape. The roar of the guns soon
gave the signal that she had been attacked by the enemy, and those
outside waited with great anxiety to learn the fate of the crew and
the ship.

Meanwhile a small boat by which the men expected to escape be-
came disabled, and when the vessel was abandoned, they were obliged
to keep themselves afloat by clinging to a raft. They remained in this
condition in the water until overtaken by the steam launch of the
Spanish admiral, when they surrendered as prisoners and were taken
aboard. The same day a tugboat from Santiago, bearing a flag of
truce, brought out a letter from Admiral Cervera to Admiral Sampson
assuring him of the safety of Hobson and his men, and returned to
Santiago with clothing and necessaries for the heroes who had escaped
from the sinking '' Merrimac." Efforts to exchange these men proved
unsuccessful, as the '' Merrimac " prisoners had been delivered to the
custody of the army, and the matter was referred to Captain-General
Blanco. The Spanish officials were afraid the prisoners had acquired
too much valuable information in regard to the defenses of the harbor
of Santiago, and they were not exchanged until July 6th, after nego-
tiations with General Shafter.

On Monday, June 6th, Santiago was bombarded by the American

274 CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.

fleet, orders being given to avoid Morro Castle where the " Merrimac "
prisoners were confined; but several shots struck there, severely
wounding a number of the garrison. Lieutenant Hobson and his men
were uninjured. They were removed to quarters in the city the next
day.

June loth, the American vessels took possession of the landing at
Guantanamo, making it possible for the marines to establish a camp
there.

The first United States forces to land upon Cuban soil were 650
men of the First Marine Battalion Volunteers of New York, under
the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Robert W. Huntington. These
men had been aboard the transport '' Panther " since May 22d, and
hailed with delight the prospect of stretching themselves on shore.
On the afternoon of Friday, June loth, they landed and marched up a
steep hillside east of Fisherman's Point, Guantanamo Bay, and hoisted
the Stars and Stripes on a plateau at the summit of the hill. The
camp was laid out, tents set up, and the marines, proud of having the
honor of making the first landing, and with a sense of security in hav-
ing been able to establish themselves without opposition, christened
their camp after the commander of the gunboat " Marblehead," Cap-
tain McCalla, and gave themselves up to the enjoyment of a night's
rest. Before the landing, the coast and the. neighborhood had been
bombarded by the American vessels outside, and the Spaniards had
been dispersed for a short time. About 4 o'clock in the afternoon of
the next day, while some of the men were resting, and about 150 were
bathing in the surf, they were suddenly surprised by an attack from
the jungles beyond the camp, where a large body of Spaniards had
collected and were pouring a deadly rain of Mauser bullets upon the
startled marines.

Then ensued the first land fight of the war, in which four of our men
were killed and a number wounded. The first to fall was Dr. John
Blair Gibbs, surgeon of the battalion. The attack continued at inter-
vals all night long, the smokeless powder used by the Spaniards
giving them great advantage, and making it almost impossible for
the marines to pick off their skulking foes. Twenty-four hours longer
the fight was maintained, but the arrival of sixty Cuban scouts,
familiar with the tactics of the enemy and able to serve as guides,
assisted the marines, who formed themselves into scouting parties, and
in three or four days succeeded in driving the Spaniards back to
Caimanera and holding their camp unmolested. This heroic en-

THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 275

counter proved the great superiority of the United States forces, their
courage, endurance and determination to conquer, while it developed
the fact that the Cubans, although brave and enthusiastic, were of
little value as disciplined fighters, and were utterly unskilled as
marksmen. The landing, thus severely contested, remained in the
possession of the Navy and was used by Admiral Sampson zs a
coaling and repair station.

On June 22d, Captain Sigsbee of the " St. Paul," disabled the
Spanish destroyer '' Terror," which had been left at Martinique for
repairs, and which, coming up with the cruiser near San Juan, fool-
ishly attempted to torpedo her.

On the 20th of June, word was brought to the admiral's flagship of
the approach of the transports bringing the Army of Santiago under
the command of General Shafter. After a consultation between the
two commanders, naval and military, a conference was held with the
Cuban chieftains at the headquarters of General Rabi at Aserraderos,
about eighteen miles west of Santiago, and the final plans for landing
the troops were decided upon. On the 22d, the steam launches and
other boats of the blockading fleet which could be spared, were col-
lected at the flagship, each in charge of a young naval of^cer, and all
under command of Captain Goodrich of the " St. Louis," ready to
assist in landing the troops. The ships began to shell the coast as
soon as the troops were ready to land at Daiquiri, while a feint was
made on a large scale at Canabas on a little bay west of the harbor.
During this action a shell hit and seriously damaged the '' Texas,"
killing one and wounding nine men. A few days later some of the
troops were landed at Siboney, 3,000 Cubans under Garcia were
brought there from Aserraderos, and on the 17th, 1,300 of General
Duffield's brigade arrived on the " Yale," making about 21,000 men
in all who had been landed at that time.

One of the most important features of the blockade was the search-
light thrown into the harbor at night, making it impossible for the
enemy to attempt to send out even the smallest vessel. The search-
light service was maintained by the " Iowa," " Oregon," and " Massa-
chusetts," whose crews took up the watch for two hours at a time,
while the guns of the adjacent vessel were trained on the entrance.
The ships of the blockading squadron were arranged in a semi-circle,
drawing up at night closer to the shore and at daylight moving out to
a line about six and a half miles from the land batteries.

By June 30th, the preparations for attacking the city were com-

276 Cuba's struggle against spain.

pleted, and arrangements were made tor a joint attack by the land
and sea forces. Early on the morning of July ist, an assault was
commenced on Aguadores by General Dufifield's brigade, supported
by the '' New York," the " Suwanee," and the '' Gloucester." The
attack was a feint to draw off the Spanish forces from the land side of
the city. While the firing was in progress the '' Yale," " Newark," and
'' Vulcan " arrived crowded with soldiers who cheered wildly at every
shot and begged permission to land, but the day was too far advanced
for them to be put on shore. The shelling, which lasted all the fore-
noon, ruined the fortifications of Aguadores.

Next day a bombardment commenced on the forts and batteries
defending the harbor and on the ships within. The line of warships
was formed as follows: "Gloucester," ''New York," ''Newark,"
" Indiana," " Oregon," " Iowa," " Massachusetts," " Texas," " Brook-
lyn," and " Vixen," and the firing commenced at 6 o'clock continuing
two hours, when signals were received that the shells thrown toward
the Spanish position might endanger our own troops. The firing
ceased after having done much damage to the fortifications, and in-
cidentally to the buildings in the city. The marksmanship displayed
by the American gunners was again shown to be unsurpassed.

Meanwhile, Admiral Cervera, who had found it impossible to
elevate his guns sufficiently to assist in the defenses of the city, re-
ceived orders from the Spanish government and from Captain-Gen-
eral Blanco to leave the harbor, and, if possible, sail to the rescue of
Havana. It was hoped that with his sv/ift cruisers, Cervera would be
able to make a dash and get past the American ships before they could
recover from their surprise. The admiral did not share this belief, but
while he protested the impossibility of executing the manoeuver with
success, he obeyed orders and prepared with his magnificent ships to
rush into certain and awful destruction.

Sunday morning, the 3d of July, dawned clear and beautiful over
Santiago bay. The American ships of war, swinging in the semi-
circle outside the entrance of the harbor, gave little token of the
terrible work in which they were so soon to take part. The men
were in their " Sunday clothes," and the ordinary routine of the holy
day was in progress. Admiral Sampson on the flagship " New York,"
was steaming seven miles ofif to Siboney to hold a consultation with
General Shafter and form plans for a simultaneous attack of the land
and sea forces upon the beleaguered city of Santiago.

About half past 9 o'clock, at an opening in the cliffs surrounding

THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 277

the harbor, appeared the fighting masts of a warship, her funnels
throwing out dense clouds of smoke, indicating that she was coming
out with great speed. Suddenly the signal " Enemy's ships are coming
out," appeared on the masthead of the " Iowa," and almost at the
same moment from the other vessels; while the " Brooklyn," Com-
modore Schley's flagship, instantly displayed the signal, *' Close in
and engage the enemy." The '' Maria Teresa," Admiral Cervera's
flagship, was followed by the '' Vizcaya," the " Cristobal Colon," and
the ''Almirante Oquendo," only a few minutes elapsing between the
appearance of the different vessels.

It was evidently the intention of the '' Vizcaya " to immediately
ram the " Brooklyn," but the splendid manoeuvering of the American
vessels, which instantly responded to the commodore's orders, com-
pelled the Spaniards to change their tactics, and they immediately
commenced a running fight, while firing wildly and inefTectively, their
only hope being to disable some of the American vessels and escape
to the open sea.

In a few moments the Spanish flagship was undone; the first shell
that struck her shattered her main water-supply pipe; the second went
into the admiral's cabin, exploding and set the stern afire, while an-
other tore through a gunroom and killed sixty men. In twenty
minutes the " Teresa " was beached six miles from the harbor entrance,
her captain and many of her crew killed, and the survivors, among
them Admiral Cervera and his son, were compelled to leap into the
water and swim ashore. The ''Almirante Oquendo," the last of the
cruisers to leave the bay, was wrecked and beached half a mile be-
yond the '' Maria Teresa." The " Vizcaya " and '' Colon " were speed-
ing to the west, pursued by the " Brooklyn," '' Oregon," " Iowa," and
" Indiana."

Meanwhile the little torpedo-boat destroyers '' Pluton " and
" Furor," came rushing out of the harbor entrance and were met by
the " Gloucester," under the command of Lieutenant Richard Wain-
wright. Shots from the " New York," which had now reached the
scene, and the '' Texas," assisted the '' Gloucester " in destroying these
two vessels. The '' Furor " was sunk and the " Pluton " ran ashore
hauling down her colors. The " Vizcaya " went ashore at Aserraderos,
fifteen miles west of Santiago. On flew the '' Cristobal Colon," fol-
lowed by the '' Brooklyn," the " Oregon," the plucky little " Vixen,"
the " Texas," and the '' New York." The Americans had ceased
firing, intent only on winning the race; the ''Oregon," ''Brooklyn,"

278 Cuba's struggle against spain.

and ''Texas" were making great speed and closing in upon the doomed
vessels. In answer to a signal from Captain Clark of the " Oregon,"
Commodore Schley gave the orders to try one of the thirteen-inch
projectiles. The first struck the water close astern the '' Colon," the
second reached the mark. The magnificent '' Colon," the pride and
glory of the Spanish Navy, and considered one of the fleetest vessels in
the world, hauled down her colors and ran aground at Rio Darquino,
seventy-five miles west of Santiago, at 1:15 p. m., after a chase of three
hours and a quarter. Captain Cook of the '' Brooklyn " went on board
to receive the surrender of the '' Colon," conveying from Commodore
Schley most considerate orders as to the terms to be granted the
prisoners. The crew of 525 men were transferred to the " Resolute,"
while Commodore Paredes and his aide and Captain Moreu were taken
on board the *' New York." The sea-valves of the vessel were opened
by the Spaniards, and she sank so rapidly that it was impossible to
save her.

The survivors of the '' Vizcaya," consisting of Captain Eulate and
twenty-five officers, together with 250 petty officers and men, thirty-
two of whom were wounded, were rescued by the '' Iowa," while the
'* Indiana," the *' Gloucester," and other vessels were busy with the
work of rescuing the crews of the '' Maria Teresa," the '' Oquendo "
and the torpedo boats. Four hundred and eighty prisoners were taken
from the '' Maria Teresa," and about forty from the '' Oquendo,"
twenty-two from the '' Pluton " and seventeen from the " Furor."

Admiral Cervera and his son were taken aboard the '' Gloucester,"
and afterward transferred to the *' Iowa."

In the noble work of rescue the kindness, tenderness and chivalry
of the American seaman were not less conspicuous than his matchless
courage and devotion in the hour of conflict.

The American officers and seamen bore testimony to the bravery
displayed by the Spaniards, as well as to the patience and fortitude
of the wounded prisoners, and their appreciation of the kindness with
which they were treated by their captors. The Spaniards had fought
against overwhelming odds, but they could have done immense dam-
age to the blockading fleet had it not been for their incompetency
with machinery, and their poor marksmanship. Another thing against
the Spaniards was the fact that the seamen at the outset of this
desperate enterprise was stimulated by liquor, while the American
seamen were all sober. The Spaniards expected no quarter from the
Americans, and so astonished were they at the treatment received

CAPTAIN-GENERAL BLANCO.

THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY.

281

that Admiral Cervera cabled to General Blanco: " The crews are very
grateful for the noble generosity with which they were treated." The
prisoners were taken to healthy quarters in the United States, sup-
plied with good clothing and food, while the officers were conveyed to
Annapolis and released on parole; and these men, so kindly treated by
the Americans, had been rescued by them at the risk of their own
lives.

In this action the Americans lost one killed and two wounded. The
man killed was George H. Ellis, yeoman of the '' Brooklyn," who was
instantly killed by a shell from the *' Vizcaya," as he was stepping
forward to find the range of that ship. None of the American vessels
were disabled, although the " Iowa " was struck five times, two shells
piercing her, one starting a fire that was quickly extinguished.

The following dispatch in regard to the action was sent by Com-
modore Watson:

Playa del Este, Inly 3.
Secretary of the Navy, JVashington:

July 3d, at 9:30 A. M, To-day Spanish squadron, seven in all, including one
gunboat, came out of Santiago in column and was totally destroyed within an
hour, excepting " Cristobal Colon," which was chased forty-five miles to west-
ward by the commander-in-chief, " Brooklyn," " Oregon," and " Texas," sur-
rendering to " Brooklyn," but was beached to prevent sinking. None of our
officers or men were injured, except on board " Brooklyn," the chief yeoman,
Ellis, was killed and one man wounded. Admiral Cervera, all commanding
officers excepting of " Oquendo," about seventy other officers, and 1.600 men
are prisoners. About 350 killed or drowned and 160 wounded; latter cared for
on " Solace " and " Olivette." Have just arrived off Santiago in " Marble-
head " to take charge while commander-in-chief is looking out for " Cristobal
Colon."

WATSON.

On the afternoon of the 3d, Admiral Sampson sent the following
cable dispatch to Washington:

SiBONEY, Inly sd, via Hayti, Inly 4th.

The fleet under my command offers the nation, as a Fourth of July present,
the whole of Cervera's fleet. It attempted to escape at 9:30 this morning. At
2 the last ship, the " Cristobal Colon," had run ashore seventy-five miles west
of Santiago and had let down her colors. The " Infanta Maria Teresa,"

282 • Cuba's struggle against spain.

" Oquendo," and " Vizcaya," were forced ashore, burned and blown up within
twenty miles of Santiago. The " Furor " and " Pluton " were destroyed
within four miles of the port.

SAMPSON

This message, which reached the President at noon on Monday
the 4th, filled the country with joy and exultation, arousing the
national spirit from the depression caused by the heavy losses at San
Juan and El Caney on July ist.

Immediately on the receipt of Admiral Sampson's message, the
President sent the following:

Executive Mansion,

Washington, D. C, July 4th.
Admiral Sampson, Playa del Esfe:

You have the gratitude and congratulations of the whole American people.
Convey to your noble officers and crews, through whose valor new honors have
been added to the American Navy, the grateful thanks and appreciation of the
nation.

WILLIAM McKINLEY.

Secretary Long sent the following:

To Admiral Sampson, Playa del Este:

The Secretary of the Navy sends you and every officer and man of your
fleet, remembering afifectionately your dead comrade, grateful acknowledg-
ment of your heroism and skill. All honor to the brave. You have main-
tained the glory of the American Navy.

JOHN D. LONG.

The following is a translation of Admiral Cervera's telegram de-
scribing the battle:

CERVERA'S TELEGRAM.

Playa del Este (Santiago).

I went out with the ships at 9:30 and sustained a very hot battle with the
enemy. The defense was brilliant, but it was impossible to fight against the
hostile forces, which were three times as large as ours. The " Maria Teresa,"
" Oquendo," and '* Vizcaya," all with fire on board, ran ashore, and were then
blown up. The destroyers " Pluton " and " Furor " were sunk by shots from

THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 283

the hostile guns. The " Colon," the Americans say, surrendered after running
aground. I estimate our losses at 600 killed and wounded. The rest of the
crews have been taken prisoners. Villaamil was killed in battle; I believe also
Lazaga. Among the wounded are Concas and Eulate. The Americans have
allowed the latter to retain his sword because of his brilliant conduct. I must
state that the American sailors are treating us with all possible consideration.

CERVERA.

Six days later, the admiral wrote as follows to the captain of the
U. S. S. '' St. Louis," the vessel in which the officers of the Spanish
ships were transported to the United States:

Captain Casper F. Goodrich, U. S. M. S. " St. Louis: "

My Dear Sir. — I have the greatest pleasure in acknowledging by the pres-
ent, in my own name and also in that of all captains and officers actually on
board this ship, that we consider ourselves under the greatest obligation to
you for the many kindness and excellent treatment which you and all the
officers under your command have shown to us during this passage. I must
also mention the careful and most valuable medical assistance which has been
given to our wounded and sick men; your kind feelings are gone as far in
this respect as to order them to be put in one of the saloons of the ship, in
order to provide more effectually to their comfort.

I know nothing which does not agree with what I have just written. * -i= *
I thank you again for the delicate and manifold acts of kindness through
which you have endeavored to alleviate the sore burden of our great misfor-
tune. I assure you that I shall never forget them, and I am, sir,

Your most obedient servant,

PASCUAL CERVERA.
At Sea, July 9, 1898.

The battles of Santiago "and Manila, though reversed in circum-
stances and movements, were perfect parallels as to results. The
losses to the Spaniards in these two engagements amounted to twenty-
ships in all, valued at about $25,000,000. The Spanish loss in men in
both engagements was about 1,100 killed, 2,400 captured, and several
hundred wounded and missing. The American loss in the two battles
was one killed and sixteen wounded, while the injuries sustained by
our vessels were comparatively of the most trivial character. The

284 Cuba's struggle against spain.

commanders engaged on the American side in the battle of Santiago
were Sampson, Schley, Clark, Philip, Cook, Evans, Taylor, and Wain-
wright, all of whom were eminent and conspicuous for bravery and
good conduct, and all of whom were advanced in the order of their
rank in recognition of their good service in this engagement.

On July 4th, the Spaniards made an attempt to imitate Hobson's
exploit by towing the dismantled cruiser '' Reina Mercedes " into the
entrance to sink her across that part of the channel not closed by the
wreck of the '' Merrimac." The movement was observed by the
battle ship " Texas," which opened fire with such good effect that the
'' Mercedes " was driven out of her course to the north side of the
channel, where a thirteen-inch shell struck her in the hull, exploded
and sank her in shoal water, far out of the channel. The Spanish
cruiser ''Alphonso XII " left Havana harbor and endeavored to reach
'* Mariel," but was pursued and destroyed; the crew and part of her
cargo were rescued by detachments of Spanish infantry and artillery
which reached the shore where she was stranded.

On July loth, Santiago was bombarded by the '' Brooklyn,"
*' Texas," and '' Indiana," and on the following day by the *' New
York," " Brooklyn," and '' Indiana," this demonstration being in-
tended to support the attack of the army on the land side of the city.
On the 17th, Santiago having capitulated and the mines in the harbor
being removed under the terms of capitulation, the blockading fleet
entered the bay, and the gunners were able to observe for the first
time the efifect of the projectiles fired by them during the various
bombardments.

On July i8th, all the Spanish ships in Manzanillo harbor were de-
stroyed by the "Wilmington," "Helena," "Scorpion," "Hist,"
" Hornet," " Wompatuck," and " Osceola," without any casualties to
our own vessels. On the 12th of August the city was bombarded, but
on the next day news was brought of the agreement for a treaty of
peace, and hostilities ceased.

The most important facts demonstrated by the naval battles during
the war were the advantage of the use of smokeless powder, and the
great superiority of land fortifications over armed vessels; also the
great importance of thorough drilling in the care and use of machinery
and in marksmanship. So great have been the improvements in the
manufacture of artillery, that success in modern warfare depends in a
great measure upon the efficiency of the men handling the machinery.

Another fact demonstrated to the satisfaction of the members of the

THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 285

" Maine " board of inquiry, as well as to the country at large, was
that the destruction of the '' Maine " could not possibly have been due
to an internal cause, the v/recked vessels of Cervera's fleet having been
injured in such a manner as to cause their magazines to explode
leaving the wrecks in a condition totally different from that of the
" Maine." •

The following are the official reports of officers engaged in the
battle with Cervera's squadron:

SAMPSON'S REPORT OF BATTLE WITH SPANISH FLEET.

U. S. Flagship " New York," ist Rate,

Off Santiago de Cuba, Cuba, July 15, 1898.

Sir. — I have the honor to make the following report upon the battle with
and the destruction of the Spanish squadron commanded by Admiral Cervera.
oft' Santiago de Cuba, on Sunday, July 3, 1898:

The enemy's vessels came out of the harbor between 9:35 and 10 a. m., the
head of the colunm appearing around Cay Smith at 9:31 and emerging from
the channel five or six minutes later.

The positions of the vessels of my command ofif Santiago at that moment
were as follows: The flagship " New York" was four miles east of her block-
ading station and about seven miles from the harbor entrance. She had
started for Siboney, where I intended to land, accompanied by several of my
staff, and go to the front to consult with General Shafter. A discussion of the
situation and a more definite understanding between us of the operations pro-
posed had been rendered necessary by the unexpectedly strong resistance of
the Spanish garrison of Santiago. I had sent my chief of staff on shore the
day before to arrange an interview with General Shafter, who liad been suffer-
ing from heat prostration. I made arrangements to go to his headquarters,
and my flagship was in the position mentioned above when the Spanish squad-
ron appeared in the channel. The remaining vessels were in or near their
usual blockading positions, distributed in a semi-circle about the harbor en-
trance, counting from the eastward to the westward, in the following order:
The " Indiana " about a mile and a half from shore, the '"' Oregon " — the
" New York's" place being between these two — the '" Iowa," " Texas," and
" Brooklyn," the latter two miles from the shore west of Santiago. The dis-
tance of the vessels from the harbor entrance was from two and one-half to

286 Cuba's struggle against spain.

four miles, the latter being the limit of day blockading distance. The length
of the arc formed by the ships was about eight miles. The " Massachusetts "
had left at 4 a. m. for Guantanamo for coal. Her station was between the
" Iowa " and " Texas." The auxiliaries " Gloucester " and " Vixen " lay close
to the land and nearer the harbor entrance than the large vessels, the
" Gloucester " to the eastward and the " Vixen " to the westward. The tor-
pedo boat " Ericsson " was in company with the flagship and remained with
her during tlie chase until ordered to discontinue, when she rendered very
efficient service in rescuing prisoners from the burning " Vizcaya." I inclose
a diagram showing approximately the positions of the vessels as described
above.

The Spanish vessels came rapidly out of the harbor, at a speed estimated at
from eight to ten knots, and in the following order: " Infanta Maria Teresa"
(flagship), "Vizcaya," "Cristobal Colon," and the " Almirante Oquendo."
The distance between these ships was about 800 yards, which means that from
the time the first one became visible in the upper reach of the channel until
the last one was out of the harbor, an interval of only about twelve minutes
elapsed. Following the " Oquendo," at a distance of about 1,200 yards, came
the torpedo-boat destroyer " Pluton," and after her the " Furor." The armored
cruisers, as rapidly as they could bring their guns to bear, opened a vigorous
fire upon the blockading vessels, and emerged from the channel shrouded in
the smoke from their guns.

The men of our ships in front of the port were at Sunday " quarters for
inspection." The signal was made simultaneously from several vessels,
" Enemy ships escaping," and general quarters were sounded. The men
cheered as they sprang to their guns, and fire was opened probably within
eight minutes by the vessels whose guns commanded the entrance. The
" New York " turned about and steamed for the escaping fleet, flying the
signal, " Close in towards harbor entrance and attack vessels," and gradually
increasing speed, until toward the end of the chase she was making sixteen
and one-half knots, and was rapidly closing on the " Cristobal Colon." She
was not, at any time, within the range of the heavy Spanish ships, and her
only part in the firing was to receive the undivided fire from the forts in
passing the harbor entrance, and to fire a few shots at one of the destroyers,
thought at the moment to be attempting to escape from the " Gloucester."

The Spanish vessels, upon clearing the harbor, turned to the westward in
column, increasing their speed to the full power of their engines. The heavy
blockading vessels, which had closed in toward the Morro at the instant of
the enemy's appearance, and at their best speed, delivered a rapid fire, well
sustained and destructive, which speedily overwhelmed and silenced the Spanish

THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 287

fire. The initial speed of the Spaniards carried them rapidly past the blockad-
ing vessels, and the battle developed into a chase in which the " Brooklyn "
and " Texas " had, at the start, the advantage of position. The " Brooklyn "
maintained this lead. The " Oregon," steaming with amazing speed from the
commencement of the action, took first place. The " Iowa " and the " Indi-
ana " having done good work, and not having the speed of the other ships,
were directed by me, in succession, at about the time the " Vi/.caya " was
beached, to drop out of the chase and resume blockading stations. These ves-
sels rescued many prisoners. The " Vixen, '^ finding that the rush of the
Spanish ships would put her between two fires, ran outside of our own column
and remained there during the battle and chase.

The skillful handling and gallant fighting of the " Gloucester " excited the
admiration of everyone who witnessed it, and merits the commendation of
the Navy Department. She is a fast and entirely unprotected auxiliary vessel
— the yacht " Corsair " — and has a good battery of light rapid-fire guns.
She was lying about two miles from the harbor entrance, to the southward
and eastward, and immediately steamed in, opening fire upon the large ships.
Anticipating the appearance of the " Pluton " and " Furor," the " Gloucester "
was slowed, thereby gaining more rapidly a high pressure of steam, and when
the destroyers came out she steamed for them at full speed, and was able to
close to short range, while her fire was accurate, deadly, and of great volume.
During this fight the " Gloucester " was under the fire of the Socapa battery.
Within twenty minutes from the time they emerged from Santiago harbor the
careers of the " Furor " and the " Pluton " were ended, and two-thirds of their
people Icilled. The " Furor" was beached and sunk in the surf; the " Pluton "
sank in deep water a few minutes later. The destroyers probably suffered
much injury from the fire of the secondary batteries of the battle ships " Iowa,"
" Indiana," and the " Texas," yet I think a very considerable factor in their
speedy destruction was the fire, at close range, of the '* Gloucester's " battery.
After rescuing the survivors of the destroyers, the " Gloucester " did excellent
service in landing and securing the crew of the " Infanta Maria Teresa."

The method of escape attempted by the Spaniards, all steering in the same
direction, and in formation, removed all tactical doubts or difficulties, and
made plain the duty of every United States vessel to close in, immediately
engage, and pursue. This was promptly and effectively done. As already
stated, the first rush of the Spanish squadron carried it past a number of the
blockading ships which could not immediately work up to their best speed;
but they suffered heavily in passing, and the " Infanta Maria Teresa " and the
" Oquendo " were probably set on fire by shells fired during the first fifteen
minutes of the engagement. It was afterward learned that the ". Infanta Maria

288 Cuba's struggle against spain.

Teresa's " fire main had been cut by one of our first shots, and that she was
unable to extinguish fire. With large volumes of smoke rising from their
lower decks aft, these vessels gave up both fight and flight, and ran in on the
beach — the "Infanta Maria Teresa" at about 10:15 a. m. at Nima Nima, six
and a half miles from Santiago harbor entrance, and the " Almirante Oquendo "
at about 10:30 a. m, at Juan Gonzales, seven miles from the port.

The " Vizcaya " was still imder the fire of the leading vessels; the '* Cristobal
Colon " had drawn ahead, leading the chase, and soon passed beyond the range
of the guns of the leading American ships. The " Vizcaya " was soon set on
fire, and, at 11:15, she turned inshore and was beached at Aserraderos, fifteen
miles from Santiago, burning fiercely and with her reserves of ammunition on
deck already beginning to explode. When about ten miles west of Santiago
the " Indiana " had been signaled to go back to the harbor entrance, and at
Aserraderos the " Iowa " was signaled to " Resume blockading station." The
" Iowa," assisted by the " Ericsson " and the " Hist," took off the crew of the
" Vizcaya," while the " Harvard " and the " Gloucester " rescued those of
the " Infanta Maria Teresa " and the " Almirante Oquendo." This rescue of
prisoners, including the wounded, from the burning Spanish vessels was the
occasion of some of the most daring and gallant conduct of the day. The ships
were burning fore and aft, their guns and reserve ammunition were exploding
and it was not known at what moment the fire would reach the main maga-
zines. In addition to this a heavy surf was running just inside the Spanish
ships. But no risk deterred our officers and men until their work of humanity
was complete.

There remained now of the Spanish ships only the " Cristobal Colon " — but
she was their best and fastest vessel. Forced by the situation to hug the
Cuban coast, her only chance of escape was by superior and sustained speed.
When the " Vizcaya " went ashore, the " Colon " was about six miles ahead
of the "Brooklyn" and the "Oregon;" but her spurt was finished and the
American ships were now gaining upon her. Behind the " Brooklyn " and the
" Oregon " came the " Texas," " Vixen " and " New York." It was evi-
dent from the bridge of the " New York " that all the American ships were
gradually overhauling the chase, and that she had no chance of escape. At
12:50 the "Brooklyn" and the "Oregon" opened fire and got her range —
the "Oregon's" heavy shell striking beyond her — and at 1:20 she gave up
without firing another shot, hauled down her colors and ran ashore at Rio
Torquino, forty-eight miles from Santiago. Captain Cook, of the " Brooklyn,"
went on board to receive the surrender. While his boat was alongside I came
up in the " New York," received his report and placed the " Oregon " in charge
of the wreck to save her, if possible, and directed the prisoners to be transferred

THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 289

to the " Resolute," which had followed the chase. Commodore Schley, whose
chief of staff had gone on board to receive the surrender, had directed that
all her personal effects should be retained by the officers. This order I did
not modify. The " Cristobal Colon " was not injured by our firing, and
probably is not much injured by beaching, though she ran ashore at high
speed. The beach was so steep that she came off by the working of the sea.
But her sea valves were opened and broken, treacherously, I am sure, after her
surrender, and despite all efforts she sank. When it became evident that she
could not be kept afloat, she was pushed by the " New York " bodily upon
the beach, the " New York's " stem being placed against her for this purpose —
the ship being handled by Captain Chadwick with admirable judgment — and
sank in shoal water and may be saved. Had this not been done she would
have gone down in deep water and would have been, to a certainty, a total
loss.

I regard this complete and important victory over the Spanish forces as the
successful finish of several weeks of arduous and close blockade, so stringent
and effective during the night that the enemy was deterred from making the
attempt to escape at night, and deliberately elected to make the attempt in day-
light. That this was the case I was informed by the commanding ofBcer
of the " Cristobal Colon."

It seems proper to briefly describe here the manner in which this was ac-
complished. The harbor of Santiago is naturally easy to blockade, there being
but one entrance and that a narrow one, and the deep water extending close
up to the shore line presenting no difficulties of navigation outside of the
entrance. At the time of my arrival before the port — June ist — the moon was
at its full, and there was sufficient light during the night to enable any move-
ment outside of the entrance to be detected; but with the waning of the moon
and the coming of dark nights there was opportunity for the enemy to escape,
or for his torpedo boats to make an attack upon the blockading vessels. It
was ascertained with fair conclusiveness that the " Merrimac," so gallantly
taken into the channel on June 3d, did not obstruct it. I, therefore, maintained
the blockade as follows: To the battle ships was assigned the duty, in turn,
of lighting the channel. Moving up to the port, at a distance of from one to
two miles from the Morro — dependent upon the condition of the atmosphere
— they threw a search-light beam directly up the channel, and held it steadily
there. This lighted up the entire breadth of the channel for a half a mile inside
of the entrance so brilliantly that the movement of small boats could be de-
tected. Why the batteries never opened fire upon the search-light ship was
always a matter of surprise to me; but they never did. Stationed close to the
entrance of the port were three picket launches and a little distance farther out

290 CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.

three small picket vessels — usually converted yachts — and, when they were
available, one or two of our torpedo boats. With this arrangement there was
at least a certainty that nothing could get out of the harbor undetected. After
the arrival of the army, when the situation forced upon the Spanish admiral a
decision, our vigilance increased. The night blockading distance was reduced
to two miles for all vessels, and a battle ship was placed alongside the search-
light ship, with her broadside trained upon the channel in readiness to fire the
instant a Spanish ship should appear. The commanding officers merit the
greatest praise for the perfect manner in which they entered into this plan and
put it into execution. The " Massachusetts," which, according to routine, was
sent that morning to coal at Guantanamo, like the others had spent weary
nights upon this work, and deserved a better fate than to be absent that
morning.

I inclose for the information of the Department, copies of orders and mem-
orandums issued from time to time, relating to the manner of maintaining the
blockade.

When all the work was done so well it is difificult to discriminate in praise.
The object of the blockade of Cervera's squadron was fully accomplished, and
each individual bore well his part in it — the commodore in command on the
second division, the captains of ships, their of^cers and men. The fire of the
battle ships was powerful and destructive, and the resistance of the Spanish
squadron was, in great part, broken almost before they had got beyond the
range of their own forts. The fine speed of the " Oregon " enabled her to
take a front position in the chase, and the " Cristobal Colon " did not give up
until the " Oregon " had thrown a thirteen-inch shell beyond her. This per-
formance adds to the already brilliant record of this fine battle ship, and speaks
highly of the skill and care with which her admirable efficiency has been main-
tained during a service unprecedented in the history of vessels of her class.
The " Brooklyn's " westerly blockading position gave her an advantage in
the chase which she maintained to the end, and she employed her fine battery
with telling effect. The " Texas " and the " New York " were gaining on
the chase during the last hour, and had any accident befallen the " Brooklyn "
or the " Oregon," would have speedily overhauled the " Cristobal Colon."
From the moment the Spanish vessel exhausted her first burst of speed the re-
sult was never in doubt. She fell, in fact, far below what might reasonably have
been expected of her. Careful measurements of time and distance give her an
average speed, from the time she cleared the harbor mouth until the time she
was run on shore at Rio Tarquino, of thirteen and seven-tenths knots. Neither
the " New York " nor the " Brooklyn " stopped to couple up their forward
engines, but ran out tJie chase with one pair, getting steam, of course, as

THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 29I

rapidly as possible on all boilers. To stop to couple up the forward engines
would have meant a delay of fifteen minutes, or four miles in the chase.

Several of the ships were struck — the "Brooklyn" more often than the
others — but very slight material injury was done, the greatest being aboard
the " Iowa." Our loss was one man killed and one wounded, both on the
" Brooklyn." It is dif^cult to explain this immunity from loss of life or injury
to ships in a combat with modern vessels of the best type, but Spanish gun-
nery is poor at the best, and the superior weight and accuracy of our fire
speedily drove the men from their guns and silenced their fire. This is borne
out by the statements of prisoners and by observation. The Spanish vessels,
as they dashed out of the harbor, were covered with the smoke from their
own guns, but this speedily diminished in volume and soon almost disappeared.
The fire from the rapid-fire batteries of the battle ships appears to have been
remarkably destructive. An examination of the stranded vessels shows that
the " Almirante Oquendo " especially had suffered terribly from this fire.
Her sides are everywhere pierced and her decks were strewn with the charred
remains of those who had fallen.

The reports of Commodore W. S. Schley and of the commanding officers
are inclosed.

A board, appointed by me several days ago, has made a critical examination
of the stranded vessels, both with a view of reporting upon the result of our
fire and the military features involved and of reporting upon the chance of
saving any of them and of wrecking the remainder. The report of the board
will be speedily forwarded.

Very respectfully,

W. T. SAMPSON,
Rear Admiral United States Navy.
Commander-in-Chief U. S. Naval Force, North Atlantic Station.

The Secretary of the Navy, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

SCHLEY'S REPORT OF ENGAGEMENT WITH SPANISH

SQUADRON.

North Atlantic Fleet, Second Squadron, U. S. Flagship '' Brooklyn,"

GuANTANAMO Bay, Cuba, Jtily 6, 1898.
Sir. — I have the honor to make the following report of that part of the
squadron under your command which came under my observation during
the engac^ement with the Spanish fleet on July 3, 1898.

292 Cuba's struggle against spain.

At 9:35 A. M. Admiral Cervera, with the " Infanta Maria Teresa/' " Vizcaya,"
" Oquendo," '' Cristobal Colon " and two torpedo boat destroyers, came out
of the harbor of Santiago de Cuba in column at distance and attempted to
escape to the westward. Signal was made from the " Iowa " that the enemy
was coming out, but his movements had been discovered from this ship at the
same moment. This vessel was the farthest west, except the " Vixen," in the
blockading line. Signal was made to the western division, as prescribed in
your general orders, and there was immediate and rapid movements inward
by your squadron and a general engagement at ranges beginning at 1,100
yards and varying to 3.000 yards, until the " Vizcaya " was destroyed, about
10:50 A. M. The concentration of the fire of the squadron upon the ships com-
ing out was most furious and terrific, and great damage was done them.

About twenty or twenty-five minutes after the engagement began two ves-
sels, thought to be the " Teresa " and " Oquendo," and since verified as such,
took fire from the effective shell fire of the squadron and were forced to run
on the beach some six or seven miles west of the harbor entrance, where they
burned and blew up later. The torpedo boat destroyers were destroyed early
in the action, but the smoke was so dense in their direction that I cannot say
to which vessel or vessels the credit belongs. This, doubtless, was better seen
from your flagship.

The " Vizcaya " and " Colon," perceiving the disaster to their consorts, con-
tinued at full speed to the westward to escape and were followed and en-
gaged in a running fight with the " Brooklyn," " Texas," " Iowa " and
"Oregon" until 10:50, when the "Vizcaya" took fire from our shells. She
put her helm to port and, with a heavy list to port, stood in shore and ran
aground at Aserraderos, about twenty-one miles west of Santiago, on fire
fore and aft, and where she blew up during the night. Observing that she
had struck her colors, and that several vessels were nearing her to capture
and save her crew, signal was made to cease firing. The " Oregon " having
proved vastly faster than the other battleships, she and the " Brooklyn," to-
gether with the " Texas " and another vessel which proved to be your flagship
continued westward in pursuit of the " Colon," which had run close in shore,
evidently seeking some good spot to beach if she should fail to elude her
pursuers.

This pursuit continued with increasing speed in the " Brooklyn," " Oregon"
and other ships, and soon the " Brooklyn " and " Oregon " were within long
range of the " Colon," when the " Oregon " opened fire with her thirteen'
inch guns, landing a shell close to the " Colon." A moment afterwards the
*' Brooklyn " opened fire with her eight-inch guns, landing a shell just ahead of
her. Several other shells were fired at the " Colon," now in range of the

THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 293

" Brooklyn's " and " Oregon's " guns. Her commander, seeing all chances of
escape cut off, and destruction awaiting his ship, fired a lee gun and struck
her flag at 1:15 p. m., and ran ashore at a point some fifty miles west of
Santiago harbor. Your flagship was coming up rapidly at the time, as was
also the " Texas " and " Vixen." A little later, after your arrival, the " Cristo-
bal Colon," which had struck to the " Brooklyn " and the " Oregon," was
turned over to you as one of the trophies of this great victory of the squadron
under your command.

During my official visit, a little later, Commander Eaton, of the " Resolute,"
appeared and reported to you the presence of a Spanish battleship near Altares.
Your orders to. me were to take the " Oregon " and go eastward to meet her,
and this was done by the " Brooklyn," with the result that the vessel reported
as an enemy was discovered to be the Austrian cruiser " Infanta Maria Teresa,"
seeking the commander-in-chief.

I would mention, for your consideration, that the " Brooklyn " occupied the
most westward blockading position, with the " Vixen," and, being more di-
rectly in the route taken by the Spanish squadron, was exposed for some
minutes, possibly ten, to the gun fire of three of the Spanish ships and the
west battery, at a range of 1,500 yards from the ships and about 3,000 yards
from the batteries, but the vessels of the entire squadron, closing in rapidly,
soon diverted this fire and did magnificent work at close range. I have never
before witnessed such deadly and fatally accurate shooting as was done by the
ships of your command as they closed in on the Spanish squadron, and I deem
it a high privilege to commend to you, for such action as you may deem
proper, the gallantry and dashing courage, the prompt decision and the skillful
handling of their respective vessels of Captain Philip, Captain Evans, Captain
Clark, and especially my chief of staff. Captain Cook, who was directly under
my personal observation and whose coolness, promptness and courage were of
the highest order. The dense smoke of the combat shut out from my view
the " Indiana " and the " Gloucester," but, as these vessels were closer to your
flagship, no doubt their part in the conflict was under your immediate obser-
vation.

Lieutenant Sharp, commanding the " Vixen," acted with conspicuous
courage; although unable to engage the heavier ships of the enemy with his
light guns, nevertheless was close in to the battle line under heavy fire, and
many of the enemy's shot passed beyond his vessel.

I beg to invite special attention to the conduct of my flag lieutenant, James
H. Sears, and Ensign Edward McCauley, Jr., aid, who were constantly at my
side during the engagement and who exposed themselves fearlessly in dis-
charging their duties; and also the splendid behavior of my secretary, Lieui-

294 Cuba's struggle against spain.

tenant B. W. Wells, Jr., who commanded and directed the fighting of the
fourth division with splendid effect.

I would commend the highly meritorious conduct and courage in the en-
gagement of Lieutenant Commander N. E. Mason, the executive officer, whose
presence everywhere over the ship during its continuance did much to secure
the good result of this ship's part in the victory.

The navigator. Lieutenant A. C. Hodgson, and the division officers, Lieu-
tenant T. D. Griffin, Lieutenant W. R. Rush, Lieutenant Edward Simpson,
Lieutenant J. G. Doyle, Ensign Charles Webster and the junior divisional offi-
cers were most steady and conspicuous in every detail oi duty contributing
to the accurate firing of this ship in her part of the great victory qf your forces.

The officers of the Medical, Pay, Engineer and Marine Corps responded to
every demand of the occasion, and were fearless in exposing themselves. The
warrant officers. Boatswain William L. Hill, Carpenter G. H. Warford and
Gunner F. T. Applcgate, were everywhere exposed, in watching for damage,
reports of which were promptly conveyed to me.

I have never in my life served with a braver, better, or worthier crew than
that of the " Brooklyn." During the combat, lasting from 9:35 until 1:15 f. m.,
much of the time under fire, they never flagged for a moment, and were appar-
ently undisturbed by the storm of projectiles passing ahead, astern and over the
ship.

The result of the engagement was the destruction of the Spanish squadron
and the capture of the Admiral and some thirteen to fifteen hundred prisoners,
with the loss of several hundred killed, estimated by Admiral Cervera at 600
men.

The casualties on board this ship were: G. H. Ellis, chief yeoman, killed;
J. Burns, fireman, first class, severely wounded. The marks and scars show
that the ship was struck about twenty-five times, and she bears in all forty-one
scars as the result of her participation in the great victory of your force on
July 3, 1898. The speed-cone halyards were shot away and nearly all the
signal halyards. The ensign at the main was so shattered that in hauling it
down at the close of action it fell in pieces.

I congratulate you most sincerely upon this great victory to the squadron
under your command, and I am glad that I had an opportunity to contribute
in the least to a victory that seems big enough for all of us.

I have the honor to transmit herewith the report of the commanding officer
and a drawing, in profile, of the ship, showing the location of hits and scars,
also a memorandum of the ammunition expended and the amount to fill her
allowance.

Since reaching this place and holding conversation with several of the cap-

THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 295

tains, viz., Captain Enlate, of the Vizcaya, and the second in command of the
" Colon," Commander Control as, I have learned that the Spanish admiral's
scheme was to concentrate all fire for awhile on the " Brooklyn," and the
" Vizcaya " to ram her, in the hopes that if they could destroy her the chance
of escape would be increased, as it was supposed she was the swiftest ship of
your squadron. This explains the heavy fire mentioned and the " Vizcaya's "
action in the earlier moments of the engagement. The execution of this purpose
was promptly defeated by the fact that all the ships of the squadron advanced
into close range and opened an irresistibly furious and terrific fire upon the
enemy's squadron as it was coming out of the harbor.

I am glad to say that the injury supposed to be below the water line was
due to a water valve being opened from seme unknown cause and flooding
the compartment. The injury to the belt is found to be only slight and the
leak small.

I beg to inclose a list of the officers and crew who participated in the combat
of July 3, 1898.

I cannot close this report without mentioning in high terms of praise the
splendid conduct and support of Captain C. E. Clark of the " Oregon." Her
speed was wonderful and her accurate fire splendidly destructive.

Very respectfully,

V/. S. SCHLEY,
Commodore United States Navy.
Commanding Second Squadron North Atlantic Fleet.
The Commander-in-Chief U. S. Naval Force, North Atlantic Station.

U. S. Flagship " New York," ist Rate,
Playa del Este, July 4, 1898.
Sir. — I have the honor to make the following report of the part taken by
this ship in the action of yesterday during and following sortie of Admiral
Cervera's squadron.

The ship had started at 8:50 for the army landing at Siboney, the commander-
in-chief having an appointment with the general commander of the army. A
few minutes after the crew had been called to quarters for Sunday inspection,
firing was heard and a ship was seen leaving the harbor entrance; the helm was

296 Cuba's struggle against spain.

at once put over, the crew called to general quarters, signal " Close in toward
harbor entrance and attack vessels " made, orders given to spread all fires
and the ship headed back for the enemy, whose ships were seen successively-
coming out at a high speed. The flagship " Infanta Maria Teresa " was first,
then another armored cruiser of the same class (which turned out to be the
" Vizcaya "), followed by the " Cristobal Colon," and armored cruiser
C Oquendo "), and the torpedo-boat destroyers "Furor" and " Pluton."

The nearer ships had immediately engaged and by the time we were off the
entrance, one, the flagship, was already afire and was soon ashore. The
" Indiana " and " Gloucester " were actively engaged with the torpedo boats.
This ship fired some four-inch shell at the one nearer the port toward which
she was headed and seemed attempting to return, but she was already practi-
cally out of the fight. The boiler of the more aclvanced one had blown up,
showing a vast column of condensed steam. During this time the batteries,
whose line of fire we had crossed close to, repeatedly fired upon us, without
effect. No return was made to this fire. A shell from the west battery fell
within 200 yards of the ship when we were over four miles to the westward
and we had thought ourselves entirely out of range. This ship stood on, leav-
ing the " Gloucester," which had r.hown herself so capable, to look after the
survivors in the torpedo boats. By this time a second cruiser was ashore and
burning (the " Almirante Oquendo "), while the third, the " Vizcaya," and the
" Cristobal Colon " were still steaming rapidly westward. The " Indiana " was
now signaled (11:26 a. m.) to return to the blockading position to look after
snylhing which might be there. Very shortly the " Vizcaya " turned shoreward,
smoke began to issue from her afterpart, and by the time that she was ashore
on the reef at Aserraderos (fifteen miles west of Santiago) she was ablaze. The
" Iowa " had signaled a little before that she had surrendered, and stopped
off this place, where she gave much assistance in the rescue of the " Vizcaya's "
people.

This ship stood on in the chase of the " Cristobal Colon," with ahead of
us the " Brooklyn," " Oregon," " Texas " and " Vixen," the " Oregon " being
much nearer inshore of the two headmost ships, but not in gunshot. We were
rapidly increasing our speed.

It was evident, however, that the " Colon " would give us a lengthy chase,
and at noon the crew left quarters and went to dinner.

About 12:50 the "Oregon" opened fire, and some of her shells were ob-
served to strike beyond the " Colon." This made her capture a foregone
conclusion, and shortly after i o'clock she turned in toward shore and soon
struck her colors. She had been beached at a small inlet known as Rio
Tarquino. By the time we arrived a boat was alongside her from the " Brook-

ADMIRAL SAMPSON.

w

fin

W

H

THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 299

lyn," and Captain Cook, the boarding officer, came alongside this and re-
ported. This ship then sent a boat to take possession, the commanding
officer going in the boat. I was received by the commodore of the squadron,
the captain. Captain de Navio Don Emilio Moreu and Captain de Navio,
of the first class, Don Jose de Paredes y Chacon (which latter had been
civil governor of Santiago and had only just been attached to the gquadron).
I arranged for the transfer of the crew and officers, a division to each ship
present and the engineer force to be left aboard. While aboard, however,
the " Resolute " arrived and it was arranged to transfer the whole number to
her,

I had taken with me the fleet surgeon, an engineer officer and the carpenter
to examine and make secure everything necessary. The engineer officer re>-
ported to me that she was making water aft. I had previously had soundings
taken and found eight feet at the bow and seventy at the stern, so that bur a
small portion of the ship was ashore. I returned as quickly as possible to
the flagship to report the situation. The "Oregon" was 'signaled to take
charge and the men were hastened on board, a number being sent also from
this ship. Our work of closing water-tight doors, etc., was of no avail. A
large number of sea valves had been treacherously opened and the valves so
broken as to make it impossible to close them. The ship thus slowly settled.
At 7:30 she came afloat and came out into deeper water. The officer in charge
(Lieutenant-Commander Cogswell) had let go an anchor, but as it was clear
that if she went down in water of the depth in which she was she could never
be recovered, this ship's stem was placed against her quarter, and later, a
line being taken from our own bow to hers, the " Colon " was forced inshore.
It was by this time dark, but using a searchlight we were enabled gradually
to force the ship in on the beach, the chain being paid out at the same time.
She thus sank in a very moderate depth of water, and it is very probable she
may be saved.

At II p. M. the flagship returned to Santiago, leaving the " Texas " and
" Oregon " in charge of the prize.

Though the ship was not able to come to action with any of the larger
ships on account of her distance to the eastward, every nerve was strained
to do so, and all was done that could be done. Our speed had rapidly in-
creased so that we were going sixteen knots at the end. We were imme-
diately astern while all others were considerably to seaward. We were thus in
a position to prevent a possible doubling to the rear and escape to the south-
east.

The officers and crew, as they always have done, acted in the most enthu-
siastic and commendable m^nner. They have worked into so complete a

300 Cuba's struggle against spain.

system that the ship is practically instantaneously ready for action, and while
all are deserving of commendation and credit, I think it no derogation from
the deserts of others to particularly name Lieutenant-Commander Potter, to
whom, as executive ofTficer, so much of the ship's efficiency is due, and Chief
Engineer McConnell, who has kept the machinery in the admirable order
which has enabled us at all times to develop the ship's full speed.

Very respectfully,

F. E. CHADWICK,
Captain, U. S, N., Commanding.
The Commander-in-Chief U. S. Naval Force, North Atlantic Station.

U. S. Flagship "New York," 'ist Rate,
GuANTANAMO Bay, July 2g, 1898.

Sir. — As supplementary to my report, dated July 4th, of the action of the
3d, I beg to state that at the close of the chase of the " Colon " our speed had
increased to not less than seventeen knots, instead of sixteen, as mentioned
in my ninth paragraph.

We were making at the close from 104 to 108 turns. One hundred and four
turns with a clean bottom would give seventeen and a third knots. One hun-
dred and eight turns with a clean bottom would give eighteen knots. An
allowance of one knot off for foul bottom is more than ample, as the ship was
flying light, having in but a moderate amount of coal and very few stores.
Under such circumstances there can be no question that this ship would have
quickly overhauled the " Colon " had she continued her flight, and would have
insured her capture had there been an accident of any sort to the other ships
in pursuit.

Very respectfully,

F. E. CHADWICK,
Captain, (J. S. N., Commanding.
The Commander-in-Chief.

THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 3OI

CAPTAIN CLARK'S REPORT OF BATTLE AT SANTIAGO, JULY 3,

1898.

U. S. S. " Oregon," ist Rate,

Off Santiago de Cuba, July 4, 1898.

Sir.— I have the honor to report that at 9:30 a. m., yesterday, the Spanish
fleet was discovered standing out of the harbor of Santiago de Cuba. They
turned to the westward and opened fire, to which our ships replied vigorously.
For a short time there was an almost continuous Alight of projectiles over this
ship, but when our line was fairly engaged, and the " Iowa " had made a swift
advance as if to ram or close, the enemy's fire became defective in train as
well as range. The ship was only struck three times, and at least two of them
were by fragments of shells. We had no casualties.

As soon as it was evident that the enemy's ships were trying to break through
and escape to the westward we went ahead at full speed, with the determination
of carrying out to the utmost your order: " If the enemy tries to escape, the ships
must close and engage as soon as possible and endeavor to sink his vessels
or force them to run ashore." We soon passed all of our ships except the
" Brooklyn," bearing the broad pennant of Commodore Schley. At first we
only used our main battery, but when it was discovered that the enemy's tor-
pedo boats were following their ships we used our rapid-fire guns, as well as
the six-inch, upon them with telling effect. As we ranged up near the stern-
most of their ships she headed for the beach, evidently on fire. We raked her
as we passed, pushing on for the next ahead, using our starboard guns as they
were brought to bear, and before we had her fairly abeam she too was making
for the beach. The two remaining vessels were now some distance ahead, but
our speed had increased to sixteen knots and our fire, added to that of the
" Brooklyn," soon sent another, the " Vizcaya," to the shore in fiames. The
" Brooklyn " signaled " Oregon, well done." Only the " Cristobal Colon "
was left, and for a time it seemed as if she might escape; but when we opened
with our forward turret guns and the " Brooklyn " followed, she began to
edge in toward the coast and her capture or destruction was assured. As she
struck the beach her flag came down and the " Brooklyn " signaled, " Cease
firing," folL'owing it with " Congratulations for the grand victory, thanks for
your splendid assistance."

The " Brooklyn " sent a boat to her, and when the admiral came up with
the " New York," " Texas," and " Vixen," she was taken possession of. A
prize crew was put on board from this ship under Lieutenant-Commander
Cogswell, the executive officer, but before 11 p. m. the ship, which had been

302 CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.

filling in spite of all efforts to stop leaks, was abandoned, and just as the
crew left she went over on her side.

I can not speak in too high terms of the bearing and conduct of all on board
this ship. When they found the " Oregon " had pushed to the front, and was
hurrying to a succession of conflicts with the enemy's vessels if they could be
overtaken, and would engage, the enthusiasm was intense.

As these vessels were so much more heavily armored than the " Brooklyn "
they might have concentrated upon and overpowered her, and consequently I
am persuaded that, but for the way the officers and men of the " Oregon "
steamed and steered the ship and fought and supplied her batteries, the
" Colon " and perhaps the " Vizcaya " would have escaped. Therefore, I feel
that they rendered meritorious service to the country; and while I can not
mention the name of each officer and man individually, I am going to append
a list of the officers, with the stations that they occupied, hoping that it may
be of service to them should the claims of others for advancement above them
ever be considered.

J. K. Cogswell, lieutenant-commander; had general charge of the batteries.

R. F. Nicholson, lieutenant; handled the ship, placing her as I directed

W. H. Allen, lieutenant; in charge of ammunition supply.

A. A. Ackerman, lieutenant; in charge of after thirteen-inch turret.

E. W. Eberle, lieutenant, junior grade; in charge of forward thirteen-inch
turret.

C. M. Stone, lieutenant, junior grade; in charge of six-inch battery.

L. A. Bostwick, ensign; aloft giving ranges till we closed, then in charge
of torpedoes.

C. L. Hussey, ensign; in charge of ten six-pounder H. R. F. guns.

R. Z. Johnston, ensign; in charge of signals and aid to captain.

R. Dickins, captain, U. S. M. C. ; in charge of marines and four six-pounder
H. R. F.

A. R. Davis, second lieutenant, U. S. M. C; in charge of four six-pounder
H. R. F, and two one-pounder.

H. E. Yarnell, naval cadet; in charge port after eight-inch turret.

L. M. Overstreet, naval cadet; in charge of starboard forward eight-inch
turret.

C. R. Miller, naval cadet; in charge of port forward eight-inch turret.

S. G. Magill, naval cadet; in charge of six-inch gun.

C. S. Kempff, naval cadet; in charge of starboard eight-inch turret aft.

P. B. Dungan, naval cadet; in forward thirteen-inch turret.

E. J. Sadler, naval cadet; in forward chain of supplies.

E. C. Kalbfus, naval cadet; in after thirteen-inch turret.

THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 303

H. L. Briiiser, naval cadet; in after chain of supplies,

C. B. Hatch, naval cadet; at secondary battery.

C. Shackford, naval cadet; in torpedo division.

R. W. Milligan, chief engineer; in charge of machinery.

C. N. Ofifley, passed assistant engineer; in starboard engine-room.

J. M. Reeves, assistant engineer; in port engine-room.

F. Lyon, assistant engineer; in charge of firerooms.

H. N. Jenson, naval cadet; in after hydraulic pumproom.

W. D. Leahy, naval cadet; in forward hydraulic pumproom.

T. C, Dunlap, (acting) assistant engineer; in starboard engine-room.

P. A. Lovering, surgeon; in charge of hospital.

W. B. Grove, assistant surgeon; transportation of wounded.

S, R. Colhoun, paymaster; with surgeon, aid to wounded.

J. P. Mclntyre, chaplain; with surgeon, aid to wounded.

J. A. Murphy, pay clerk; aid to wounded in six-inch compartment.

John Costello, boatswain; in central station.

A. S. Williams, gunner; in powder division.

M. F. Roberts, carpenter; in powder division.

Very respectfully,

C. E. CLARK.
Captain, U. S. AL, Commanding.
The Commander-in-Chief U. S. Naval Force, North Atlantic Station.

CAPTAIN PHILIP'S REPORT OF THE BATTLE JULY 3, 1898.

U. S. S. " Texas,"
Ofif Santiago, July 4, 1898.

Sir. — In accordance with the requirements of article 437, Navy Regulations,
I respectfully submit the follovs^ing statement in regard to the part the " Texas "
took in the engagement with the enemy yesterday.

At daylight on the morning of the 3d the " Texas " stood out from entrance
to harbor, taking day blockading position, about three miles from the Morro
(the Morro bearing north-northeast).

At 9:35, the Morro bearing N. by E. % E., distant 5,100 yards, the enemy's
ships were sighted standing out of the harbor. Immediately general signal
250 was made; this signal was followed by the "Iowa's" almost at the same
time.

304 CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.

The ship, as per order, was heading in toward the entrance; went ahead
full speed, putting helm hard astarboard, and ordering forced draft on. all
boilers. The officer of the deck, Lieut. M. L. Bristol, having given the general
alarm and beat to quarters for action at the same time.

As the leader, bearing the admiral's flag, appeared in the entrance she
opened fire, which was, at 9:40, returned by the " Texas " at range of 4,200
>ards while closing in. The ship leading was of the " Vizcaya " class and
the flagship.

Four ships came out, evidently the " Vizcaya," the " Oquendo," " Maria
Teresa," and " Colon," followed by two torpedo-boat destroyers. Upon seeing
these two we immediately opened fire upon them with our secondary battery,
the main battery at the time being engaged with the second and third ships
in line. Owing to our secondary battery, together with the " Iowa " and
" Gloucester," these two destroyers were forced to beach and sink.

Whilst warmly engaged with the third in line, which was abreast and engag-
ing the " Texas," our fire was blanketed for a short time by the " Oregon "
forging ahead and engaging the second ship. This third ship, after a spirited
fire, sheered inshore, and in 10:35 r^^^ up a white flag. We then ceased fire on
the third and opened fire with our forward guns at long range (6,600 yards)
on the second ship (which was then engaged with the " Oregon ") until 11:05,
when she (enemy's second ship) sheered in to the beach, on fire.

At 11:10 she struck her colors. We ceased fire and gave chase, with
" Brooklyn " and " Oregon," for the leading ship until 1:20, when the " Colon "
sheered in to beach and hauled down her colors, leaving them on deck at foot
of her flagstaff. We shut ofT forced draft and proceeded at moderate speed
to close up.

I would state that during this chase the " Texas " was holding her own with
the " Colon," she leading us about four miles at the start.

The reports of the executive order and the surgeon are transmitted.

I have the pleasure of stating that the entire battery of the " Texas " is in
a most excellent condition and ready for any service required by the com-
mander-in-chief, especially calling attention to the efificiency of the two turret
guns, due to the alterations recently made by Lieut. F. J. Haeseler, of this ship.

The bearing and performance of duty of all officers met with my entire
approval.

Very respectfully submitted,

J. W. PHILIP,
Captain, U. S. N., Commanding.
The Commander-in-Chief, North Atlantic Station.

THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 305

CAPTAIN TAYLOR'S REPORT OF ENGAGEMENT WITH SPANISH

FLEET.

U. S. S. " Indiana," ist Rate,

Off Santiago de Cuba, July 4, 1898.

Sir. — I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of
the " Indiana " in the action of July 3d with the Spanish squadron off Santiago
de Cuba:

At 9:37 A. M., while the crew were at quarters preliminary to general muster,
noted two guns fired from the " Iowa " and general signal " Enemy's ships
escaping " flying. At once cleared ship for action and the crew were at the
guns in a remarkably short time, all officers and men showing an alacrity that
indicated clearly their pleasure at the opportunity offered them.

The Spanish squadron was seen emerging from the harbor, and in a few
moments a general action ensued. The leading ship, which proved to be the
" Infanta Maria Teresa," flying the flag of Vice-Admiral Cervera, was followed
by the other vessels of the squadron, as follows: " Vizcaya," "Cristobal
Colon," " Oquendo," and the torpedo-boat destroyers " Furor " and " Pluton."
The enemy's vessels headed to the westward and our ships headed in the same
direction, keeping as nearly abreast of them as possible.

This ship fired on all of them as they came out one by one, and continued
the action later by firing principally on the " Maria Teresa," " Oquendo,"
" Furor," and " Pluton." Several of our shells were seen to take effect on
these vessels. Our secondary-battery guns were directed principally on the
destroyers, as were the six-inch guns. The destroyers were sunk through
the agency of our guns and those of the " Gloucester," which vessel had come
up and engaged them close aboard.

The initial fire of the last two ships was directed at this vessel, and, although
falling very close, only striking the ship twice, without any injury to ship or
crew.

Our ranges were obtained by stadimeter angles on Morro as the ships
emerged, and then by angles on the tops of the rear ships. The ranges were
from 4,500 to 2,000 yards, observed from the top. From the bridge I could
see that our shooting was excellent and showed its effect. One of our thirteen-
inch shells was seen to enter the " Maria Teresa " under the quarter-deck and
explode, and that ship was observed on fire very shortly afterward.

About 10:15 A. M. observed the " Maria Teresa " and " Oquendo " on fire
and heading for the beach, the fire from their guns having ceased. We then

3o6 Cuba's struggle against spain.

devoted our special attention to prevent the escape of the destroyers, which
appeared more than a match for the " Gloucester," she being the only small
vessel near to engage them. They were soon seen to blow up, apparently
struck by our six-inch and six-pounders. We now fired our large guns at
the " Vizcaya," which was at long range. She made for the shore soon after,
on fire and battery silenced. These ships hauled down their colors as they
made for the beach. The Spanish flagship hoisted the white flag as she
grounded.

We now ceased firing. The " Colon " was observed well over the western
horizon, closely pursued by the " Brooklyn," " Oregon," and " Texas," offshore
of her. The flagship " New York," steaming full speed to the westward, as
soon as the " Vizcaya " surrendered signaled us, " Go back and guard entrance
of harbor." Several explosions were observed on board the burning ships.
At noon turned and stood to the eastward for our station, in obedience to the
above signal. Observed the " Harvard " and several transports standing to
the westward.

About 12:30 the "Resolute" came within hail and informed us by mega-
phone that a Spanish battle ship was sighted to the eastward, standing toward
us. Later the " Harvard " passed, confirming the information, and adding
that the ship was painted white. We made out the vessel ahead and stood
for her with our guns bearing. She proved to be the Austrian armored cruiser
" Kaiserin Maria Teresa." She sent an officer on board and requested per-
mission to enter the harbor. I referred him to the commander-in-chief. She
then stood on to the westward and we resumed our station.

During this action we used no armor-piercing shell except the smokeless
powder six-pounders, and the good effect of the common shell is shown by
the fires on the enemy's ships and the short time taken to disable them without
piercing their armor, and with almost no injury to our ships.

The guns and mounts worked well; only two failures of electric primers
noted.

During the afternoon sent boats with surgeon on shore to the burning ves-
sels to assist in caring for the wounded. The boats returned, bringing one
wounded officer and seventeen men as prisoners.

Received also during the afternoon and night prisoners from the *" Glouces-
ter " and " Hist," in all 7 officers and 217 men, which were to-day transferred
to the " St. Louis."

The conduct of the officers and crew was in every respect commendable;
coolness and good discipline prevailed, coupled with a marked enthusiasm.
This desirable condition of affairs is largely due to the efforts of the officers,

THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 307

and I desire to commend to the commander-in-chief the executive officer,
Lieut.-Commander John A. Rodgers, and all the officers of the ship, for the
part taken by the '' Indiana " in bringing about this great victory and the
complete destruction of the enemy's squadron.

Very respectfully,

H. C. TAYLOR,

Captain, Commanding.
The Commander-in-Chief U. S. Naval Force, North Atlantic Station.

U. S. S. " Indiana," ist Rate,
OfT Santiago de Cuba, July 14, 1898.

Sir. — Fearing that some mistake might occur as to the position of the
" Indiana " when the Spanish squadron came out, owing to my having omitted
it in my report, I have the honor to inclose a sketch showing our correct
position at the time.

There are circumstances that identify clearly this position of the " "Indiana "
on the sketch. One of these is that by my order the officer of the deck
steamed out when the flagship turned to the eastward and took a position upon
the line parallel to shore formed by the other ships and closed in the interval
on that line. The bearing of Morro at that time was between NNW. V2 W.
and NW. by N. The distance is fixed by the fact that the first range given
by the officer in the top, as obtained by vertical angle of Morro, measured by
sextant and stadimeter, was 4,200 yards, and at this time we had only begun
to close in on the entrance, according to your instructions, and had barely
gathered way.

Our distance was, therefore, about 4,300 yards, with Morro bearing between
NNW. V2 W. and NW. by N., the ship at the time heading west-northwest
and stationary.

Very respectfully,

H. C. TAYLOR,

Captain, Commanding.
The Commander-in-Chief U. S. Naval Force, North Atlantic Station.

3o8 Cuba's struggle against spain.

CAPTAIN EVANS' REPORT OF ENGAGEMENT WITH SPANISH

SQUADRON, JULY 3, 1898.

U. S. S. " Iowa," ist Rate,

Off Santiago de Cuba, Cuba, July 4, 1898.

Str. — I have the honor to make the following report of the engagement
with the Spanish squadron off Santiago de Cuba on the 3d of July:

On the morning of the 3d, while the crew was at quarters for Sunday-
inspection, the leading vessel of the Spanish squadron was sighted at 9:31
coming out of the harbor at Santiago de Cuba. Signal, " Enemy's ships
coming out," was immediately hoisted and a gun fired to attract attention.
The call to general quarters was sounded immediately, the battery made ready
for firing, and the engines rung full speed ahead.

The position of the vessel at the time of sighting the squadron was the usual
blockading station off the entrance of the harbor, Morro Castle bearing about
north and distant about three to four miles. The steam at this time in the
boilers was suf^cient for a speed of five knots.

After sighting the leading vessel, the " Infanta Maria Teresa " (Admiral
Cervera's flagship), it was observed that she was followed in succession by
the remaining three vessels of the Spanish squadron, the " Vizcaya," " Cristo-
bal Colon," and " Almirante Oquendo." The Spanish ships moved at a speed
of about eight to ten knots, which was speedily increased as they cleared the
harbor entrance and stood to the westward. They maintained a distance of
about 800 yards between vessels. The squadron moved with precision and
stations were well kept.

Immediately upon sighting the leading vessel fires were spread, and the
" Iowa " headed toward the leading Spanish ship. About 9:40 the first shot
was fired from this ship, at a distance of about 6,000 yards.

The course of this vessel was so laid that the range speedily dimixiished.
A number of shots were fired at ranges varying between 6,000 and 4,000 yards.
The range was rapidlv reduced to 2,500 yards, and subsequently to 2,000 and
to 1,200 yards.

When it was certain that the " Maria Teresa " would pass ahead of us, the
helm was put to starboard, and the starboard broadside delivered at a range
of 2,500 yards. The helm was then put to port and the ship headed across
the bow of the second ship, and as she drew ahead the helm was again put to
starboard and she received in turn the full weight of our starboard broadside at
a range of about 1,800 yards. The " Iowa " was again headed off with port
helm for the third ship, and as she approached the helm was put to starboard

THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 3O9

until our course was approximately that of the Spanish ship. In this position
at a range of 1,400 yards the fire of the entire battery, including rapid-fire guns,
was poured into the enemy's ships.

About 10 o'clock the enemy's torpedo-boat destroyers " Furor " and '* Plu-
ton " were observed to have left the harbor and to be following the Spanish
squadron. At the time that they were observed, and in fact most of the time
that they were under fire, they were at a distance varying from 4,500 to 4,000
yards. As soon as they were discovered the secondary battery of this ship
was turned upon them, while the main battery continued to engage the " Viz-
caya," " Oquendo," and " Maria Teresa."

The fire of the main battery of this ship, when the range was below 2,500
yards, was .most effective and destructive, and after a continuance of this fire
for perhaps twenty minutes it was noticed that the " Maria Teresa " and
" Oquendo " were in flames and were being headed for the beach. Their colors
were struck about 10:20, and they were beached about eight miles west of
Santiago.

About the same time (about 10:25) the fire of this vessel, together with that
of the " Gloucester " and another smaller vessel, proved so destructive that
one of the torpedo-boat destroyers (" Pluton ") was sunk and the " Furor "
was so much damaged that she was run upon the rocks.

After having passed, at 10:35, the " Oquendo " and Maria Teresa," on fire
and ashore, this vessel continued to chase and fire upon the " Vizcaya " until
10:36, when signal to cease firing was sounded on board, it having been dis-
covered that the " Vizcaya " had struck her colors.

At II the " Iowa" arrived in the vicinity of the " Vizcaya," which had been
run ashore, and, as it was evident that she could not catch the " Cristobal
Colon," and that the " Oregon," " Brooklyn," and " New York " would, two
steam cutters and three cutters were immediately hoisted out and sent to the
" Vizcaya " to rescue her crew. Our boats succeeded in bringing off a large
number of officers and men of that ship's company, and in placing many of
them on board the torpedo boat " Ericsson " and the auxiliary dispatch vessel
" Hist."

About 11:30 the "New York" passed in chase of the "Cristobal Colon,"
which was endeavoring to escape from the " Oregon," " Brooklyn," and
" Texas."

We received on board this vessel from the " Vizcaya," Captain Eulate, the
commanding of^cer, and twenty-two officers, together with about 248 petty
officers and men, of whom thirty-two were wounded. There were also re-
ceived on board five dead bodies, which were immediately buried with the
honors d'le to their grade.

The battery behaved well in all respects.

310 CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.

The dashpot of the forward twelve-inch gun, damaged in the er.gagement
of the 2d, had been replaced the same day by one of the old dashpots, which
gave no trouble during this engagement.

The following is an approximate statement of the ammunition expended
during the engagement. A more exact statement cannot be given at this time:

Twelve-inch semi-armor-piercing shell, with full charges 31

Eight-inch common shell, with full charges 35

Four-inch cartridges, common shell 251

Six-pounder cartridges, common shell 1,056

One-pounder cartridges, common shell 100

This ship was struck in the hull, on the starboard side, during the early
part of the engagement by two projectiles of about six-inch caliber, one strik-
ing the hull two or three feet above the actual water line and almost directly
on the line of the berth deck, piercing the ship's side between frames 9 and 10,
and the other piercing the side and the cofferdam between frames 18 and 19.

The first projectile did not pass beyond the inner bulkhead of the cofferdam
A 41-43. The hole made by it was large and ragged, being about sixteen inches
in a longitudinal direction and about seven inches in a vertical direction. It
struck with a slight inclination aft, and perforated the cofferdam partition bulk-
head (A 41-43 to 45-47). It did not explode, and remained in the cofferdam.

The second projectile pierced the side of the ship and the cofferdam A 105,
the upper edge of the hole being immediately below the top of the cofferdam
on the berth deck in compartment A 104. The projectile broke off the hatch
plate and the coaming of the water-tank compartment, exploded, and perforated
the walls of the chain locker. The explosion created a small fire, which was
promptly extinguished. The hole in the side made by this projectile was
about five feet above the water line, and about two or three feet above the
berth deck. One fragment of this shell struck a link of the sheet chain wound
around the six-pounder ammunition hoist, cutting the link in two. Another
perforated the cofferdam on the port side and slightly dished the outside
plating.

These two wounds, fortunately, were not of serious importance.

Two or three other projectiles of small caliber struck about the upper bridge
and smokestacks, inflicting trifling damage, and four other small projectiles
struck the hanmiock nettings and the side aft.

There are no casualties among the ship's company to report. No officer
nor man was injured during the engagement.

After having received on board the rescued crew of the " Vizcaya," this
vessel proceeded to the eastward and resumed the blockading station in obe-
dience to the signal made by the commander-in-chief about 11:30.

THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 3II

Upon arriving on the blockading station, the " Gloucester *' transferred to
this vessel Rear Admiral Cervera, his flag lieutenant, and the commanding
officers of the torpedo-boat destroyers " Furor " and " Pluton," and also one
man of the " Oquendo's " crew, rescued b}' the " Gloucester."

Naval Cadets Frank Taylor Evans and John E. Lewis, and five men belong-
ing to the " Massachusetts," were on board the " Iowa " when the enemy's
ships came out. Tliey were stationed at different points and rendered efficient
service.

The officers and men of this ship behaved admirably. No set of men could
have done more gallant service.

I take pleasure in stating to you, sir, that the coolness and judgment of the
executive officer, Lieutenant-Commander Raymond P. Rodgers, deserves, and
will, I hope, receive a proper reward at the hands of the Government. The test
of the executive officer's work is the conduct of the ship and crew in battle.
Tn this case it was simply superb.

The coolness of the navigator. Lieutenant W. H. Schuetze, and of Lieutenant
F. K. Hill, in charge of the rapid-fire guns on the upper deck, are worthy of the
greatest commendation.

Other officers of the ship did not come under my personal observation, but
the result of the action shows how well they did their duty.

I cannot express my admiration for my magnificent crew. So long as
the enemy showed his flag they fought like American seamen; but when the
flag came down they were as gentle and tender as American women.

In conclusion, sir, allow me to congratulate you on the complete victory
achieved by your fleet.

Very respectfully,

R. D. EVANS,

Captain, U. S. N., Comr.ianding.
The Commander-in-Chief U. S. Naval Force, North Atlantic Station.

COMMANDER WAINWRIGHT'S REPORT OF BATTLE AT

SANTIAGO.

U. S. S. " Gloucester,"
Ofif Santiago de Cuba, Cuba, July 6, 1898.
Sir.. — I have the honor to report that at the battle of Santiago on July 3d,
the officers and crew of the " Gloucester " were uninjured and the vessel was

312 CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.

not injured in hull or machinery, the battery only requiring some slight over-
hauling. It is now in excellent condition.

I inclose herewith a copy of the report of the' executive officer made in
compliance with paragraph 525, page no, Naval Regulations, which report, I
believe, to be correct in all particulars. I also inclose copies of the reports
of the several officers, which may prove valuable for future reference.

It was the plain duty of the " Gloucester " to look after the destroyers, and
she was held back, gaining steam, until they appeared at the entrance. The
" Indiana " poured in a hot fire from all her secondary battery upon the
destroyers; but Captain Taylor's signal, " Gunboats close in," gave security
that we would not be fired upon by our own ships. Until the leading destroyer
was injured our course was converging, necessarily; but as soon as she slack-
ened her speed, we headed directly for both vessels, firing both port and star-
board batteries as the occasion offered.

All the officers and nearly all the men deserve my highest praise during the
action. The escape of the " Gloucester " was due mainly to the accuracy and
rapidity of the fire. The efficiency of this fire, as well as that of the ship
generally, was largely due to the intelligent and unremitting efforts of the
executive officer, Lieutenant Harry P. Huse. The result is more to his credit
when it is remembered that a large proportion of the officers and men were
untrained when the " Gloucester " was commissioned. Throughout the action
he was on the bridge and carried out my orders with great coolness. That we
were able to close in with the destroyers — and until we did so they were not
seriously injured — was largely due to the skill and constant attention of P. A.
Engineer George W. McElroy. The blowers were put on and the speed in-
creased to seventeen knots without causing a tube to leak or a brass to heat.
Lieutenant Thomas C. Wood, Lieutenant George H. Norman, Jr., and Ensign
John T. Edson not only controlled the fire of the guns in their divisions and
prevented waste of ammunition, but they also did some excellent shooting
themselves. Acting Assistant Surgeon J. F. Bransford took charge 01 one of
the guns and fired it himself occasionally. Acting Assistant Paymaster Alex-
ander Brown had charge of the two Colt guns, firing one himself, and they did
excellent work. Assistant Engineer A. M. Proctor carried my orders from
the bridge and occasionally fired a gun when I found it was not being served
quite satisfactorily. All were cool and active at a time when they could have
had but little hope of escaping uninjured.

Lieutenants Wood and Norman, Ensign Edson, and Assistant Engineer Proc-
tor were in charge of the boats engaged in saving life. They all risked their
lives repeatedly in boarding and remaining near the two destroyers and the
two armed cruisers when their guns were being discharged by the heat and

THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 3I3

their magazines and boilers were exploding. They also showed great skill
in landing and taking off the prisoners through the surf.

Of the men mentioned in the several reports, I would call special attention
to John Bond, chief boatswain's mate. He would have been recommended
to the Department for promotion prior to his gallant conduct during the
action of July 3d. I would also recommend to your attention Robert P.
Jennings, chief machinist, mentioned in the report of Mr. McElroy. I believe
it would have a good effect to recognize the skill of the men and the danger
incurred by the engineer's force. I would also recommend that the acting
appointments of those men mentioned by the officers in their reports be made
permanent.

The wounded ana exhausted prisoners were well and skillfully tended by
Assistant Surgeon Bransford, assisted by Ensign Edson, who is also a surgeon.

The admiral, his officers and men were treated with all consideration and
care possible. They were fed and clothed as ^ar as our limited means would
permit.

Very re> pectfully,

RICHARD WAINWRIGHT,

Lieutenant-Commander, U. S. N., Commanding.
The Commander-in-Chief U. S. Naval Forces, North Atlantic Station.

LIEUTENANT SHARP'S REPORT OF ENGAGEMENT OF "VIXEN"
WITH SPANISH FLEET JULY 3, 1898.

U. S. S. "Vixen,"

GuANTANAMO, Cuba, luly 7, 1898.

Sir. — I have the honor to make the following report as to the part taken
by the U. S. S. " Vixen " in the engagement with the Spanish fleet under the
command of Admiral Cervera during the morning and afternoon of Sunday,
July 3, 1898.

Between 9:35 and 9:45 a. m. the "Vixen'' was at a point about four miles
to the westward of Morro, and at a distance of about one and one)-half miles
south of the shore line. At about 9:40 it was reported to me that an explosion
had taken place in the entrance of Santiago Harbor. I went on deck and
almost immediately sighted the leading vessel of the Spanish fleet standing out
of the entrance. Some of the vessels of our fleet were closing in toward Morro
and firing.

314 Cuba's struggle against spain.

The " Vixen " was heading toward the Morro. The engines were ordered
ahead at full speed and the helm put hard aport, the object being to cross ahead
of the leading Spanish vessel, and thus not obstruct the gun fire of our own
fleet, the shells from which soon began to fall about the position we had just
left.

The leading Spanish vessel opened fire on this vessel with her starboard
bow guns the projectiles from which passed over us, all being aimed too high.
I estimate the number of shots fired at us at this time to have been between
five and ten

As the " Vixen " gathered headway her head came to about south by east,
opening the '"Brooklyn" up about two points on our port bow; steadied her
and steamed on about this course until we had reached a position about a mile
to the southward and westward of the " Brooklyn," which was now turning with
port helm and firing her guns as they bore on the enemy's vessels. At 9:50
hoisted signal No. 252. The course was then ordered changed to west-south-
west, the intention being to steer a parallel course to that of the Spanish fleet.
By some mistake the quartermaster steadied the helm on southwest by south,
which was soon discovered, but not until the " Vixen " had increased her dis-
tance off-shore by perhaps another half mile. The course west-southwest was
again ordered, and when steadied on it we were an estimated distance of about
five miles from the shore. From about 10:15 the courses and times of changing
were as follows: At 10:15 changed course to W. % S., at 10:56 to NW. by N.,
at it:oo WNW., at 11:05 W. by N., at 11:10 NW. by W., at 11:15 W. by N.,
'at 11:30 W. by S., at 1:50 W. by N. All these courses were by the steering
compass, and the speed was estimated from twelve to thirteen and one-half
knots per hour. Times noted are by deck clock, which was five minutes fast
of watch time vised in the notes inclosed.

Seeing that the Spanish vessels were out of range of our guns while we
were well within range of theirs, we reserved our fire.

About ii:c6, having approached within range of the " Vizcaya, we opened
^fire with our starboard battery at an elevation of 5,000 yards for the six-pounder
guns and extreme elevation for the one-pounders; continued the fire for six
minutes, when, seeing that the ensign of the " Vizcaya " was not flying, at
11:12 ordered cease firing. Expended 27 six-pounder armor-piercing shells and
18 one-pounder common shells.

After passing Aserraderos the course was held at from west by north to west
b}- south, heading for the point on the western horizon. Average speed, about
twelve to thirteen and one-half knots; average number of revolutions, 105 per
minute; average steam pressure, 122% pounds.

The " Brooklyn " and " Oregon " bore on the port and starboard bows, re-

CAPT. "BOB" EVANS.

THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 317

spectively, and were gradually dropping the " Vixen " astern, as was the
" Cristobal Colon," which was running closer inshore. About 12:25 the " Ore-
gon " opened fire on the " Colon, as did also the " Brooklyn," feeling their
way up to the range, which was apparently obtained after the fourth or fifth
shot. About 1:20 the " Oregon" and " Brooklyn " headed inshore about four
points. About i :28 the " Texas " hoisted signal, " Enemy has surrendered."
This signal was repeated to the " New York " by the " Vixen." At 2:30
'• Vixen " stopped ofT Rio Tarquino, in the vicinity of the " Oregon " and
'■ Brooklyn." The " Cristobal Colon " was close inshore, bows on the beach,
her colors down, lying on the deck at the foot of her staff.

I have the honor to inclose a copy of notes taken during the chase by my
orders upon the suggestion of Lieutenant Harlow. These notes were written
by Assistant Paymaster Doherty. The incidents and times were given by
Lieutenant Harlow, whose watch was five minutes slow of deck-clock time.
The times taken after 10:30 are accurate; those taken before that time were
estimated and may be in error a few minutes.

Inclosed is a sketch showing positions of vessels at various times. It is
taken from a chart taken from the " Cristobal Colon " after the surrender and
is enlarged four times. All courses are true.

In conclusion, I wish to call to your attention the coolness and strict atten-
tion to duty of both officers and men.

Very respectfully,

ALEX. SHARP, Jr.,

Lieutenant, Commanding.
The Commander-in-Chief U. S. Naval Forces, North Atlantic Station.

In connection with the defeat of Cervera's squadron on the 3d of
July, the following pages from the report of the Spanish Lieutenant
Jose Muller y Tejeiro, will be found interesting.

XXVI.

SORTIE OF THE FLEET.

If I were to live a thousand years and a thousand centuries, never should I
forget that 3d day of July, 1898, nor do I believe that Spain will ever forget it.
The day dawned beautifully. One of those summer days when not the slightest
breath of air stirs the leaves of the trees, when not the smallest cloud is visible
in the skies; when not the slightest vapor fills the atmosphere, which was won-
derfully transparent, so that the horizon could be observed at a great distance.

3i8 Cuba's struggle against spain.

Nothing special was to be noticed among the ships of our fleet; motionless
on the quiet waters of the bay, that reflected their hulls, though inverted, with
wonderful accuracy, they looked as though they ought not to leave an anchor-
ing place where they could remain in such perfect safety.

It was 8:30. Feeling sure that the ships would not go out, and taking advan-
tage of the chance of gettmg a horse, for the distance was great, I went to the
military hospital to see Mr. Joaquin Bustamente, whom I found a different man,
as the saying is. His voice was strong, his eyes bright, and his cheeks flushed.
He moved with ease and did not appear to experience any difficulty in doing so.
I was agreeably surprised.

Why does one remember things that are really not of great importance? Is
it perhaps because they are connected with others that are? I cannot explain it.
I only know that I remember, word for word, the conversation that took place
between us. It was as follows:

" Is the fleet not going out?" he asked, without giving me a chance to say
anything.

" Not just now, I believe, though it is ready to go out. Is it known when
the other fleet will arrive? " I said.

"What other fleet?"

" The one that is supposed to come from Spain; they probably know at about
what time it may be expected at the mouth of the harbor."

" Don't be simple." (I don't remember whether he called me simple, or
innocent, or a fool.) " There is no other fleet; the ships are going out and that
is all there is to it. I have a letter from Don Pascual (Admiral Cervera) in
which he tells me so."

I remained thunderstruck. I could doubt no longer. I know Admiral Cer-
vera sufficiently well, as does everybody else, to know that he does not say, and
still less write, what he does not intend to do.

" Do you think he will go out to-day? " I said.

" I thought he was going even now."

I could not answer. A gunshot which, judging from the direction, could
only be from one of the two fleets, left me motionless.

Two or three minutes later a terrific cannonade commenced, such as I have
never heard, nor will probably ever hear again, a cannonade more intense than
that of June 6th, a thing which I believed impossible, shaking the building,
thundering through the air. I could not think coherently. I kept looking
at Mr. Bustamente like an imbecile, and he looked at me and didn't say a word.
I felt something that commenced at my feet and went up to my head, and my
hair must have stood on end. Then suddenly, without taking leave. T went out,

THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 319

got on my horse and rode down the hill at breakneck speed, and I hardly under-
stand how it was that I did not break my neck. I arrived at the captaincy of
the port, where I found them all, from the commander of marine to the last
clerk, with emotion painted on every face, and all looking in the direction of
the mouth of the harbor, the mountains of which, that had been such a protection
to us, and which now prevented us from seeing what was going on outside, we
should have liked to grind to powder.

The noise caused by the gunshots which the mountains and valleys echoed
was truly infernal and comparable to nothing. An idea may be gained of what
it was when it is remembered that over 250 guns, most of them of large
caliber and all breach-loading, were firing incessantly. The earth trembled,
and very soon Punta Gorda, the Morro and the Socapa took part in the fright-
ful concert, adding the thunder of their guns to the noise of those of the two
fleets.

But the firing continued and that is what puzzled me. I thought, taking
into account the number and class of hostile ships and of our own, that the
catastrophe of the latter must necessarily take place in the very channel of the
harbor, which is such a difficult one, even for ships of less length and draft than
those which formed our fleet, under normal conditions; how much more, then,
when sustaining a battle. A deviation, a change of course ahead of time, an
injury to the rudder or the engine, even though slight and momentary, the least
carelessness, in a word, might run a ship aground, and such a disaster would
cause also the destruction of the other ships that were coming after and which
would have collided with the first; the hostile ships might sink the first right
there and then; for the same reasons, the disaster of the others becomes
inevitable.

To my mind, the going out from Santiago harbor under the circumstances
Admiral Cervera did, and as confirmed by the commanders of the ships of the
fleet, constitutes the greatest act of valor imaginable, for it meant to go out to
certain death, not only with fearlessness, but with a clear head, for a man must
be completely master of himself in order to command a ship without becoming
excited nor losing his head. One may form an idea of it from the horror which
I experienced, who was not in any of the ships, but I knew perfectly well the
dangers of the enterprise, which, in my opinion, was impossible.

The day, as I said, was most beautiful and the calm perfect. Therefore, the
smoke, far from vanishing, rose up in a straight line. When the first moments
of excitement were over and we had somewhat cooled down, we could see per-
fectly that the smoke from the firing formed four groups more or less distant
from each other, but what group did our fleet form? If the one farthest to the
west, then no doubt it was not surrounded and had the open sea before it, and

320 CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.

this was a great advantage. If, on the contrary, it formed the second or third,
then it was between two fires.

Later on it was noticed that the firing was at a greater distance and decreased
in intensity, and that the columns of smoke were moving farther to the west.
Had they succeeded in escaping and outwitting the hostile fleet? For the pres-
ent one thing was certain: Our ships had not gone down in the entrance of
the harbor, nor even close to it, and that was of great importance, for the great-
est danger was in the channel. Imagine our joy when the Morro advised us
by telephone that our fleet was fighting in wing formation and that the enemy
did not have the range. Evidently the age of miracles is not over. I will not
try to describe what we felt that day — we, at Santiago, who have the honor of
belonging to the navy.

I still had the horse at my disposal, and as I remembered the anxiety in which
I had left Mr. Bustamente and his delicate state of health, I hastened to bring
him the news, which I thought would do him a great deal of good. When I
arrived, he knew it already, as everyone else did in Santiago. He had been all
over the city. I found him radiant with satisfaction.

I may safely say that the 3d of July was a day of true rejoicing, for, as will
be seen later when I relate the events of that day, it was believed that our ships
had accomplished their object, although at the cost of the destroyers, the loss of
which was already known. And although we felt very sad over the victims
there must have been, the result, on the whole, was so brilliant that it surpassed
all reasonable expectations.

How great were my consternation and sorrow when, at 6 o'clock in the even-
ing, I saw the pilot Miguel Lopez arrive, his appearance changed and his cloth-
ing and shoes wet from the drizzling rain, with the news that he had at his house
at Cinco Reales five shipwrecked from the " Maria Teresa " and " Oquendo,"
worn out and weak; that both ships, on fire, had run aground on the coast close
to each other west of Punta Cabrera and about eight miles from the harbor
of Santiago, and that a great many more, some wounded and all tired, were on
the road.

The " Teresa " and " Oquendo " lost, besides the " Pluton " and '' Furor! "
What a horrible contrast and what a sad awakening! In the morning I had
believed the ships safe and was already thinking of a telegram from Havana
announcing their arrival at that port. At night the news of the catastrophe,
the full extent of which I did not know even then!

But as my comments and lamentations do not explain what had happened,
I will give the news as it was received in the course of the day at the captaincy
of the port. It will explain why, for eight hours, we believed at Santiago de
Cuba that the Spanish fleet was in safety.

THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 32I

NAVAL BATTLE OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA.

July 3d. — The hostile tieet in sight, about five miles distant.

At 9:45 the Spanish fleet went out. Shortly after, a violent bombardment
was heard.

At 10:40 the Morro said: "The Spanish fleet is fighting in wing formation
at Punta Cabrera; the enemy does not have the range and it seems as though
they would succeed in escaping. The American fleet is composed of the
' Brooklyn,' ' Indiana,' ' Iowa,' ' Texas,' ' Massachusetts,' ' Oregon,' and one
yacht. The ships from Aguadores have come to assist in the battle."

At 11:15 no more firing was heard.

At 12:30 the Morro said: " When the fleet went out it did so slowly. After
the four large ships had gone out the destroyers went, and all of the American
ships fell upon them. Our fleet opposed the attack and the destroyers hurried
to join them, but near Punta Cabrera one of them took fire and ran ashore.
The other continued to fire and when she saw herself lost she lowered two
boats filled with men; one reached the coast, the other was captured. On
leaving the destroyer they set it afire and she ran aground burning."

So they are both lost. When our fleet passed Punta Cabrera one of the
ships, apparently the " Teresa," went close to the shore and a great deal of
smoke was seen. The " Iowa " and " New York " were pursuing her and
the others followed them. By this time the hostile ships from Aguadores were
already taking part in the fight.

At 2 an English warship was signaled to the south.

At 3 the Morro said that the ships which pursued our fleet were twenty-four
in all; fifteen warships, armored and unarmored; the others merchant vessels
equipped for war.

At 6:30 the pilot, Miguel Lopez, said that at his house at Cinco Reales, he
had five shipwrecked from the " Teresa " and " Oquendo," and they said there
must be others at Cabanitas.

The tug " Esmeralda," with the second commander of marine and Ensign
Nardiz, with the pilot, Lopez, and ten armed sailors, went out to gather them
up. Forces of the army also went out in the steamer " Colon " to protect
those who might be returning by roads and paths along the coast.

At nightfall Colonel Escario's column arrived from Manzanillo.

My friend, Mr. Robert Mason, Chinese consul, who is interested in naval
matters, and has a good understanding of everything concerning them, wit-
nessed the battle from the Vigia del Medio, which is the highest mountain in
the bay, and overlooks a great part of it. But we must take into account that,

322 Cuba's struggle against spain.

as it is quite distant from the coast, the ships that pass close to it cannot be
seen. As soon as he arrived he told me what had happened as he had seen it,
and I put it down as he dictated it to me. The following is what I heard from
his own lips, word for word, without changing anything in this interesting
account:

"The 'Teresa' went out first, then the ' Vizcaya ' and 'Colon;' after a
somewhat longer interval, the ' Oquendo,' then the destroyers. The Admiral
passed the Morro at 9:45. A little to windward of the Mcrro (west) was the
' Brooklyn.' Opposite the Morro another ship, apparently the ' Massachusetts,*
and I could distinguish no other war ships from the Vigia. When the Admiral
passed the Morro the hostile ships and the Morro and Socapa opened a violent
fire simultaneously; the hostile ships that could not be seen and that were
at Aguadores also opened fire at the same time. After passing the Morro, the
Admiral went west and was lost from sight on account of the Socapa. The
' Vizcaya ' followed, and then the other two. In the meantime the destroyers
remained in the bay. The Spanish ships were now visible again, the ' Vizcaya '
in the lead, the ' Colon,' ' Oquendo,' and ' Maria Teresa,' in line ahead at a
certain distance from the American fleet. The Spanish fleet was firing slowly,
the American ships lively, so that I did not lose sight again of the Spanish
ships, but often of the American ships on account of the smoke. In the mean-
time the American warships and two yachts were gathered opposite the Socapa,
and when the destroyers came out it seemed impossible that they should be
able to escape. The fire was horrible from the large guns, as well as from the
rapid-fire guns. Nevertheless, the destroyers were lost from sight, but they
appeared again, firing from their stern guns. As long as the ships could be
distinguished it could not be estimated whether they had received injuries of
any kind. When they disappeared from sight, at 10:30, we could see no in-
juries in the masts or smokestacks, or anything special. At this time we saw
all the American ships firing in a westerly direction, and at that hour the ' New
York,' which had not yet entered the fight, passed the bay headed westward.
When I left the battle I had not seen any ship run aground nor on fire, either
Spanish or American."

Before I continue. In order to give a better understanding, I will recall the
fact that the coast between Santiago and Punta Cabrera, a stretch of about
six miles, forms a kind of bay on which are situated Cabaiias and Guaicabon;
that Punta Cabrera projects south and is very high land, consequently the
ships which are west of it and close to the coast cannot be seen. It is abso-
lutely necessary to remember this in order to understand why it was that the
final result of the battle was not seen.

At 9:30 the Spanish fieet started up; first the " Maria Teresa," Admiral Cer-

THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 323

vera's flagship, the " Vizcaya," then the " Cristobal Colon," and " Oquendo."
Behind these the " Pluton " and " Furor." This was the order of sortie as
I learned from the pilots Lopez and Nunez.

The " Brooklyn," " Iowa," " Indiana," " Texas," " Massachusetts," " Ore-
gon," and one yacht were waiting at the mouth of the harbor. The others
arrived soon from Aguadores, where they had been, with their engines going
and under steam. One of the last ones to arrive was the " New York," which,
the same as the " Brooklyn," has a twenty-mile speed.

The Spanish ships, which necessarily had to go out in line-ahead, received,
as each went out, the fire of all the American ships, which they could not
answer until they had passed the bank of Diamante, because they could not
present the broadside, consequently their guns, to the enemy. Therefore, as
long as they were inside of the harbor, they all sustained a terrible fire.

Nevertheless, they came out without serious injuries and reached the open sea.
The "Vizcaya," which was the fastest ship, but had not had her bottom
cleaned, was making only thirteen miles, and the other ships had to regulate
their speed by hers in order to preserve the line.

I suppose, from what happened, and taking into account the order of the
sortie, that Admiral Cervera intended to protect the retreat of the " Vizcaya,"
accompanied by the " Colon " (which did not have her turret guns mounted),
with the " Oquendo " and " Maria Teresa," and then have the latter, by putting
on forced draft, rejoin the former, but both were set on fire by the stern, which
they presented to the hostile fire, and they were soon converted into one im-
mense blaze and went aground on the coast, the " Teresa " about seven miles
from Santiago harbor, west of Punta Cabrera, then close to her the " Oquendo."
These events I learned at nightfall from the shipwrecked who had arrived.
The fate of the " Vizcaya " and " Cristobal Colon " I will anticipate, in order
to complete the account of what happened to the whole fleet as it was told me
by an officer of the Austrian cruiser " Maria Teresa " (same name as ours) the
next day.

When the " Oquendo " and " Teresa " had been lost, two or three American
ships remained there to consummate the surrender and gather up the ship-
wrecked and wounded and take the others prisoners. The other ships con-
tinued to pursue the " Vizcaya " and the " Colon." The first of the two also
took fire at the stern and stranded at a distance of about twenty miles (toward
Aserraderos) ; the second did not take fire. Probably her engine was damaged
and she ran up on the coast about sixty miles distant (off Tarquino).

Such was the hecatomb (for there is no other name for it) of our ill-fated
fleet, and I do not believe that history records another like it. Not a single
ship was saved from the catastrophe. The commanders and officers of all the

324 CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.

ships knew well what was going to happen, when, calm and serene in spite
of everything and ready to do their duty fully, they took leave of each other
and of their comrades who remained on shore, as they did not belong to the
fleet.

A person who has witnessed and seen with his own eyes an event like the
one which I have in vain tried to describe, must necessarily be of interest, even
though of little prominence and education. For that reason I have had the
pilots Miguel Lopez and Apolonio Nunez, who took out the " Teresa " and
" Oquendo," respectively, repeat to me a hundred times what they had seen.
I shall not copy everything they said; that would be too much of a task, but
only what relates to the battle and which gives an idea of that veritable hell,
for that is what the mouth of Santiago harbor was for fifteen minutes.

Miguel Lopez, who is cool-headed and daring on land as well as on the sea,
said to me about as follows:

" I was in the forward tower by the side of Admiral Cervera, who was as
calm as though he had been at anchor in his own cabin, and was observing
the channel and the hostile ships and only said these words:

"'Pilot, when can we shift the helm?' He had reference to turning to
starboard, which could only be done after we had passed Diamante bank.
After a few seconds he said.

'* * Pilot, advise me when we can shift the helm.'

** ' I will advise you. Admiral,' I answered.

" A few moments later I said: ' Admiral, the helm may be shifted now.'

" In a mon^ent the Admiral, without shouting, without becoming excited,
as calm as usual, said: ' To starboard,' and the next minute, ' Fire! ' At the
same moment, simultaneously, the two guns of the turret and those of the port
battery fired on a ship which seemed to me to be the ' Indiana.' I thought the
ship was sinking. I cannot tell you, Don Jose, all that passed. By this time
there were already many dead and wounded in the battery, because they had
been firing on us for some time, and I believe that in spite of the water that
was in the ship she was already on fire then. The Admiral said to me:

" ' Good-by, pilot; go now; go, and be sure you let them pay you, because
you have earned it well.' And he continued to give orders."

These were, more or less, the words that Miguel Lopez spoke to me, and
which he repeats to anyone who wishes to hear them.

Apolonio Nunez, who took out the " Oquendo," is very difterent from
Lopez, not daring, but rather easily frightened. These were his impressions:

" When we arrived at Santa Catalina battery, ihey were already firing.
There v/as a hail of bullets on board which cannot be compared to anything.
I was in the tower looking after the course of the ship. The commander, who

THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 325

is very kind, and who knew me because I had taken the ship in on the 19th,
said to me:

"'You can go, pilot; we can get along now, and later on perhaps you will
not be able to go.' I thanked him and should have gone gladly enough, I
can tell you, but I was afraid they might shift the helm before they passed
Diamante, and you can imagine Don Jose, what would have happened. I
remained on board, and when we had passed the bank I said to him: ' Com-
mander, you can shift the helm.'

" ' Go, pilot, go,' he said, and then he commanded to put to starboard and
shouted, 'Fire!' The noise caused by the big forward gun and the shaking
of the ship made more impression on me than the fire of the Yankees. I
thought the * Oquendo ' had been cut in two. I do not even want to remember
it. I was lowered in a boat and then I thought I was a dead man. The bullets
were falling all around me. Finally I reached Estrella Cove, where Miguel
Lopez had already arrived. I did not even dare look at the battle, which was
now outside of the harbor."

These two accounts, which, perhaps, do not inspire the interest which no
doubt they possess, because I have not been able to remember the exact words
of the men, although in substance they are the same, may give an idea of that
never-to-be-forgotten sortie which had such fatal consequences.

I supposed that the American fleet would await the Spanish fleet at the
mouth of the harbor and absolutely prevent it from going out, under penalty
of having the ships attacked. But that requires a great deal of courage and
presence of mind. Nevertheless, it would have been the safest means for ac-
complishing it. By not doing so they exposed themselves to being outwitted
and this is proved by the fact that our ships succeeded in getting out of the
harbor and as far as Punta Cabrera (about six miles), so that they really ac-
complished the most difBcult part, and there is no doubt that if they had not
been set on fire and if they had had a speed of even eighteen miles they would
have run the blockade.

It will also have been noticed that the three ships built in Spain all had the
same fate; they were burned. The one built in Italy, although not having the
turret guns, and which had suffered from the hostile fire much longer, because
she "died" later than the others, was not burned; she had a different fate,
but not that. I believe I am not bold in affirming that if the four ships had
been protected like the " Colon," they would have outwitted the enemy's pur-
suit. In that event they might have reached Havana, for as the whole, or
nearly the whole, American fleet was in front of Santiago, they would have
met no one to prevent them and the situation would have been very different.

326 Cuba's struggle against spain.

A few of the shipwrecked arrived in the tug " Colon," and were embarked by
our commander of marine in the cruiser " Reina Mercedes."

The tug " Esmeralda," with Ensign Nardiz, ten armed sailors, and the pilot
Lopez, went to Cabafiitas Cove to gather up shipwrecked; but, although they
made a careful search, they found none.

At night Colonel Escario's column, whose forces have already been men-
tioned, arrived from Manzanillo. The next day General Escario told me that
when he heard the fire of the battle in the morning, he proceeded with a small
vanguard to the heights of the harbor of Bayamo, and that the detachment
there told him the same thing, viz., that they saw our ships run the blockade
and disappear past Punta Cabrera.

To my mind there is nothing so interesting and eloquent as the account of
a naval battle by persons who have taken part in it. Lieutenants Bustamente
and Caballero, second in command of the destroyers " Furor " and " Pluton,"
respectively, who escaped by a miracle from the horrible hecatomb, in which
the greater part of their crews perished, told me two days after the catastrophe,
still sick and tired, of the battle which their ships sustained. Their accounts
follow:

Mr. Caballero. — " The last ships were already outside of the harbor when
the destroyers, which had stopped between the Socapa and Cay Smith for the
purpose of getting up steam, proceeded and passed through the channel as
far as Punta Morrillo, where the ' Furor,' which was in the lead, put to port
as though trying to go east, but when she discovered the ' Gloucester ' and
other ships which were near Aguadores, she put to starboard, following the
lead of our fleet, which was already at some distance, opening fire on the
' Gloucester ' which we (the two destroyers) had left astern. And the ' Indi-
ana,' ' Oregon,' ' Iowa,' and ' Texas,' which we had passed in the order named
on the port hand, continued to fire vcr}^ rapidly, which made it extremely diffi-
cult for us to serve the guns. After we had passed Cabaiias we comm.enced
to gain on the ' Furor,' and when we came up with her and were about fifty
meters to starboard, she listed rapidly on that side, her rudder having been
disabled, and passed astern of us at a distance of one meter, and sank by the
stern, standing up almost vertically, and was buried in the sea a moment later,
before reaching Punta Cabrera.

" As we (the ' Pluton ') were making a great deal of water we continued
close to the shore to reach Punta Cabrera, and when we were close to the
headland which it forms, we received a thirty-two centimeter projectile, which
exploded the forward group of boilers, blowing up the whole deck and cutting
off communication between the two ends. She then veered to starboard and

THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 327

struck on the headland, tearing off a great pait of the bow. The shock threw
her back some distance, then she struck again. I jumped into the water and
reached the shore.

" I cHmbed up on the headland of Punta Cabrera and lay there for about
fifteen minutes, during which the fire continued. When it was at an end I
went into the mountains and gathered up such personnel of the ship as I met —
about twenty or twenty-five — and with them I went around a small hill for the
purpose of hiding from the coast and took the road to Santiago de Cuba,
avoiding the roads and seeking the densest thickets and woods. The pilot,
on pretext that the road which I was following was not a good one, left us
and did not again put in an appearance. We continued walking in an easterly
direction — some clothed, others naked, and the rest half clothed — for
two hours, resting now and then and trying to keep close to the coast.
When we reached the beach we met Lieutenant Bustamente with a group of
shipwrecked from the ' Furor ' (his ship) and some from the ' Maria Teresa.'
We saw a yacht with the English flag close to the coast maneuvering back of
Punta Cabrera, as though trying to gather up the shipwrecked there. We
made signals to her with a shirt, and seeing that she paid no attention to us
we walked on, avoiding the formation of large groups and hiding ourselves as
much as possible.

"About 3:30 we reached the harbor of Cabafias, which we had to cross
swimming, and on the opposite shore, about 9 o'clock at night, we reached
the trenches of the Socapa, where at last we could rest for the night, with the
assistance of some guerrillas, who supplied us with what they could."

Mr. Bustamente. — " When we (the ' Furor ') reached the mouth of the
harbor and saw the Spanish fleet we thought that by shaping our course west-
ward we could seek the protection of the Spanish fleet, which was already at
some distance, and we maneuvered accordingly. One of the projectiles struck
one of the hatches of the boiler ventilators, thereby reducing the pressure and
consequently the speed of the ship. By this time the projectiles were falling
on board in large numbers. One of the shells struck Botswain Duenas, cut-
ting him in two; one part fell between the tiller-ropes, interrupting them mo-
mentarily, and it was necessary to take it out in pieces. Another projectile
destroyed the engine and the servo-motor, so that the ship could neither pro-
ceed nor maneuver. Another had struck the after shellroom, exploding and
destroying it.

Our torpedoes had their warheads on and were ready to be used, but we
did not launch them because we were never at a convenient distance from the
enemy. Under these circumstances, the commander of the destroyers, Captain

328 CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.

Fernando Villamil, gave orders to abandon rhe ship, and I, with part of the
crew, jumped into the water, about three miles from the coast. In the water,
one of the men near me, I believe the first boatswain, was struck by a bullet
in the head and was buried in the water forever. The ship, in the meantime,
after a horrible series of explosions, went down. When we reached the land
we went in an easterly direction toward Santiago. Shortly after we met Lieur
tenant Caballero and with him and his men we reached Santiago, and following
the same road and the same fortunes; as they are identical, I will not here
relate them."

To what has been said it is useless to add another word.

CAUSES OF THE LOSS OF THE NAVAL BATTLE OF SANTIAGO

DE CUBA.

Words fail me to describe the painful impression produced upon me by the
disaster of the four cruisers and two destroyers under Admiral Cervera's com-
mand, and by what I may call the hecatomb of their crews, which was not
complete for the only reason that the battle had taken place so near the shore,
where the ships, all on fire, could run aground, rather than surrender to the
enepiy. In less than two hours the ships were destroyed, and yet, this is not
strange. T am surprised, on the contrary, that they were not sunk in the
channel.

The loss of the fleet had been foretold by all it§ commanders, with whom
I have talked more than once, and was prophesied, so to speak, as soon as
the order was received at the Cape Verde Islands to start for Cuba, and the
Admiral, who was in command, advised the Government to that effect several
times; these official communications are still in existence. But it seems that
public opinion in the island of Cuba, especially at Havana, required the pres-
ence of the fleet in those waters, and between that and the very sensible and
logical reasons advanced by the Admiral, the Government decided in favor of
the former, and the fleet departed, shaping its course to the west. From that
moment the loss of the fleet became inevitable, and it was only a question of
time, as will be easily understood from what follows.

The fleet left the Cape Verde Islands with no more coal than was m the
bunkers, the greater part of which must necessarily be used up during the
voyage across the Atlantic ocean. The three destroyers, " Pluton," " Furor,''
and " Terror," accompanied it and had to be convoyed and supplied with coal,
which involved difficulties and delays.

At Martinique (where the " Terror " was left, being no longer able to follow
the fleet) the ships could not coal; and at Curagao, in spite of the Govern-

THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 329

merit's promise that they were to find a ship there with fuel, which did not put
in an appearance, only two of the ships could get a small number of tons.

The order to proceed to the island of Cuba was there; what could they do
under such circumstances? The only natural and logical thing: go to the
harbor that was nearest and for that reason offered the least dangers, go to
Santiago de Cuba, which Admiral Cervera believed well defended, as the harbor
is suited for that purpose, and supplied with provisions. How great was his
surprise when he found that only two guns worthy of the name defended its
entrance, and that provisions were lacking in the city, as well as ammunition
and everything else.

I have already stated, and will here repeat it, that during those days of May,
before the hostile fleet appeared with forces superior to ours (that is, from
the 20th to the 27th) the ships could not go out, not only because they did not
have coal enough, but also because there was considerable swell in the sea,
which prevented them from going out, as was stated by the pilots of the
locality, who said that the ships were almost sure to touch bottom, especially
the " Colon," which drew more water than the others.

We must take into account, for it means everything for a f^eet, that they
had not cleaned their bottoms for a long time and their speed was, therefore,
far from what it should have been; the '* Vizcaya," above all, was not able to
n:ake thirteen miles, and later, after being in Santiago harbor for forty-six
days, her speed was reduced to even less.

But even if there had been no swell in the sea to the sovtth and the ships
could have gone out, where would they have gone? To Havana by the short-
est route? They would have met Sampson's fleet, as Admiral Cervera knew
only too well, and that was just what he wished to avoid. Perhaps, he might
have succeeded by taking a course which he would have been least expected
to take, through Providence channel, for instance; and this did occur to Ad-
miral Cervera, but it was impossible, for the simple reason that he did not
have fuel enough for so many day«; of navigation.

Moreover, when the fleet reached Santiago harbor, everybody there, as well
as in the peninsula, believed it safe and congratulated its commander on his
success and his clever maneuver; and when I say "everybody" I do not
mean the common people only, but the official element. Could there be a
better proof that Admiral Cervera complied with the wishes of the Govern-
ment?

The fleet received definite order from the Captain-General of the island of
Cuba to leave the harbor of Santiago, which he reiterated, in spite of Admiral
Cervera's remonstrances. After that, what was to be done? Only one thing;
go out, as, indeed, they did, resigned, but calm and serene, those heroes; for

330 CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.

all those who went out with the fleet to certain death, as every one knew,
deserve that name. And I say that they went out calm and serene, and shall
say it a thousand times, for only thus can ships be maneuvered in so narrow
and dangerous a channel, without any of them running aground, which can
happen so easily even under ordinary circumstances, when it is not necessary
to oppose the fire of a hostile fleet, and with ships of less draught and length.
The sortie from that harbor, under the circumstances under which those ships
eft'ected it, I do not hesitate in calling the greatest act of valor, fearlessness,
skill, intelligence and practical experience in seamanship that can be conceived.
This was stated repeatedly and with great admiration by the commanders and
officers of the English corvette " Alert " and the Austrian cruiser " Maria
Teresa," who, it may be said, witnessed the battle.

The number of ships that were awaiting ours at the mouth of the harbor,
and with which the latter had to fight, as well as their nature and the kind of
armament they mounted, was given in one of the first chapters, from statistics
of the American Navy. This alone is more than suflicient to demonstrate that,
in view of the inferiorit}'- of ours in quantity and quality, it was impossible to
sustain the battle.

But there is more, much more, to be added in order to explain what hap-
pened in the naval battle of Santiago de Cuba, the greater part of which is not
known by the people in Spain.

I have already stated that the " Colon," the only really protected ship of
the four that composed the fleet, did not have her turret guns. Of the 14-cm.
guns of the " Teresa," " Oquendo," and " Vizcaya," which are the ones that
do most of the firing in a battle, six had been declared useless; and while the
" Teresa " could change hers, the " Oquendo " and " Vizcaya " could not do
so, and had to fight, the former with one, the latter with two, useless guns, as
I have stated.

Moreover, the supply of ammunition for all of the ships was inadequate,
and the ** Teresa " had seventy useless charges. The greater part of (the
primers were no good, and consequently the guns did not go off. The breech-
plugs were imperfect, so that after the second or third shot they no longer
closed. The firing-pins blew out, and from many of the survivors of the
'' Oquendo " and " Teresa " I have learned that a number of the men serving
the guns were wounded by their own pieces. Therefore, if the whole thing
were not so sad and serious, it might be said that the guns of our ships were
like the "carbine of Ambrosius," which went off at the breech; that is, that
far from injuring the enemy, they were a danger to those who had charge of
firing them.

The majority of the cartridge cases did not have the required diameter, and

THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 33 1

on the " Maria Teresa " it happened that seven had to be discarded before one
good one could be found. Under these conditions, it will be readily understood
that the armament, which was intended to be converted into rapid-fire artillery,
was instead converted into artillery — I do not know what to call it, but it
was certainly entirely useless.

After what has been stated, can the result of the battle of Santiago be
wondered at? Certainly not. The only thing that may appear strange is that,
under such conditions, a fleet should have been sent to the scene of war.

It was under these circumstances that the sortie was made from the difficult
harbor of Santiago by those commanders and officers who, convinced that they
would all perish, contented themselves with saying farewell to the comrades
who remained on shore ar d whom they never expected to see again.

We Spanish are very proud of the disaster of Trafalgar on account of the
heroism which our navy showed on that occasion, when they placed honor-
above everything else, though our ships were buried in the sea. The battle
of Santiago de Cuba is much more glorious even than that of 1805. In this
latter battle, thirty-two allied ships of 64, 80, and 120 guns fought with twenty-
eight English ships, also of 120, 80, and 64 guns; the forces, therefore, were
almost equal; and if the battle was lost, while it might very well have been
won, it was because our fleet was commanded by Villeneuve, and the hostile
fleet by Nelson. In the battle of Santiago, six ships (if the " Pluton " and
"Furor" may be called such), had to fight against twenty-four that were
better protected and armed. After these figures, anything else that might be
added would appear to be useless.

I have never been able to understand the reason why there was sent to the
island of Cuba a fleet that was in no manner able to cope with that of the
United States, and which, therefore, could in nowise prevent the ships of the
latter from blockading our ports and controlling the sea; but since it was sent,
without its arrival being able to prevent the loss of the island, which was lost,
as experience has shown, from the very moment when war was accepted, owing
to the conditions prevailing there, then it should have been prevented from
being destroyed, as it was, without resulting in any advantage whatever.

The only way of gaining any advantage would have been, in my opinion,
taking advantage of the fact that all the hostile ships were in Cuba, to send a
few ships of great speed, more or less well armed, to the commercial ports of
the United States and bombard them, even though not very effectively. It is
probable that public opinion, especiallj'' of those who did not participate in
the war, would have exacted the return of the ships, and then the Spanish fleet
could have left Santiago in perfect safety, and a catastrophe would have been
avoided which has brought us no advantage. At the same time, the ports of

332 Cuba's struggle against spain.

the island, freed from the blockade, could have supplied themselves with pro-
visions; and although the final result would probably have been the same, it
would not have been so immediate.

The following, taken from a German report of the naval battle at
Santiago, explains in some measure the defeat of the Spanish fleet:

In order to be able to realize the complete defeat of the Spanish fleet it is
necessary to call clearly to mind its situation in Santiago harbor. Cervera
had entered the harbor on May 19th. As early as May 27th five hostile cruisers
with several gunboats and auxiliary cruisers were observed in front of the
harbor, and there was no longer any doubt that the whole American battle
fleet was blockading the harbor. Then followed the bombardments of Morro
Castle and the Socapa, several shells falling into the bay, and the Spanish ships
retreated closer to the city. On June 3d the " Merrimac " was sunk, but the
entrance remained unobstructed. On June 226. occurred the landing of the
American troops, who on July ist attacked the fortifications of the city. Five
hundred men of the landing corps of the Spanish ships took part in the defense
and are said to have fought very valiantly.

The Government authorities at Havana were very anxious to have the fleet
leave the harbor, in order to remove the main object of the attack upon San-
tiago; for the ships had been the cause of the blockade and of the attack on
the unprepared city. Hence it was imperative that the ships should leave.
It is probable that ever since the middle of June this had been suggested to
Admiral Cervera by the authorities at Havana; but the Admiral appears to
have declared that it was impossible to make an attempt to run the blockade
at night. Whether direct orders were finally given to leave the harbor under
all circumstances I have not been able to ascertain.

Admiral Cervera was in a very diflicult position. He was expected to act
in some manner. He did not dare make the attempt at night, and so he de-
cided to go out with his fleet in broad daylight. The whole crew fell a victim
to this fatal decision. Instructions for the order of the sortie and the taking
of the western course had been previously issued by the chief of the fleet.
According to the Revista General de Marina, Vol. XI, No. 3, August, 1898,
the Admiral was entirely convinced of the impossibility of defeating the enemy
or of reaching another Cuban harbor, even if he should succeed in steaming
right through the hostile fleet. It is to this feeling of helplessness and im-
potence as against the American naval forces more than to anything else that I
attribute the defeat. The Spanish ships had spent a month and a half in the
harbor without even attempting to attack the blockading fleet when a favorable

' - ^it'

o
I— I

w

H

o

CAPTAIN CHADWICK.

THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 335

opportunity presented itself, or even of harassing it. The two torpedo-boat
destroyers were not used for the purpose for which they were intended. This
inactivity and lack of initiative must have had a very demoralizing effect on
the officers and men. If we add to this the certain knowledge that the oppos-
ing forces were much stronger, it will be readily understood that the idea of
general flight after coming out of the harbor entrance was the only acceptable
one, especially in view of the possibility of beaching the ships, thereby rendering
them unserviceable, and eventually rescuing the crews. From the very moment
that this feeling of impotence took possession of the Spanish and led to the
above reflections, their fate psychologically speaking, was sealed. We do not
mean to disparage their valor and tenacity in the midst of the hostile fire; but,
on the other hand, it is quite natural that the Admiral, seeing that everything
was happening as he had foreseen, was the one who set the example of running
his ship ashore. All the other commanders followed this example.

On the American side the situation was just the reverse. Admiral Samp-
sun's fleet was fully conscious of its power. The blockade was being con-
ducted in accordance with carefully prepared plans, as were also the arrange-
ments in case of the enemy's attempt to escape. Frequent engagements with
the Spanish forts had given commanders and crews that calm and assurance in
the handling of their weapons which guarantees success. The long blockade
service, exhausting and monotonous, hardly interrupted by any action on the
part of the Spanish, had strung the nerves to the highest pitch, and everybody
was anxious for the end to come. Suddenly the enemy attempts to escape.
All the passions that had been smoldering under the ashes break forth. The
welcome opportunity for settling accounts with the enemy had come at last,
and with a wild rush the American ships fell upon their victims. At the be-
ginning the American fire, owing to the excitement of the personnel and the
great distances, was probably not very effective; but when the Spanish Admiral
turned to westward and the other ships followed him the moral superiority of
the Americans reasserted itself. The commanders, calm and cool-headed, had
their ships follow the same course, and the Americans, having every advantage
on their side, recommenced the fire on the fleeing ships, which soon resulted in
their total annihilation.

I have already spoken of the lack of training of the Spanish crews, the
neglect of gun and torpedo target practice, the inadequate education of the
commanders of the ships and torpedo-boat destroyers. It is mainly due to
these deficiencies that the defeat was hastened and that the American ships
sustained so few losses. Furthermore, there can be no excuse for having
allowed the cruiser " Cristobal Colon to leave Spain without her heavy arma-
ment. It has also been stated that the rapid-fire guns of this cruiser were

33^ Cuba's struggle against spain.

unserviceable, so that she was really completely defenseless. The training of
the engine personnel also was totally unreliable, which is not surprising in
view of the fact that the Spanish ships, as a rule, are not sent out on extensive
cruises. The bottoms of the Spanish ships had not been cleaned for a long
time, and as they had been lying in Santiago harbor for a month and a half
they were considerably fouled. Thus the cruisers " Maria Teresa," *' Oquendo,"
and " Vizcaya," which in all ©facial books are credited with eighteen and a half
knots speed, went into the battle with a speed of from ten to twelve knots at
most, and the " Cristobal Colon," which is the latest ship and was to run
twenty knots, hardly attained a speed of thirteen and a half. Under these cir-
cumstances, in every way unfavorable to the Spanish, whose crews were in-
sufficiently trained and physically and morally enervated by long inactivity,
whose ships were inferior in number, speed, and fighting efficiency, it is no
wonder that the victory of the Americans was easy and paid for with insignifi-
cant sacrifices.

There was only one chance for the success of the sortie. It should have
been made at night in scattered formation. After a personal investigation of
the locality, it is my opinion that it is entirely practicable for a fleet to leave
Santiago harbor at night. The wreck of the '* Merrimac " did not constitute
an obstruction. It is true that Admiral Sampson's report on the night of the
blockade states that the light-ships were lying from one to two miles from
Morro Castle, according to the state of the atmosphere, and that they lighted
up the channel for half a mile inside. Even the best search light, however,
does not reach farther than one mile. Therefore, the illumination could not
have been very effective. Moreover, the shore batteries, by opening fire upon the
light-ships, could have compelled them to change their positions; but, strange
to say, this was never done. The dark nights at the time of the new moon,
about the middle of June, would have been best suited for the enterprise. Be-
sides, the four vessels of the fleet, two large Spanish merchant vessels lying in
Santiago harbor might have been taken out in order to deceive the enemy.
The six vessels, with lights darkened, should have followed each other out
of the harbor entrance, m predetermined order, as fast as possible. They
should then have steered different courses, previously determined, with orders
not to fight except when compelled to do so by the immediate vicinity of the
hostile ship or when there was no possibility of escaping the enemy in the
darkness. A rendezvous should have been fixed for the next day, where the
ships that succeeded in escaping were to assemble.

If the fleet did not dare attempt a night sortie and was nevertheless com-
pelled to leave the harbor in obedience to orders, then the ships should have
been headed straight at the enemy. All weapons, including the torpedo and

i

THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY. 337

the ram, should have been used. A bold attack in close formation was the
only chance of success against the superior hostile fighting forces, who would
hardly have found time to form their lines.

I shall not attempt to discuss at length all the lessons which may be derived
irom the battle, because this would lead too far, I will only enumerate them,
and confine myself to dwelling a little more fully on those which are of the
greatest importance for practical service.

(a) Abolition of all woodwork.

(b) No unprotected torpedo tubes.

(c) Protection for all gun crews against shell fire.

(d) Protection of the fire-extinguishing apparatus against shell fire.

(e) Smokeless powder; greatest possible simplicity in the service of the guns
and the greatest possible rapidity of fire.

(f) Good speed of the ships under normal conditions.

(g) Thorough training of the crews in all branches of the service.

The last two are the most important. A ship may show very brilliant re-
sults at the trial trip and be credited with the greatest speed in the different
books on the navies of all nations; but for the officer who is to command the
ship in battle this is not a criterion from which to judge of her efficiency.
Frequent trial trips under full steam, making it possible to discover and cure
defects of the machinery in time of peace, and familiarizing the personnel with
the functioning of the vessel in all its details, can alone give the commander
an idea of what he may expect of his ship in battle. Extensive cruises at war
speed should also be made, in order that the personnel may get an idea of
how much more will be required in time of war. This is especially important
in the tropics, where the great heat materially affects the physical endurance
and ef^ciency of the boiler and engine personnel.

The most perfect training of the crews in all branches of the service, espe-
cially by all kinds of torpedo and gun practice, as nearly as possible under
war conditions, is the foundation of success. As I said in Part IV of this
work, nothing should be left undone to attain the greatest perfection possible
in time of peace. No expense should be spared to enable those who bear the
responsibility of the battle — the chiefs of fleets and squadrons, as well as all
commanders — thoroughly to test the actual degree of efficiency of their crews
by practical exercises, resembling as nearly as possible the operations of actual
warfare.

Such exercises will also demonstrate whether the weapons, from a technical
standpoint, are equal to all the exigencies of war.

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.

CHAPTER X.

Embarkation.

At the approach of hostilities, I had volunteered my services in case
of war, and on May 4th, my nomination as major-general was sent
to the Senate and was immediately confirmed by that body; I promptly
reported for duty, and, on the 9th, I was ordered to report to General
Brooke at Chickamauga.

I left Washington on the first through train, and reached General
Brooke's headquarters early on the morning of May nth. This officer
had earned a very line reputation. He is one of the three major-
generals in die regular army, and as Governor-General of Cuba has
become quite distinguished. He is a large, soldierly-looking man, and
impresses those who meet him very favorably.

The next day at 2 o'clock I received the following telegram:

War Department, Adjutant-General's Office,

Washington, D. C, May 12, 1898 — 1:38 p. m.

Major-General Joseph Wheeler, Chickamauga Battlefield, Ga., care of General
Brooke:

With approval of Secretary of War, major-general commanding directs you
to report at Tampa, Fla., to command the cavalry in the expedition now leaving.
General Miles leaves here to-night. You should meet him at Tampa soon as
possible after his arrival.

H. C CORBIN,

A djutant-General.

I hastened to the depot in time to take the 2 107 train, and reached
Tampa on the evening of the 13th, pitched my tent with the cavalry,
and devoted myself to inspection and other duties which would enable
me to become thoroughly familiar with the officers and men, and I
soon learned that the division was a body of men of whom any com-
mander might be justly proud.

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 339

The concentration of these troops at Tampa was for the purpose of
a movement upon Havana, it being beHeved that the city could be as-
saulted and captured before the rainy season commenced. The inten-
tion was to land the army at Mariel, a point about twenty-six miles
west of Havana.

The following dispatches are interesting to show more correctly
the military plans at that time:

Headquarters of the Army,

Washington, D. C, May g, 1898.

The major-general commanding directs that the following orders be sent by
telegraph to General Wade, at Tampa:

Direct Major-General Shafter to move his command, under protection of
Navy, and seize and hold Mariel, or most important point on north coast of
Cuba and where territory is ample to land and deploy army. Follow up his
command with all the force sent to you. Troops will be sent you as rapidly
as possible from Chickamauga and other points. Have troops fully equipped;
send abundance of ammunition and ship with them food for men and animals
for sixty days, to be followed by four months' supplies.

J. C. GILMORE,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

Adjutant-General's Office,
Washington, May g, 1898 — 6:7 p. m.

General Wade, Commanding Troops at Tampa, Fla.:

With the approval of the Secretary of War, the major-general commanding
directs that General Shafter move his command under protection of Navy and
seize and hold Mariel, or most important point on north coast of Cuba, and
where territory is ample to land and deploy army. Follow up his command
with all the forces sent to you. Troops will be sent you as rapidly as possible
from Chickamauga and other points. Have troops fully equipped, send
abundance of ammunition, and ship with them food for men and animals for
sixty days, to be followed by four months' supplies. Acknowledge receipt.

H. C. CORBIN,

Ad jut ant -General.

3-4^ CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.

General Shafter's dispatches at this time show that he anticipated
difficulty in concentrating a force at Key West on account of the fresh
water at that place. These dispatches are as follows :

Tampa Bay Hotel, Tampa, Fla., May y, 1898 — 3:44 p. m

Adjutant-General, United States Army, Washington, D. C:

Am crowding work of watering and coal transport and put in pen and stall
for sortie (stock?). Will have it completed Wednesday sure. Many obstacles

to .

SHAFTER,

Briga dier -General.

Tampa Bay Hotel, Tampa, Fla., May 7. 1898 — 6:50 p. m.

Adjutant-General, United States Army, War Department, Washington, D. C:

Colonel Lawton just returned from Key West. Brings message from Com.-
modore Watson that water is absolutely necessary; that supply on all ships is
very short, and that if I can assist him in getting supply it will be a great favor
to him. A barge, capacity one hundred thousand gallons, can start in morning
for Key West, towed by one of ships under charter. Cost of water two cents
per gallon. No tug here for hire. Shall I send it?

SHAFTER,

Brigadier-General.

Adjutant-General's Office,

Washington, May 8, 1898.

General Shafter, Tampa Bay Hotel, Tampa, Fla.:

Your telegram concerning water supply for Commodore Watson received,
and Secretary of War directs you to make every possible effort to furnish any-
thing and everything to help him along. In this and other cases Secretary of
War approves any action you take, but desires every such order of yours
reported for his information.

H. C CORBIN,

Adjutant-General.

Headquarters of the Army,

Washington, D. C, May 10, 1898.
The major-general commanding directs that the following orders be tele-

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 341

graphed General Wade, Tampa, Fla.: That the movement of troops to Cuba
is delayed until Monday, May i6, 1898. In the meantime he will send the
infantry in the ships, with an abundant supply of water and whatever else is
required with them, to Key West, there to disembark. The ships are to return
to Tampa to carry more infantry to Key West until there are about 12,000 men
there. These will move from Key West to Dry Tortugas and Cuba on ships
coming from New York. Also, that General Brooke has been directed to send
to Tampa from Chickamauga the Second, Seventh, Eighth, Twelfth, and Six-
teenth Infantry. These can be forwarded to Key West by any means available.

J. C. GILMORE,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

Adjutant-General's Office,
Washington, May 10, 1898 — 6:35 p. m.
General Wade, Commanding Troops at Tampa, Fla.:

Movement of troops to Cuba is delayed until Monday, May i6th. In the
meantime you will send infantry in the ships, with an abundant supply of water
and whatever else is required with them, to Key West, there to disembark.
The ships are to return to Tampa to carry more infantry to Key West until
there are about 12,000 men there. These will move from Key West to Dry
Tortugas and Cuba on ships coming from New York. General Brooke has
been directed to send to Tampa from Chickamauga the Second, Seventh,
Eighth, Twelfth, and Sixteenth Infantry. These can be forwarded to Key
West by any means available.

By command General Miles.

H. C. CORBIN,

A d jut ant- Gen eral.

Tampa Bay Hotel, Tampa, Fla., May 11, 1898.

Adjutant-General United States Army, for Commanding General, War
Department, Washington, D. C.:

Water for large body of troops at Key West is serious question. Absolutely
no water there. Only water barge from this port, capacity 130,000 gallons,
should reach Key West to-morrow with water for Navy, and be back Friday.
Transports carry considerable water, but have no way of distillation. Is im-
perative that water be placed in Key West before troops begin to arrive.
Quartermaster-general has been asked to charter, clean, loan, and start
1,000,000 gallons tank steamer with light-draft barge for unloading. Dry

342 Cuba's struggle against spain.

Tortugas reported to have brackish water in cisterns. Am now trying to
ascertain quantity and quality. Expect information.

J. F. WADE,

Brigadier-General.
(Received, Washington, 8:12, p. m.)

Tampa Bay Hotel, Tampa, Fla., May 21, i8g8 — 11:21 a. m.

Gen. N. A. Miles, Washington, D. C:

On account of difficulty in finding suitable camp ground, with abundant
water supply, I have temporarily stopped part of the volunteer regiments at
Jacksonville, and placed them under command of General Lawton. The
Government will not be subjected to extra expense on account of transporta-
tion, nor for supply depots or officer. They will be brought closer to Tampa
as soon as possible. The principal difficulty here is water, which must be
drawn from wells; surface water can not be used.

SHAFTER,

^ Major-General

Measures were promptly taken to remedy the deficiency of water, but
by this time it had become evident that Admiral Cervera's fleet was
in the harbor of Santiago, the movement against Havana was aban-
doned, and it was determined to send a force of some 5,000 men to the
southern coast of Cuba, but further information of the enemy made a
further change necessary, and it was determined to direct the efforts
of the Government against the Spanish fleet and army at Santiago, it
being believed that our Army and Navy combined could capture the
Spanish fleet as well as the forces in that part of Cuba.

The following letter from General Miles to the Secretary of War
explains the views of the Government at that time:

Headquarters of the Army,

Washington, D. C., May 2y, 1898.
The Honorable the Secretary of War:

Sir. — Referring to my letter of yesterday, and to our consultation since, I
desire to submit the following:

As we are now about to inaugurate active military operations in conjunction
with the Navy, I think it would be advisable to load the transports at Tampa
with a strong force of infantry and artillery, move them to Key West, and

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 343

thence along the northern coast of Cuba, where they would have the full
protection of Admiral Sampson's fleet until they reach Admiral Schley's fleet
at Santiago de Cuba, and then, by a combined effort of the Army and Navy,
capture the harbor, garrison, and possibly the Spanish fleet at that point.

If before reaching Admiral Schley's fleet it shall be found that he has already
accomplished the above object, or that the Spanish fleet shall have escaped, I
then urge the importance of a combined attack of the Army and Navy upon
Porto Rico. We will be able to land a superior force, and I believe that a com-
bined effort will result in capturing the island, with its garrison, provided it is
done before it can be re-enforced from Spain. The distance from Key West to
Porto Rico is 1,040 miles, and from Cadiz, Spain, to Porto Rico is about
4,000 miles. The possession of Porto Rico would be of very great advantage to
the military, as it would cripple the forces of Spain, giving us several thousand
prisoners. It could be well fortified, the harbor mined, and would be a most
excellent port for our Navy, which could be speedily relieved from any re-
sponsibility in the charge of that port, as we could leave a sufificient garrison
to hold it against any force that might be sent against it.

Then we should commence, in my judgment, a movement toward the west
by capturing the ports along the northern coast of Cuba, at the eastern end,
supplying the insurgents with abundance of arms and munitions of war, and as
speedily as possible land our cavalry and sufUcient light artillery to enable them
to move from the harbor of Pto de Nuevitas along the line of railroad to
Puerto Principe. From that base our cavalry and light artillery, in con-
junction with the forces of Lieutenant-General Garcia and General Gomez,
should move west to near Santa Clara. These movements, in my judgment,
can all be accomplished during the rainy season, through a country com-
paratively free from yellow fever, well stocked with cattle, and having grass
suflicient for our animals. While this is being accomplished our Volunteer
Army will be prepared to land in the vicinity of Mariel, Havana, or Matanzas
in suflicient force to complete the capture or destruction of the Spanish forces
upon the Kland of Cuba. The advantage of this movement will be that the
Army and Navy will act in concert and close unison; that it does not divide
our Navy, and that it will utilize our most available military force in the best
way during the time of the year when military operations are most difUcult.

I believe that the entrance to the port of Cienfuegos can be obstructed or
blockaded by one or two monitors to better advantage than to send the Army
there, where it would have to meet a strong garrison, which is already there,
and also of the forces that can be quickly sent there by rail directly from
Havana and Matanzas.

If the above plan is approved, troops could be ordered to embark on the

344 CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.

transports immediately, and the purpose would be the occupation of Spanish
territory, first, by moving our troops as speedily as possible to Santiago de
Cuba and Porto Rico, and later to the north coast of Cuba, especially our
cavalry. This military occupation to continue until hostilities cease.

Very respectfully,

NELSON A. MILES,

Major-General Commanding.

With great energy the Government had secured thirty-six trans-
ports, all of which arrived at Port Tampa about May ist; and with
great rapidity they were arranged for transportation of troops, horses
and munitions of war. Major-General Shafter was selected to com-
mand the expedition. His instructions were contained in the follovv-
ing letter, dated May 31:

War Department,

Washington, May 31, 1898 — 2:30 a. m.

Major-General William R. Shafter, Tampa, Fla.:

With the approval of the Secretary of War, you are directed to take your
command on transports, proceed under convoy of the Navy to the vicinity of
Santiago de Cuba, land your force at such place east or west of that point as
your judgment may dictate, under the protection of the Navy, and move it onto
the high ground and bluffs overlooking the harbor or into the interior, as shall
best enable you to capture or destroy the garrison there, and cover the Navy
as it sends its men in small boats to remove torpedoes, or, with the aid of the
Navy, capture or destroy the Spanish fleet now reported to be in Santiago
harbor. You will use the utmost energy to accomplish this enterprise, and the
Government relies upon your good judgment as to the most judicious use of
your command, but desires to impress upon you the importance of accom-
plishing this object with the least possible delay. You can call to your
assistance any of the insurgent forces in that vicinity and make use of such of
them as you think advisable to assist you, especially as scouts, guides, et cetera.
You are cautioned against putting too much confidence in any persons outside
of your own troops. You will take every precaution against ambuscade or
surprises or positions that may have been mined or are commanded by the
Spanish forces. You will co-operate most earnestly with the naval forces in
every way, agreeing beforehand upon a code of signals. Communicate your
instructions to Admiral Sampson and Commodore Schley. On completion
of this enterprise, unless you receive other orders or deem it advisable to remain

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 345

in the harbor of Santiago de Cuba, re-embark your troops and proceed to the
harbor of Fto de Banes, reporting by the most favorable means for further
orders and future important service — this with the understanding that your
command has not sustained serious loss and that the above harbor is safe for
your transports and convoy. When will you sail?
By command of Major-General Miles:

H. C. CORBIN,

Adjutant-General.

On June ist General Miles arrived at Tampa to assist in the prompt
dispatch of this expedition. The following was sent General Shafter
on June 4th :

Adjutant-General's Office,

Washington, June 4, 1898 — 6:15 p. m.
Major-General Shafter, Tampa, Fla.:

Admiral Sampson cables to-day: " ' Merrimac ' in channel. Cervera, with
four ships and two torpedo boats, in harbor safely bottled up. He urges
immediate aid from your troops. He reports 7,000 men intrenched in Juraqua-
cito and Daiquiri; 5,000 at Morron de Cuba; 4,000 at other points; in bay 500,
with small Hotchkiss gun. Cervera sent flag of truce opprobriously to exchange
prisoners for Naval Constructor Hobson and seven men who unharmed with
him on ' Merrimac,' were taken prisoners, in recognition of their bravery.
We are sure Cervera is there."

ALGER,

Secretary of War.

To this dispatch General Shafter replied as follows:

Tampa, Fla., June 4-5, 1898 — 6:32 a. m.

Adjutant-General, United States Army, Washington, D. C:

Replying to your dispatch that President wishes report of the situation, I
have to say that everything possible is being done to get away, but delays
occur that can not be prevented or foreseen. Siege guns have only been
assembled late this evening. They will be loaded on cars to-night and sent to
transports early in the morning and the loading rushed. Will begin putting
men on to-morrow, p. m., if possible, and be ready to start Monday night or
Tuesday morning. The last of the troops from Chickamauga are expected
to-night. Officers engaged in loading transports have worked night and day.
The main cause for delay has been the fact that great quantities of stores have

346 Cuba's struggle against spain.

been rushed in promiscuously, and with no facilities to handle or store them.
The last ten miles before reaching the wharf is a single track and very narrow
place in which to work. The capacity of this place has been greatly exceeded.
Could have put the troops on and rushed them off, but not properly equipped,
as I know the President wishes them. I will not delay a minute longer than is
absolutely necessary to get my command in condition, and start the earliest
moment possible.

SHAFTER,

Major-Gencral.

The following telegrams are given to show the progress of events
during this campaign:

Adjutant-General's Office,

Washington, June 5, 1898 — 12 noon.

Major-General Shafter, Tampa, Fla.:

Your telegram of 6:45 this morning shown to the President, with which he
expressed his satisfaction, with every confidence that you are doing everything
for the best. I would like to have a telegram at 6 o'clock this evening of the
situation.

H. C CORBIN,

A djutant-General.

Tampa, Fla., June 5, 1898 — 12:24 p. m.
The Secretary of War, Washington, D. C:

This expedition has been delayed through no fault of anyone connected with
it. It contains the principal part of the Army, which for intelligence and effi-
ciency is not exceeded by any body of troops on earth. It contains fourteen
of the best conditioned regiments of volunteers, the last of which arrived this
morning. Yet these have never been under fire. Between 30 and 40 per cent,
are undrilled, and in one regiment over 300 men have never fired a gun. I re-
quest ample protection at all times for this command from the Navy. This en-
terprise is so important that I desire to go with this army corps or to immedi-
ately organize another and go with it to join this and capture position number
2. Now that the military is about to be used, I believe it should be continued
with every energy, making the most judicious disposition of it to accomplish the
desired result

MILES,
Major-General Commanding Army.

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 347

Tampa, Fla., June 6, 1898 — 2:37 p. m.

Secretary of War, Washington, D. C:

In telegram sent to you yesterday morning please substitute words " while on
sea " for " at all times " after word " protection."

MILES,

Major-General Commanding.

Navy Department,

Washington, June 6, 1898.

Sir. — ■ This Department has received from Admiral Sampson, ofif Santiago
de Cuba, a telegram from which the following is an extract: " Very important
we should know immediately whether the army expedition has sailed for
Santiago and its number of vessels." You are respectfully requested to give
information on the above points as soon as practicable, in order that it may be
communicated to the Admiral. It is respectfully urged that the expedition
should get off as soon as possible. The naval force is all ready to convoy it.

Very respectfully, CHAS. H. ALLEN,

The Honorable the Secretary of War. Acting Secretary.

Tampa, Fla., June 6, 1898 — 11:40 p. m.

Hon. R. A. Alger, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C:

Troops have been marching on board to-day and will continue all night.
General Shafter hopes to sail to-morrow night or next day. There is siege
artillery here and more will arrive before No. 2 can be ready. There should
be a few regiments well equipped at Camp Alger.

MILES,

Major-General.

Navy Department,

Washington, June 7, 1898.

To Major-General Shafter or Major-General Miles, Tampa, Fla.:

Secretary of Navy has received this dispatch from Sampson to-day: " Bom-
barded forts at Santiago 7:30 to-day, June 6. Have silenced works quickly
without injury of any kind, though stationed within 3,000 yards. If 10,000
men were here, city and fleet would be ours within forty-eight hours. Every

34^ Cuba's struggle against spain.

consideration demands immediate army movement. If delayed, city will be
defended more strongly by guns taken from the fleet."

R. A. ALGER,

Secretary of War.

Washington, June 7, 1898.
Major-General Shafter, Port Tampa, Fla.:

Since telegraphing you, an hour since, the President directs you to sail at
once with what force you have ready.

R. A. ALGER,

Secretary of War.

Tampa, Fla., June 7, 1898 — 9 p. m.

Secretary of War, Washington:

I will sail to-morrow morning. Steam can not be gotten up earlier. There
is loaded to-night one division of infantry (9 regiments), 16 companies of
dismounted cavalry, 4 light batteries, 2 siege batteries artillery, 2 companies
of engineers, and the troops from Mobile. I will try and get on the rest of
the cavalry and another division of regular infantry by morning. I will sail
then with whatever I have on board.

SHAFTER,

Major-General.

Executive Mansion,

Washington, June 7, 1898.
General Shafter, Tampa, Fla.:

About how many men will you have ready by morning?

CORBIN,

Adjutant-General

Port Tampa, Fla. (direct), June 7, 1898 — 10:15 p. m

Adjutant-General Corbin:

I expect to have 834 ofHcers, 16,154 men on transports by daylight and will
sail at that hour. Will wire particulars before starting,

SHAFTER.

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 349

Tampa, Fla., June 7, 1898 — 9:34 p. m.
The President, Washington:

From the Commanding General down to the drummer boys, everyone is im-
patient to go, and annoyed at the delay. The last of the troops from Chick-
amauga arrived this morning and have been equipped and hurried to the
steamers. Feel confident they will all do their best to carry out the wishes
and directions of the President.

MILES,
Major-General Commanding.

War Department,
Washington, D. C, June 8, 1898.
Major-General Siiafter, Tampa, Fla.:

Wait until you get further orders before you sail. Answer quick.

R. A. ALGER,

Secretary of War.

War Department,
Washington, D. C., Jttne 8, 1898.
Major-General Miles, Port Tampa, Fla.:

I have sent the following telegram to Major-General Shafter: " Wait until
you get further orders before you sail. Answer quick."

R. A. ALGER,

Secretary of War.

Tampa, Fla., June 8, 1898 — 4:3^ p. m.
Adjutant-General U. S. Army, IVashington:

Your dispatch of to-day received.

MILES,
Major-General Commanding Army.

Port Tampa, Fla., June 8, 1898 — 4:06 p. m.

R. A. Alger, Secretary of War, Washington, D. C:

Message received. Vessels are in the stream, but will be able to stop them
before reaching the Gulf.

SHAFTER,

Major-General.

3S<^ Cuba's struggle against spain.

War Department, ♦

Washington, June 8, 1898.

Major-General Miles, Tampa, Fla.:

The reason for countermanding order you will find in the following. The
order was given at the request of the Navy Department by direction of the
President:

Key West, June 8.

" Spanish armor cruiser, second class, and Spanish torpedo-boat destroyer
seen by " Eagle," Nicholas Channel, Cuba. Destroy convoy. Detail follow.

" REMEY."

" Key West, June 8.

" Last cipher just came by 'Resolute,' just arrived; was pursued by two
vessels, Nicholas Channel, Cuba, last night. Shall I order ' Indiana " and all
available cruisers to coast of Cuba? More detail to follow. — Remey."

R. A. ALGER,

Secretary of War.

Tampa, Fla., June 8, 1898 — 11:42 p. m.

Hon. Secretary of War, Washington, D. C:

If that report is true, those Spanish vessels could be within six hours of the
loaded transports now, and there to-morrow. Have ample measures been
taken by the Navy to insure their safety?

MILES,

Commanding.

Port Tampa, Fla., June 8, 1898 — 5:03 p. m.
Hon. Secretary of War, Washington, D. C:

Ships commenced moving at 4 o'clock yesterday. They have been moving
out during night and morning as loaded. Your dispatch just received. Ships
can be recalled and await orders.

MILES,

Commanding.

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THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 353

Headquarters of the Army,

Tampa, Fla., June 9, 1898 — 6:50 p. m.

Secretary of War, JVashingfon, D. C:

Think it would be well to announce that the Army got on board trans-
ports and started, as they did yesterday. Say nothing about its being recalled,
but let our naval vessels go over the course that our transports would have
gone over, with the hope of finding those Spanish ships. Does not the pres-
ence of Spanish war vessels in Cuban waters render it extremely hazardous
to send troops on transports until they are captured, destroyed, or driven away?
And, under the circumstances, is it expected that I shall organize expedition
number 2? Arrangements had been partly made before the presence of the
Spanish ships was announced.

MILES,

Major-General Commanding Army.

War Department, June 9, 1898.
Major-General Miles, Tampa, Fla.:

The President directs me to say that no change of plan will be made; that
Expedition No. 2 must be organized as rapidly as possible. We are looking
for transports and are satisfied the Navy will take care of that problem. Give
nothing out.

R. A. ALGER,

Secretary of War.

Tampa, Fla., June 9, 1898 — 2:45 p. m.

Secretary of War, Washington, D. C:

It seems that it is a naval problem yet unsolved, and it might be advisable fot
the command now on board transports to have the protection of the entire
Navy to convoy it to number i, number 2, or Nuevitas, or, if this is considered
too hazardous, then keep the troops in healthful camps, as they are now, and
assist the Navy to destroy the Spanish fleet. There are here 25 good steam-
ers that could be used to carry water, coal and supplies, guns, revolving
cannon and mortars, etc., and they could be added to the force of the Navy.
It seems strange to be suggesting that the Army assist the Navy in this way,
but I am sure we v/oiild receive most loyal support when the waters are safe
for crossing with the Army.

MILES,

Major-General Commanding Army.

354 Cuba's struggle against spain.

Adjutant-General's Office,

Washington, June 9, 1898.
Major-General Shafter, Tampa, Fla.:

Should you not sail until Monday, Secretary War desires to know whether
you will keep your troops on board or disembark them.

H. C CORBIN,

A d jut ant- General.

Port Tampa, Fla., June 9, 1898 — 9:32 p. m.

Adjutant-General, United States Army, Washington, D. C:

As the ships are lying it is impracticable to disembark the men. The gen-
eral officers in command are all unanimous in this opinion. They will be taken
off, however, in detachments for exercise. There is no place in the vicinity
where they can be camped with any degree of comfort.

SHAFTER,
Major-General U. S. Volunteers.

The following communication was received from Navy Depart-
ment on date named:

Navy Department,

Washington, June 9, 1S98.
The Honorable the Secretary of War:

Sir. — Referring to the expedition destined to Santiago de Cuba, I have the
honor to inform you that it is expected that the convoy of men-of-war, re-
enforced by two armored ships from Admiral Sampson's fleec, will be coaled
and ready to start for Santiago de Cuba by the evening of Monday, the 13th
instant, or by the morning of the following day, without' regard to the
Spanish ships.

The board is of opinion that the army transports should not move from the
vicinity of Tampa until about twenty hours before the naval convoy will be
coaled and ready to start. This latter time, though estimated as above, can not
be closely fixed to-day, but probably can be by to-morrow evening.

Very respectfully,

CHAS. H. ALLEN,

Acting Secretary.

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 355

Adjutant-General's Office,
Washington, June 9, 1898 — 9:30 p. m.
Major-General Miles, Tampa, Fla.:

Following from the Acting Secretary Navy sent you for your information
and you will transmit it to General Shafter:

" Referring to the expedition destined to Santiago de Cuba, I have the honor
to inform you that it is expected that the convoy of men-of-war, re-enforced
by two armored ships from Admiral Sampson's fleet, will be coaled and ready
to start for Santiago by the evening of Monday, the 13th instant, or by the
morning of the following day, without regard to the Spanish ships. The
board is of opinion that army transports should not move from the vicinity of
Tampa until about twenty hours before the naval convoy will be coaled and
ready to start. This latter time, though estimated as above, can not be closely
fixed to-day, but probably can be by to-morrow evening."

Any further information concerning the movement of vessels for convoy
will be sent you the moment it is received.

By order Secretary of War:

H. C. CORBIN,

A djutant-General.

Adjutant-General's Office,

Washington, June 12, 1898 — 11 a. m.

Maj.-Gen. W. R. Shafter, Port Tampa, Fla.:

The following is sent you for your information and guidance: Commodore
Remey, commandant of the naval base at Key West, has been directed to
reassemble and coal as soon as possible the naval force which was recently
designated to convoy the army transports in which is embarked the military
expedition for Santiago de Cuba. As soon as Commodore Remey reports
when the convoy will be coaled and ready, his instructions are to send it to
meet the army transports in the passage or strait between Rebecca Shoal and
the Dry Tortugas, and considerable time would be saved if the army transports
could leave Tampa about eighteen hours before the Key West division of the
convoy reaches the neighborhood of Rebecca Shoal. The date and hour at
which the Key West division of the convoy will reach the vicinity of Rebecca
Shoal can not be exactly fixed, but you will be informed of it as soon as
practicable.

35^ Cuba's struggle against spain.

You will place yourself in communication with Commodore Remey and ar-
range to meet convoy as herein suggested, making close connection. Ac-
knowledge receipt.

By order of Secretary of War.

H. C CORBIN,

Adjutant-General.

War Department,

Washington, June 12, 1898.
Major-General Shafter, Port Tampa, Fla.:

Having reference to telegram of this morning, the Secretary of War now di-
rects me to inform you that the " Indiana " and other ships forming the con-
voy will meet the transports at Rebecca Shoal and proceed together to desti-
nation. You should reach the shoal not later than to-morrow afternoon.
Confer freely with Commodore Remey.

H. C. CORBIN,

Adjutant-General.

Tampa, Fla., June 12, 1898 — 7:18 p. m.

Adjutant-General U. S. Army, Washington, D. C:

4:30 p. m. Your dispatch in reference to starting delivered at 3 p. m. to-day.
Have consulted with senior naval officer present, who says we must have day-
light to get down the lower bay. Will start the transports at daylight to-
morrow, and with good luck will meet convoy from Key West before
Wednesday noon.

SHAFTER,

Major-General U. S. Volunteers, Commanding.

Port Tampa, Fla., June 13, 1898 — 1:10 p. m.
Secretary of War, Washington, D. €.:

Steamers are moving out to sea and should be away at i o'clock.

MILES,
Major-General.

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 357

Adjutant-General's Office,

Washington, D. C, June 14, 1898 — 11:40 p. m.

Major-General Miles, Tampa, Fla.:

Secretary of War desires the names of the general officers accompanying
General Shafter's expedition.

H. C. CORBIN,

Adjutant-General.

Tampa, Fla., June 15, 1898 — 1:41 p. m.
Gen. H. C. Corbin, Adjutant-General U. S, Army, Washington, D. C:

In reply to your telegram of yesterday the Major-General Commanding
directs me to inform you that the following general officers accompanied
General Shafter:

Maj.-Gen. Joseph Wheeler, Brig. -Gens. J. F. Kent, H. S. Hawkins, S. S.
Sumner, J. C. Bates, S. B. M. Young, H. W. Lawton, and A. R. Chaffee.
Also Major-General Breckinridge and Brig.-Gen, William Ludlow went as
inspecting officer and engineer officer from Headquarters Army, respectively.

MICHLER,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

Key West, Fla., June 15, 1898.

Captain Montgomery, Executive Mansion, Washington, D. C.:

Twenty-one transports and eight convoys off Tortugas 10 this morning, and
at same place at sundown.

SAWYER,

Censor.
(Received at Washington 10:55 p- m.;

Playa del Este, via Haiti.

Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.:

Off Daiquiri, Cuba, June 22, 1898. — Landing at Daiquiri this morning suc-
cessful. Very little, if any, resistance.

SHAFTER.
(Received, Washington June, 22, 1898, 6:22 p, m.)

358 Cuba's struggle against spain.

Adjutant-General's Office,

Washington, June 21, 1898.
Major-General Shafter, Santiago de Cuba:

Secretary War directs that the transports that went with you be returned to
Tampa for re-enforcements under same convoy that conducted you to your
present station, unless you think it unsafe to send it. Also report as to your
needs. Proposed to send you auxiliary cruisers " Yale " and " Harvard "
sailing from Newport News with re-enforcements.

H. C CORBIN,

Adjutant-General.

War Department,
Washington, June 21, 1898.
The Honorable the Secretary of the Navy:

Sir. — I have the honor to inclose herewith copy of a telegram just sent to
Major-General Shafter, Santiago de Cuba.

Very respectfully,

R. A. ALGER,

Secretary of War.

By H. C. CORBIN,

«

Adjutant-General.

Adjutant-General's Office,

Washington, June 23, 1898.
Major-General Shafter, Santiago de Cuba:

Secretary of War directs such of the transports as can be spared be returned
to Tampa soon as convenient under convoy of the Navy. Please cable number
and names that can be returned and time of departure. Should it be deemed
best to not unload all supplies not perishable on ships, the same can be left in
them until next voyage.

By command Major-General Miles.

H. C. CORBIN,

A djutant-General.

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 359

Playa del Este, via Haiti.
Adjutant-General, Washington :

Siboney, i. — Cable received. Colonel Humphrey has been ordered to re-
turn as many transports as possible at once.

W. R. SHAFTER,
Major-General, U. S. Volunteers, Fifth Corps.
(Received at Washington, July 2, 1898 — i :2i a. m.)

On June 24th General Miles proposed the following for the plan of
the campaign:

Headquarters of the Army,

Washington, D. C, June 24, 1898.

Sir. — I have the honor to submit the following:

With the capture of Santiago de Cuba it is expected we will have several
thousand Spanish prisoners, and with the capture of the second objective
position, now under consideration, it is expected we will add to the number,
making, it is hoped, in the aggregate at least 30,000 prisoners.

After the capture of the position next after Santiago de Cuba it would be, in
my judgment, advisable to take some deep-water harbors on the northern
coast of Cuba, which would be advisable, not only for our Army, but also for
the Navy, as safe ports for our transports, supply ships, and naval vessels
between Key West and Porto Rico. It is also important that we should select
some point at which to disembark our mounted troops and light artillery, with
which our Government is well supplied. We will have, in a few weeks, upward
of 15,000 cavalry. This force, with the light artillery and a small body of
infantry, will make a most formidable army corps with which to conduct a
campaign in the interior of Cuba.

The most available point, it appears to me, would be thei harbor of Neuvitas,
which has twenty-eight and one-half feet of water. From there the command
could move to Puerto Principe, one of the principal cities of the Island of Cuba.
Using that as a base, it could move through the rolling country, which is
reported to be free from yellow fever, to Moron and Taguayabon, and thence
to the Villa Clara, or, by a more southern route, from Puerto Principe to
Ciego de Avila, thence to Spiritus, and thence to Villa Clara. A road could be
built at the rate of five miles per day as that army corps marches; also, we
would find two railroad bases between Puerto Principe and Villa Clara.

360 Cuba's struggle against spain.

To move the mounted troops over from Florida to Cuba and make this march
would undoubtedly consume the time up to nearly the 30lh 01 September.

This army corps would also have the assistance of all the available forces of
Garcia and Gomez, and would by that time be occupying practically two-thirds
of the Island of Cuba.

If no serious force was encountered, this army corps could continue its march
to the south side of Havana. If a large force of Spanish troops, sufficient to
check its march, was moved to the vicinity of Villa Clara, then the entire army
with which we propose to invade Cuba could be moved between the forces at
Villa Clara and Havana, dividing the Spanish forces and defeating them in
detail.

I make this suggestion as having three advantages: First, we could employ
at reasonable compensation such prisoners as desired occupation in road
building; second, we could move into the interior of Cuba our large cavalry
com.mand without serious molestation; third, we would be operating during the
rainy or sickly season in the most healthful parts of Cuba, practically free
from yellow fever, and at the same time be occupying a large portion of the
enemy's territory.

If this proposition does not meet with favor, then, after the capture of
Santiago de Cuba and other places to the east, we could move the entire force
to the west of Havana and conduct the campaign from the deep harbors on
that coast. My judgment, however, is decidedly in favor of the first plan of
campaign.

Before reaching Villa Clara we would undoubtedly have upward of 50,000
prisoners, and if we could, by judicious, humane treatment, use them in a way
that would be advantageous to themselves as well as to our interests, I think
it would be advisable. There would be one great danger in moving them to
our own territory and establishing a large camp of prisoners, and that is that
they would bring the germs of disease with them and spread them among our
own people, as many Americans would have to be employed on the ships and
railroads, together with the guards necessary to control them.

J Very respectfully,

NELSON A. MILES,

Major-General Commanding.
The Secretary of War.

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 3^^

When General Miles reached my headquarters in front of Santiago
on July 13th, he informed me of this proposition to organize a
mounted force of 15,000 men, with full artillery equipment, and he
also informed me that I was to be in command.

The plan was for me to move westerly to Havana, and capture all
the positions occupied by the enemy between Santiago and Havana.

But to return from this digression and to resume the thread of our
narrative, on June 7th orders were received from Washington for the
immediate embarkation of our troops. That night will long be remem-
bered at Tampa. The hotel was made bright and beautiful by the
presence of fair ladies daintily attired in hlmy muslins and laces; while
the brilliant uniforms of our infantry, cavalry and artillery of^cers, with
their white, yellow or red trimmings, and the additional novelty of the
uniforms of the foreign attaches moving about amid the ever-changing
throng added to the general interest and gayety of the scene. The
band was sending inspiring strains of martial music through the
foyer of the hotel and over the moonlit grounds. Many of the guests
were out on the front porch and steps watching the Rough Riders who
had come in from camp to be paid off for the first time, their kaki
uniforms making a long brown line as they sat on the ground in the
dim light waiting their turn.

About 9 o'clock there was a decided and very perceptible wave of
excitement and mystery sweeping over the concourse of visitors.
Orderlies were coming in saluting and giving dispatches to officers,
after reading which the latter would hastily excuse themselves and call-
ing other officers aside would disappear for a consultation. It was
evident from the indications that the long waiting was over and that
important orders had come.

Out in the camps great excitement reigned. Orders rang out clear
and distinct in the still night air, dark figures were seen hurrying to
and fro, while orderlies darted about holding candles by whose meagre
light the hurried packing was done. Soon the tents were struck and
huge white piles of tentage and baggage were heaped up beside
the railroad, awaiting the train which was expected to leave at 11
o'clock. Groups of ofiicers sat around discussing the situation and ex-
pressing their belief at the prospect of immediate active service. The
train did not arrive until daylight when it was eargely boarded by the
weary soldiers. After reaching Port Tampa, a distance of nine miles,
the troops were hurriedly embarked on the transports.

362

CUBA S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.

The following official table shows approximately the order of naval
ships, transports and cruisers:

Order of Cruising.

International Signal, T. C. F.

Vesuvius. O 1600 yds. O Scorpion.

1600 yds. 1600 yds.

Annapolis. Castine. Helena. Indiana.

O 800 yds. O 800 yds. O 1600 yds. O

4

00 yds.

400

yds.

0)

0 I

0 9

0

17 Alleghany.

• I— 1

s

0 2

0 10

0

18 ist Div.

0

*^ 1600 yds.

0 3

0 II

0

19 1600 yds.

"5
0

0 4

0 12

0

20

*^ Panther.

Yosemite.

0 1600 yds.

0 5

0 25

0

30 0

8co

yds.

800 yds.

Bancroft.

Detroit.

0 0

8co yd

s.

0

800

yds.

. 0

0

400

yd5

>.

400 yds

0 26

0 28

0

22

0 7

0 15

0

23 2d Div.

0 8

0 16

0

24 1600 yds.

Wompatock,

0 27

0 29

0

Eagle.

0 1600 yds.

0 6

0 14

0

21 0

16

00 yds.

?F^j^. 0

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 3^3

The cavalry division were on board the steamships '* Alleghany/'
'' Rio Grande," " Miami " and " Yucatan." It was understood that
the hurried orders for immediate embarkation were due to the dispatch
from Admiral Sampson to the effect that with the aid of 10,000 troops
the city of Santiago and Cervera's fleet could be captured. This fired
the men who knew of it with the wildest anxiety to be on the spot
without a moment's delay; those who did not know of it felt there was
some urgent need at the front and every man was intensely anxious to
be off. Bitter disappointment was felt when the dispatch came order-
ing a delay. It was reported that a Spanish fleet was lying in wait in
Nicholas Channel to attack the transports, which had not sufficient
convoys to protect them Finally on Monday, the 13th, orders came
to sail, and on Tuesday morning, June 14th, we succeeded in pushing
down Tampa Bay. The channel is a difficult one, the ships drawing
eighteen feet, and the narrow channel being only twenty-three feet at
its deepest part. There were only four pilots for this large number of
vessels, which caused some delay.

The last glimpse the soldiers had of faces from home was when a
number of ladies went down on the steamer '' Margaret," which took
water and mail to the fleet anchored off Egmont Keys, twenty miles
from Port Tampa. When the ship sailed majestically out of Tampa
Bay, cheer after cheer from the men on the decks and crowded in the
rigging proved how glad they were to go forth and face the hardships
and dangers in store for them ; everyone exulted in the joyous con-
sciousness that he was to have the privilege of striking a blow at one
and the same time for humanity and for the honor of his country.

On Wednesday, June 15th, the transports passed Tortugas light,
leaving it to the right, and at daylight on June i6th they found them-
selves under the escort of the warships. They moved in triple columns.
My own quarters were on the " Alleghany," the leading vessel in the
right-hand column of transports, some thousand yards behind the
warship " Indiana."

Only a few horses and mules were carried, these being for the use
of general and staff officers, and the absolute necessities of trans-
portation, making in all about 2,000 animals. The troopers, to their
great disappointment, had to go dismounted on account of the im-
possibility of transporting a large number of horses, which necessitated
leaving in Tampa a detachment of each regiment to care for the
horses there. The entire cavalry division which entered this expedi-
tion numbered 158 officers and 2,822 men, and the strength of the

364 Cuba's struggle against spain.

entire army which sailed from Tampa to Cuba was 815 officers and
16,072 enlisted men.

Fortunately the weather was calm and the voyage was accomplished
safely, with no unlooked-for incidents. Sailing around the northern
coast of Cuba, we caught sight of the mainland on Friday morning,
June 17th, about opposite the west end of Puerto Principe; on Sunday
morning we turned southward into the Windward Channel ; that nighi
we rounded Cape Maysi, and at daylight, Monday, June 20th, were
within thirty miles of Santiago. As we rounded the Cape, the waiting
tugs which had been impatiently looking out for the appearance of the
American armada, catching sight of the '* Indiana " and the foremost
of the transports, scurried back in haste to the waiting fleet; and when
we came near Guantanamo, the '' Detroit " shot forward in a race
with the tugs to carry the news. The flagship fired a salute and sent
the Admiral's launch to welcome General Shafter. The hurrahs ex-
changed between the soldiers and the sailors at this great distance, the
salutes and cheering on both sides, were awe-inspiring to a high degree
and must have reached the ears of the Spaniards in and around the
city of Santiago.

After a meeting with Admiral Sampson, General Shafter with his
staff went ashore and had a consultation with the Cuban generals.
It was decided that the landing should be effected at Daiquiri, while
feints were to be made at other points in order to confuse the
Spaniards.

A general bombardment of the shore took place on the morning of
the 22d, immediately after which the disembarkation commenced.
The men went ashore, joyous and jubilant, generosity and good
nature prevailed, and with few exceptions — for in every large body
of men the chronic grumbler may be found — not a complaint or
criticism was to be heard. Officers of all grades cheerfully packed
their blankets and rations, and by the following day the advance
troops of the corps were marching forward.

Much has been said as to the correctness of judgment which
directed the landing at Daiquiri, and it has been contended by some
that a landing at some point west of the bay would have been better.
There would certainly have been advantages in such a course, but also,
objections and difficulties. The coast was by no means favorable and
the scarcity of water was also urged; but all things being considered,
with the facts before General Shafter, it was certainly good judgment
to land troops at Daiquiri, which could be pushed forward, drive the

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 365

enemy from Siboney and thus open that locaHty as an additional place
of landing.

On the 22d I went ashore at the earliest possible moment to pre-
pare for my troops and directed Colonel Wood to have his regimental
flag hoisted upon the flagstaff of a Spanish blockhouse, on an emi-
nence near the shore. The flag was instantly saluted by shrill whistles
from the entire fleet. I rode forward into the country about three
miles and a half, returning late at night, and was ordered next morning
to proceed with such of my troops as had already disembarked, to
Juragua, and to throw forward pickets to Juraguacito, commonly
called " Siboney," which place, we were informed, was occupied by
General Linares with a considerable force of Spainards, the defenses of
the place being blockhouses and other temporary works.

LAS GUASIMAS.

Directing General Young and Colonel Wood with two squadrons
of the First Volunteers, known as the '' Rough Riders," and one squad-
ron each of the First and Tenth Regulars, amounting in all to 964 men,
and the commanders of three Hotchkiss guns and one dynamite gun
to follow me, I rode forward accompanied by my staff officers.
Major Beach and Lieutenant Steele, my interpreter, Mr. Mestre,
and one orderly and a guide. Approaching Siboney I found that the
Spaniards had evacuated that place and had started at daylight in the
direction of Sevilla, followed by 200 Cubans.

General Lawton, with his fine division, had been given the privilege
of bein.g the first to land. He had reached Siboney with the advance
of his command soon after the Spaniards had evacuated that place.
Two of his brigades were encamped upon the Daiquiri and Siboney
road, about half a mile from the latter place. I proceeded rapidly
to the front and found that the enemy had halted in a strong position
three miles from Siboney, and that the Cubans had engaged their rear
with a loss of two killed and seven wounded. After examining the
position and consultation with General Castillo and other Cuban offi-
cers and learning the features of the country, I returned to Siboney,
reaching that place after dark, leaving the Cubans encamped on the
road about one-third of the distance between Siboney and the Spanish
position. This body of Cubans knew the country, and their officers
seemed to be enthused to learn that the Americans were to move upon
the Spaniards, and they were delighted with the idea that at daylight
they were to march to battle side by side with the army which had

366 Cuba's struggle against spain.

come for their deliverance. I expected several hundred, and these,
together with my 900 men, would, I thought, be able to make a very
formidable attack; and I was much impressed with the advantage it
would give us for the Spaniards to be promptly and forcibly con-
vinced that their American foes were bold, brave, aggressive and
determined.

I resolved to attack as early as possible. The disposition of the
troops and the plan of attack were as follows:

General Young with the Hotchkiss guns, the dynamite gun, the
two squadrons of regular cavalry, and the Cubans, were to march by
the main Santiago road, while Colonel Wood with his two squadrons
of volunteers was to march by a road running to the left of and nearly
parallel with the main road. At a designated point, where the two
columns would be about seven or eight hundred yards apart, Colonel
Wood was to file to the right, causing his right flank to connect with
the left fiank of the regulars, which, together with the Cubans, would
file to the left; this would bring our troops directly in position for
attack.

I was up before daylight and together with Major Beach and Mr.
Mestre hastened to get the columns in march. After my own troops
had been started, I sought General Castillo and the Cuban officers who
had come into the town the night before, to make certain of prompt
movement on their part. Being assured that the Cubans would cer-
tainly be with us if not in our advance, I rode rapidly, soon overtaking
the column of regulars. I was disappointed in finding but few Cubans
and could hear nothing of the main body of these troops.

On emerging from a dense wood, the Spaniards were discovered
on a hill at a distance of about 800 yards. Preparations for action
were promptly made. A Cuban guide was dispatched to Colonel
Wood, who deployed the troops under Lieutenant-Colonel Roose-
velt, a squadron as a reserve being under Major Brodie. General
Young put Bell's squadron of the First Regular Cavalry in line, Major
Norvill being at first held in reserve and the Hotchkiss guns were
put in position upon and near the road. All this was done in full
view of the enemy, not more than 800 yards distant, but to our
surprise not a shot was fired by them. This, together with our
inability to find or hear of the main body of the Cuban force, and
the further fact that the Cuban officers had stated that Spaniards
would certainly retreat during the night, made me uncertain whether
the troops we saw were really Spaniards or our Cuban allies, who, we

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 367

had been assured, would start for the front at the earliest dawn. I
had a very powerful glass and Major Beach and I rode out on an
elevation and spent some twenty-five minutes in examining the line
which confronted us. They were stationed on a ridge, their breast-
works were very clearly visible, and our glasses soon made it evident
that they were without doubt Spaniards.

I went back to the Hotchkiss guns, told General Young and Cap-
tain Watson of my observations and directed that a well-aimed shot
be fired from the Hotchkiss guns. We could see the missile strike
the works, and instantly a volley from a line many hundred yards in
length was showered upon us. Unfortunately the dynamite gun, on
which we very much depended, had not been heard from, but the three
Hotchkiss guns and Bell's squadron of regulars returned the fire with
promptitude and precision. Then troops of Norvill's squadron were
put in line and one troop under the gallant Ca.ptain Ayers was held in
reserve. I moved forward in person with a squadron of the First Regu-
lar Cavalry under Major Bell and was particularly struck with the ad-
mirable conduct of both officers and men. The fire upon the squadron
seemed to come from the breastworks a little to the left of our front
and also from a portion of the Spanish line screened by a wood
directly in front of us. The first man to fall in this part of the line,
and I think he was the first of this regiment who was struck, was
private Emil Bjork. I glanced at him as he lay partly on his side
gasping, and I told the next soldier to unbuckle his belt, under which
I saw a red spot showing he had been shot directly through the
stomach. The Mauser bullets are so small — only twenty-seven cali-
bre — that although I looked directly at his belt I could not see where
he had been struck until his belt was removed. Major Bell, the
squadron commander. Captain Knox, Lieutenant Byram and a num-
ber of noncommissioned officers and privates were badly wounded
during the advance. It was very pleasing to see the perfect discipline
displayed by these regular troops; as men fell, those nearest them
would call in a loud voice for the hospital corps, but without for a
moment turning from their duty. Most of the wounded officers and
men lay in the grass where they fell, but some tried to crawl or roll
back to a less exposed position.

On approaching the wood I turned ofif to the left so I could see that
portion of the line which was advancing through the open grass-cov-
ered fields. Meanwhile Colonel Wood had deployed his regiment,
his right nearly reaching the left of the regulars.

It now being evident that the Cubans were still in our rear, I went

368 Cuba's struggle against spain.

to General Young, who was in position about fifty yards to the left
of the battery, and told him I would send an officer back to find the
Cubans, or get any other available troops to come up. During all
this time our men were advancing and under the direction of the offi-
cers, stopping to fire when it could be done to advantage. After some-
thing over an hour's warm fighting and when our troops were within
some 300 yards of the Spanish intrenchments, the enemy com-
menced retreating. Upon reaching the enemy's position we found
it lined with empty shells of the Mauser rifles, showing their
lavish use of ammunition. Our men fired a few well-directed volleys
at the flying enemy, but were too exhausted to pursue.

The character of the roads over which our columns had moved was
such as to render progress very difficult. The masses of under-
growth, obstructed here and there by a tangle of briers and occasional
wire fencing and a succession of rocky heights and deep gullies, made
the regular formation of flanking lines almost impossible, besides the
extreme heat of the climate told severely on our men; but in spite of
these obstacles they responded to every command with readiness of
seasoned veterans and pushed steadily on with a valor so heroic and
irresistible as to strike terror into the hearts of their opponents.

Our losses were 16 killed and 52 wounded, the number of killed
being exactly the same in each column, but the number of wounded
being much higher among the volunteers. Among the killed
were Captain Allyn K. Capron, Jr., an officer in the regular army,
but a captain in the First Volunteer Cavalry, Sergeant Hamilton
Fish, of the distinguished family of that name. Sergeant Marvyn
Russell of New York, a gentleman of education and culture. The
others killed were Corporal Dougherty, Privates Leggett, Irvine,
Hefner and Dawson, of the First Volunteer Cavalry, Corporal White,
of the Tenth Cavalry, and Corporal Slemmer, Privates Stark, Krupp,
Bjork, Kolb, Dix and Berlin, of the First Regular Cavalry. Major,
afterward Colonel, Brodie, who commanded a squadron of the First
Volunteer Cavalry, was badly wounded and disabled.

This battle, though not great either in point of numbers engaged or
in casualties, was far-reaching in results, especially in the esprit de
corps and enthusiasm with which the victory inspired our troops.
Nine hundred and sixty-four dismounted cavalry in less than two days
after reaching the shores of Cuba had marched fourteen miles and at-
tacked and defeated the Spanish forces under Lieutenant-General
Linares in a position which this distinguis'ied general had selected
as very favorable to defense. The Spaniards had thrown up some tern-

MACEO.

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 371

porary defenses which still further strengthened their position. The
Spanish force was variously estimated at from 1,400 to more than
double that number.

The following is an extract from my official report:

On June 21st, I was ordered to report to General Shafter on board the
" Seguranca," and orders were given for the Army to disembark the next day,
General Lawton's division to land first, Bates' Independent Brigade second,
and the dismounted cavalry division, which I had the honor to command,
third. In conversation with General Shafter at this and at other times, I
specially dwelt upon the historic fact that the tactics of Spanish armies had
been to fight in defenses around cities, and that the information we had gave
strong indications that the same plan would be followed by the Spanish gen-
erals in Cuba, and I emphasized the importance of our using every effort and
device to overtake and attack the enemy's detachments before they could con-
centrate at Santiago behind their strong breastworks, which we knew were
made still stronger by wire entanglements in their front. General Shafter and
all the officers to whom the suggestion was made fully concurred in this.

On the morning of the 226. a fleet of boats towed by steam or naphtha
launches belonging to the Navy was placed at General Lawton's disposal, and
his division was quickly landed. Appreciating the importance of getting the
Army ashore as soon as possible, and knowing that it was General Shafter's
desire that this should be done, I, so far as practicable, urged the landing of
my troops by means of the ships' boats, and seeing these efforts on our part,
some of the young naval ofificers, not being able to find the ships occupied by
Bates' brigade, and my ships being near the shore, landed some of my troops
on the afternoon of the 22d and on the morning of the 23d. I went ashore
myself on the 22d, rode out to the front about four miles to reconnoiter the
country, and returned that night. The next morning General Shafter sent for
me and expressed great anxiety at not having heard from Lawton. He told
me that there was a Spanish force in blockhouses and other fortifications at
Siboney, and directed me to proceed to its immediate vicinity with the dis-
mounted cavalry then on shore and throw out my pickets to that place. General
Shafter's exact language being to '' proceed to Juragua and throw forward
pickets to Juraguacito." The latter place was also called Siboney, and after-
wards was almost always designated by that name.

I appreciated the importance of getting Siboney into our possession, as it
had a good harbor and was some nine miles nearer to Santiago than our then
landing place at Daiquiri. General Shafter's anxiety for me to move rapidly
was such that he gave orders for his quartermaster, Major Jacobs, to furnish
me all the horses I needed for my Hotchkiss guns, dynamite gun, and for

37^ Cuba's struggle against spain.

myself and staff. The sea was so high that the captain of my transport stated
that it was not safe for his boats to be lowered at that time, but I insisted upon
his doing so, reached the shore, procured the horses, directed the Hotchkiss
guns and the dynamite gun to move forward as soon as possible, gave the same
directions to Colonel Wood and General Young, and then, accompanied by
Major Beach, Lieutenant Steele, and Mr. Mestre of my staff, and one orderly,
I rode rapidly to Siboney. This is a small village close to the shore, while the
place which was designated Juragua was on a slight elevation overlooking
Siboney and but a short distance from it.

I found General Lawton's division had been halted before reaching Siboney
and was camped on the Daiquiri and Siboney road. I also found that the
enemy had left Siboney that morning and was fighting with some Cubans on
the Siboney and Santiago road. I rode rapidly to the front, reconnoitered the
ground, and was forcibly impressed that it would be a great military advantage
to attack and defeat the enemy in their position. At dark I rode back to
Siboney and sent for General Young and Color .\ Wood. The First Volunteer
Cavalry, about 500 strong, reached Siboney between 7 and 8 o'clock that night,
and the two squadrons of regular cavalry, numbering about 464 men, had been
halted by General Young and put in bivouac before reaching Siboney. Many
of the Cubans insisted that the enemy would leave that night. I gave directions
for the command to take breakfast before daylight, and to start to the front at
the first dawn of day. I explained to General Young and Colonel Wood the
position and strength of the enemy.

Fully an hour before day I was up and seeking to hasten preparations for
the march. The regular cavalry had arisen long before daybreak, finished
their breakfast, marched quite a distance, and reached Siboney very shortly
after daylight. There were two roads leading up to the point occupied by the
Spaniards. The First Volunteer Cavalry, accompanied by Capt. Lloyd S.
McCormick, Seventh Regular Cavalry; First Lieutenant Tyree R. Rivers, Third
Regular Cavalry, and Second Lieutenant William R. Smedberg, Jr., Fourth
Regular Cavalry, were, on the recommendation of General Castillo, sent by
the less frequented and m.ost dif^cult road, while the regular troops and the
artillery were ordered upon the main Siboney and Santiago road. General
Castillo had promised to take a Cuban regiment with us, and after starting the
American troops I went to General Castillo and urged him to push his troops
forward, v/hich he promised to do. The Spaniards were found in the same
position they occupied the previous night, about three miles from Siboney.
The squadron of the First Cavalry, commanded by Major James M. Bell, was
promptly put in line and the three Hotchkiss guns in position on the road, and
Major Norvell's squadron of the Tenth Cavalry was at first held in reserve.

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 373

The dynamite gun, upon which we placed great dependence, failed to
reach us.

A man was sent across to Colonel Wood to let him know that wc were in
position and that the enemy was directly in our front. What appeared to be the
right of the enemy's line was in full view. The space intervening betv/een this
portion of the enemy's line and our position was quite open, but the enemy's
left was hidden by heavy timber and undergrowth. As we were not fired
upon, and as I had been unable to find the bulk of the Cuban force, I feared
for a moment that the men we saw might be Cubans. I, therefore, together
with Major Beach, rode to a little elevation in front and carefully examined
them with a powerful glass, and being satisfied that they were Spaniards, I
went back and ordered a shot to be fired from one of the Hotchkiss guns.
This was replied to by a long line of infantry, and the fight commenced.
Shortly afterward we heard shots to our left, which told us that Wood was
also in action. Bell's dismounted squadron of the First Cavalry was imme-
diately advanced, and Major Norvell, leaving Captain Ayres' troop with the
battery, deployed his other three troops into line, and the seven troops
advanced together. Officers and men fought with great gallantry, continuing
to advance, and in an hour the fight was won. The enemy's retreat was pre-
cipitate, and our men being exhausted, and all the men and regimental of^Eicers
being on foot, pursuit was impossible. Our losses w^ere i6 killed and
52 wounded, and after giving directions in regard to the care, of the wounded
and the burial of the dead, I rode rapidly to Sevilla, which was in full
view of Santiago, and then rode on to a point about seven miles from Santiago.
Immediately after the fight was over I wrote to General Shafter and received
from him complimentary replies.

That afternoon I received instructions to take command of all the troops on
shore, and in the evening received the following from General Shafter's
adjutant-general :

Headquarters Fifth Army Corps,

S. S. " Seguranca," Jtme 24, 1898 — i r. m.

Sir. — Tlie commanding general directs me to say that he is glad to hear
such good news, and that you are occupying the enemy's ground. A battery
will be sent you as soon as it can be unloaded and horses are off. Will also
send you some saddle horses from the artillery. The mounted cavalry will be
dispatched as fast as possible.

McCLERNAND,

A. A. G.
Major-General Wheeler, U. S. Volunteers, Commanding Cavalry Division.

374 Cuba's struggle against spain.

Later I also received the following:

Headquarters Fifth Army Corps,
On Board S. S. " Seguranca," off Daiquiri,
Cuba* June 25, 1898 — 5:50 a. m.
Sir. — ^ Dispatch of 5 p. m. just received. Your news is excellent. Have
ordered Bales to repair road to Sevilla at once. One battery of artillery is on
way to you, and will have another battery before night. Four troops Second
Cavalry will be gotten to you just as early as possible.

Very respectfully,

WM. R. SHAFTER,

Major-General, U. S. Volunteers, Commanding.

Major-Gencrai J. Wheeler, U. S. Volunteers, Comnianding Cavalry Division,
near Sevilla, Cuba.

General Shaftcr, in his official report dated September 13, 1898,
in referring to this battle says:

The engagement had an inspiriting effect upon our men and, doubtless, corre-
spondingly depressed the enemy, as it was now plainly demonstrated to them
that they had a foe to meet who would advance upon them under heavy lire
delivered from intrenchments.

The day after the Las Gnasimas fight General Shafter received the
following telegrams from Washington:

Washington, D. C, June 25.
General Shafter, Daiquiri, Cuba:

The President directs me to send his thanks to you and your Army for the
gallant action of yesterday, which I gladly do.

R. A. ALGER,

Secretary of War.

Washington, D. C, June 25.
General Shafter, Daiquiri, Cuba:

Congratulations on success attained thus far. Regret most deeply to hear
of the loss of your heroic men.

MILES,

Major-General.

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 375

General Shafter replied:
Major-General Miles, Commanding Army, Washington:

Thanks for congratulations. Nine hundred and sixty-four men only engaged
on our side. But it was very decisive in our favor, and the enemy retreated
precipitately. Lack of cavalry only prevented their capture. Reports from
Spanish sources from Santiago say we were beaten, but persisted in fighting,
and they were obliged to fall back. Deeply regret the loss of so many brave

"^^"- SHAFTER.

The follovving is General Young's report of this engagement:

Headquarters Second Cavalry Brigade,
Camp near Santiago de Cuba, Cuba, June 29, 1898.
The Adjutant-General, Cavalry Division:

Sir. — By direction of the major-general commanding the cavalry division,
I have the honor to submit the following report of the engagement of a part of
this brigade with the enemy at Guasimas, Cuba, on the 24th instant, accom-
panied by detailed reports from the regimental and other commanders engaged,
and a list of the killed and wounded:

After debarking at Daiquiri on the afternoon of the 23d instant, I received
from Major-General Wheeler, the division commander, verbal orders to move
out with three days' rations in haversacks, to a good camping place between
Juraguacito and Siboney, on the road leading to Santiago de Cuba.

In obedience thereto, at 4:30 p. m., I moved from my bivouac near the land-
ing, with brigade headquarters, the First Volunteer Cavalry (Wood's), one
squadron of the First United States Cavalry (Bell's), one squadron of the
Tenth United States Cavalry (Norvell's), and the Hotchkiss mountain-gun
battery (four guns. Captain Watson, Tenth Cavalry, temporarily commanding),
all dismounted. The remainder of the brigade was ordered to follow early
the following morning on receiving its rations.

I arrived at Siboney with the head of the column at about 7 p. m., where I
bivouacked for the night with the First Volunteer Cavalry, the two squadrons
of the First and Tenth United States Cavalry and the battery being delayed by
the crowded condition of the trail and the difliculty of following through the
jungle after night.

I reported to General Wheeler and from him learned of an engagement be-
tween Cubans and Spaniards in that vicinity during the day, resulting in the
repulse of the former with some loss. Later I met General Castillo, the com-
mander of the Cuban forces, who gave me a full description of the topography

376 Cuba's struggle against spain.

of the country and much information regarding the Spanish troops, their man-
ner of fighting, etc. General Castillo expressed the belief that although the
Spaniards had successfully resisted his attack, they would fall back to Santiago
during the night; but he also stated that he had received information they were
being re-enforced.

Deeming it essential that positive information should be obtained as to the

position and movements of the enemy in our front, I asked and obtained from

'General Wheeler authority to make a reconnoissance in force for this purpose.

General Castillo having promised to assist and co-operate with me with a force

of 800 effective Cubans.

Leading from Siboney there are two roads, or more properly trails, one to
the eastward, the other to the westward of the little town, which unite about
one mile before reaching Sevilla and a little in advance of the scene of the
Cuban-Spanish engagement. The trails are at no point more than one and
one-half miles apart.

I concluded to move by the two trails. General Castillo having informed me
his outposts covered both. I consequently directed Colonel Wood to move
v/ith his regiment by the western route, cautioning him to keep a careful look-
out and to attack any Spaniards he might encounter, connecting in the latter
event by his right flank with the other column while trying to gain the enemy's
right flank. Colonel Wood marched about 6 a. m. the 24th instant, and I sent
my personal aids. First Lieutenant T. R. Rivers, Third Cavalry, and Second
Lieutenant W. R. Smedberg, Fourth Cavalry, to accompany his column.

The other, the right column, marched at 5:45 a. m. I moved with it, accom-
panied by Captain A. L. Mills, assistant adjutant-general. I proposed to
attack the enemy in front and on his left if I found him in position.

At 7:20 A. M., the right column being masked in an open glade, Captain
Mills with a patrol of two men advanced and discovered the enemy located, as
described by General Castillo, in a locality called Guasimas, from trees of that
name in the vicinity. After having carefully examined the enemy's position I
prepared to develop his strength. Canteens were ordered filled; the Hotchkiss
battery was placed in position in concealment at about 900 yards, and Bell's
squadron was deployed and Norvell's in support.

On discovering the enemy I had sent a Cuban guide to warn Colonel Wood,
and knowing that his column had a more difficult route, and would require a
longer time to reach the position, I delayed the attack some time in order
that the development on both flanks should begin simultaneously. During this
delay General Wheeler arrived and was informed of my dispositions, plan of
attack, and intentions. After an examination of the position by him, and his
approval of my action, I ordered the attack, and it was executed in a manner

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 377

winning the admiration of the division commander and all present who
witnessed it.

The Spanish forces occupied a range of high hills in the form of an obtuse
angle, with the salient toward Siboney and with an advance party on the trail
on which I had been moving. The attack of both wings was simultaneous, and
the junction of the two lines occurred near the apex of the angle on the ridge,
which had been fortified with stone breastworks flanked by blockhouses.

The Spaniards were driven from their position and fled precipitately toward
Santiago. The attacking force numbered 950 men, while that of the enemy, at
first estimated at 2,000, has since been learned from Spanish sources to have
been 2,500. The Cuban military authorities claim the Spanish strength was
4,000. It has also been reported that Lieutenant-General Linares, commanding
the Spanish forces in eastern Cuba, and two other general of^cers were present
and witnessed the action. The fire of the enemy was almost entirely by
volleys, executed with the precision of parade. For an account of the opera-
tions of the left column, attention is invited to the inclosed report of Colonel
Wood, marked ''A."

The ground over which the right column advanced was a mass of jungle
growth, with wire fences, not to be seen until encountered, and precipitous
heights as the ridge was approached. It was impossible for the troops to keep
touch along the front, and they could only judge of the enemy from the sound
and direction of his fire. However, had it not been for this dense jungle, the
attack would not have been made against an overwhelming force in such a
position. Headway was so difficult that advance and support became merged and
moved forward under a continuous volley firing, supplemented by that of two
rapid-fire guns. Return firing by my force was only made as here and there a
small clear spot gave a sight of the enemy. The fire discipline of these par-
ticular troops was almost perfect. The ammunition expended by the two
squadrons engaged in an incessant advance for one hour and fifteen minutes
averaged less than ten rounds per man. The fine quality of these troops is also
shown by the fact that there was not a single straggler, and in not one instance
was an attempt made by any soldier to fall out in the advance to assist the
wounded or carry back the dead. The fighting on the left flank was equally
creditable and was remarkable, and I believe unprecedented in volunteer troops
so quickly raised, armed, and equipped.

Our total losses were i officer and 15 men killed; 6 officers and 46 men
wounded. Forty-two dead Spanish soldiers were found, the bodies of nearly all
of whom had been thrown into the jungle for concealment. Spanish news-
papers of Santiago the day after the battle gave their loss as T] killed. It is
knov/n that many wounded were carried to the city.

37^ Cuba's struggle against spain.

Every possible attention was given to the wounded, and the medical officers
were unremitting in their efforts to alleviate their sufferings. Circumstances
necessarily limited their appliances to the first aid order. The wounded were
carried on improvised litters to Siboney, and the dead were carefully buried on
the battlefield, a proper record of their burial being kept.

Finding, when the ridge was carried, that many of my men had become ex-
hausted by the excessive heat and exertion, I ordered a halt and occupation of
the captured position. Had I had at hand at the time of the assault a force of
mounted cavalry, the fruits of our victory would have been more apparent.

General Castillo did not appear on the field, nor did any of his troops come to
the front until the firing had ceased. No other troops than those mentioned
were engaged in the action. Three troops of the Ninth United States Cavalry
arrived on the left after the firing had stopped and were posted as pickets until
relieved by General Chaffee's brigade of General Lawton's division, which then
took the advance.

The action of all of^cers and men, so far as my personal observation ex-
tended, was superb, and I can only at this time mention the names of those
whose conduct was personally observed by me as being highly conspicuous in
gallantry and daring, and evidencing a firm intention to do everything within
the power and endurance of humanity and the scope of duty. Captain Knox,
after being shot through the abdomen, and seeing his lieutenant and first
sergeant wounded, gave necessary orders to his troops and refused to allow a
man in the firing line to assist him to the rear; Lieutenant Byram, after having
his scalp wound dressed, and knowing his captain (Knox) to be wounded, as-
sumed command of his trcop, but fell fainting while pushing to the front;
Captain Mills, the only member of my staff present with me on this part of
the field, was most conspicuous for his daring and unflagging energy in his
efforts to keep troops in touch on the line and in keeping me informed of the
progress made in advancing through the jungle.

In connection with the conduct of the officers, attention is called to Colonel
Wood's report on the conduct of Captain Capron, Major Brodie, Captain
McClintock, Lieutenant Thomas, Lieutenant-Colonel Roosevelt, Captain Mc-
Cormick (Seventh United States Cavalry), and my personal aids. Lieutenants
T. R. Rivers and Smedberg. I can not speak too highly of the efficient man-
ner in which Colonel Wood handled his regiment, and of his magnificent
behavior on the field. The conduct of Lieutenant-Colonel Roosevelt, as re-
ported to me by my two aids, deserves my highest commendation. Both
Colonel Wood and Lieutenant-Colonel Roosevelt disdained to take advantage
of shelter or cover from the enemy's fire v/hile any of their men remained
exposed to it — an error of judgment, but happily on the heroic side. I beg

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 379

leave to report that the behavior of all men of the regular and volunteer
forces engaged in this action was simply superb, and I feel highly honored in
the command of such troops.

I desire to express my admiration of the fine soldierly qualities and conduct
on the march and after meeting the enemy, of Major Norvcll, Tenth Cavalry,
and Major Bell, First Cavalry, commanding squadrons. Their quick and rapid
execution of orders and instructions were admirable and gratifying. Major
Bell received a serious wound in the early part of the engagement and was
succeeded in the command of his squadron by Captain Wainwright, whose
management of the right wing of the advance firing line was all that I could
desire or hope for, and more than I could, under such opposing conditions,
confidently expect. Captains Beck and Galbraith and Lieutenants Wright and
Fleming also deserve equal praise for the manner in which they maneuvered
and controlled their troops in attacking the precipitous heights before them.
Captain Ayres' performance of the duties assigned his troop was highly com-
mendable, as was Captain Watson's fine work with his battery. Attention is
invited to the inclosed reports of troop commanders regarding the conduct of
their subordinates and their men. Assistant Surgeon Fuller and Acting
Assistant Surgeon Delgardo, also Assistant Surgeon J. R. Church, First
Volunteer Cavalry, deserve special mention for .their gallant action in person-
ally carrying and assisting in carrying wounded men from the field under
heavy fire.

The chief results following from this action with the Spaniards are a test of
the valor of the opposing forces; the spirit of superiority I believe it has fixed
in our own; the opening of the road to the gates of Santiago de Cuba, and the
gaining of a beautiful camping ground for our Army on the heights over-
looking that city, which can now easily be taken at our leisure.

Very respectfully,

S. B. M. YOUNG,
Brigadier-General, U. S. Volunteers, Commanding.

The following is a list of the ofricers who participated in this
battle :

Major-General Joseph Wheeler, commanding.

Major William D. Beach, chief engineer.

Aurelius E. Mestre, volunteer aid.

Brigadier-General S. B. M. Young, U. S. Volunteers.

Captain A. L. Mills, A. A. G., U. S. Volunteers.

First Lieutenant T. R. Rivers, Third Cavalry, aid.

380 Cuba's struggle against spain.

Second Lieutenant W. R. Smedberg, Jr., Fourth Cavalry, aid.
First Lieutenant L. A, Fuller, assistant surgeon.
First United States Regular Cavalry:

Major James M. Bell, commanding squadron, wounded, Las Guasimas,
June 24th.

Captain Thomas T. Knox, commanding Troop K, wounded, Las Guasimas,
June 24th.

Captain R. P. Page Wainwright, commanding Troop G.

Captain Jacob G. Galbraith, commanding Troop B.

First Lieutenant George L. Byram, squadron adjutant, wounded, Las
Guasimas, June 24th.

First Lieutenant Peter E. Traub, duty with Troop G.

First Lieutenant Edmund S. Wright, commanding Troop A.

Second Lieutenant Walter M. Whitman, duty with Troop G.

Second Lieutenant Charles McK. Saltzman, duty with Troop B.

Second Lieutenant Henry C. Smither, duty with Troop A.
Tenth United States Regular Cavalry:

Major S. T. Norvell.

Captain W. H. Beck.

Captain C. G. Ayres.

Captain J. B. Watson.

Lieutenant R. L, Livermore.

Lieutenant R. J, Fleming.

Lieutenant G. Vidmer,

Lieutenant A. M. Miller, Jr.

Lieutenant H. O. Williard.

Lieutenant F. R. McCoy.
First United States Volunteer Cavalry:

Colonel Leonard Wood.

Lieutenant-Colonel Theodore Roosevelt.

Major Alexander O. Brodie, wounded, Las Guasimas, June 24111.

Major and Assistant Surgeon Henry La Motte.

Captain L. S. McCormick, Seventh United States Cavalry.

Captain Allyn K. Capron, killed, Las Guasimas, June 24th.

Captain Micah J. Jenkins.

Captain Frederick Muller.

Captain Maximilian Luna.

Captain R. B. Huston.

Captain W. H. H. Llewellyn.

Captain William O. O'Neill.

Captain J. C. McClintock.

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN. 38 1

First United States Volunteer Cavalry — (Continued) 1
First Lieutenant Woodbury Kane.
First Lieutenant Frank Frantz.
First Lieutenant J. A. Carr.
First Lieutenant J. B. Wilcox.

First Lieutenant J. R. Thomas, Jr., wounded, Las Guasimas, June 24th.
First Lieutenant and Surgeon J. R. Church.
Second Lieutenant R. C. Day.
Second Lieutenant Maxwell Keyes.
Second Lieutenant J. C. Greenway.
Second Lieutenant J. C. Goodrich.
Second Lieutenant Thomas Rhyning.
Second Lieutenant J. D. Carter.
Second Lieutenant D. J. Leahey.
Second Lieutenant H. K. Devereux.
U. S. Military Cadet Ernest Haskell.
Edward Marshall, wounded. Las Guasimas, June 24th.
Richard Harding Davis.
Caspar Whitney.
Robert C. Cramer.

All these officers were distinguished, btit at the time I made special
mention of General Young, Colonel Wood and Colonel Roosevelt, and
these officers and myself made special mention of Majors Bell and
Brodie, Captains McClintock, Wainwright, McCormick, Capron,
Knox, Miller, Beck, Galbraith, Ayres, Watson; Surgeons Fuller,
Delgardo and Church, and Lieutenants Mills, Byram, Rivers, Smed-
berg, Wright, Fleming and Thomas. Mr. Marshall (who was badly
wounded), Richard Harding Davis, Mr. Whitney and Mr. Cramer
were also fa